Examination of Witnesses (Questions 494-499)
RT HON
DAVID MILIBAND,
MP, PAUL BERMAN,
SHAN MORGAN
AND MARTIN
SHEARMAN
12 DECEMBER 2007
Chairman: Will members of the public
please switch off their mobile phones? I do not want any interruptions.
Foreign Secretary, I welcome you and your colleagues.
Perhaps you would introduce them.
David Miliband: Good afternoon,
Chairman. I am pleased to be here. Shan Morgan is director of
our Europe team. Martin Shearman is head of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy team—I know that you want to discuss
that—and Paul Berman is our legal adviser.
Q494 Chairman: Thank you. Obviously,
we shall focus largely on what will presumably be called the Lisbon
treaty, but if there is time we hope to touch on some wider issues,
including Kosovo. We are doing an inquiry into foreign policy
aspects of the Lisbon treaty, and we will publish our report in
January.
Do you think in retrospect that the Government's
position during the original negotiations on the ill-fated constitutional
treaty was correct? If so, why did the definition of foreign policy
red lines change between the original negotiations before the
constitutional treaty was agreed and the current position, in
which those red lines seem to be much firmer than before?
David Miliband: Do you mean the
position that was taken in 2001 and 2002, when the idea of a "constitution"
was first mooted? There have been so many versions.
Q495 Chairman: Let me be more specific.
In 2004, we signed up to a constitutional treaty, but in 2007
we seem to have a different position on the foreign policy aspects
than in 2004.
David Miliband: That is an interesting
way of looking at the matter. In foreign policy, the status quo
is pretty strongly maintained in the current reform treaty. That
was certainly the conclusion of the European Scrutiny Committee.
I do not know whether you are highlighting particular changes
from the constitutional treaty, but we have been clear all along
that the most important red line—that term was not in common
use at the time—or foundation is that foreign policy should
retain an area of unanimity and that each country should be able
to exercise a veto. That has been a consistent theme of the Government's
policy since our 1997 election manifesto, and one could probably
argue that it has been a theme of Governments of both parties
since the idea of political co-operation, as it was then called,
was first mooted in 1984 and then put into the Single European
Act in 1986.
Q496 Chairman: But you would accept
that there are differences from the position that the Government
agreed in 2004. I thought their case was that the constitutional
treaty and the reform treaty were very different.
David Miliband: One can go through
the different elements. Some of them are structural, and a feature
of the reform treaty is that the Common Foreign and Security Policy
should remain a separate pillar, which is one important structural
change from the constitutional treaty. Also, obviously, some declarations
have been added, but the fundamental point is that the Common
Foreign and Security Policy is an area of unanimity and has been
a consistent theme of Government policy for much longer.
Q497 Chairman: We will come on to
some of the specifics in later questions, but I am dealing with
the general matter. Some critics have said that the Government
have taken something of a negative approach to the red lines—you
have taken a begrudging approach to the treaty—and that
that has damaged relations with other European partners. How do
you respond to that?
David Miliband: The Government
have been clear and firm in setting out what we understand to
be the national interest. I think that clarity is valued in the
European Union, and people know where we stand on the treaty.
That does not mean that people agree with us, but they understand
our position: the fact that we have stuck to it is respected.
I do not think that we have been begrudging
or even grudging in the way in which we have gone about the matter:
I think that we have been clear and focused. There was a sense
of exhaustion about institutional reform at the meeting in Lisbon
in October that concluded the discussions on the treaty. Those
who were most, and least, enthusiastic for an expansive version
of the treaty agreed that we had spent the past six or seven years
discussing ourselves and institutional reform, and that that could
not be a feature of the next six or seven years. There was unity
on that and a certain amount of mutual respect for different positions
on that basis.
Q498 Chairman: The argument for the
constitutional treaty was always that it would somehow simplify
and reconnect the EU with the public. That exercise came to a
disastrous end in France and the Netherlands. A witness who appeared
before the Committee told us that the proposed structure is almost
unintelligible even to a very intelligent person, and others have
referred to its great complexity. How have we fulfilled in the
Lisbon treaty the ideal or desire to reconnect with the public?
David Miliband: That is a really
important and good point. I have never believed that institutional
reform is the route to love and respect for the European Union
among the peoples of Europe. It is a perfectly logical argument,
but it says that the "democratic deficit" is the fundamental
problem in the relationship between European institutions and
the peoples of Europe, which I have never believed.
I believe that a delivery deficit is the fundamental
barrier between the European Union and the peoples of Europe,
which is why I am passionate about the following point: if the
European Union is to show itself to be useful, it need not reform
its institutions or become obsessed with institutional reform;
rather, it needs to get on with tackling the big issues that people
recognise cannot be addressed at national level. That is why the
globalisation declaration that will be adopted in Brussels on
Friday is important. The Prime Minister has led the way on that,
and it is at the heart of the "Global Europe" pamphlet
that he and I published. The critical point about the reform treaty
is that it brings to an end six or seven years of institutional
obsession and allows us to get on and tackle issues such as climate
change and energy, international terrorism, migration and trade,
which people in all strands of the spectrum recognise as international
issues. The key for the European Union is that it shows clearly
that it is able to address those issues.
People sometimes say, "You can't address
those issues unless you reform the institutions," but to
take the topical example of climate change—the Bali conference
is meeting now—if you look at the conclusions of the March
2006 European Council, which offer a genuine leadership role for
Europe on climate change issues and international negotiations,
you will realise that they have done more to show the relevance
of the European Union than any amount of institutional tinkering.
The issue is important, but there is division. Both positions
are perfectly logical and internally compatible, but people must
judge which one they support.
Q499 Mr Horam: I am interested to
hear what you say. None the less, you presumably regard that particular
bit of institutional tinkering in the treaty as necessary.
David Miliband: Yes. We think
the treaty makes some important and good changes, and it is good
for that reason, but it also brings to an end a period of—to
use your phrase—institutional tinkering, which I think will
be liberating for the European Union.
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