Memorandum submitted by Dr Ian Davis,
Co-Executive and Paul Ingram, Senior Analyst, British-American
Security Information Council
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BASIC's primary objective in following the Iranian
nuclear file has been to promote non-proliferation. Along with
the UK government, we share the crucial objective of preventing
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and see the denial of a nuclear
weapon capability by the Iranian government as central to this.
Our problem with UK government policy is that it contains important
elements that are self-defeating in this regard. We recommend
that the UK government:
— Ditch preconditions and take up Iran's
offer of "serious talks", starting with a genuine attempt
to define the interests of all the key players involved;
— Identify common ground with P5+1
partners and Iran, and isolate areas of conflict in order to formulate
compromise proposals;
— Give serious consideration to either
the Forden-Thomson plan for a multilateral enrichment facility
on Iranian soil or for a pilot enrichment facility at Natanz under
an intrusive IAEA inspection regime;
— Work towards the publication of an
agreed UN Security Council document on the security risks of the
different technologies being developed by Iran, in order to prioritise
proposals and demands accordingly, and search for common solutions;
and
— Develop the proposals offered by
the P5+1 on 6 June 2006 into concrete offers to Iran in return
for tighter inspections and abandoning all ambitions towards reprocessing
(as offered by the Iranians in 2005).
In addition, the UK government should seek to
influence the United States, Israel and Iran to enter into mutual
security guarantees, as part of a regional security system. The
P5, including Britain, should consider their own deployment of
nuclear weapons and engage more seriously in furthering the multilateral
disarmament commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
In the case of the UK, it is not too late to reconsider the timing
of its own upgrade programme for Trident.
THE BRITISH
AMERICAN SECURITY
INFORMATION COUNCIL
(BASIC)
BASIC is an independent research and advocacy
organisation that analyses government policies and promotes public
awareness of defence, disarmament, military strategy and nuclear
policies in order to foster informed debate. BASIC has offices
in London and in Washington and its governing Council includes
former US ambassadors, academics and politicians. Further information
is available on our website: http://www.basicint.org
Contact Details: BASIC, The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles
Square, London N1 6HT;
email: idavis@basicint.org Tel: 020 7324 4680
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Iran claims that its development of
nuclear power is benign, but like the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), we are not yet convinced that this is the case.
Iran's previous cooperation with international inspections has
helped to build some confidence, but it remains uncertain whether
Tehran is seeking to acquire a threshold nuclear weapons capability.
International concern is justified by Iran's past concealment
of important parts of its nuclear programme (such as the Natanz
uranium enrichment facility) and the unacceptable rhetoric towards
Israel by President Ahmadinejad.
1.2 The case of Iran highlights a crucial
loophole in the international non-proliferation regime due to
the unavoidable dual-use nature of the technologies involved in
the production of fuel for nuclear power, and in the disposal
of waste from the back-end of reactors. A country can perfectly
legally acquire foreign technical assistance under safeguards
for its civil programme that will also give it a capability to
develop nuclear weapons in a short period. Countries with highly-advanced
nuclear programmes, such as Japan, Germany and Canada are already
in this position. Iran is probably well on the way to achieving
this.
1.3 We strongly agree that the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by Iran or any other non-nuclear weapon state
would be destabilizing and dangerous and must be avoided. However
in our judgement the current strategy of the UK, EU and the United
States is unlikely to achieve this important objective. The combination
of coercive diplomacy, sanctions and conditional engagement has
created a stalemate that Iran is exploiting to continue to advance
its nuclear programme.
1.4 This paper addresses most of the remit
outlined by the Foreign Affairs Committee when launching this
inquiry, but focuses in particular on the international engagement
with Iran on nuclear matters, some of the unintended consequences
of the strategy, and alternative options that have been articulated
by a number of analysts, but neglected in the negotiations.
2. EXTENT OF
IRANIAN NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT
2.1 An accurate technical assessment of
Iran's nuclear programme is essential to framing an appropriate
response. Misjudging the nature of the threat could lead to an
over or under reaction, either of which could prove costly.
2.2 Uranium enrichment, as practiced by
Iran, involves acquiring the feedstock, uranium hexafluoride (UF6),
and then spinning the UF6 in gaseous form at super-sonic speed
in centrifuges. This process separates streams of uranium with
minutely different concentrations of the fissile isotope U-235.
Fed several times through cascades of centrifuges the concentrations
can be increased gradually over time. Uranium enriched to 3% to
5% U-235 is used as the basic material for fabricating fuel rods
for standard power reactors, and is known as low-enriched uranium
(LEU); uranium enriched to more than 70% U-235 is used for bombs
or special varieties of reactor, and is termed highly enriched
uranium (HEU). Additionally, when LEU fuel is burned in a nuclear
energy reactor, some of the uranium is converted into plutonium,
the material of choice for military purposes for most weapons
programmes. This plutonium can be chemically separated from the
spent fuel using specialised plutonium reprocessing facilities.
2.3 Under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), all States Parties have the "inalienable right
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
Articles I and II". Also under Article IV, all states have
"the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". Thus a party to
the NPT in good standing is allowed the means to produce HEU and
plutonium—key nuclear weapons ("fissile") materials
that also have commercial uses—and stockpile them without
limit as long as they are placed under IAEA safeguards.
2.4 While exact quantities are unknown,
estimates put the global total quantity of fissile material at
more than 3,700 metric tons, enough for hundreds of thousands
of nuclear weapons, in about 50 countries. This stockpile grows
each year, along with the difficulty of ensuring that such material
is not diverted. In short, the development and global spread of
nuclear power as a source of energy makes it more likely that
materials are diverted into nuclear weapons programmes.
2.5 Worries about dual-use enrichment and
reprocessing technology are not new and received much attention
in the 1970s, soon after the NPT was signed. However, Iran's pursuit
of a broad nuclear technology programme, and nuclear weapons developments
in India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan (all of which
involved the use of civil nuclear energy as cover), have prompted
many states to re-think the basic nuclear technology bargain.
2.6 The balancing of rights of States Parties
to have nuclear technology (under Article IV of the NPT) while
addressing the proliferation threat posed by the development of
such technology has been a key issue for the international community
in recent years. Proposals have included Mohamed ElBaradei's idea
of internationally-controlled facilities for the enrichment and
stockpiling of LEU for power reactors. But while attention has
been drawn to the dangers involved in the widespread proliferation
of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, there
is as yet no international consensus on how to deal with the problem.
2.7 Iran's nuclear efforts have their origins
in the late 1960s under the late Shah Reza Pahlavi. Iran ratified
the NPT in 1970 and concluded a comprehensive safeguard agreement
(CSA) with the IAEA in 1974. After the 1979 revolution the new
Islamic Republic was placed under a virtual embargo on the provision
of nuclear technology and equipment from the West. In any case,
at least initially, the Islamic Republic had no interest in the
technology. These Western restrictions on nuclear technology to
Iran have continued to the current day, although the concerns
that underpin them have rarely, if at all, been universally shared.
China and Russia, and members of the Non-Aligned Movement, in
particular, have generally adopted a more supportive position
towards Iran.
2.8 Iran's nuclear efforts restarted in
earnest in the late 1980s during the country's eight-year war
with Iraq. Design information and technical assistance for the
construction of uranium conversion facilities and centrifuges
were acquired from China and Pakistan in the mid-1990s, and Russia
began to provide assistance for the reconstruction of a 1,000-megawatt
power reactor at Bushehr, started and almost finished in the 1970s
by a German firm. Iran also began another secret programme to
eventually reprocess the plutonium produced by this and other
reactors.
2.9 A combination of steep technical challenges
and uneven support within Iran's governing elites meant that progress
on all of these programmes was initially slow, but accelerated
significantly after 2000. Disquiet was heightened considerably
in August 2002, when construction of secret underground uranium
enrichment facilities at Natanz and heavy water production facilities
at Arak were exposed. Both of these processes are dual-use and
could be used in civil or military programmes. This sparked an
intensive round of discussions and inspections by the IAEA in
February 2003. In his report of November 2003 to the IAEA Board
of Governors, Mohamed ElBaradei stated that "it is clear
that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended
period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement"
and "in the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its
nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation
to comply with the provision of its Safeguards Agreement".
Keen to regain its good standing, Iran initially cooperated with
the IAEA inspections in most respects and agreed in December 2003
to sign and act by the terms of an Additional Protocol (AP), although
the Iranian parliament did not ratify it. However, as shown by
the timeline in Table 1, the crisis eventually spiralled out of
control and culminated in the Iran dossier being referred to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Table 1
TIMELINE TO A CRISIS
| Aug 2002 | An Iranian opposition group discloses the secret construction of an underground uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant at Natanz and Arak respectively
|
| Feb 2003 | Intensive IAEA inspections commence that lead to regular verbal and written reports by Dr. El Baradei, IAEA Director General, to the 35-member Board of Governors, outlining Iranian experiments that had not been declared in accordance with their obligations under its CSA
|
| Sept 2003 | IAEA Board gives Iran weeks to prove that it does not have a nuclear weapon programme
|
| Oct 2003 | E3 Foreign Ministers (UK, France and Germany) visit Tehran and announce a set of measures to bring Iran back into compliance
|
| Nov 2003 | Iran starts a voluntary suspension of its uranium enrichment program, allows stricter IAEA inspections under an Additional Protocol, and the IAEA Board concludes that there is no evidence of a nuclear weapons programme
|
| Nov 2004 | Paris Agreement: Iran agrees with the E3 to continue its suspension of all activities related to enrichment, and all parties to negotiate towards "objective guarantees" that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran states it will not permanently stop conversion and enrichment activities
|
| May 2005 | NPT Review Conference in New York fails to agree any substantial measures to tackle proliferation
|
| Aug 2005 | Iran claims that the E3 are playing for time in the negotiations, and restarts its uranium conversion process. The E3/EU submit a proposal which is rejected out of hand by Iran. The case is discussed in an emergency IAEA Board which urges Iran to stop its conversion activities
|
| Sept 2005 | IAEA Board finds Iran in violation of its non-proliferation obligations and agrees that it is a matter under the remit of the UNSC but does not refer the case. Although decisions within the IAEA are normally taken by consensus—in the past 20 years there have only been two instances in which the IAEA board has not done so—the EU-US inspired decision not to refer the matter to the UNSC was forced through on a majority vote of 22 to one (Venezuela) with 12 abstentions
World Summit fails to reach agreement on any nuclear disarmament statement
|
| Oct 2005 | UK alleges that Iran is assisting insurgents in southern Iraq by supplying sophisticated bombs. Tony Blair strongly condemns a statement made by Iranian President Ahmadinejad that Israel should be wiped off the map, and alludes to threats of military action
|
| Nov 2005 | Increased speculation that the Iranians are prepared to compromise on enrichment if they were allowed to develop uranium conversion within Iran
|
| Jan 2006 | Iran announces the resumption of nuclear research activities, and removes some of the IAEA seals on its plants
|
| Feb 2006 | Iran tells the IAEA that it is resuming full-scale uranium enrichment. Kofi Annan urges Tehran to return to the negotiating table. On 4 Feb the IAEA board passed a resolution requesting the IAEA Director General to report to the UNSC all IAEA reports and resolutions relating to the implementation of safeguards in Iran
|
| 8 March 2006 | IAEA refers the Iran nuclear dossier to the UNSC
|
| 29 Mar 2006 | UNSC gives Iran until April 28 to suspend enrichment
|
| Apr 2006 | Iran begins military manoeuvres in Gulf; world oil prices jump by almost two dollars on the news
|
| May 2006 | Following Iran persisting in its nuclear activities after the April 28 deadline, Britain and France introduce a UNSC resolution to set the stage for possible sanctions against Iran if it does not abandon uranium enrichment;. France, Germany and the UK offer Iran a light-water nuclear reactor as part of a package of incentives; Ahmadinejad rules out halting nuclear fuel work in return for EU incentives
|
| June 2006 | EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presents Iran with a package of incentives (agreed by the P5 + Germany) that requires a suspension of Iran's enrichment programme as a pre-condition for further talks—5 July set as the deadline for an Iranian response
|
| 31 July 2006 | UNSC passes Resolution 1696 giving Iran until 31 August to suspend uranium enrichment or face the threat of economic and diplomatic sanctions. The resolution passes by a vote of 14-1. Qatar, which represents Arab states on the council, casts the lone dissenting vote.
|
| 31 Aug 2006 | UN deadline for Iran to stop enriching uranium passes
|
| 23 Dec 2006 | UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 1737 banning the supply of specific nuclear materials and technology to Iran, and freezing the assets of individuals and companies linked to Iran's nuclear programme. The resolution also specifies that if Iran fails to suspend nuclear enrichment, further non-military sanctions may follow.
|
| 24 Mar 2007 | UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1747 to tighten the existing sanctions and impose a ban on arms sales. Further steps promised if no compliance within 60 days
|
| 23 May 2007 | IAEA report confirms that Iran has failed to suspend its enrichment related activities. Although the IAEA is "able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran" it remains "unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme".
|
2.10 Today, the IAEA is still unable to verify that there
are no additional undeclared materials or activities in Iran.
But neither has it found evidence of a "smoking gun"
that would confirm an illicit nuclear weapons programme. Prior
to the US-led invasion of Iraq, neoconservative political commentators
seized on statements by Hans Blix that he was unable to say with
certainty that Iraq had not violated the 1991 UNSC resolution
to disarm, which they then spun as proof that Iraq was guilty.
The same spin is happening with respect to Iran today.
Conclusions
2.11 All the evidence suggests that Iran remains in the
early stages of perfecting uranium enrichment and its effort to
develop an indigenous plutonium-separation capability is much
less advanced, though in the long term could be more important
to any nuclear weapon capability. Iran's declared enrichment programme,
which is based on relatively primitive P1 gas centrifuge technology
acquired via the A.Q.Khan network, continues to face technical
obstacles that could take several years to resolve before a reliably
smooth industrial-scale operation is achieved.
2.12 The most recent IAEA report (following inspections
at the plant in April and May this year as part of a new agreement
between Tehran and the IAEA that allows "a combination of
unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures"
to improve transparency at the facility) said Iran had started
up 1,312 centrifuges, divided into eight cascades, or fuel-cycle
networks. This is part of an accelerating campaign to lay a basis
for "industrial scale" enrichment (50,000 centrifuges)
in the Natanz complex. Iran has doubled the number of centrifuges
in Natanz in the past two months and says publicly that it aims
to have 3,000 running by the end of May.
2.13 While 3,000 centrifuges running for long periods
without breakdown could be enough produce enough fissile material
for one nuclear bomb within a year, Iran has yet to demonstrate
such proficiency.
2.14 A facility operating, as proposed, with 50,000 reliable
P1 centrifuges could potentially produce enough HEU for dozens
of nuclear weapons a year, although Iran claims that it will only
produce LEU under safeguards for the Bushehr reactor. The consensus
judgement of the US intelligence community, according to published
accounts of the classified May 2005 National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on Iran's nuclear programme, is that Iran is five to ten
years away from the ability to produce indigenously enough HEU
for a bomb. Director of US National Intelligence John Negroponte
restated that timeline in September 2006. As this timeline anticipated
these recent developments it would seem that the judgement still
stands. Indeed, Mohamed ElBaradei more or less confirmed this
at a press conference in Luxembourg on 24 May 2007: "I tend,
based on our analysis, to agree [with US assessments] that even
if Iran wanted to go for a nuclear weapon, it would not be before
the end of this decade or sometime in the middle of the next decade.
In other words, three to eight years from now". However,
he also said the agency had seen no evidence that Iran was trying
to "weaponise" nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear
facilities operating in the country.
2.15 These estimates are based on "worst case"
analyses, whereby Iran overcomes all the major technical obstacles
and runs the centrifuges at optimal levels. While it appears that
Iran has overcome some of the obstacles that have slowed down
its programme considerably in 2006 and the early months of 2007,
progress is still slower than might otherwise be expected. IAEA
reports, for example, indicate that Iran's experiments with its
first two 164-machine cascades used to enrich small amounts of
uranium in 2006 met with limited success and only operated for
a few days at a time. In November 2006, the IAEA reported that
between August and November that year Iran enriched 34 kg of uranium
to levels below 5%.
2.16 Iran continues to claim that it has not enriched
uranium beyond low levels, and that it has no intention of doing
so. Yet Iranian nuclear scientists do not appear to be in any
hurry to produce nuclear fuel, after all the country has no fuel
manufacturing plant for a Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel assembly,
and no finished reactor to load. The facility also continues to
be safeguarded by the IAEA. The fear is that by building up a
stock of LEU Iran could be developing the capability of rapidly
manufacturing HEU, simply by reintroducing the material back into
the centrifuge cascades.
2.17 Of course, on current trends, in time Iran will
soon master the technology that will in future enable it to enrich
uranium at any grade. Based on public sources, it is still unclear
when Iran will cross this threshold, but the latest May 2007 IAEA
report suggests that it may have already done so. Mohamed ElBaradei
is quoted in the New York Times on 14 May 2007 as saying: "We
believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich.
From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge.
People will not like to hear it, but that's a fact."
2.18 If Iran is able to sustain this recent progress
it raises the possibility (as stated above) of Iranian nuclear
scientists being able to enrich enough uranium for a nuclear weapon
within one year. But it would be unable to do this using its declared
facilities at Natanz without the international community having
considerable warning of its intentions. It would then have a number
of additional barriers to surmount, not least in designing a warhead,
and in miniaturising it sufficiently to fit atop of their missiles.
Thus, a working nuclear weapon remains at least five years down
the line.
2.19 However, there are also enough "known unknowns"
that the possibility of Iran achieving a surprise breakthrough
cannot be excluded. This could happen, for example, if Iran: (a)
has a parallel, secret and more advanced enrichment capability;
(b) steals or diverts an alternative source of HEU from one of
the many stockpiles located around the world; or (c) acquires
fissile materials or a complete nuclear weapon from another government,
such as Pakistan or North Korea.
2.20 A credible UK policy towards Iran must take steps
to hedge against one of these eventualities, but uncertainty is
a double-edged sword. It is also possible that circumstances arise
that limit the rate of progress in Iran's nuclear programme. Such
factors include: the enrichment technology proving too difficult
or expensive; the denial of key components as a result of UN sanctions;
and political divisions within Iran exacerbating management problems
in the nuclear programme.
2.21 Bottom line: if Iran is determined to perfect uranium
enrichment and build a nuclear weapon it will eventually do so.
Sanctions, censure, export controls, and economic and technological
problems have slowed down past efforts, such as those in Argentina
and Brazil, allowing time for internal changes in governments
to reverse previously resolute decisions to proceed with nuclear
programmes. Could that happen in Iran, too? That question is discussed
in sections 5 and 6 below.
2.22 The May 2007 IAEA report also said Iran had stopped
letting inspectors verify design work at the Arak heavy water
reactor (HWR), under construction and scheduled for completion
in 2009. This is a major proliferation risk as it could be used
to produce plutonium, although Iran says it has only peaceful
purposes such as production of radio-isotopes for medical care.
Plutonium has been the fissile material of choice for most weapons
programmes, as it requires only a few kilogram's for a weapon,
making the warhead lighter and easier to deliver. If Iran did
intend to produce plutonium for a bomb, it will also require a
specialised plant for extracting the plutonium from the spent
fuel. Iran has told the IAEA that it has no plans to build such
a facility and it may be difficult to build one clandestinely,
one that could receive and process the spent fuel rods without
detection. Reprocessing facilities could be on a smaller scale,
and therefore easier to hide, than an enrichment plant. Nonetheless,
Arak has been overlooked in the West's rush to close the uranium
enrichment route. The international community needs to act fast
to secure an agreement with Iran to abandon facilities at Arak
before significant investment raises the costs of closure.
3. IRAN'S
SECURITY SITUATION
AND ITS
NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
3.1 Public pronouncements by UK, EU and US policymakers
and "opinion shapers" too often fail to reflect that
Iran is a complex country. While there are clearly highly reactionary
elements within the Iranian government and the state apparatus
is used to perpetuate human rights abuses, the country has a rich
culture and history, containing people with technological, economic
and political aspirations and understandable fears of foreign
attack. A limited vision can only feed tensions between Iran and
the West. The current nuclear dispute is not the cause, but a
symptom, of a failed relationship. It is this relationship that
must, in the long-term, be improved if further political crises
like the present one are to be avoided.
3.2 Iran's nuclear ambitions are being fed by a combination
of US threats of regime change, domestic politics and regional
security concerns and aspirations. It is widely recognised that
Iran has become more influential in the Middle East since the
elimination of two regional rivals (the Taliban in Afghanistan
and Saddam Hussein in Iraq). The Iranian regime actively cooperated
with the United States in Afghanistan but felt threatened by US
rhetoric, including President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address
in which Iran—along with Iraq and North Korea—were
described as part of an "axis of evil". From the Iranian
perspective, the United States is a hostile power that, together
with the UK, fomented the 1953 coup against the democratically
elected Mohammed Mossadeq, continues to support domestic groups
hostile to the regime (including violent action), and refuses
to recognise the Islamic Republic.
3.3 The Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's populist,
pan-developing world approach to the nuclear issue has raised
his international profile and cultivated nationalist sentiments
at home. For many Iranians, therefore, relinquishing the right
to nuclear technology under the NPT would be seen as a national
humiliation. Neither reformists nor conservatives appear willing
to contemplate such a move. Iran has a history as a regional power,
and its nuclear advances serve as a symbol of Iran's political
importance and its modernity.
3.4 If, as existing nuclear weapon states argue (including
the UK government in deciding to renew Trident), such weapons
confer status and provide security through "deterrence,"
some factions in Iran might indeed find the prospect of obtaining
nuclear weapons attractive. The country is situated in a war-plagued
region (five major wars in less than 25 years). When Iraq attacked
Iran in 1980, subjecting it to the most extensive use of chemical
weapons since the First World War, the international community
turned a blind eye. The conflict cost the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Iranians and remains a major scar on the national
psyche to this day. Iran is located between two regional nuclear
weapon states (Israel and Pakistan), and is encircled by US military
forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Kuwait, Qatar, Diego Garcia
and Kazakhstan, as well as naval forces in the Gulf.
3.5 Views among the Iranian political elite are mixed
as to whether or not Iran should build a nuclear bomb, although
senior religious and political leaders have made public declarations
that this is not their intention. As discussed above, the most
likely scenario is that Iran is positioning itself to establish
a "virtual" or "breakout" nuclear weapon capability—namely,
the ability to manufacture a nuclear device within a short period
of time by virtue of its non-military nuclear technical capabilities
and assets. This "breakout" option would put Iran on
a par with a number of Non-Nuclear Weapon States under the NPT,
such as Brazil and Japan, although unlike Iran, these countries
remain in good standing with the international community and the
IAEA.
3.6 There appears to be a growing consensus among Iranian
elites that mastering uranium enrichment and securing such a "breakout"
capability could enable Iran to achieve several key goals of paramount
importance, including: deterring US interference in Iran's internal
affairs; consolidating Iran's regional status as a leading power;
and sustaining Iranian nationalism and support for the current
regime. The UK, EU and US face a major challenge in seeking to
help Iran satisfy these goals without recourse to a nuclear weapons
capability, especially given that certain aspects of current US
policy are directly apposite to these goals. It might also be
the case, however, that some of these key Iranian goals can be
modified in the light of a new approach by the Western powers—as
discussed in Section 6 below.
4. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
Is a nuclear weapon capability the ultimate goal?
4.1 The assumption that Iran's nuclear programme is a
cover to achieve a nuclear weapon capability is so widespread
within the Western analyst community that it is often taken as
read. It means that success in the strategy pursued by Western
states in the stand-off can be measured simply in terms of preventing
Iran acquiring, openly or illicitly, any dual-use technologies
that will inevitably contribute to this budding capability; hence
the emphasis on insisting on a suspension of enrichment prior
to any negotiation.
4.2 But such an assumption needs to be treated with caution,
particularly in the light of the Iraq experience, when assumptions
made prior to the 2003 Iraq war that Saddam Hussein had developed
useable WMD were found to be entirely without foundation. It is
easy today to forget how widely held these assumptions were, even
by a majority of those opposed to the war. That is not to say
that Iran is not looking to develop a nuclear weapon or "breakout"
capability; indeed we at BASIC believe the evidence, though circumstantial,
does point in this direction. We recommend, however, proceeding
with caution.
4.3 The legitimacy of international action to stem the
tide of nuclear proliferation hangs on the actions of the international
community in regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Too soft, and
in the light of North Korea's testing of a nuclear explosive device,
other potential proliferators may be emboldened to plough ahead.
Too strong, and the non-proliferation regime could be equally
badly affected, as developing countries in particular begin to
lose faith in its central bargain: states without nuclear weapons
pledged not to acquire them, but were free to pursue the peaceful
use of nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control,
while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up.
And there is a widespread and growing perception among States
Parties to the NPT that the freedom to pursue peaceful use of
nuclear technology is under threat and that the nuclear weapon
states are failing to honour their disarmament commitments. If
not addressed, this situation is a recipe for disaster: it will
probably lead to a more unstable world of 20 or more nuclear weapon
states.
4.4 While it is prudent to be strongly concerned about
Iran's potential "breakout" capability, it is equally
prudent to be open to the possibility that Iran may simply be
seeking self-sufficiency in its civilian programme. The Iranian
people do, after all, have plenty of reason to desire this self-sufficiency,
having been let down several times when collaborating internationally
in the nuclear field. For example, Iran remains a shareholder
in Eurodif, which was formed in 1973 by five countries including
Iran, to provide assured supplies of enriched uranium from a single
facility based in and run by France. The company now supplies
around eight million separative work units (SWU) of enrichment
services worldwide, beyond its original partners. In the 1970s
Iran lent Eurodif $1 billion and purchased $180 million of services
from the company. After a bitter legal battle, Iran was partly
compensated for its loan in 1991, still part-owns Eurodif indirectly,
but has yet to see delivery of any material. France simply refuses
to export it.
4.5 Russia's more recent dispute with Iran over completion
of the Bushehr reactor and the delivery of fuel has exacerbated
doubts among Iranians as to the reliability of Russian supplies.
Proposals that Iran rely upon Russian enrichment facilities for
the supply of its nuclear fuel were never really the silver bullet
some thought it might be.
4.6 Thus, any proposals that involve Iranian dependency
upon foreign sources of nuclear fuel, even if there are apparent
guarantees, are not going to curry strong favour in Iran. This
lack of enthusiasm for foreign fuel supplies does not in itself
indicate an Iranian desire to control the enrichment processes
for military purposes. Neither does the pursuit of a strong nuclear
power industry while sitting on large oil and gas reserves—a
state of affairs that is often cited in the Western media as a
reason for questioning Iranian motives. Iran faces a different
energy security calculation than states dependent upon energy
imports, but is heavily reliant on foreign exchange income from
energy exports and has a burgeoning domestic demand for energy.
Iran's failure to develop significant sources of renewable energies
or engage seriously with energy conservation may be lamentable,
but the country is not alone in falling short in this regard.
4.7 The concealment of sensitive nuclear technologies
for 17 years provides stronger grounds for mistrusting Iranian
intentions, although, again, there are some credible explanations
for their uncompromising behaviour. Given Iran's technological
isolation and distrust of its neighbours, it is perhaps not surprising
that it would seek to conceal its nuclear activities for as long
as practicable. Iran would have been concerned about espionage
and foreign interdiction of imports of critical technologies.
There is a conflict of interpretation over Iran's need to inform
the IAEA about the extensive facilities it was constructing, though
the IAEA is clear and explicit in stating that it broke the Safeguards
Agreement in failure to report on key sensitive experiments. IAEA
reports have explicitly censured Iran for failing to declare many
aspects of nuclear fuel cycle activities, particularly in the
areas of uranium enrichment and conversion, and plutonium research.
However, the IAEA also acknowledge that Iran has taken some corrective
actions since October 2003 and the Agency has verified some of
Iran's declarations.
4.8 A similar defence can be made of Iran's networks
of clandestine supply. The Iranians believe that open procurement
of nuclear technologies would be blocked, irrespective of whether
they were for legitimate civilian or for military purposes (something
which is, as discussed earlier, difficult to establish either
way). The formal and informal nuclear sanctions applied against
Iran, along with clandestine interdiction and disruption, forced
them to acquire nuclear technologies, legitimate or otherwise,
from the black-market if they were to develop an indigenous power
industry. They used underground suppliers like A.Q. Khan who sometimes
had more to offer than simply civil or dual-use technologies.
Iran's receipt of blueprints for nuclear weapon designs from the
A.Q. Khan network quite rightly rang alarm bells. Attention has
focused on a 15-page document supplied by the network, that Iran
claims it did not request, that provides partial information on
the process of reducing enriched uranium hexafluoride into a solid
metal and casting it in metal spheres. This is a process that
is only useful for military purposes. The document has been inspected
by the IAEA and is under their seal, but Iran has refused to allow
the Agency to take a copy. There is no evidence that Iran has
used this document in any way.
4.9 Another cause for concern, the IAEA's discovery of
enriched uranium particles, is explained away as having originated
with the equipment supplier. By and large, the IAEA has accepted
this explanation, though the Agency has been unable to confirm
this with any certainty. Iran has also been unable to supply full
information on its imports of centrifuge parts and related technologies,
and this remains the main outstanding issue with the IAEA. Questions
are also outstanding on a number of small-scale plutonium reprocessing
experiments that may have been undertaken by Iran.
Security implications from an Iranian nuclear weapon
4.10 An important recent study (April 2007) by Anthony
Cordesman, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) in Washington DC, looks at possible scenarios arising from
Iranian development of a nuclear arsenal. Two important conclusions
are: (a) Iran will remain much more vulnerable than Israel, given
significant and lasting Israeli superiority in strategic, including
nuclear, forces; and (b) a combination of active and passive defences
deployed by Gulf States, operating alongside US extended deterrence,
is likely to entirely neutralise any advantage Iran may seek from
possession of nuclear weapons.
4.11 Clearly, introducing nuclear weapons into a region
as unstable as the Middle East, involving cultures that have experienced
such enduring hostility and regular "hot wars", is highly
undesirable, and deterrence in these circumstances is unlikely
to be effective in the long run. Equally, the threat, large enough
in reality, should not be exaggerated. Quoting the Iranian President
out-of-context, and interpreting words in particular ways, does
not support the thesis that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against
Israel.
4.12 There is widespread recognition within Iranian security
establishment that moves towards open deployment of nuclear weapons,
or an ambiguous posture mirroring Israel, would make Iran a target.
It would also severely undermine Iran's relationships in the region,
to the point where neighbours may well decide to develop their
own nuclear arsenals, or develop much stronger security partnerships
with the United States. This would entrench the US position in
the region, harming Iranian influence significantly.
Prospects for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle
East
4.13 A belligerent and fearful atmosphere after the Cuban
Missile Crisis in the early 1960s prompted the countries of the
Latin American and Caribbean Region to create the world's first
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty. Since then, three more
NWFZs have been created: the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, covering
the South Pacific; the 1996 Treaty of Bangkok, covering Southeast
Asia; and the 1997 Treaty of Pelindaba, covering Africa. In addition,
Austria (1999) and Mongolia (2000) are single-state NWFZs. A Treaty
creating a Central Asian NWFZ has been opened for signature, but
there remains disagreement over whether it may have a loop hole
over the transportation or deployment of Russian nuclear weapons.
There continue to be discussions (but currently no more) on the
possibility of NWFZs in the Middle East and in parts of Europe.
4.14 The proposed Middle East NWFZ would differ significantly
from previous ones in that it would include a de facto nuclear
weapon state (Israel) and border on another declared nuclear weapon
state (Pakistan). It would also require a transition from past
experience, whereby the treaties established a passive but legally
protected status for countries in the region covered by the NWFZ,
to a situation where active disarmament is carried out. Iran's
nuclear programme would need to be curtailed or controlled to
provide guarantees against "breakout", while Israel
would need to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapon stockpiles
and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. To protect
Israeli interests, and assure its security, such a scheme would
also probably require an extended US security guarantee, to the
effect that it would destroy any Iranian, or other Middle Eastern,
facility that threatened to cheat.
4.15 The goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East has long been
recognised as both desirable and unachievable. Today, it is more
necessary—but less likely—than ever, and could be
made more possible, given courage and vision of the kind that
spawned momentous changes in the previous century (such as the
Marshall Plan, the end of the Cold War and the re-unification
of Germany).
5. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
WITH IRAN
OVER NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION
5.1 Since the 2002 exposure of its clandestine nuclear
programme, Iran has devised at least five proposals which included
provisions designed to assure the international community that
its nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes,
rather than nuclear weapons. In early 2003, the Iranian government
indicated a willingness to negotiate an end to its support for
Hezbollah, its opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,
and possibly its nuclear programme. An April 2003 proposal from
Iran for resolving these differences was ignored by the Bush administration.
Key US officials, including then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice, now claim they never saw the Iranian proposal.
5.2 Later in 2003, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
(E3) agreed to discuss with Iran a range of nuclear, security,
and economic issues as long as Tehran suspended its uranium enrichment
programme and cooperated fully with the IAEA investigation. However,
that agreement unravelled in 2004 when Tehran continued aspects
of its work on developing a nascent enrichment programme.
5.3 Iran then agreed with the E3 in November 2004 (under
the Paris Agreement) to implement a more stringent voluntary suspension.
Negotiations between the two sides began shortly afterwards. Iran's
proposals emphasised a broad regional security approach, including
action against terrorism (indicated by a stated willingness to
reign in the actions of Hamas and Hezbollah, and to see to their
disarmament and integration into the political structures of Palestine
and Lebanon), further agreement to reinforce respect for sovereignty
and national security, and technical and economic cooperation.
Iran's proposals to the joint E3-Iranian meeting in March 2005
accepted the possibility of limiting the country's nuclear programme
by: (a) operating an open fuel cycle (ie no reprocessing); (b)
agreeing a ceiling of enrichment at LEU levels; (c) immediately
converting all enriched uranium into fuel rods; (d) continuing
to implement the Additional Protocol and continuous on-site presence
of IAEA inspectors at Esfahan and Natanz; and (e) confirming a
permanent ban on nuclear weapons, and the enforcement of Iranian
export controls on sensitive nuclear technologies and materials.
5.4 The Iranian proposals in March and April 2005 contained
clear precursors to those that were subsequently included in the
E3 proposals in August 2005. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
as Iranian President was a turning point in relations, and pushed
the Europeans onto the back foot. But it is still not clear if
the deterioration in negotiations occurred as a result of any
change of Iranian policy or because of a hardening of attitudes
by EU negotiators (under pressure from the US administration)
following the election. What is clear is that the talks soured:
the offer from the Europeans was delayed into August, and when
Iran restarted its uranium conversion activities on 1 August 2005
the opportunities for compromise had already diminished considerably.
5.5 The August 2005 E3 offer was characterised by BASIC
at the time as strong on demands and weak on concrete offers.
It showed little willingness to make clear and concrete positive
proposals until Iran had made commitments not to develop its nuclear
fuel cycle activities and to place all nuclear work under tight
safeguards. The E3 proposal failed to pay enough attention to
key Iranian interests, and may have been motivated more by a desire
to appease Washington, which was not prepared to tolerate any
Iranian enrichment, than to finding a solution. The Iranian response
was furious, and had an air of finality about it, pushing the
diplomacy further towards a crisis situation.
5.6 The subsequent P5+1 proposal to Iran on 6 June 2006
was an improvement on the previous offer in two key respects:
it involved all the major parties representing the UNSC (P5+1);
and it was less demanding and included clearer incentives to Iran.
BASIC highlighted seven key aspects to the draft proposal that
was leaked at the time: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060901.htm_en03#en03(a)
the willingness of the United States to sit down directly with
Iran; (b) recognition of the Esfahan uranium conversion plant;
(c) an international fuel cycle centre in Russia involving the
Iranians; (d) a five-year fuel-bank/buffer stock for Iran; (e)
affirmation of Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes; (f) an energy partnership that included investment
in Iran's oil and gas infrastructure, and assistance in energy
conservation and renewable technologies; and (g) a new regional
political forum to involve Iran and other regional states to discuss
security guarantees, and a WMD-free zone for the Middle East.
5.7 Subsequently "Elements" of the P5 + 1 package
were published by the French Foreign Ministry. It is difficult
to know whether this is a summary document or the full proposal.
Made after the Europeans consulted with the United States, it
appears to have diluted several of the proposals outlined in the
draft. For example, the proposed regional political forum to discuss
security guarantees and a WMD-free zone was relegated to a vague
"new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional
security issues". Indeed, the Bush administration only agreed
to support the June 2006 offer after the EU agreed to drop any
security and territorial integrity guarantees.
5.8 The fatal flaw within the final P5+1 offer was the
precondition that Iran give up enrichment before coming to the
negotiating table: giving up leverage with no clear quid pro quo
commitment on the part of the United States or the Europeans.
The Iranian delay in replying was therefore inevitable; it would
require complex internal discussions to hammer out an agreed line
when offered tempting nuggets, alongside an unacceptable precondition
that Iran give up its main bargaining chip.
5.9 The Iranian counter-offer was never made public.
However, the 21-pages had sufficient substance for Javier Solana,
representing the EU in the negotiations and the formal recipient
of the counter-offer, to decline any immediate formal public reaction.
He limited his remarks to saying that "the document is extensive
and therefore requires a detailed and careful analysis".
Official Iranian declarations and reports since then strongly
suggest that the Iranian counter-proposal rejected pre-conditional
suspension of enrichment, but that suspension within the negotiations
would be considered.
5.10 The E3/EU have been in negotiations with Iran over
this issue, on and off, for nearly four years now. It is widely
seen as a test case for European foreign policy after the divisions
caused by the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The November 2004 temporary
suspension of Iranian enrichment was seen as an initial success
for European diplomacy. But when the Iranians restarted enrichment
in August 2005, the E3/EU saw it as an affront to their position,
leading to a more determined stance. While the EU has supported
the targeted, but limited UN sanctions, many EU member states
are reluctant to push coercion too far, not least because they
are worried about handing over valuable commercial opportunities
and essential energy sources to Russia and China. In addition,
opposition to military action is currently widespread within the
EU, even though key leaders (notably Tony Blair and Angela Merckel)
have refused to rule it out, believing the threat to be an important
negotiating tool. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French
Presidency adds a new dimension, and his first published comments
on the standoff suggest a hardening in the French position. On
the 23 May he said "I for my part think one should not hesitate
to toughen the sanctions" in an interview published in the
German monthly magazine Cicero.
5.11 The failure of the US government to attempt any
meaningful diplomacy with Iran or to rule out military action
has also been damaging. US policy appears to be based on the premise
that Iran's further isolation will prompt regime change. Such
a policy is fanciful, almost certainly counter-productive and
no substitute for the proper engagement which is now urgently
needed. US and EU policies that appear to discriminate against
Iran are likely to strengthen domestic support for the present
government and its pursuit of nuclear technology and limit international
pressure on Iran. The present EU-US strategy is only likely to
push Tehran eastwards, building further economic and political
relations with Russia, China and India.
5.12 Russia and China hold powerful positions in this
diplomatic process. Both countries are keen to prevent Iran acquiring
nuclear weapons—they fear Islamic extremism as much as the
US administration does. Both, however, also have strong interests
in spoiling any strong rapprochement between Iran and the West
that might harm their current and future commercial interests
with Tehran. Russia remains committed to building the Bushehr
reactor and has invested heavily in the Iranian oil industry infrastructure.
A more adversarial and distant relationship is developing between
Russia and the West, partly due to renewed confidence in Russia's
own place in the world (bolstered by a much stronger economy driven
by energy exports) and partly by a perception that it continues
to be frozen out by key Western institutions, such as NATO and
the EU. Thus, according to resurgent Russian strategic interests,
Iran plays an important offsetting role to the US power in the
Middle East. Russia and Iran together also hold more than 50%
of the world's known reserves of natural gas, which is widely
expected to grow in strategic importance over the next decade
or so.
5.13 Similarly, China's growing hunger for energy inevitably
determines its foreign policy towards Iran and the Central Asian
states to the north. Chinese officials have consistently called
for a negotiated settlement to the dispute, and appear reluctant
to push coercive diplomacy and sanctions too hard. They are likely
to support efforts that avoid conflict but also prevent the emergence
of a nuclear-armed regime in Tehran.
5.14 If negotiations are not revived, this stalemate
in the UNSC is likely to leave Iran with sufficient wriggle-room
to develop their nuclear weapons capability transparently and
under existing safeguards. Continued allusions by US officials
to the prospect of military action also give the Iranian government
a powerful incentive to double their efforts in this direction.
Should these events occur, the prospect of military action against
Iran by either the US or Israel cannot be excluded. Such action
would be a disaster for global and regional security and must
be avoided. Diplomacy and creative compromise on all sides are
the only acceptable choice. The core diplomatic challenge facing
all the main players is to craft a compromise that allows all
parties claim some victory. Any successful negotiation requires
nothing less.
6. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS,
AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR
SECURITY
6.1 We are often sold the current strategy as if it were
the only realistic course on offer (contrasted with military action
on one extreme and appeasement on the other). In actual fact there
are plenty of possible ideas, themes and strategies that could
make the attempt to prevent Iran's acquiring a weapons capability
more likely to succeed.
6.2 Solutions often require creative thinking. In attempting
to develop a workable resolution those involved need to ask what
they ultimately hope to achieve. Once these goals are established
and parties acknowledge that there are common interests, room
for negotiation can be found, but only with a credible commitment
from all sides. So far, while the US administration has occasionally
tempered the rhetoric in an effort not to alienate its European
allies and Russia and China, it has shown little faith in achieving
a negotiated solution, and little willingness to compromise on
the policy positions adopted and demands made.
6.3 It is clear the US administration is "building
a case" against Iran. What it intends to do with that case
is unclear. But while the situation is dynamic and uncertain,
some of the major underlying issues have remained constant throughout
the crisis.
6.4 The first of these issues is the need for accountable,
farsighted and coordinated problem solving in Washington and the
capitals of Europe—as opposed to the irresponsible, short-sighted
and largely unilateral US-led action that has led to the failure
in Iraq. It would be folly of an even greater magnitude to rely
upon a build up of US military forces within the region to pressurise
Iran to change course and allow that momentum to determine the
choice over military strikes. The US elections of November 2006
demonstrated that Americans are ready for a new approach to national
security. Surveys and opinion polls in Europe also confirm a large
transatlantic consensus for policies that are effective; policies
that reflect a principled and lucid assessment of the best way
to achieve national security goals. There is growing repudiation
of the pre-emptive use of military force, and a desire for US
and European governments to use all the tools in their foreign
policy toolkit (diplomatic, economic, intelligence) to tackle
complex security challenges.
6.5 A second theme is the contrast between the disastrous
costs of an unprovoked attack on Iran and the potential lasting
benefits of a serious dialogue with Iran. There is broad agreement
among military and intelligence experts that there is no good
military solution to this problem. While an attack on Iran would
have disastrous costs and consequences, without achieving the
intended results, the potential benefits of a constructive and
open dialogue with Iran are substantial. Building a direct relationship
with the government and people of Iran is likely to pay off domestically,
for the region, and for the rest of the world.
6.6 A third then is that smart, tough-minded multilateral
diplomacy—of the kind that has just been applied to North
Korea to stop, seal and (hopefully) ultimately disable its nuclear
facilities as part of a grand bargain—works, even in the
most difficult of circumstances. Diplomatic options with Iran
are not only less risky than military options but also more likely
to produce real and long-lasting progress—and are a long
way from being exhausted.
6.7 It will not be easy for the US administration to
talk with Iran—nor for some Iranian officials to talk to
Washington—and any agreement will require both sides to
step back from their red lines and swallow some bitter medicine.
But the elusive middle ground is still available for negotiations
to develop. However, the broad outlines of the negotiation that
has to take place are already known to diplomats on both sides,
outlined in a communication sent by Tehran to Washington in April
2003—although the hard work of devising mutually acceptable
trade-offs has yet to begin. We discuss some of the potential
trade-offs below.
6.8 A final theme is the need to look at the big picture
in the Middle East and globally. A smart, farsighted Iran policy
will help stabilise the region and enable progress to be made
towards some of US and Europe's most important shared foreign
policy goals. Thus, there is an urgent need to halt the escalating
rhetoric and to get serious about diplomatic engagement with Iran
across a range of issues. The US administration needs to openly
recognise that policy, not regime, change is the goal. The cost
of not talking to Iran is unacceptably high, and getting higher.
It is undermining regional stability and global hopes of stemming
nuclear proliferation. While there is no guarantee that talks
with Iran would succeed, the refusal of the US to talk is increasing
the likelihood of transatlantic failure in too many important
areas.
6.9 The P5+1, and especially the United States, must
enter into direct negotiations with Iran without pre-conditions.
In the short-term, we believe the best strategy lies with ensuring
that controls over Iran's nuclear fuel cycle are fair, equitable
and effective. To satisfy international concerns, Tehran should
accept an intrusive nuclear inspections regime going beyond what
is stipulated in its Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, and
even any revival of its Additional Protocol. While it would be
preferable in the long-term for Iran, as well as other countries,
to rely on other, safer energy sources, the P5+1 governments must
recognise that, without evidence of nuclear weapons development,
their entitlement and ability to impose restrictions on Iran's
nuclear programme are limited. In this context, and in the light
of proposed US nuclear cooperation with India (a non-NPT state),
the EU-US insistence that Iran permanently shut down much of its
nuclear fuel activities are not backed by the NPT and appear discriminatory.
It may also reinforce perceptions among Muslims that the US and
EU wish to relegate them to second-class status. P5 plans to update
their own nuclear arsenals also exposes them to charges of hypocrisy.
Finally, states within the Non-Aligned Movement in particular
see Iran as the "thin end of the wedge", and fear that
the US-EU axis will also attempt to restrict their access to nuclear
power technologies. The Iranian government has successfully framed
the disagreement among much of its population and the non-aligned
movement as an attack upon its rights. This has entirely overshadowed
and squashed the more important domestic debate around the costs
and benefits to Iran from pursuing this technology. The US and
EU positions are partially responsible for this.
6.10 Without flexibility on the key issue of Iranian
nuclear fuel production there is little prospect of either reaching
agreement with Iran or, alternatively, building the strong international
consensus for dealing with the Iranian "nuclear dossier"
(see Table 2 for ideas already floated). Since best estimates
suggest that Iran is several years and possibly a decade away
from any potential nuclear weapon we recommend a renewed P5+1
effort to constructively negotiate a more equitable agreement
with the Iranian government.
6.11 Flexibility aimed at closing off Iran's easier routes
to nuclear weapons while ensuring that any remaining sensitive
activities (such as limited enrichment) are closely scrutinized
through rigorous inspections could open up more palatable options
for engagement in the future. This could be assisted by the explicit
identification of those technologies that present greater threats
of proliferation, and an agreement on this analysis. For example,
HWRs and reprocessing plants present more danger, and are more
difficult to monitor, than enrichment activities. If the EU were
to lead on building a consensus around this, in collaboration
with the IAEA, it could make more transparent the need to control
such technologies.
Table 2
IDEAS ALREADY TRIED FOR BREAKING THE ENRICHMENT STALEMATE
Cessation of enrichment (EU3 2003)
Indefinite suspension, no HWR, with LWR for research (EU3
2005)
Continuation, under normal safeguards and Additional Protocol
(Iran 2004-05)
Internationally supervised on-shore enrichment Joint Venture
(Iran, floated 2004-07)
Off-shore enrichment Joint Venture (Russia 2006)
Moratorium on industrial scale enrichment (Iran 2006)
Time limited moratorium on all enrichment and HWR activity
(P5+1 2006)
6.12 The Forden-Thomson plan for breaking the stalemate
deserves greater attention. Essentially, this proposal involves
a multilateral enrichment facility on Iranian soil with the capacity
to provide material for a virtual fuel bank. The sensitive centrifuge
technologies would be "black boxed". For further details,
see BASIC Iran Discussion Paper Series, No.2, "The Iranian
Nuclear Crisis—A Risk Assessment", by Sir John Thomson,
March 2007, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/iran2.pdf The
proposal has merit because it: (a) meets the bottom line of all
sides, enrichment on Iranian soil and no nuclear weapons in Iranian
hands; (b) has robust and effective built in safeguards, which
are more likely to prevent clandestine operations than any other
proposals; and (c) represents arguably the best option in difficult
circumstances. Of course, this proposal risks giving Iran access
to the most advanced centrifuge technologies, and the facility
could be "nationalised" or seized by force at some later
point. But were Iran to do so, its intentions would be crystal-clear
and enable a robust and unified international response—unlike
the situation today.
6.13 An alternative proposal, and one that BASIC has
been advocating for over 18 months, is the operation of a limited
or pilot enrichment facility at Natanz. There would be strict
limits on the numbers of centrifuges and on the amount of time
they would be allowed to operate, as well as an intrusive IAEA
inspection regime to prevent diversion to a nuclear weapons programme.
Again, the risk is that it would allow Iranian technicians to
gain increased knowledge of the enrichment process, transfer those
skills to a covert facility and then to achieve "breakout".
But that risk already exists and grows more likely as the current
stalemate continues. With Russian and Chinese support for such
a proposal it would at least tie Iran to a clear commitment, and
allow for greater unity in the UNSC in the event of a future transgression
by Iran.
6.14 In exchange for international acceptance of either
a multilateral or a highly limited and carefully monitored national
"front-end" nuclear fuel capability in Iran and a precise
and detailed plan of action addressing Iran's economic and security
concerns (see below), Tehran might be expected to: (a) establish
a continuous, in-country IAEA inspections regime with the power
to visit any site, with due regard to Iran's sovereignty and security;
(b) permanently cease construction of the HWR at Arak, which is
a dangerous potential source of plutonium for nuclear weapons;
(c) relinquish any ambitions to reprocess spent nuclear fuel,
which can be more easily diverted for nuclear weapons; and (d)
permanently renounce its rights under Article X of the NPT to
withdraw from the IAEA safeguards regime, or failing that, enact
domestic legislation that binds the Iranian government to a non-nuclear
weapon policy indefinitely.
6.15 In addition to securing some form of enrichment
on Iranian soil, Iran's negotiators will most likely also require
more detailed and specific measures to guarantee the security
of the Iranian state (and the current regime) against external
attack. Engaging with Iran on broader regional security issues
could potentially be very favourable.
6.16 Concrete EU/US proposals for a new regional security
architecture would go far in alleviating Iran's sense of vulnerability.
More than economic incentives, security cooperation has the potential
to not only undermine Iranian ambitions for a nuclear weapons
programme, but also provides the opportunity to discuss Iranian
support for radical groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and,
perhaps, achieve concessions there as well. Iran has said that
it is willing to consider temporarily suspending enrichment if
negotiations progress. The P5+1 should offer an invitation to
a major regional conference on specific security issues, including
a discussion of security guarantees from the United States, while
Iran suspends its fuel-cycle programme as a quid pro quo.
6.17 In the longer term the international community must
aim at solutions that assure Iran and other states that they have
no need for nuclear weapons, by building clear assurances of security
through regional defence arrangements and reformed defence and
foreign policy postures from external powers. Control of technology
transfers and enforcement of agreements could be further tightened.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) needs to be applied
consistently and fairly; reaching out to Russia and China is therefore
particularly important. The informal arrangements of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group need reform; export control information is not
systematically shared with the IAEA or even fully among the Group's
members.
6.18 The economic incentives offered by the P5+1 in June
2006 also need to be enhanced in order to change Iran's cost-benefit
calculus. The lifting of US restrictions on foreign investment
in Iran's oil refinery sector would be one such move. The claims
from US officials that Iran need only improve the efficiency of
its oil sector to achieve the energy savings equivalent to potential
production from a nuclear energy programme are undermined by such
restrictions.
6.19 Finally, the nuclear weapon states must speed up
their own negotiations over the disarmament commitments they made
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, such as the Fissile Material
(Cut-Off) Treaty to ban the production of highly enriched uranium
and processed plutonium, and make moves to reduce their reliance
upon nuclear weapons. Pressure must also be exerted upon Israel
to discard its nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT, and join talks
towards the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
Silence on the Israeli case only serves to strengthen public support
throughout the region for a balancing nuclear power.
6.20 Britain's own decision to renew Trident was directly
and indirectly criticised by other States Parties (and not just
Iran) at the recent NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna.
The UK has missed a major opportunity to lead the way in devaluing
the military, political and symbolic importance of nuclear weapons,
and as a result, the UK government has very little moral authority
to persuade other countries to permanently give up their own pursuit
of these weapons.
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