Further memorandum from the National Council
of Resistance of Iran, UK Representative Office
The aim of this second memorandum is to deal
briefly with the main issues raised by the Foreign Affairs Committee
in its meeting with the NCRI on 6 December 2007.
LEVEL OF
NCRI/PMOI SUPPORT INSIDE
IRAN
The Iranian Resistance has widespread grassroots
support inside Iran, which for reasons of absolute repression
operate underground. However, rather than engaging in arbitrary
assessments of its support inside Iran, the Resistance has repeatedly
called for free elections in Iran monitored by the UN, as it believes
that elections and universal suffrage are the sole indicators
of political legitimacy. If in such elections, the Resistance
does not receive a majority of the vote, then it will participate
in the political process as an opposition party. Although it is
not possible to accurately analyze the Iranian Resistance's support
base until free elections are held, the best indicator of the
Resistance's support inside Iran is the regime's reaction to it.
— Regime's fear of the Resistance:
A leaked secret survey carried out by Iran's Interior Ministry
in 2002 found that, of 16,000 people questioned in Tehran, 94%
said they were opposed to the entirety of the regime and wanted
complete change. The regime is fully aware of the support enjoyed
by the Resistance and fears its ability to organize such discontent.
The regime therefore expends enormous resources to destroy the
Resistance. This is the main reason for the widespread suppression
of the PMOI inside Iran. However, such suppression is not limited
to within Iran's frontiers. The main subject of the regime's diplomatic
exchanges with its international interlocutors is the PMOI and
imposition of restrictions against it, including the terrorist
label. By way of examples, (i) on 26 September 2002, former US
Assistant Secretary of State, Martin Indyk, told Newsweek that
the terrorist designation of the PMOI was due to "The White
House interest in opening up a dialogue with the Iranian Government",
(ii) on 21 October 2004, AFP reported that as part of the package
of incentives given to the regime to convince it to end its uranium
enrichment, the EU-3 stated, "If Iran complies we would continue
to regard the MEK (Iranian Resistance Group) [PMOI] as a terrorist
organization", and (iii) prior to the 2003 Iraq war, one
of the regime's preconditions for non interference in Iraqi affairs
was US-British bombing of PMOI bases in Iraq (see documents 1-3[94]).
— Hysteric reaction to the Resistance:
In July 2003, a daily called "Asia" published in Tehran,
printed a news photo of Mrs. Maryam Rajavi taken by the news agency
Reuters. The daily's editor and owner, as well as his family,
were quickly arrested. The editor-in chief spent 200 days in solitary
confinement (see document [95]).
When Mrs. Rajavi was invited to speak at the European Parliament,
Council of Europe, or has visited Norway or Belgium, the regime
has threatened these countries and even threatened to end the
on going nuclear negotiations.
— Absolute repression of the Resistance:
After the fall (of the Shah the PMOI quickly became the largest
political Party) inside Iran. Despite threats and attacks its
rallies attracted millions of Iranians and its publication had
a daily circulation of 500,000 which was far greater than the
state run dailies. Since then the Iranian regime has executed
120,000 PMOI members and sympathizers including 30,000 in 1988
(see document [96]).
In Iran, PMOI members and sympathizers have no right to life or
property. These sympathizers and their families have not disappeared.
— Resistance's social network inside
Iran: Instead, these sympathizers form part of the PMOI's social
network, which (i) organizes anti-regime protests, in particular
among students, teachers and labour groups, (ii) raises funds
for the Resistance, and (iii) gathers information on the regime's
nuclear programmes, terrorism and human rights abuses. In December
2007, the PMOI declared a students' week in Iran. During this
week, dozens of universities across Iran took part in strikes
and protests. Without an extensive support network at all levels
of Iranian society, including inside the regime, the Resistance
would not have been able to obtain the regime's most important
secrets. Moreover, despite jamming of transmissions and destruction
of satellite dishes, the Resistance's satellite TV channel has
millions of viewers in Iran.
— Resistance's support within Iranian
communities outside Iran: As the FAC recognised, despite widespread
restrictions, the Resistance enjoys s extensive support within
the Iranian Diaspora. Its rallies are attended by tens of thousands
of Iranians who also fund the Resistance.
One recent example was a gathering of more than
50,000 Iranians in a Parisian suburb on 30 June 2007 in defence
of the Resistance.
REGIME'S
EFFORTS TO
TARNISH THE
IMAGE OF
THE RESISTANCE
The FAC referred to documentation provided to
it in Iran, which the regime claimed was proof that the PMOI is
a terrorist organisation. Having failed to destroy the PMOI through
mass executions, torture, bombings and assassinations, the regime's
Ministry of Intelligence has for years concentrated its efforts
on an elaborate, sophisticated and well-financed operation to
tarnish the image of the Resistance at home and abroad. This is
done directly by the regime, as well as through front organisations
and individuals who pose as disaffected former members of the
PMOI. This has been recognised by the German security agency (Office
for the Protection of the Constitution- BFV) and the Dutch Interior
Security Service (AIVD). Examples of proven cases of misinformation
include:
1993 murder of three Christian leaders in Iran
and 1994 bombing at the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashad, northeast
Iran.
The regime carried out these atrocities with
a view to blaming the PMOI. A number of individuals claiming to
be PMOI members were paraded before the world's media where they
confessed to having committed these crimes on the orders of the
PMOI leadership. A few years later, the regime was forced to admit
that its Intelligence Ministry's second in command, Saeed Emami,
and other agents had committed these crimes. In a report on 9
February 1996, UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Tolerance, Mr.
Abdelfattah Amor, wrote: "The Iranian government had apparently
decided to execute those Protestant leaders in order not only
to bring the Mojahedim organization into disrepute abroad by declaring
itself responsible for those crimes but also at the domestic level
partly to decapitate the Protestant community and force it to
discontinue the conversion of Muslims."
ALLEGED CONCEALING
OF IRAQ'S
WMDS
On 12 November 2002, in a three page spread,
including sketches of alleged locations, the Canadian broadsheet
newspaper, "The Ottawa Citizen", accused the PMOI of
concealing Iraq's WMDs. Their story was based on the testimony
of Nowrouz-Ali Rezvani, referred to as a "former leader"
of the PMOI. Mr Rezvani also accused the PMOI of torturing him
and taking part in the killing of Iraqi Kurds. Prior to the publication
of this article, many of the regime's officials made the same
allegation.
ALLEGED PMOI PARTICIPATION
IN KILLING
IRAQI KURDS
AND SHIITES
The Iranian regime and its non-Iranian agents
agents accuse the PMOI of participating in killing or Iraqi Kurds
and Shiites. We bring the following points to the attention of
the FAC:
On 22 August 1995, International Educational
Development—an NGO with the UN, submitted a statement to
the UN Commission on Human Rights containing its findings of an
investigation into the above allegations. It stated,
"We have been distressed because of certain
misrepresentation of events in the area, in particular allegations
made that the MLA has collaborated with the armed forces of the
Government of Iraq inter-alia by participating in attacks against
the Kurdish people in Kurkuk, Qara, Hanjeer, Kifrit and Altun
Kopiar in April 1991 . . .
From our independent investigation and discussion
with parties involved, we find these allegations false . . . Most
of the allegations made against the BNAA regarding the Kurdish
people come from a man named Jamshid Tafrishi- Enginee, who was
cited by people at this session of the sub-commission as a former
leader of the Iranian Resistance. Our investigation indicates
that Mr Tafrishi-Enginee joined the Resistance in 1988, but left
after 19 months with a low rank. In his letter of resignation,
hand-written and dated 23 September 1990, he sites personal problems
and requests leave to transfer to a refugee camp. He then traveled
to Europe where he began to campaign publicly against the NLA.
There is compelling evidence that he is in fact an agent of the
Khomeini regime's Ministry of Intelligence.
In a letter dated l4 July 1999, Mr Hoshyar Zebari,
then head of the Kurdish Democratic Party's international relations
and presently Foreign Minister of Iraq (see document [97]),
wrote,
The KDP as a major Kurdish political party has led
and participated in the Kurdish Spring uprising of 1991 in Iraqi
Kurdistan . . . The oil-city of Kirkuk was liberated by the people
of Kurdistan (peshmerga). When the Iraqi troops counter attacked
and regained control of Kirkuk and other major cities there were
rumours of Mujahedin [PMOI] units assisting the Iraqi troops.
But due to disorder of events and development it was difficult
to establish the truth. However, when . . . the situation was
stabilized, these rumours happen to be untrue. The KDP can confirm
that the Mujahedin were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish
people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have
not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have
exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Mujahedin-e-khalq has its own political agenda in Iran and
its members do not interfere in Iraqi internal affairs."
In a follow up report to the U.N Commission
on Human Rights dated 23 January 2001, International Educational
Development (see document [98])
stated,
"Mr Tafrishi has recently written letters
in which he reveals that the Intelligence Ministry of the Iranian
regime hired him (apparently paying him $72,000 in addition to
trawl and other expenses) especially to carry out a misinformation
campaign about the NLA, with false accusations that the ALA had
itself engaged in violations of human rights or intimidation or
extortion of the Iranian exile community. A number of human rights
organisations were treated to false testimony and government orchestrated
letter writing campaigns. Unfortunately, some of these organizations
may have believed this misinformation."
PMOI'S ALLEGED
MISTREATMENT OF
ITS MEMBERS
IN CAMP
ASHRAF
In July 2005, a delegation of MEPs traveled
to Camp Ashraf charged with the specific mission of conducting
a thorough investigation into similar allegations contained in
a Human Rights Watch report in a more than 100 page Mission Report
the MEPs set out their findings there was no basis whatsoever
for the allegations made against the "PMOI" (document
[99]).
Moreover, in a letter dated 27 May 2005 (see
document [100]),
Col. Phillips of the US Army wrote:
"I am the commander 89th Military Police
Brigade and in that role, I was responsible for the safety and
security of Camp Ashraf from January 50 December 2004. Over the
year long period, I was apprized of numerous reports of torture,
concealed weapons and people being held against their will by
the leadership of the Mujahedine-Khalq. I directed my subordinate
units to investigate each allegation. In many cases I personally
led inspection teams on unannounced visits to the MeK/PMOI facilities
where the alleged abuses were reported to occur . . . Each report
of torture, kidnapping and psychological deprivation turned out
to be unsubstantiated. The MeK/PMOI in fact notified us on a routine
basis of people who desired to leave the organization and then
transported them to our gate . . . To my knowledge, as the senior
officer responsible for safeguarding and security Camp Ashraf
throughout 2004, there was never a single substantiated incident
as outlined in your report . . . Your recent report was based
on unsubstantiated information from individuals without firsthand
knowledge or for reasons for person[al] gain . . . In one case
a young woman requested to leave the MeK/PMOI, but first wanted
to complete her responsibility as a singer in one of the holiday
festivities. One of my subordinate commanders encouraged her to
depart immediately as opposed to returning to her unit. She emphasized
that she wanted to participate as a singer in the festival and
would then depart from the organization in order to return home
to her mother. Several days after the festival we were notified
by the MeK/PMOI that the young woman was ready to leave and we
picked her up from a hotel type facility. The other three females
also voluntarily departed the MEK/PMOI. I never discovered a single
incident where a female or male was held in the organization against
their will, I observed a total freedom of choice on the part of
the member to either remain or depart from the MK/PMOI."
In a letter dated 24 August 2006 (document [101]),
Lt. Col. Julie S. Norman stated that during her tenure at the
Commandant at Camp Ashraf in 2006:
"Normally, PMOI members invite their families,
friends and colleagues who live in Iran or foreign countries to
Ashraf for visits. These visitors are welcomed to a secure environment
and hosted by the PMOI . . . The PMOI has been very co-operative
in facilitating International Organizations requests for family
contacts and JLATF's visits with these individuals . . . In the
cases that the PMOI members question the true intent (concern
over the dissemination of false and /or disturbing information
about Ashraf and its residents) of these requests or that the
Iranian regime are brokering these requests, the PMOI members
may submit their thoughts or concerns in writing to the JLATF
who will forward them back to the respective International organization.
There exists no prison or obligation to stay in Ashraf; everyone
is free to leave PMOI anytime h/she wishes to."
In a witness statement provided to POAC, Benjamin
James Fender, a Foreign Office official stated, "the US authorities,
with support from Iraq, the UK and others, have encouraged the
residents of PMOI camps in Iraq who are free to leave the return
voluntarily to Iran. UK officials have also discussed this with
the Iranian authorities."
The issue is not human rights. Camp Ashraf is
at the centre of a strategic struggle between the Iranian regime
and the Resistance. The regime intends to set up a satellite Islamic
fundamentalist state in Iraq and the Resistance is intent on topping
it. To this end, the PMOI has revealed details of funds, training
and arms provided to Shiite and Sunni militant groups by the regime
to attack Coalition troops, its sponsorship of assassination squads
and vast intelligence network in Iraq. In January 2007, the PMOI
revealed the details of 32,000 Iraqis who are on the regime's
payroll (see document [102]).
In August 2006, The Sunday Telegraph reported the PMOI had revealed
the locations of three factories in Iran mas-producing Improvised
Explosive Devices for use in Iraq and Afghanistan (see document
[103]).
At the same time, the PMOI is raising awareness amongst Iraqis
about the threats posed by Iranian regime. This led to 5.2 million
Iraqis signing a petition in 2OO6 condemning the regimes interference
in Iraq and expressing support for the PMOI. This was followed
by a similar declaration by 300,000 Iraqi Shiites in December
2007 (see document [104]).
Those Iraqi parties and political leaders who are not under the
influence of the Iranian regime including Dr Tariq Hashemi, Iraqi
Vice President, Dr Ayad Allawi, former Prime Minister, Dr Adnan
Dulaimi, leader of Iraqi Accordance Front, Dr Saleh Mutlak, leader
of Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Sheikh Khalaf-al-Ulyan, leader
of the National Dialogue Council and Dr Nadeem Jaberi, have plainly
emphasized that the presence of Mojahedin in Iraq is based on
international conventions based on which Mojahedin are considered
political refugees.
For these reasons, the regime wants to see Camp
Ashraf dismantled and the PMOI out of Iraq. To this end, it will
do or say anything, including carrying out terrorist attacks on
the camp.
Judgment of the Proscribed Organisations Appeals
Commission
On 30 November 2007, the three judges of POAC
handed down their judgment in an appeal brought by a group of
35 cross party members of both Houses of Parliament seeking deproscription
of the PMOI. The Appellants included The Rt. Hon. Lord Slynn Hadley
(former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and judge at the European Court
of Justice), The Rt. Hon Lord Archer of Sandwell QC (former Solicitor
General), The Rt. Hon. Lord Waddington QC (former Home Secretary),
The Rt. Hon. Lord Fraser of Carmyllie QC (former Advocate General).
The Court ruled that the PMOI is not a terrorist
organisation. In its judgment it concluded:
"In the light of the principles applicable
on an application for judicial review, in our determination the
decision at the First Stage was flawed and mast he set aside.
Further, having carefully considered all the material before us,
we have concluded that the decision at the First Stage is properly
characterized as perverse. We recognise that a finding of perversity
is uncommon. We believe, however, that this Commission is in the
(perhaps unusual) position of having before it all of the material
that is relevant to this decision. In our view, that is a requirement
of the 2000 Act and of the procedures adopted before the Commission.
The material available to us is, therefore wider, more extensive
and more detailed than the evidence that is commonly before a
Judge in the Administrative Court."
It was on this basis that the Court ordered
the government to "lay before Parliament the draft of an
Order under section 3(3) (b) of the 2000 Act removing the PMOI
from the list of proscribed organizations".
The 144 page judgment was the culmination of
an 18 month legal process, which concluded with nearly two weeks
of Court hearing. The three judges scrutinised the evidence of
15 witness and more than 20 files of documents. There was even
a "closed" part to the hearing, where the Court considered
in private "secret information" and heard oral evidence
from a British Foreign Office official.
On 14 December 2007, POAC refused the government's
application for permission to appeal, stating:
"The matters identified in the Secretary
of State's submissions and grounds are selective and have been
taken out of context. The Commission has considered the application
in the light of all of the matters set out in both the Open and
Closed Determinations. On the basis of the entirely of the matters
contained in the Open and Closed Determinations the Commission
considers that the Secretary of State has no reasonable prospects
of succeeding on an appeal on the issues identified in the submissions
and the ground."
Documents enclosed[105]
1. Newsweek—26 September 2002 and The
Washington Times—28 May 2003
2. "Preparatory text for European proposals
on Iranian nuclear programme", AFP—21 October 2004
3. "US Bombs Iranian Fighters on Iraqi
Side of the Border—Pledge to Target the Group was made Early
to Assure Tehran of War's Benefits"—17 April 2003
4. "Iranian editor released on bail
a year after arrest" AFP—3 August 2004
5. "Khomeini fatwa `led to killing of
30,000 in Iran'" The Sunday Telegraph—21 February 2001
6. International Educational Development
report—22 August 1995
7. Hoshyar Zebari letter—14 July 1999
8. International Education Development report—23
January 2001
9. MEP delegation—Mission Report
10. Letter from Col David Philips—27
May 2005
11. Letter from Lt Col Julie S Norman—24
August 2006
12. "Iranian opposition group claims
Iran has thousands of agents in Iraq", Associated Press—26
January 2007
13. "Three Iranian factories mass produce
bombs to kill British Troops" The Sunday Telegraph—21
August 2006
14. "Shiites in S Iraq rebuke Tehran"
The Washington Post—22 November 2007
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