Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Third Report


4  Foreign policy in the Lisbon Treaty

68. This chapter sets out the way in which EU external action would be governed under the Lisbon Treaty. It first establishes where provisions on external action would be located in the EU's Treaty architecture, and refers to the connected issue of the EU's single legal personality. We then discuss the provisions which govern EU external action in general—that is, those which are intended to apply both to "Community" areas of policy and to the intergovernmental CFSP. We then consider each of these in turn, briefly referring to "Community" areas before examining the provisions on the CFSP in greater detail. We consider the Treaty's provisions on "enhanced co-operation", which may apply to policy areas which include the CFSP. Finally, we discuss several provisions in the Treaty which do not fit fully into either the "Community" or CFSP areas: the "solidarity clause", enlargement and neighbourhood policy.[150]

External action in the Lisbon Treaty architecture

69. If the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, provisions on EU external action will continue to be found in two separate Treaties. This is a result of the abandonment of the idea—embodied in the Constitutional Treaty—of consolidating the EU's major Treaties into a single main Treaty for the EU.[151] Under the Lisbon Treaty, in broad terms, provisions governing the "Community" elements of EU external action would be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the renamed and amended Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC).[152] Provisions governing the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), would continue to be found in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU).[153] The splitting of EU external action provisions between two Treaties, and the broad division between "Community" elements in the TEC (or its successor) and intergovernmental ones in the TEU, would be the same as at present.

70. In the field of the EU's external action, the central declared aim of the current Treaty reform process has been to achieve greater coherence between the "Community" and the intergovernmental elements of policy.[154] In the Constitutional Treaty, this was attempted not only by bringing all the provisions governing EU external action together in a single Treaty, but also by introducing new text on the principles and objectives of EU external action. These latter were to apply both to "Community" policy-making and to the intergovernmental CFSP.[155] Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Constitutional Treaty chapter which set out principles and objectives for EU external action would be inserted into the amended TEU. This would constitute a new chapter of the TEU, on "General provisions on the Union's external action".[156] The TEU would then deal in a following chapter with "Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy".[157] The part of the TEU which contains both chapters (Title V) would be renamed "General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy".[158] In the current TEU, by contrast, Title V deals only with the CFSP.

71. By virtue of the new chapter which it would insert into the Treaty on European Union, the Lisbon Treaty would seek to retain from the Constitutional Treaty the single set of principles and objectives governing all of the EU's external action, despite the fact that the EU would continue to have two main Treaties, both of which would contain external action provisions. In proceeding in this way, the Lisbon Treaty would effectively establish a hierarchy between the EU's two main Treaties in the external action field: the amended Treaty on European Union would set out principles and objectives which would apply both to the CFSP and to "Community" external action otherwise governed by the TFEU.[159] Annex 1 presents these arrangements. We conclude that the insertion of principles and objectives for all EU external action into the Treaty on European Union is a sensible way of encouraging greater EU policy coherence while two main EU Treaties remain in place.

72. The Government has suggested that the fact that the CFSP will continue to be governed by one Treaty, and "Community" areas of EU external action by another, offers a stronger demarcation of the CFSP than would have been available under the single Constitutional Treaty. Mr Murphy told us that the new Treaty "will leave us with two Treaties—including a separate Treaty governing CFSP".[160] Similarly, Mr Miliband told us that "CFSP remains distinct from other policy areas, in a separate Treaty. In effect, we have retained it in a separate pillar."[161] Dr Solana acknowledged that the retention of two Treaties had been "important conceptually" for the UK.[162] Dr Solana said that, under the Lisbon Treaty, "the second pillar and the autonomy within that […] is maintained".[163]

73. In terms purely of the location of Treaty provisions, under the Lisbon Treaty arrangements for the retention of two main Treaties the CFSP is clearly governed more separately from "Community" areas of policy than it would have been in the single Constitutional Treaty. However, under the Lisbon Treaty, more provisions that are relevant to the CFSP appear to be included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) than are at present included in its predecessor, the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). This appears partly to result from the abolition of the European Community. When both the EC and the EU were in place, provisions governing international agreements and "enhanced cooperation" for the two distinct entities were placed in the two separate Treaties, the TEC governing the European Community and the TEU governing the European Union. Under the Lisbon Treaty, governing the now unified European Union, detailed provisions governing these two policy areas—including provisions relevant to the CFSP—are placed in the TFEU.[164] Furthermore, the new "solidarity clause" is placed in the TFEU, despite the fact that it has CFSP relevance.[165] Detailed provisions on the imposition of sanctions under the CFSP continue to be found in the TFEU, as they are currently in the TEC.[166]

74. Lord Owen was concerned for different reasons that the EU's intergovernmental elements might no longer be sufficiently ring-fenced under the Lisbon Treaty. He told us that the Lisbon Treaty "dismantles the intergovernmental pillars" and is therefore a "massive step towards further integration."[167] Lord Owen was also concerned that the movement of remaining areas of justice and home affairs to the "Community" method might impinge on the CFSP, because he contended that it is no longer possible to keep anti-terrorism issues separate from foreign policy.[168] Lord Owen urged that the Government's Bill giving effect to the Lisbon Treaty should make it "clear at least in UK legislation that [the CFSP] retains its separate legal character."[169]

Single legal personality

75. The Lisbon Treaty would give the EU legal personality.[170] Hitherto, the EC has had this attribute, but not the EU. The attribution of legal personality to the EU is a concomitant of the abolition of the EC. It is a provision previously found in the Constitutional Treaty.[171]

76. Open Europe told us that the attribution of legal personality to the EU "would be a huge transfer of power and make the EU look more like a country than an international agreement."[172] However, Open Europe did not elaborate on this assertion.

77. At present, the EU has a degree of "functional" legal personality to conclude international agreements.[173] This legal personality is made more general by the new provision introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, but the new provision does not by itself make the Union's legal capacity the same as that of a state. Under the Lisbon Treaty, it will remain the case that the EU will be able to conclude international agreements only within the scope of the powers conferred on it by the Member States.[174]

78. Dr Solana told us that he thought the EU's acquisition of legal personality was "not a minor issue", but that it was "important politically more than legally".[175] Dr Solana thought that it would be easier for third countries to understand the EU without the complication of dealing with, and sometimes signing agreements with, different entities.[176]

General external action provisions

79. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the principles and objectives for EU external action which would be inserted into the TEU[177] are largely ones which are already contained separately in the existing TEU and TEC. As already noted, the list of principles and objectives would also have appeared in the Constitutional Treaty.[178]

80. On the basis of these stated principles and objectives, the Lisbon Treaty would charge the European Council—the body of EU heads of state or government—with determining "the strategic interests and objectives of the Union" for all the EU's external action. Such determinations "may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach." They would apply for a specified duration, which could presumably be prolonged. They would require unanimity. However, such "strategic" determinations by the European Council would take place on the basis of proposals from the Council of Ministers which would for their part be adopted according to the voting procedure applicable to the policy area in question—that is, by qualified majority in "Community" areas of policy.[179]

81. The European Council's ability to make determinations of "strategic interests and objectives" for all of the EU's external action represents a change from the current Treaties. Under the current TEU, the European Council may make such "strategic" decisions only for the CFSP.[180] The expanded remit for the European Council contained in the Lisbon Treaty is taken over from the Constitutional Treaty.[181] Through this provision, the Lisbon Treaty would insert a unanimity requirement at European Council level into areas of external action otherwise governed by the "Community" method. As any proposal for a "strategic" decision would have to come from the Council of Ministers, the European Council would probably be asked to make such a determination only where the Member States were united in any case (because, in policy areas governed by qualified majority voting, Member States in a majority in the Council of Ministers could prevent a proposal from going forward to the European Council if they feared it might there be rejected). The European Council also already issues conclusions and declarations—including on matters which fall under "Community" competence—which, while they have no legal force, can help to shape the direction of policy.[182] We conclude that the European Council's new ability under the Lisbon Treaty formally to determine "strategic interests and objectives" for all areas of EU external action represents a symbolically important assertion of Member State authority over "Community" policy areas, although it remains to be seen whether this will have any significant impact in practice.

82. The Lisbon Treaty would make the European Council into an official institution of the European Union for the first time. As such, the European Council would have the duty to practise "mutual sincere cooperation" with the other official EU institutions, according to a provision which does not mention the Member States.[183]

83. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the section of the amended TEU which would give the European Council authority to make "strategic" determinations for EU external action, as described above, on the basis of proposals from the Council of Ministers, would contain the following provision:

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the area of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council.[184]

This provision appears to facilitate the joint working between the High Representative and the Commission which is implicit in the practice of "mutual sincere cooperation". We welcome this. However, a subsequent provision of the Lisbon Treaty, relating to the TEU chapter dealing specifically with the CFSP, explicitly excludes the Commission on its own from making CFSP proposals to the Council of Ministers, and does not mention the possibility of "joint" Commission and High Representative proposals, only the possibility of the High Representative making proposals with Commission support.[185] The unclear wording is taken over directly from the Constitutional Treaty.[186]

84. We conclude that the section of the amended Treaty on European Union giving authority to the European Council to make strategic determinations for EU external action is unnecessarily ambiguous and should be clarified by the Government in its response to this Report.

Simplified Treaty revision procedure

85. The Lisbon Treaty provides for a "simplified Treaty revision procedure".[187] The procedure is taken over from the Constitutional Treaty[188] and does not exist under the current Treaties. Under the part of the simplified Treaty revision procedure which applies to the external action part (Title V) of the amended TEU, for an area in which Title V provides for the Council of Ministers to act by unanimity, "the European Council may adopt a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority in that area".[189] The European Council would have to make any such decision by unanimity. Decisions in the defence field or with military implications could not be moved to qualified majority voting (QMV) in this way. For Title V items, the European Parliament would have to consent to this form of Treaty revision. In addition, any national Parliament could block the Treaty revision by making known its opposition within six months.

86. Lord Owen urged the Government to incorporate in its Bill giving effect to the Lisbon Treaty in the UK a "Parliamentary braking mechanism" across "all the most sensitive political questions that concern the British people". These would include any extension of QMV or of ECJ jurisdiction over the CFSP.[190]

87. On his return from the informal European Council in Lisbon in October, the Prime Minister told the House that "we will make a provision in the Bill that any proposal to activate the mechanisms in the Treaty that provide for further moves to QMV, but which require unanimity of member states, will have to be subject to a prior vote by this House."[191] The European Union (Amendment) Bill, as published, contains a provision that a Minister may not support a decision adopting qualified majority voting under the simplified Treaty revision procedure without Parliamentary approval, which is defined as the agreement without amendment by each House of Parliament to a Government motion that that House "approves Her Majesty's Government's intention to support the adoption of a specified draft decision".[192] The Bill also provides that an approval motion brought before the House may include provision dispensing with the need for a further motion in respect of "any later draft decision", as long as a Minister certifies that the decision in question is "an amended version of" the original draft decision.[193]

88. We welcome the Bill's provisions giving Parliament the right to accept or reject individual proposals to extend qualified majority voting. However, we are concerned at the implications of the provisions whereby Parliament could be invited to set aside this right in respect of "any later draft decision", as long as a Minister certifies that the decision in question is an amended version of the original decision. We see nothing on the face of the Bill that would preclude this power being invoked in circumstances where the "amended version" of the draft decision contains further transfers to qualified majority voting not found in the original decision. If this were to be the case, transfers to qualified majority voting might take place without specific Parliamentary approval. This could represent a breach of the undertaking given by the Prime Minister. We recommend that further consideration be given to procedures which would allow Parliament to decide separately on "amended versions" of initial draft decisions to transfer items to qualified majority voting. We further recommend that all amendments to the Treaty, including extensions of qualified majority voting, should be done by primary legislation and not simply by a vote of the House.

"Community" areas of EU external action

89. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the "Community" areas of EU external action would continue to comprise trade, development assistance and other types of co-operation with third countries. Measures on humanitarian aid and on the provision of urgent macrofinancial assistance would become subject to qualified majority voting for the first time.[194] The EU would also gain the right to legislate by qualified majority on measures "establishing the co-ordination and co-operation measures necessary to facilitate" the diplomatic and consular protection of Member State citizens by Member States other than their own, in third countries where the relevant citizens' own Member State has no representation.[195]

90. Open Europe told us that the movement of civil protection policies to qualified majority voting under the Lisbon Treaty should also be seen as an incursion of QMV into foreign policy-related areas.[196]

Common Foreign and Security Policy

GENERAL CFSP PROVISIONS

91. The Lisbon Treaty introduces four substantive changes of wording in relation to general provisions on the nature of the CFSP, compared to the existing TEU. First, under the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP would be based on—among other things—"the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions."[197] Second, the Treaty would oblige Member States to "comply with the Union's action" in the area of the CFSP.[198] Third, the aim of consultation among Member States would become that of "determining a common approach".[199] Fourth, the Treaty would insert new text stating that:

Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.

[…] The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the delegations of the Union in third countries and at international organisations shall co-operate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach.[200]

These four sections of text were all included in the Constitutional Treaty.[201] Open Europe told us that the fourth of the new pieces of text, dealing with consultation among Member States, "has the potential to significantly restrict the freedom of the UK Government in implementing foreign policy it deems appropriate, by subjecting it to evaluation and approval [by] other EU Member States."[202]

92. An FCO legal adviser pointed out that the existing TEU contains language referring to "convergent action" by the Member States in the CFSP.[203] The adviser also said that general language on the CFSP had to be "applied within the framework of decision making of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It does not undermine the unanimity checks elsewhere."[204] The Foreign Secretary agreed that Member States were only obliged to pursue positions that they had already agreed, by unanimity.[205] However, we note that the existing Treaty reference to "convergent action" by the Member States occurs in the context of an Article specifically on consultation among them. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the reference to an "ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions" occurs outside the context of Member State consultations, as part of the description of the CFSP in general.

93. Professors Hill and Whitman reminded us that, however strong its common obligations may appear to be, there are no formal enforcement mechanisms in the CFSP as there are in "Community" areas of policy.[206] The ECJ has no powers to bring rulings against Member States which may violate CFSP acts.[207] Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Council would continue to have responsibility for ensuring "compliance" with the principle that, in the CFSP, Member States "shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations."[208] The Lisbon Treaty would make this a shared responsibility with the new High Representative.[209] However, neither the Council nor the High Representative can sanction Member States in any formal way.

94. The general provisions on the CFSP in the main body of the Lisbon Treaty are supplemented by the two Declarations on the policy which were secured by the UK. These state that the CFSP will not affect Member States' exercise of their national foreign policy rights and responsibilities.[210] The Government acknowledged that, like other Declarations to EU Treaties, the Declarations on the CFSP are not law.[211] However, the Foreign Secretary told us that the Declarations are "worth having because they set out the views of Heads of State about the way in which CFSP should work."[212] The Minister for Europe told us that the Declarations "will be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the Treaty itself."[213] Professor Whitman said that the Declarations were "reiterations of principles that have underpinned the common foreign and security policy over time",[214] while Professor Hill said that the Declarations set out, "as it were, the default position".[215]

95. At present, the TEU provides for a formal system of differentiated CFSP instruments, consisting of "common strategies", "joint actions" and "common positions". Professor Hill told us that the system was "ludicrously elaborate" and "a nonsense".[216] The Lisbon Treaty would effectively allow for the adoption of the same types of instruments, but it would do away with the formal linguistic differentiation, converting all CFSP acts into simple "decisions".[217] We conclude that the simplification of the nomenclature for Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty represents an improvement on the current situation.

CFSP DECISION-MAKING

96. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council—of heads of state or government—would "determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for" the CFSP.[218] The Foreign Affairs Council of Ministers would "take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing" the CFSP.[219] Both the European Council and the Council of Ministers would act by unanimity except where specifically provided otherwise.[220] The roles of the European Council and Council of Ministers, and the norm of unanimity, would be unchanged from the current Treaties.

97. The European Commission currently has a so-called "right of initiative" to refer CFSP matters to the Council and to make CFSP-related proposals.[221] Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission as a body would lose this right, which would pass to the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who would be Commission Vice-President.[222] Member States would retain their existing right to submit CFSP proposals. We conclude that the Commission's loss of the right to make Common Foreign and Security Policy proposals is welcome because it represents an important assertion of the intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

98. Under the Lisbon Treaty, Member States in the Council of Ministers would retain their existing option of "constructive abstention" in respect of both unanimous and qualified majority decisions in the CFSP. Simple abstention cannot block a Council CFSP decision. However, a Member State planning to abstain may exercise its right to "constructive abstention" by making a formal declaration. Having done so, the Member State in question would be expected to accept that the relevant CFSP decision "commits the Union", but it would not be obliged to apply the decision itself.[223] Under the existing TEU, if the group of "constructive abstainers" were to represent one-third of Council votes, the Council would not adopt the decision in question.[224] Under the Lisbon Treaty, the group of "constructive abstainers" needed to block a decision must represent one-third of the Member States, representing one-third of the EU population.[225]

99. Professor Whitman told us that, in practice, QMV is "not used very much".[226] Similarly, Mr Donnelly told us that:

Experience has shown that national ministers prefer, even when majority voting is theoretically available as a decision-making procedure to proceed by consensus, with the possibility of majority voting acting essentially as a spur to compromise by minorities […] It is difficult to believe that a large member state such as the United Kingdom in particular will often, if ever, find itself bound by majority decisions which it finds seriously damaging or unacceptable to itself.[227]

Discussing this point, Dr Solana used the example of the Council's ability under the existing CFSP provisions to appoint EU Special Representatives by qualified majority vote. Dr Solana said:

Let us suppose that […] the decision can be taken today with no need for unanimity. That would make things more efficient, but it would be stupid to make such a nomination with the opposition of, let us say, the United Kingdom […] the possibility formally exists already, but it is not used.[228]

Qualified majority voting

100. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the main passage of the TEU which relates to CFSP voting would list, as exceptions to the normal unanimity rule, four types of CFSP decision which the Council of Ministers would take by qualified majority. The Council would decide by qualified majority where a decision would:

  • define an action or position on the basis of a European Council decision regarding the Union's strategic interests or objectives;
  • define an action or position on the basis of a proposal made by the High Representative "following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative";
  • implement a decision defining an action or position; or
  • appoint an EU special representative.[229]

The Lisbon Treaty would retain the existing ban on CFSP decisions with military or defence implications being taken by qualified majority vote.[230]

101. Of the four types of CFSP decision which would be taken by QMV under the Lisbon Treaty, three are provided for by the existing TEU.[231] The one innovation would be qualified majority voting on proposals made by the High Representative. This provision, which was introduced in the Constitutional Treaty,[232] has excited considerable comment. Open Europe told us that as a result of this provision, "EU states could [unanimously] ask the Foreign Minister to come up with a plan but then, if individual states such as the UK don't agree with what he/she comes back with, could find themselves in a majority voting situation."[233] Lord Owen told us that, in light of the provision for QMV on proposals from the High Representative, "to argue that there is always a veto is wrong".[234]

102. The Foreign Secretary denied that the new provision on proposals made by the High Representative altered the existing dominance of unanimity in the CFSP. He insisted that "it remains the case that implementation of an agreed policy can be done by qualified majority voting, but the policy is set by unanimity."[235] He added: "the distinction is between agreeing the policy and implementing it. That is unchanged by this;"[236] and again, "QMV is triggered only once there has been unanimous agreement to do something".[237]

103. The key issue in the dispute over the significance of the new majority voting case appears to be whether CFSP "actions" and "positions" are by definition "implementing" measures. If decisions defining CFSP "actions" and "positions" are by definition "implementing" decisions, the Government's position would appear to be sustained, since it is decisions defining CFSP "actions" and "positions" for which the High Representative will be able to make proposals to be subject to QMV. However, at present, the decisions defining CFSP "actions" and "positions" which may be taken by QMV must be taken on the basis of a prior strategy determined by the European Council by unanimity. If it is this feature that makes the relevant decisions "implementing" ones, the Government's position would appear to be undermined. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative can make proposals defining CFSP "actions" and "positions", to be subject to QMV, without there being a prior strategic decision by unanimity in the European Council; there needs only to have been a "specific request from the European Council". In this context, the nature of a "specific request" from the European Council, and in particular the degree of detail any such request might include, is not clear.

104. Dr Solana told us that the Lisbon Treaty provision allowing the new High Representative to make proposals which could be approved by QMV was "nothing new",[238] and that he did not think that the provision was significant.[239] Dr Solana said that the High Representative could "be tasked to propose something on a particular occasion, but the basic definition will not be decided on the basis of majority voting."[240]

105. We conclude that greater clarity would have been helpful in the Lisbon Treaty wording on the Council of Ministers' new ability to vote by qualified majority on proposals from the High Representative.

106. We set out in the following paragraphs some further decisions relevant to the CFSP which may be taken by qualified majority voting.

107. Apart from the types of CFSP decision which are listed in the main TEU chapter on the CFSP as exceptions to the unanimity rule, the Lisbon Treaty would provide that decisions adopting measures to implement sanctions under the CFSP would also be taken by qualified majority, once an initial decision had been taken by unanimity in favour of sanctions in principle. Such sanctions might be against third countries, or individuals or non-state entities. The proposal for the specific measures to implement sanctions would be made jointly by the High Representative and the European Commission.[241] The ECJ may review the legality of decisions taken under the CFSP implementing sanctions against individuals or non-state entities.[242] Under these circumstances, while CFSP decisions to implement sanctions in principle are taken by unanimity, the implementation of sanctions may be seen as to a considerable extent "Communitarised". Many of the relevant policy areas, such as trade and financial regulation, fall under "Community" competence. As already noted, under the Lisbon Treaty the provisions governing the implementation of sanctions under the CFSP would be found in the TFEU—just as, at present, the sanctions article is found in the TEC.[243] Lord Owen was of the view that sanctions constituted "yet another area where there would be creep […] if you start getting into this, there is the rationale of why you have applied sanctions, which are usually foreign policy actions".[244]

108. The Lisbon Treaty contains a "solidarity clause", which would oblige Member States to offer mutual assistance on terrorism and natural disasters.[245] We give more details about this in paragraphs 122-125 below. The "solidarity clause" is not formally part of the CFSP. However, its implementation may involve or have implications for the CFSP. The "solidarity clause" would be an innovation taken over from the Constitutional Treaty.[246] Any decision on its implementation would be taken by qualified majority, except where such a decision had defence implications. The proposal on the implementation of the "solidarity clause" would be made jointly by the High Representative and the European Commission.[247]

109. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who shall "conduct the Union's foreign and security policy",[248] would be appointed by qualified majority vote in the European Council.[249]

"Emergency brake"

110. The Lisbon Treaty would retain the "emergency brake" mechanism for CFSP decisions taken by qualified majority in the Council. Under this provision, any Member State may block the taking of a qualified majority vote in the CFSP by formally declaring its opposition and giving reasons of national policy. The Lisbon Treaty would toughen the requirement for triggering the "emergency brake", demanding that the Member State in question have "vital" reasons of national policy at stake, rather than "important" ones as under the current TEU. The Lisbon Treaty would also insert a requirement that the High Representative "search for a solution" in a situation where a Member State has applied the "emergency brake". However, in the event that this effort were to fail, under the Lisbon Treaty the Council would continue to have the opportunity to request, by qualified majority, that the matter be referred to the European Council for unanimous decision.[250]

"Passerelle clause"

111. Under a so-called "passerelle clause", the Lisbon Treaty would allow the European Council to add to the list given in the TEU's main CFSP chapter of CFSP decisions taken by qualified majority. The European Council would take any such decision by unanimity, and could not move CFSP decisions with military or defence implications to QMV under this procedure.[251] The CFSP "passerelle" clause would be new compared to the current Treaties, and would be taken over from the Constitutional Treaty.[252]

112. In contrast to the simplified Treaty revision procedure, which would also allow the European Council to move non-defence CFSP decisions from unanimity to QMV,[253] the CFSP "passerelle" would not involve national Parliaments or the European Parliament. However, as noted above, the Prime Minister told the House that the Government would provide for prior parliamentary approval of any new move to QMV.[254] The Foreign Secretary confirmed to us that this would apply to any extension of QMV under the CFSP passerelle,[255] and the Government's Bill lists the CFSP passerelle as among the items which would attract a Parliamentary decision.[256] We conclude that the Government's confirmation that any movement of further Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions from unanimity to qualified majority voting under the "passerelle" procedure would be subject to a prior vote in Parliament, even where the Lisbon Treaty itself does not provide for national Parliamentary involvement, is welcome, although we recommend elsewhere that all Treaty changes are the subject of primary legislation. However, our concerns remain about the possible use of the provision in the Government Bill which would allow "amended versions" of decisions moving items from unanimity to qualified majority voting to avoid a separate Parliamentary vote.

ARTICLE 308

113. Article 308 of the current TEC allows the Council to take action, by unanimity, where the Treaties have not explicitly authorised it to do so, if such action "proves necessary to attain" an official Treaty-based objective. Under the current TEC, Article 308 by definition applies only to the European Community. The Lisbon Treaty would extend the applicability of Article 308 to the Union as a whole. However, the Lisbon Treaty would also add a provision that Article 308 "cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security policy".[257]

ECJ ROLE

114. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ has jurisdiction over the CFSP in two areas.[258] These are:

  • the legality of CFSP decisions imposing sanctions on individuals or non-state entities; and
  • compliance with the requirement that implementation of the CFSP shall not affect "Community" procedures and competences, and that implementation of "Community" policies shall not affect procedures and competences laid down for the CFSP. Effectively, the ECJ has authority to police the boundary between the CFSP and "Community" areas.[259]

ECJ jurisdiction in both these areas is already provided for in the existing TEC,[260] although the Lisbon Treaty would additionally allow individuals to appeal to the ECJ to seek review of a CFSP decision listing them as a target for sanctions.[261]

CFSP DECISION-MAKING: OVERALL ASSESSMENT

115. As regards unanimity in the CFSP, Open Europe told us that the government's claim that unanimity will remain the norm represents "an extraordinary distortion of the facts".[262] However, Mr Donnelly said that "unanimity will remain for the foreseeable future the predominant form of decision-making within the Council" on CFSP.[263] For his part, Dr Solana told us that, in foreign and security policy, "all the decisions will be taken by unanimity".[264]

116. As regards the CFSP overall, our witnesses felt that the Lisbon Treaty would preserve its distinctive character. Mr Avery told us that "one thing that does not change in the Treaty is that there is still a clear difference at the decision-making level in the Council between the first pillar and the second—the Community mode and the intergovernmental mode. The Reform Treaty does not change that aspect."[265] Professor Whitman likewise told us that "the underlying principle of a distinctive decision-making regime for the [CFSP/EDSP] is retained" in the Lisbon Treaty.[266] "The CFSP/EDSP remains a distinctive 'pillar' in that the role of the Commission, European Court of Justice and European Parliament are very heavily circumscribed", Professor Whitman told us.[267] He concluded that "the essential quality of the CFSP in terms of its 'intergovernmentalness', if we can call it that, remains unchanged."[268] Mr Donnelly told us that "at present and probably for the foreseeable future the CFSP will remain exceptional in its decision-making structures within the European Union."[269] He went on:

For better or worse, the [Lisbon] Treaty essentially takes as given the 'intergovernmentalist' framework of the CFSP and tries to make it work better […] Those whose general criticism of the European Union's recent evolution is that it has moved since the Maastricht Treaty in an excessively 'integrative' or 'federalist' direction will find little comfort for their critique in the provisions of the [Lisbon] Treaty on the CFSP.[270]

Lord Owen identified "clearer guarantees of continuation of the specific character of the Common Foreign and Security Policy" in the new Treaty,[271] and gave the Government credit, saying that "in a clever way, despite getting rid of the pillars, they have almost created another pillar for foreign policy".[272]

117. In line with the CFSP's continuing distinctive character, our witnesses mostly felt that it would continue to be dominated by the Member States. Professor Hill told us that "there is still an absolute intergovernmental control of the main lines of foreign and external policy, so there is no danger of Member States being subordinate to some kind of Communitarisation".[273] Similarly, Dr Solana told us that "Member States have the last word in foreign policy and security policy".[274]

118. We note the point made by several of our witnesses, that CFSP decision-making tends to proceed by consensus, whatever the voting arrangements formally provided for by treaty.[275] We conclude that it seems highly likely that, under the Lisbon Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy will remain an intergovernmental area, driven by the Member States. We welcome this.

Enhanced co-operation

119. The Lisbon Treaty continues to provide for the possibility of "enhanced co-operation", in policy areas including the CFSP and other areas of external action which fall outside exclusive "Community" competence.[276] "Enhanced co-operation" can be established for a specific policy area by a group of Member States "as a last resort",[277] when agreement cannot be reached among all Members to proceed. "Enhanced co-operation" arrangements make use of the EU institutions, operate on the basis of the EU procedures governing the relevant policy area, and can only be established in order to reach stated EU objectives. Under the Lisbon Treaty, enhanced co-operation arrangements would require the participation of nine Member States.[278] Other Members may join subsequently.

120. Under the Lisbon Treaty, enhanced co-operation in the CFSP may be established by a unanimous decision of the Member States participating, after the High Representative and the Commission have given their opinions.[279] The Lisbon Treaty requirement for a unanimous decision to establish enhanced co-operation in the CFSP is tougher than that in the existing Treaties, under which enhanced co-operation in the CFSP could be established by QMV.[280] However, the Lisbon Treaty would also remove the bar on enhanced co-operation in matters with military or defence implications.[281] Once engaged in an "enhanced co-operation" group, Member States could decide, by unanimity, to move to QMV for decisions normally taken by unanimity.[282]

121. Professor Whitman told us that enhanced co-operation had proved to be a "device of insignificance". He implied that this was partly because of the cumbersome procedures involved in its establishment.[283]

Solidarity clause

122. As we have mentioned in paragraph 108 above, the Lisbon Treaty contains a new EU "solidarity clause". This would provide that:

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

a)   —prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

—protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

—assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

  b) assist a member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.[284]

The "solidarity clause" was contained in the Constitutional Treaty, albeit split into its two paragraphs, which were placed in different locations.[285]

123. As noted above, any proposal to implement the solidarity clause would be made jointly by the High Representative and the European Commission. Any decision to implement the solidarity clause would be made by qualified majority vote in the Council, except for any decision with defence implications, which would require unanimity.[286] The implementation of the solidarity clause may involve use of a new Committee of officials set up by the Lisbon Treaty within the Council structure to deal with "operational cooperation on internal security".[287]

124. The Foreign Secretary told us that the "solidarity clause" seemed "perfectly helpful" to the UK.[288] However, Lord Owen told us that the inclusion of the notion of "preventing" terrorism in the new text of the "solidarity clause" provided a basis for "some serious creep" of EU involvement.[289] Open Europe similarly told us that, in their view, that "the power to take action to 'prevent' rather than respond to terrorism is likely to be used by the EU to expand its role", particularly given that the implementation of the "solidarity clause" is to be decided on by QMV.[290]

125. The solidarity clause attracts a Declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty. The Declaration runs:

Without prejudice to the measures adopted by the Union to comply with its solidarity obligation towards a Member State […], none of the provisions of [the solidarity clause] is intended to affect the right of another Member State to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligation towards that Member State.[291]

Like other Declarations, this one is interpretative rather than legally binding.

126. In its evidence, the Government drew attention to new language in the Lisbon Treaty on national security. The Treaty provides that a general Article near the start of the amended TEU, dealing with principles governing the EU's operation, would declare that the Union:

shall respect [Member States'] essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.[292]

Enlargement

127. Enlargement is not technically an EU external policy, but an institutional event. Treaty provisions governing enlargement are traditionally located among "final provisions", not with the CFSP or other external policies. However, following the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004, when observers are asked about EU foreign policy "the biggest example of a successful [EU] foreign policy that most people cite is enlargement", in Professor Hill's words.[293]

128. Hitherto, the TEU has stated simply that "any European state which respects the principles [of the EU] may apply to become a member of the Union", before going on to set out the procedures involved in an accession process.[294] The Lisbon Treaty would toughen the Treaty language on enlargement. First, in language taken over from the Constitutional Treaty,[295] the Lisbon Treaty would require states acceding to the EU to be "committed to promoting" the EU's principles. Then, in wholly new text, the Lisbon Treaty would further insert a requirement that "the conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account".[296] The "conditions of eligibility" referred to are the so-called "Copenhagen criteria" set out by the European Council in 1993,[297] plus further requirements subsequently placed on acceding states by EU leaders.

129. Mr Avery told us that the inclusion of a reference to the accession criteria in the Treaty was "significant because it demonstrates a certain determination on the part of the European Union to apply the criteria for membership rigorously. There have been some cases […] in history in which those criteria were not applied with sufficient rigour."[298] Mr Avery was of the view that the change was of political rather than operational significance.[299]

130. We conclude that the process of the EU's enlargement to now 27 Member States has been a success.

European Neighbourhood Policy

131. The EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 in an attempt to mitigate some of the possible negative effects of EU enlargement, principally in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU feared that enlargement might leave the Union more exposed to the effects of low economic development and poor governance in states which were now its neighbours, while exacerbating these countries' problems by erecting new barriers to their interaction with states which were now inside the Union. Under the ENP, the EU offers intensified co-operation and integration to states surrounding the Union, in return for reform commitments. The ENP is not a new legal instrument, relying instead on long-established provisions for EU international agreements. Controversially, the ENP encompasses not only states in Eastern Europe which in principle are eligible for a future EU membership process, but also states in North Africa which have normally been regarded as ineligible for EU membership on geographical grounds. Officially, participation in the ENP does not prejudice a country's membership eligibility either way.

132. The Lisbon Treaty would insert a reference to the EU's neighbourhood policy into the EU Treaties for the first time. Under the Lisbon Treaty, a new Article would declare that:

The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.[300]

The new neighbourhood policy Article would be taken over unchanged from the Constitutional Treaty.[301]

133. We conclude that the inclusion for the first time of a Treaty reference to the EU's neighbourhood policy represents a welcome expression of the importance of the Union's relationships with states surrounding it.


150   The figure in Annex 2 b) presents foreign policy structures and processes under the Lisbon Treaty, including institutional arrangements discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 as well as the present Chapter.  Back

151   As discussed in Chapter 2 above.  Back

152   Provisions on external action in the TFEU would be gathered into a Part Five. Back

153   On the ESDP, see Chapter 7. In the TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, provisions on EU external action, including the CFSP and ESDP, would continue to be found in Title V, as at present. Annex 1 presents the arrangement of external action provisions under the Lisbon Treaty.  Back

154   See Chapter 3 above. Back

155   Part III, Title V, Chapter 1, Article III-292 Back

156   Article 1 24) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting new Articles 10A and 10B TEU Back

157   Article 1 25) of the Lisbon Treaty Back

158   Article 1 23) of the Lisbon Treaty Back

159   Under Article 2 155) of the Lisbon Treaty, the TFEU would refer (in Part Five, Title I, Article 188A) to the principles and objectives for EU external action set out in the first chapter of Title V TEU. The arrangement of external action provisions under the Lisbon Treaty is shown in Annex I. Back

160   Ev 41 Back

161   Ev 63 Back

162   Q 616 Back

163   Q 616 Back

164   On international agreements, Article 2 171) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188L of the TFEU; on enhanced cooperation, Article 2 278) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Articles 280A to 280I of the TFEU. Back

165   Article 2 176) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188R of the TFEU. The "solidarity clause" is discussed in paragraphs 122-125 below.  Back

166   Article 2 169) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188K of the TFEU Back

167   Ev 104 Back

168   Q 467 Back

169   Ev 106 Back

170   Article 1 55) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 46A TEU Back

171   Article I-7 Back

172   Ev 150 Back

173   Under Articles 24 and 38 TEU. Back

174   On this point see also Declaration 24 concerning the legal personality of the European Union Back

175   Q 624 Back

176   Q 624 Back

177   Under Article 1 24) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 10A TEU, as discussed in paragraphs 70-71 above.  Back

178   Part III, Title V, Chapter 1, Article III-292 Back

179   Article 1 24) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 10B TEU Back

180   Article 13 TEU Back

181   Article III-293 Back

182   The "Declaration on Globalisation" adopted by the European Council at its meeting on 14 December 2007 is an example; see Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 14 December 2007, via www.consilium.europa.eu. On the nature of European Council conclusions, see the European Scrutiny Committee's ongoing Inquiry into this topic, via www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/european_scrutiny.cfm Back

183   Article 1 14) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 9 TEU Back

184   Article 1 24) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 10B TEU Back

185   Article 1 33) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 22 to become Article 15a TEU. This change is discussed further in paragraph 97 below.  Back

186   Article III-293 Back

187   Article 1 56) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 48 TEU Back

188   Article IV-444 Back

189   Article 1 56) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 48 TEU Back

190   Ev 106; see also Qq 464-465 [Lord Owen] Back

191   HC Deb, 22 October 2007, cols 19-22 Back

192   European Union (Amendment) Bill, Clause No. 6 (2) Back

193   Ibid., Clause No. 6 (3) Back

194   Article 2 167) and 168) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Articles 188I and 188J of the TFEU; Ev 145 [Mr Donnelly], Ev 149 [Open Europe] Back

195   Article 2 36) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 20 TEC/TFEU. This change is referred to further in paragraph 201 in Chapter 6 below. Back

196   Ev 150 Back

197   Article 1 27) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 11 TEU Back

198   Article 1 27) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 11 TEU Back

199   Article 1 35) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 16 TEU Back

200   Article 1 35) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 16 TEU  Back

201   Respectively: Article I-40; Article I-16; Article I-40; and Article I-40 and III-301 Back

202   Ev 152 Back

203   Qq 573-578, referring to Article 16 TEU Back

204   Q 573 Back

205   Q 571 Back

206   Q 429 [Professor Hill]; Ev 82 [Professor Whitman] Back

207   The role of the ECJ in the CFSP is considered further below.  Back

208   Article 11 TEU Back

209   Article 1 27) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 11 TEU. The new High Representative position is discussed in Chapter 5 below.  Back

210   Declarations 13 and 14. We referred to these in Chapter 3 above in the context of the Government's foreign policy "red line". The full text of the Declarations is at Ev 69. Back

211   Q 277 [Mr Murphy] Back

212   Q 358 Back

213   Ev 20 Back

214   Q 449 Back

215   Q 428 Back

216   Q 428 Back

217   Article 1 28) of the Lisbon Treaty amending Article 12 TEU; Article 1 31) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 14 TEU; Article 1 32) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 15 TEU Back

218   Article 1 29) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 13 TEU Back

219   Article 1 29) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 13 TEU Back

220   Article 1 34) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 23 to become Article 15b TEU; on qualified majority voting, see paragraphs 100-105 below. Back

221   Article 22 TEU Back

222   Article 1 33) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 22 to become Article 15a TEU. The new High Representative position is considered in Chapter 5 below.  Back

223   Article 23 TEU Back

224   Article 23 TEU Back

225   Article 1 34) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 23 TEU to become Article 15b TEU Back

226   Q 452 Back

227   Ev 145 Back

228   Q 623 Back

229   Article 1 34) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 23 TEU to become Article 15b TEU Back

230   Article 1 34) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 23 TEU to become Article 15b TEU Back

231   Article 23 TEU Back

232   Article III-300 Back

233   Ev 147 Back

234   Q 463 Back

235   Q 520 Back

236   Q 522 Back

237   Q 524 Back

238   Q 622 Back

239   Q 623 Back

240   Q 623 Back

241   Article 2 169) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188K TFEU to replace Article 301 TEC Back

242   Article 2 223) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 240a TFEU. The role of the ECJ is discussed further below.  Back

243   At present, the sanctions article is Article 301 TEC. Under Article 2 169) of the Lisbon Treaty, this is replaced by Article 188K TFEU. Back

244   Q 477 Back

245   Article 2 176) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188R TFEU Back

246   Articles 1-43 and III-329 Back

247   Article 2 176) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188R TFEU Back

248   Article 1 19) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 9E TEU. The new High Representative position is discussed in Chapter 5 below.  Back

249   Article 1 19) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 9E TEU. The new High Representative position is discussed in Chapter 5 below.  Back

250   Article 1 34) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 23 TEU to become Article 15b TEU Back

251   Article 1 34) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 23 TEU to become Article 15b TEU Back

252   Article III-300 Back

253   The simplified Treaty revision procedure was discussed at paragraphs 85-88 above. Back

254   HC Deb, 22 October 2007, cols 19-22; see paragraphs 87-88 above. Back

255   Q 533 Back

256   Clause No. 6(1)c Back

257   Article 2 289) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 308 TEC/TFEU; on Article 308, see European Scrutiny Committee, Twenty-ninth Report of Session 2006-07, Article 308 of the EC Treaty, HC 41-xxlx Back

258   Article 2 223) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 240a TFEU Back

259   The Article prescribing "non-interference" between "Community" and CFSP areas is Article 25b of the TEU, as provided for by Article 1 45) of the Lisbon Treaty. This Article was referred to in Chapter 3 above in the context of the Government's foreign policy "red line". Back

260   On sanctions, in modified form under Article 230 TEC; on the "boundaries" issue, in modified form under Article 47 TEU Back

261   Article 2 214) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 230 TEC/TFEU; Ev 70 [Foreign Secretary], Ev 80 [Foreign Secretary] Back

262   Ev 149 Back

263   Ev 144 Back

264   Q 616 Back

265   Q 413 Back

266   Ev 83 Back

267   Ev 83 Back

268   Q 413 Back

269   Ev 146 Back

270   Ev 144 Back

271   Ev 105 Back

272   Q 467 Back

273   Q 439 Back

274   Q 629 Back

275   For example, Mr Donnelly at Ev 145; Q 453 [Professor Whitman]; see also paragraph 99 above.  Back

276   Article 1 22) of the Lisbon Treaty, providing for Article 10 TEU; Article 2 278) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 280A to 280I TFEU Back

277   Article 1 22) of the Lisbon Treaty, providing for Article 10 TEU but retaining on this point language from Article 43a of the existing TEU Back

278   Article 1 22) of the Lisbon Treaty, providing for Article 10 TEU Back

279   Article 2 278) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 280D TFEU Back

280   Article 27c TEU Back

281   The bar is currently in Article 27b TEU. Under Article 1 22) of the Lisbon Treaty, providing for Article 10 TEU, Article 27b of the current TEU would appear to be replaced, without the bar on enhanced cooperation with military or defence implications being repeated in the new Article 10 TEU or Articles 280A to 280I TFEU. In his letter to the Chairman of 11 January, printed at the end of this volume, the Foreign Secretary confirmed that enhanced cooperation on the one hand, and permanent structured cooperation in the field of military capability development, on the other, are "completely different and distinct provisions". Permanent structured cooperation is discussed in Chapter 7 below.  Back

282   Article 2 278) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 280H TFEU; Ev 149 [Open Europe] Back

283   Ev 85 Back

284   Article 2 176) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188R TFEU Back

285   Article I-43 and III-329 Back

286   Article 2 176) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 188R TFEU Back

287   Article 2 64) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 61D TFEU Back

288   Q 539 Back

289   Q 466 Back

290   Ev 153 Back

291   Declaration 37 on Article 188R of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Back

292   Article 1 5) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 3a TEU Back

293   Q 415 Back

294   Article 49 TEU Back

295   Article I-1 Back

296   Article 1 57) of the Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 49 TEU Back

297   The "Copenhagen criteria" are that states acceding to the EU "must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union." The European Council at Copenhagen further added that "The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries"; Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 1993, via www.consilium.europa.eu Back

298   Q 455 Back

299   Q 455 Back

300   Article 1 10) of the Lisbon Treaty, inserting Article 7a TEU Back

301   Article I-57 Back


 
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