Examination of Witnesses (Questions 411-419)
MR GRAHAM
AVERY, PROFESSOR
CHRISTOPHER HILL
AND RICHARD
G WHITMAN
21 NOVEMBER 2007
Chairman: Gentlemen, good afternoon,
and thank you for coming to see us. As you know, we are looking
at the foreign policy aspects of the EU reform treaty, and we
shall be taking evidence over the coming weeks from other witnesses,
including the Foreign Secretary in December, before the intergovernmental
conference.
Will any members of the public please switch
off their mobile phones? I do not want interruptions.
Perhaps the witnesses will introduce themselves
briefly, and we will then start the session.
Professor Hill: My name is Christopher
Hill, and I am what I think of as a foreign policy analyst. That
is, I am interested in foreign policy decision making on a comparative
basis with an historical slant. The European Union's attempt to
create a collective foreign policy over the years is of particular
interest to me, as are the foreign policies of individual member
states.
Mr Avery: I worked for 33 years
in the European Commission in Brussels, and my last post there
before I retired was preparing the foreign policy aspects of the
constitutional treaty, so I have seen the work from the inside.
At an earlier stage, I was a junior member of the British team
negotiating for membership of the European Communities, and I
was private secretary to a British Minister, so I have served
on both sides of the Channel.
As I retired from the European Commission 18
months ago, I do not represent it, and I want to make it clear
that the views that I express here are my personal views, and
not the official line of the organisation for which I worked.
Professor Whitman: I am professor
of politics at the university of Bath, and an associate fellow
of Chatham House, where I was previously head of the European
programme, so I moved from a think tank to an academic environment.
I have had an interest in the foreign policy of the European Union
and individual member states, and particularly in how they react
and interrelate with the EU's foreign policy, over the past decade.
Q411 Chairman: Thank you very much.
Could we begin by asking for your overall assessment of where
the EU is with regard to being a foreign policy actor?
Professor Hill: I first started
observing what was going on in the European Community in the late
1970s. The process of so-called foreign policy integration has
been happening since 1970, as you know, so we are now well into
the fourth decade of this process. I think that when historians
come to write the history of the late 20th century in that regard
they will see the attempt to create such a thing, and indeed the
progress made, as remarkable and unparalleled. There has been
nothing else in the history of modern diplomacy to match this
attempt to provide systematic co-ordination between separate sovereign
states.
Equally, over 37 years, there has been a steady,
if incremental, form of progress, mostly at institutional level,
and I think that that must be seen in the context of the enlargement
process. If, for example, you had been attempting to create a
common foreign policy solely on the part of the original six,
you would almost certainly have made greater progress by now than
you have. Every enlargement round has inevitably created a challenge
for the attempt to co-ordinate separate national foreign policies
because the process is intergovernmental and remains so. The process
and the outputs are only what the member states want them to be.
That is not to say that it is always going to
be like that or that there are not choices in the system that
might enable it to become self-transcending, to jump onto a new
level—as the French say it, to have a saut qualitatif.
There have been elements introduced into the system over the years
that could have led to that sort of saut qualitative, such as,
in theory, qualified majority voting and what is called Brusselisation—the
tendency to increasingly move activities from the member state
capitals revolving around the presidency to Brussels itself.
Academics also talk about Europeanisation in
foreign policy. That is to say that although there are no formal
legal requirements to converge their policies—it is a voluntary
process—through the process of socialisation, common action,
common institutions and the logic of events, member states might
gradually move from a situation of great diversity to one of less
diversity. That might eventually lead to speaking with one voice
all of the time on big issues. Any half-serious observer can see
that the EU does not speak with a single voice on all important
issues all of the time, or possibly most of the time. Nonetheless,
historically that is a formidably interesting development.
Mr Avery: I would say that the
European Union is on the way towards having a foreign policy,
but it is only partly on the way—maybe halfway, maybe not
even halfway. The Maastricht treaty announced a common foreign
and security policy and invented the second pillar, the intergovernmental
pillar of the external relations of the EU. The Amsterdam treaty
introduced a new figure, the High Representative, Mr Solana, who
has been very effective in helping the common foreign and security
policy to have flesh and reality.
This new treaty is another step forward. It
aims to eliminate some of the duplication that exists in Brussels,
and the multiplicity of voices that exist elsewhere in the world.
You will detect from my evidence, Mr Chairman, that I am in favour
of the new treaty and generally in favour of the EU and I would
like to say that I find it quite worrying that the debate in this
country focuses so much on the question of whether the European
Union's conduct of foreign policy can hinder British national
interests. As a pragmatist, I see many ways in which the United
Kingdom can act more effectively in international affairs to pursue
its interests by acting through and with its European partners,
and I think that this treaty will help.
Professor Whitman: I do not want
to add much more to what Professor Hill has said, but I think
the question that arises is: what is our benchmark for success
of the EU in foreign policy terms? That takes us to the question
of how we define foreign policy, because clearly the Union, and
the Community before it, has been rather more successful in some
aspects of its foreign economic policy than in some aspects of
its common foreign and security policy.
The key thing about this process, which Professor
Hill touched on, is that there is a duality to it. It is both
about how far the member states are able to cast a set of agreements
among themselves, to have collective foreign policy positions
on particular issues, but at the same time—I would suggest
it has been rather less good at this—it is about taking
those positions forward and trying to implement them in their
relationships with third countries and through international organisations.
Probably in that area the EU has got better in the last few years,
but it is certainly not as good as one might expect, certainly
in terms of some of the resources and energy that are put in by
member states, to make the common foreign and security policy
in particular successful.
Q412 Chairman: On the specifics of
this reform treaty, how in practice do you think that it offers
a more effective way to develop foreign policy in the EU than
the existing arrangements? We are told—you used the phrase,
Mr Avery—that duplication would be removed. Clearly there
is a shift from some of the Community areas towards a more intergovernmental
approach with some of these changes. How will that make it more
effective?
Professor Hill: My view is that
it could make it less effective over the long run, because there
are problems of overload that might arise from the role of the
High Representative and his double-hatting capacity. I have always
been seen by my colleagues as somebody who has taken a rather
cautious view of the whole process, because I have emphasised
the gap between capabilities and expectations that has existed
in EU foreign policy making. In other words, every new development
in the whole system, whether that is St. Malo or the High Representative,
tends to lead to a sudden revolution of hopes that the EU will
become a more effective actor in the system.
Those expectations can be internal or external.
Sometimes the EU does well in meeting them and certain innovations
have proved modestly successful. In this instance, there is certainly
a case for trying to avoid the inherent tension that there is
between the Commissioner for External Relations and the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. The idea of a European foreign policy
is supposed to be holistic, especially in this era of so-called
soft power, in which the EU does not dispose of the kind of hard
power of the United States, for example. Instead it disposes of
things to do with accession, commercial policy, development aid
and so on—carrots rather than sticks. Those policies need
to be coherent, and there has been talk of consistency and coherence
as a desideratum in EU foreign policy going back at least to the
Single European Act 1986, and possibly the Genscher-Colombo plan
and the London report of 1981.
Inevitably, when there is a system of diverse
institutions and separate pillars, which the current reform treaty
attempts to go beyond, there will be an inherent system of checks
and balances. The American system is supposed to laud checks and
balances as a way of controlling excess in foreign policy making.
However, I do not think that many people would see it in those
terms in Europe, because it is not linked closely to the democratic
dimension—it is purely a bureaucratic and policy-making
issue, and one of great duplication. Mr Solana and Mr Patten worked
well together for example, and the argument would be that if those
different roles were put together in a single individual, the
degree of coherence would be increased.
Q413 Chairman: Does anyone wish to
add to that?
Mr Avery: Plainly one thing that
does not change in the treaty is that there is still a clear difference
at the decision-making level in the Council between the first
pillar and the second—the Community mode and the inter-governmental
mode. The reform treaty does not change that aspect. It is clear
that the respective responsibilities of the institutions in Brussels
and of Brussels and the member states are not changed by this
treaty.
What will change is that there will be a more
efficient system upstream and downstream of the decision making—in
formulating and developing the policies and presenting proposals
to the Council, and in executing the policies and in representing
the European Union in the rest of the world. That means that we
will first eliminate some of the duplication between the two agencies
in Brussels on either side of the Rue de la Loi—Commission
and Council—and secondly, it will simplify the multiplicity
of voices by which the EU expresses itself outside.
Let me say a word about duplication. It is very
difficult in real life to make a categorical distinction between
what is first pillar and what is second pillar. I can give two
examples of activities that are, in principle, first pillar Community
activities, but in which the Commission has played a very important
role in foreign role in foreign policy, and done it rather well.
I am referring to enlargement policy—the successful enlargement
for Central and Eastern Europe, the ongoing effort for reform
in the Balkans, and the Europeanisation of Turkey. Secondly, there
is neighbourhood policy—handling the problems in the countries
that lie between us and Russia. At present these two areas of
policy, which I believe are a priority for the UK Government because
they include questions like Kosovo and Russia, are handled both
by the Commission—and by different Commissioners in the
Commission—and by the Council and Mr Solana. The two teams
get along well in general, but there is a certain rivalry, competition
and overlap, and it would be far more effective to combine the
energies and talents in what I would call a joined-up approach
to foreign policy.
Professor Whitman: Perhaps I could
add that the changes as proposed in the reform treaty represent
something like a revamp rather than a revolution of the CFSP.
That is partly for reasons that have already been picked up on
in the role of the High Representative but also, as has been indicated,
the essential quality of the CFSP in terms of its "intergovernmentalness",
if we can call it that, remains unchanged.
Q414 Mr Horam: I want to return to
a point that Mr Avery made earlier. He said, rightly, that a lot
of comment in the UK has been rather negative in this area. How
do you see a stronger EU foreign policy benefiting the UK?
Mr Avery: In my perception of
most of the things that are going on in the world, there are not
many international problems where the United Kingdom acting alone
is going to have much influence. In many of the problems which
are a priority for British foreign policy acting with the European
partners and trying to define a European common interest is likely
to be a much more effective way, also of effecting British interests.
Let me take the example of Russia. Russia is
a case where, manifestly, the United Kingdom and the other member
states maintain bilateral relations and have bilateral problems—Russian
émigrés killed in London and things like that that
have nothing to do with the European Union. But at the same time
there is a very big area of activity where European positions
on questions concerning Russia are the only way effectively to
handle the Russians. The Russians want trade; they want access;
they want membership of the World Trade Organisation, and these
are all areas where the best to way to inflect and handle Russia
in the way we want is with a European common position.
Professor Hill: May I add something
to that? I think that if the CFSP did not exist, the UK would
probably want to invent something like it on an informal basis.
We all know that in the world even superpowers cannot do without
allies of some kind; they have to work in some multilateral framework.
The only question then is whether you want informal multilateralism
with shifting coalitions, or certain structures that give you
a basis to build up what the French call the communauté
de vue—a kind of common philosophy of foreign policy—and
maybe use common instruments on a steady basis.
It is paradoxical that some member states have
actually acquired a more confident and independent foreign policy
through the CFSP. Ireland clearly did not have much of a foreign
policy before it joined the European Community. Italy and Germany,
which were both deeply inhibited by the consequences of world
war two during the cold war—admittedly, the coincidence
of the end of the cold war and the CFSP arriving was helpful in
this respect—have become rather more assertive in their
national foreign policy in the past 15 years than they were before.
To some extent, the CFSP and the EU generally give them a safe
framework within which to express themselves because they will
not then be accused of nationalism.
Q415 Mr Horam: That is how it helps
those countries, but how does it help the UK?
Professor Hill: Well, if you think,
for example, of policy towards Iran if we assume that it is useful
even within a kind of agreed western position to have some sort
of division of labour between carrot and stick, nice guy and hard
guy and so on, it is probably much more effective to have the
EU three backed, broadly speaking, by the chorus of the other
24 than for the UK to try to do it alone.
Those of us of a certain age grew up with the
notion of the decline of British power as a result of the end
of empire, the economic problems of the '60s and '70s, and so
on. It is not only the EU that has stopped that process of decline,
or even turned it around, but the EU has provided a certain platform.
I say that not as a federalist at all, or even as a great enthusiast
for the principle of foreign policy integration, per se. I tend
to take a more instrumental view of matters: if something works,
it is good, and if it does not work, make sure that you do not
get caught up in the trap.
However, there are undoubtedly ways in which
the UK has found the CFSP useful—and not just the CFSP,
as Graham Avery has said. The biggest example of a successful
foreign policy that most people cite is enlargement. Now enlargement
is not CFSP; it must be seen in a much broader framework, which
has both pluses and minuses from the point of view of thinking
about decision making.
Q416 Mr Horam: But the European countries
could have got to this stronger foreign policy posture through
political will and by co-operating informally. Is it your opinion
that we have got to a stage now where there needs to be institutional
change of sort proposed to achieve a stronger foreign policy?
Professor Hill: My view is that
institutional change has too often been a substitute for change
at the level of policy and a willingness to grasp the nettle of
difficult decisions on high politics and international relations.
Whenever there is a problem in European Union foreign policy,
the instinct is to say, "Let's invent some new procedure".
Many years ago, William Wallace coined the phrase, "Procedure
as a substitute for policy," and there is still something
in that idea, but that does not mean that certain procedural innovations
cannot be of considerable importance.
If I may just have 30 seconds more, my view
of the people who say, "This is all just technical innovation,
it is really just rationalising what is already going on, there
is nothing in it and it is just an efficiency gain," is that
they are wrong. I think that there are certain small-C constitutional
issues at stake here. Equally, those people who say that this
treaty is a bomb under national sovereignty and foreign policy
and that the idea of an independent British foreign policy is
about to disappear are just as misguided. I think that those two
extreme positions are both untenable.
Q417 Mr Horam: Professor Whitman,
do you have any view on this subject?
Professor Whitman: Thank you for
asking that question, because I think it cuts right to the heart
of deciding whether it is worthwhile participating in the CFSP
process itself. It also raises the question whether you could
arrange things in an entirely different way and get better outcomes
than those you currently get.
It is clear that an awful lot of time, energy
and effort has gone into reworking the institutions, time after
time, particularly one looks at what one might call arcane ways
of taking decisions that allow member states to opt out or to
suggest that there are peculiarities or particularities of a collective
policy that they do not want to be associated with, which have
added up to absolutely nothing. So I think that your point about
political will is absolutely spot on; if the member states do
not have the will to achieve foreign policy collectively, you
will get absolutely nowhere. To reiterate the point that Professor
Hill made, historically a lot of effort has gone into the procedure
rather than the policy.
At the same time, I think that the system that
we have at the moment is a system that bears the heavy imprint
of successive British Governments and British diplomats in terms
of both the predecessor system—European political co-operation—and
the system that we have now, the common foreign and security policy.
We have arrived at the present system because more informal arrangements
did not seem to deliver. That means that there has obviously been
a move to make more binding arrangements, for example in decision
making.
Q418 Mr Horam: So you think that
these institutional changes are necessary?
Professor Whitman: The current
institutional changes?
Q419 Mr Horam: No, the ones proposed
in the reform treaty.
Professor Whitman: I think that
the CFSP could carry on working quite happily without the changes
that are in that treaty. Whether it could operate more successfully
in the future is another matter. For example, let us consider
the position of the High Representative, which is obviously a
key change; certainly, revamping the powers of that individual
is a key change. Whether those new powers for that individual
or office will make a difference will depend, first, on who occupies
the office and whether they have the capacity and the wherewithal
to use their powers; and, secondly, on whether member states will
allow them to build an empire that they can use for the purposes
of making European foreign policy more effective, rather than
building an empire for the purpose of building an empire.
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