8 Overall assessment
218. In this Chapter we draw together a number of
themes that have run through our Report to produce some further
conclusions.
219. Our academic witnesses confirmed unequivocally
that the change of name from "Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs" to "High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy", plus the two new, UK-inspired, non-legally
binding Declarations on the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
are the only differences in the foreign affairs field between
the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty and those under the
Lisbon Treaty.[495]
We conclude that there is
no material difference between the provisions on foreign affairs
in the Constitutional Treaty which the Government made subject
to approval in a referendum and those in the Lisbon Treaty on
which a referendum is being denied.
220. As regards the extent of the changes wrought
by the Lisbon Treaty in the foreign policy field, Mr Avery spoke
of the Lisbon Treaty being "absolutely not a fundamental
reform of the structures for foreign policy",[496]
while Professor Whitman told us that the Lisbon Treaty "revamps,
rather than revolutionises, the existing arrangements for the
CFSP/EDSP."[497]
However, although the Foreign Secretary claimed that "there
are very few changes from the status quo",[498]
Professor Whitman told us that, by his calculation, 25 of the
62 amendments which the Lisbon Treaty would make to the TEU pertain
to the CFSP and ESDP provisions of the Treaty.[499]
Professor Hill told us that "people who say, 'This is all
just technical innovation, it is really just rationalising what
is already going on, there is nothing in it and it is just an
efficiency gain,' […] are wrong".[500]
We conclude that the creation of the post of High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and of the European External
Action Service, represent major innovations in the EU's foreign
policy-making machinery. We further conclude that although their
establishment does not risk undermining the Common Foreign and
Security Policy's intergovernmental nature, the Government is
underestimating, and certainly downplaying in public, the significance
of their creation. This is unlikely to be beneficial to the UK's
position in the EU. We recommend that the Government should publicly
acknowledge the significance of the foreign policy aspects of
the Lisbon Treaty.
221. As
regards the likely effects of the Lisbon Treaty's institutional
innovations in the foreign policy field, Lord Owen told us that
he was "very doubtful that it would make any improvements,
and it may even be damaging."[501]
Mr Avery, on the other hand, contended that "there will be
a more efficient system upstream and downstream of the decision-making—in
formulating and developing the policies and presenting proposals
to the Council, and in executing the policies and in representing
the European Union in the rest of the world."[502]
Dr Solana told us that "The steps that have been taken will
be constructive, positive and beneficial: that is my honest thinking
[…] They will make life easier, more efficient, more coherent
and more transparent for the EU Member States".[503]
We conclude that the new
institutional arrangements for EU foreign policy created by the
Lisbon Treaty have the potential to encourage more coherent and
effective foreign policy-making and representation. However, the
way in which the new arrangements will work in practice remains
unclear. Much will depend on the individuals chosen to fill the
new posts and how they choose to interpret their roles. We recommend
that the Government engage actively with its EU partners to minimise
the short-term disruption involved in the introduction of the
new arrangements created by the Lisbon Treaty, and to help them
contribute to the EU's development as a more effective international
entity. It is particularly important that the Government and the
FCO should not neglect the critical opportunities that are likely
to arise over the next 12 months to influence the detailed planning
of the new foreign policy arrangements, so as to ensure that they
operate in ways which are fully compatible with UK interests.
495 Qq 420-424 Back
496
Q 431 Back
497
Q 413; Ev 85 Back
498
Q 502; see also Q 504 Back
499
Ev 82 Back
500
Q 416 Back
501
Q 463 Back
502
Q 413 Back
503
Q 616 Back
|
