Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-199)
RT HON
MARGARET BECKETT,
PATRICK REILLY
AND ANTHONY
SMITH
19 JUNE 2007
Q180 Richard Younger-Ross: There
is a real danger that, with Hamas now in effective control of
Gaza, there will be an increased number of rocket attacks on Israel,
which we would all unreservedly condemn. There is also the danger
of Israel's response. Could you say, Foreign Secretary, that,
on this occasion, we will make it very clear to Israel that any
response that it does make has to be proportionate and that we
will not go back to what happened in the Lebanon when the response
was clearly disproportionate?
Margaret Beckett: Without getting
involved in discussions about events of the past, there are certainly
two things that your question raises. One is that there have continued
to be rocket attacks on Israel, both from Gaza and, indeed, over
the last couple of days, from Lebanon—although I understand
that they were carried out by Palestinians in Lebanon. We have—everybody
has—urged restraint upon Israel, which you will have observed
it has shown to a substantial and quite remarkable degree.
The issue of the rocket attacks is also a challenge
to Hamas because its case was that it had decided to take the
political road. In most democracies, the political road does not
include throwing people off roofs. Hamas has also made the case
that it felt that it had to take control of the security and military
situation in Gaza because it was not, as it judged, under control.
If in circumstances in which Hamas has clear military control,
rockets continue to be fired, that will clearly cast considerable
doubt on the good faith it has shown in saying that it will take
the political road. That is a serious question for Hamas to consider.
Q181 Ms Stuart: We started off dealing
with Iran with three Foreign Ministers—French, German and
British—going to Tehran and the troika, which was quite
a significant step. That has now moved on to what I think the
German presidency calls the twin-track approach to Iran. The EU
is quite united through the work of Solana who is our high representative.
I have two questions that I would like to put to you. In our attempts
to restrain Iran from developing its nuclear programme, do you
envisage, for example, a return to the troika? Do you envisage
a return to the high representative and the old-fashioned foreign
policy of three large member states speaking on behalf of the
Union?
Secondly, what is your assessment of how united
the various Foreign Secretaries of EU member states are, and at
what point will the EU reach a position of saying that it can
no longer negotiate with Iran? How politically united are EU member
states?
Margaret Beckett: First, you asked
me if we would return to the troika, but we have not left it.
The E3 plus three continues to be the negotiating body, and Javier
is acting as a negotiator—this is a huge compliment to him
and richly deserved—not on behalf of the EU, but on behalf
of all six of us: the United States, Russia and China, as well
as the EU. That remains the position, and when there are discussions
about, for example, whether we should consider further moves in
the Security Council, they are held at the six level. Javier is
obviously an important player; he has an important input, and
is our voice with the Iranians, because that is thought to be
the appropriate level. There could come a stage when the appropriate
level was thought to be Foreign Minister, and so far it has always
been envisaged that it would be the group of Foreign Ministers.
However, whether we ever get to that stage, given the way in which
the Iranians are conducting the negotiations, is another matter.
Member states have been absolutely united. Just
after I had been appointed and after the meeting in Vienna about
10 days in, which I chaired and when we agreed the package to
put to the Iranian Government, there was a tremendous welcome
from all our EU colleagues when we reported back to other member
states on the progress of the discussions. To be honest, I had
wondered whether some would be a little resentful, but no. Some
colleagues said how proud they were of the role that the European
Union had been able to play in working with others to put such
a dramatic set of proposals before the Iranian Government. That
has continued to be the case.
The time could come when, for one reason or
another, there is disagreement about how to go forward, but Javier
keeps the Council well informed about the process of the discussions,
negotiations and so on, and there is consensus and common ground,
I am happy to say.
Q182 Ms Stuart: All that without
a European Union Foreign Minister.
Margaret Beckett: There is one
thing to be said for having someone called a high representative,
because they can be anything. They can be an official who talks
to someone like Larijani, or they can ask to see a Prime Minister
or a President. No one says to a high representative, "You
are a Foreign Minister, so you will see the Foreign Minister."
Q183 Sir John Stanley: After President
Sarkozy apparently took everyone by surprise at the G8 by proposing
a six-month delay in putting the Ahtisaari proposals to a new
United Nations Security Council resolution to enable further negotiations
to take place between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians, is the
French President now back on board?
Margaret Beckett: If I may say
so, I do not recognise the way in which you describe that. There
was a certain amount of discussion—at the G8 there are of
course people with rather different views about Kosovo—but
there is widespread acceptance, and the European Union believes,
that the Ahtisaari plan is the best way forward. Then there is
the question of how to achieve the Ahtisaari plan. I think the
idea that a delay might contribute might have been floated, but
there was no suggestion that there was some sort of agreement
at the G8 that that would happen.
Q184 Sir John Stanley: When do you
expect the new United Nations Security Council resolution on Kosovo
to be presented to the Security Council?
Margaret Beckett: Discussions
are going on now, and all the time. It depends on whether people
identify that sufficient common ground has been reached. It is
no secret that the European Union would like the issue to make
progress, because we recognise that there are dangers in delay.
Q185 Sir John Stanley: Yes, there
most certainly are, and they are highlighted repeatedly. What
timetable are the British Government working towards to try to
get the issue agreed at the United Nations Security Council?
Margaret Beckett: The British
Government would like it to have been agreed the week before yesterday,
but we are continuing to work with all our colleagues and partners
to see whether we can get an agreement on the way forward. To
be completely fair, immediately after the discussion that I chaired
in April during our presidency of the Security Council, there
was an agreement that members of the Council would go to Serbia
and Kosovo to have discussions for themselves and ascertain what
they felt the situation was. That, I think, has helped to clarify
the position for a number of them.
Q186 Sir John Stanley: It seems likely
that, if the United Nations Security Council cannot agree a new
resolution on Kosovo and on the implementation of the Ahtisaari
plan, the US Administration are likely to proceed unilaterally
down the independence for Kosovo road. In that case, would the
US Government be supported by the British Government?
Margaret Beckett: That is a hypothetical
question. I read constantly that the United States might consider
unilateral recognition. It has not done so; if it does, we will
have to consider with our European partners how we will respond.
We are focused—as is the United States—on trying to
get an agreed Security Council resolution.
Q187 Sir John Stanley: I suggest,
Foreign Secretary, that what is not hypothetical is the British
Government's position if a United Nations resolution is not obtained.
Do we have any view at all on whether Kosovo will remain effectively
in limbo, dependent solely on a United Nations Security Council
resolution?
Margaret Beckett: That territory
is sufficiently delicate for me not to want to venture into it.
Our goal is to get a Security Council resolution and to implement
the Ahtisaari plan—we do not see a more viable way forward—and
to do that as early as possible. I do not want to encourage those
who are less than enthusiastic about such a course of action by
speculating on what might happen if that does not succeed. We
are focused on trying to achieve that success.
Q188 Chairman: Foreign Secretary,
a number of European Union countries are rather apprehensive about
this development. It is possible that the EU could split over
the question of Kosovo, as was seen, for example, in the unfortunate
events in respect of the premature recognition of Croatia in the
previous decade. Are we in a situation in which there is absolute
determination that there will be only one EU position on Kosovo?
Margaret Beckett: After Martti
Ahtisaari came to the Council in May, part of the agreement that
the EU made was that we would adopt a united position, that we
would remain united and that that would very much be our approach.
That has continued to be our approach.
Those who would prefer not to have the Ahtisaari
plan or not to have a Security Council resolution are constantly
asserting that the EU is not really united and that this, that
or the other country has this, that or the other view—in
many cases, to my personal knowledge, entirely incorrectly. So,
yes, we are united. We are determined to remain so because we
recognise that unity is a vital component of trying to get agreement.
Indeed, yesterday we carried a further set of conclusions—a
united set of conclusions—which are possibly slightly stronger
than the ones that we carried last time.
Q189 Chairman: So even if there is
no agreement but the United States recognises a unilateral declaration
of independence by the Kosovars, the EU will maintain a common
position. Are you saying that no EU countries will follow the
US?
Margaret Beckett: No, I am afraid
that I repeat what I said to Sir John. I am extremely reluctant
to enter into hypothetical discussions about what might happen
if there is no resolution and other people take other steps. The
EU is united in its approach that the Ahtisaari plan should be
followed, that there should be a resolution as soon as possible,
and that that will be in the interests of the EU, not least because
of the responsibilities that are then likely to fall on the EU.
We are all working hard to get that resolution, and to get it
as soon as possible. That is the focus of what we are doing.
Chairman: The Committee has just been
in Russia. I would like to bring Malcolm Moss in now withsome
questions about Russia. As you can appreciate, Kosovo was one
of the issues that was raised with us by the Russians.
Q190 Mr Moss: Foreign Secretary,
you said to this Committee in December that it would not be correct
to speak of Russian hostility to the EU. At a remove of more than
six months, what would your considered opinion be of EU-Russia
relations?
Margaret Beckett: There are certainly
some areas of particular sensitivity, of which Kosovo is one,
and there have been more areas where Russia has expressed stronger
disagreement than was the case six months ago, but, no, I do not
judge that its basic attitude towards the EU is hostile, not least
perhaps because we are, after all, its largest export market.
Q191 Mr Moss: If that is the case,
why was the EU-Russia summit in May not more successful?
Margaret Beckett: Because there
are strains and areas of difficulty, but I would not characterise
that summit as a failure. Not as much progress was made as we
would have liked, but that is quite often the case with such summits.
Q192 Mr Moss: How would you categorise
the prospects for opening up talks with Russia on the post-partnership
and co-operation agreement?
Margaret Beckett: That was something
that we thought might be settled at the summit. It was not, but
no doubt the Portuguese will return to it when they take over
the presidency.
Q193 Mr Moss: Given the strong bilateral
relationships between Russia and some EU member countries, is
it in the United Kingdom's interest to pursue relationships under
the EU umbrella, or should we have a more unilateral relationship
with Russia?
Margaret Beckett: Every member
state has its own bilateral relationships as well as the relationships
that it has under the umbrella of the EU. Yes, I believe that
it is in our interests to continue to work with the Russians on
issues where we can work with them.
Q194 Andrew Mackinlay: If I may return
to the issue of Kosovo—it relates to our relations with
Russia—Russia argues that it has adhered to the Helsinki
Final Act of the late 1970s. For Russia, the very important part
of it is that there should be no unilateral variation of the boundaries
of European states. Russia says that if there is a concession
for Kosovo, we will then say that there is a powerful case in
respect of the Russian enclave of Transnistria and the enclaves
in Georgia and Armenia. Russia has a point, does it not?
Margaret Beckett: Russia always
has a point, but I would say that that one is a discussion point.
We in the UK and the EU take the view that the position of Kosovo
is sui generis. There have of course been, as everywhere, difficult
episodes in the history of the areas to which you referred, but
there is nothing that matches the Kosovo-Serbian experience, which
has indeed, as Martti Ahtisaari concluded, been tragically unique.
That means that an outcome that one might have envisaged in other
circumstances or other territories does not have any prospects.
We have certainly always taken the view, and I have always said
to the Russians, that what happens with Kosovo does not have a
read-across anywhere else.
Q195 Andrew Mackinlay: The Security
Council—you might be able to help me on this—dispatched
some of its number to Kosovo. They have come back and taken a
view that is somewhat less supportive than Ahtisaari's. Is that
not correct?
Margaret Beckett: I do not think
so, no.
Q196 Andrew Mackinlay: Is their report
in the public domain?
Margaret Beckett: I am not sure
whether they made a formal report. I do not know exactly who went
in the end, but my impression was that people, who nurtured the
illusion that there must be some easy way through that an intelligent
person could find, thought that if they went to Serbia and Kosovo
themselves, they might be able to spot something that Ahtisaari
had missed. My impression is that they came back thinking that
perhaps they had not spotted it.
Q197 Andrew Mackinlay: The final
point was called "Hong Kong-plus." It was suggested
that Kosovo should get a status short of being a legal international
personality with a seat at the United Nations, but that it should
have a relationship with Serbia similar to Hong Kong's with the
People's Republic of China, which is de jure one nation, two systems.
That would not be acceptable to Kosovo but it would be tolerable,
and it would help the Serbian politicians and people to whom you
referred earlier. You were correct to say that even the most moderate
Serbian politician can never concede the loss of Kosovo. Is that
not a formula that should be followed? It would vary from Ahtisaari
only in one important respect—the international recognition
of a sovereign, independent state.
Margaret Beckett: At the moment
we are hanging our hat on Ahtisaari. If there is common ground
about some minor variation on Ahtisaari, it will find acceptance.
I do not think that anybody rules out considering anything. I
have not heard it characterised in the terms that you use, but
we are looking for a way through to get an agreed Security Council
resolution.
Chairman: We have just a few minutes
left. John Horam.
Q198 Mr Horam: As the Chairman said,
the Committee has recently been in Russia and Azerbaijan. We have
been looking to some extent at the whole area of the former Soviet
Union—what Russia calls the "near abroad" as well
as Russia itself. There are very important energy considerations
and a strong feeling that, if the European Union does not act
together, countries in the region may be picked on one by one.
I accept your point that we will always have bilateral relations
with Russia and those countries, but do you think that there is
an important strategic role for the European Union in dealing
with that area, which is so important from the point of view of
not only foreign policy but energy security?
Margaret Beckett: That is a valid
point. Another thing that we agreed yesterday was a strong statement.
The Committee probably recalls that the German presidency had
as one of its goals the strengthening of the European neighbourhood
policy, which we support as long as it is not seen as an alternative
to membership.
Q199 Mr Horam: Or a step towards
membership.
Margaret Beckett: Well, no, it
could facilitate that perhaps. We agreed yesterday a development
of the European neighbourhood policy, in which we specifically
invited Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to move closer to the
European Union on a case-by-case basis and perhaps align themselves
with our declarations, démarches or positions on common
foreign and security policy issues. We are looking at encouraging
steps towards better governance—perhaps investment and things
of that kind. On a case-by-case basis, we are looking at that
wider neighbourhood and how we can encourage the process that
I was describing in the case of Turkey—encouraging reform
and development along the lines that we in the European Union
would very much like to see—and Azerbaijan is very much
in that category.
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