Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60
- 79)
WEDNESDAY 23 MAY 2007
DR ALI
ANSARI AND
DR FRANK
BARNABY
Q60 Mr. Keetch: I just want to be
specific. I accept that we do not know everything that is going
on—to misquote Mr. Rumsfeld, we do not know what we do not
know. Given what you know, how quickly do you believe Iran could
produce a nuclear weapon—two years, three years?
Dr. Barnaby: It would take them
between five and 10 years, if they are allowed to carry on as
they are doing. If their nuclear facilities were bombed, that
would produce such popular support for the Government, including
among the scientific community, that it would accelerate their
programme and they could do it within one or two years. If we
allow them to go on as they are going, we will have five to 10
years to negotiate.
Q61 Mr. Keetch: At the moment, it
is five to 10 years.
Dr. Barnaby: Yes. I think that
there is consensus about that.
Q62 Chairman: You are saying that
a military strike could be wholly counter-productive and would
have the effect of accelerating the programme rather than delaying
it.
Dr. Barnaby: Absolutely. There
is a good reason for that. The programme that the Iranians are
developing at the moment is a big programme for producing nuclear
fuel for a number of nuclear power reactors. The programme required
for a nuclear weapon programme, however, is small, so if we were
to bomb them, we would simply encourage them to reduce the size
of their programme and concentrate on producing a nuclear weapon,
which they could do much more quickly than they are doing now.
Chairman: Thank you. We shall now come
to some of the regional dimensions of the Iran nuclear issue.
Q63 Mr. Horam: In so far as we believe
that the Iranians are intent on developing nuclear weapons, how
far do you believe that it is a purely defensive measure in light
of their feelings about insecurity at a regional level?
Dr. Ansari: By and large, it is
a defensive measure. They see themselves as strategically on the
defensive. On the other hand, clearly the achievement as they
would see it—if we assume that they are going in the direction
that you have said—would provide the Islamic Republic and
the regime, particularly the Government and perhaps Mr. Ahmadinejad,
with a certain legitimacy. It would be seen as a technological
advance, and I think that they would try to use it on a political
level regionally. It would empower them.
Q64 Mr. Horam: How would they use
that in those circumstances?
Dr. Ansari: I think of it in terms
of throwing their weight around a little more in the region, which,
as we have recently been told, we have seen them doing in Iraq
and perhaps in Afghanistan. If the technological breakthroughs
are made under this particular Government, it would obviously
empower a particular faction in Iran. They will be seen to be
the ones who made such a great modern breakthrough.
As for the military aspect, anyone with any
sense—even a modicum of sense—in Iran would say, as
Dr. Barnaby says, that as far as the deterrent value or an ability
to have an aggressive posture, the Iranians do not even believe
that, if they went down the weapons route, they could build more
than one bomb every three or four years. It is just not feasible
compared with what the Israelis, the Russians to the north and
even the Pakistanis or the Indians have. They do not see it as
a military option, but as something that stabilises them politically.
I have always said that the nuclear programme
for Iran is what the railroads were for them 100 years ago. It
is a sign of modern achievement, and it gives them a certain sense
of gravitas.
Q65 Mr. Horam: Do you think that
they have thought through the reaction of the other players in
the regional context, particularly the other Arab states and,
of course, Israel?
Dr. Ansari: They do think those
things. That is partly why I do not see them going through the
weaponised route. My understanding also comes from the historical
perspective of seeing what the Shah was doing with a nuclear programme.
The Shah basically always said at the time that he was not going
down the weapons route, but that he would like the option. I think
that that is basically the attitude that the Iranians have. They
say, "We do not want to go down this route, but you never
know—the situation may change. Therefore, let us have the
infrastructure in place, just in case."
Q66 Mr. Horam: Do you think that
the situation will change?
Dr. Ansari: Well, that depends
a lot on the regional dynamic, which is, of course, a lot messier
than it may have been 20, 25 or 30 years ago. I still do not see
the Iranians moving in a direction where they would actively seek
nuclear weapons, unless there were the prospect of an attack.
One of the things that Frank has said very correctly is that,
if Washington adopts a very aggressive posture, it encourages
Iran to go down that route and to say that it must have a deterrent
for national defence.
To feel a little more secure on a political
level, Iran must, of course, be part of the political process,
which is the dilemma that we face. They also have to share in
helping the region to feel secure. They cannot just expect everyone
else to make them feel secure; it is a bilateral process. I have
never encountered anyone, even from the more conservative wing—in
the Iranian sense—of Iranian politics arguing that they
see nuclear weapons as a military tool. I have never encountered
that view.
Chairman: We want to move on to some
of the wider international dimensions of this issue. David Heathcoat-Amory.
Q67 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: This is
a theocratic regime, which has perverted its religion into a kind
of death cult that supports suicide bombing and terrorism in other
countries. I notice that, in their constitution, they explicitly
refer to exporting the Iranian revolution. Can we explore that
a little further, to determine whether they have an expansionist,
aggressive intent, or whether their concerns are purely defensive,
as I think you, Dr. Ansari, thought they were? Maybe Dr. Barnaby
has another angle on this question, about whether they are essentially
expansionist or only concerned about defending what they already
have.
Dr. Barnaby: I would agree with
Ali; I think that they are mainly defensive. In other words, they
feel under attack and that countries have aggressive attitudes
towards them, particularly the United States. They see a need
to be heavily armed and nuclear weapons may, in the minds of some
Iranian politicians, be a way of deterring that aggression.
Q68 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: So the constitution,
which is certainly the most aggressive constitution that I have
ever read, and the preamble to it are just rhetoric and are there
for internal consumption? Is that the case?
Dr. Barnaby: I am not an expert
on the constitution, but from what I know I would say so.
Dr. Ansari: I would probably dispute
some of the assumptions that you came to, but it would probably
take us too long to go through that process. Certainly, the issue
of the export of the revolution has been debated from the time
of the revolution. Even Ayatollah Khomeini himself said that,
"When we meant export, we do not mean export through violent
means". Then again, there are those in the regime, of course,
who do feel that they should export their idea through violent
means.
We stand in a slightly awkward position, given
the situation that we find ourselves in regarding the Middle East
at the moment, because, from the Iranian perspective, other powers
are obviously exporting their own revolution, so that is a difficult
issue to argue convincingly in Tehran. I think it is better to
ask, "Do the Iranians see themselves as a regional power?"
From the historical perspective, I think that one must say, "Yes,
of course they do".
The fact is that the territories of Iraq, Afghanistan,
Transcaucasia, the Persian gulf—they make a point about
the Persian gulf, obviously—are their near abroad. If one
looks historically, these were the territories in which they had
their sphere of influence. As far as they are concerned, it is
the Americans and, to some extent, the British who are the interlopers
in the region. So they obviously see themselves as defending their
interests, by their interference in those areas. It is something
that we can dispute and not necessarily agree with, but the fact
is that that is the perspective in Tehran.
The Iranians would certainly not see their policy
as expansionist. I would say that the analogy is with the way
in which Russia continues to have an interest and role in what
it considers to be its near abroad, in central Asia and obviously
in Caucasia. Those are its old imperial territories. Iran certainly
has a perspective of itself as a regional power, and I do not
think that we can deny that.
Q69 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Does it
see the United Nations as a tool of western interests?
Dr. Ansari: Not until lately.
In actual fact, until the election—I use that word in inverted
commas—of Mr. Ahmadinejad, they saw the UN as something
they could work with. Up until last year, there was a very strong
desire to avoid going to the Security Council. They were clear
about that on the nuclear matters in particular. Since Ahmadinejad
has come in with his new policies, he has been quite flippant
about it all and has turned everything on its head, which, if
you look at the issue in detail, has caused an enormous amount
of controversy within Iran. There was a lot of criticism last
December over the fact that Iran had gone to the Security Council,
which said, "You told us this wouldn't happen, but, lo and
behold, it has happened. Where do we go from here?" I think
that there is a strong section in the Iranian political elite
who would say that the UN is something that they need to work
with rather than fighting it.
Q70 Mr. Purchase: Just a supplementary
on whether Iran is expansionist. It always claims to be totally
defensive, but history shows that it has a wide sphere of influence,
and it previously enjoyed sovereignty over a great deal of the
Gulf. People I know in the Gulf say, "Yes, the Iranians do
not invade us; they merely populate us, infiltrate us and subjugate
us." That is true of a number of people that I know from
various places in the Gulf. That is just the same—isn't
it?—as an armed invasion.
Dr. Ansari: Well, you could say
the same about Americans, couldn't you? Let us call it the Persian
Gulf, for the sake of consistency. In Dubai, for example, something
like 400,000 of the population are Iranian or of Iranian origin.
I dare say that, if they all left, the economy of Dubai would
suffer quite heavily. A lot of the Gulf states depend quite heavily
on their trading relationship with Iran. There is a lot of criticism
in Iran about how much money goes into Dubai. Dubai is widely
seen in Tehran as the private sector of Iran. Whether that is
a military expansion or some sort of imperial expansion, I do
not know. You get merchant communities everywhere. The Persians,
if you want to use that term, are a great merchant nation, and
they are everywhere, even here. You will find that Persian cultural
influence can extend far and wide, all the way to Los Angeles.
I know that there is sensitivity in the Arab world, but some of
the condemnation is, I have to say, from my point of view, playing
to an audience and some is Arab nationalism gone slightly wrong.
I do not think that the Iranians are about to annex Dubai. I cannot
see that myself.
Q71 Mr. Purchase: That would stand
contrary to the view in many Gulf states.
Dr. Ansari: I agree with you.
They say that, but let us look at the reality on the ground. What
would happen if all those Iranian merchants left? What would happen
if all that Iranian money went?
Q72 Mr. Purchase: You might as well
say the same about London. That is not quite a fair comparison.
We are talking about sovereignty.
Chairman: Mr. Purchase, I think you wanted
to continue on sanctions.
Q73 Mr. Purchase: Did I, in fact?
The question is there for debate. It is seriously being considered.
Do you believe that UN sanctions on Iran's nuclear programme would
have a powerful impact or not?
Dr. Ansari: My view is that it
depends on what sanctions are considered. First, it is a question
of getting agreement around the UN, which will be extremely difficult.
But is it quite apparent that the unilateral sanctions being taken
by the United States and the EU are having an effect, there is
no doubt about it—particularly those on the banking sector.
It is quite difficult now to transfer dollars inside or outside
Iran. It is having an effect on the business community. What is
interesting about the matter is not so much that the sanctions
are being implemented, but the threat of sanctions. That leads
to more shifting of money into Dubai, which goes back to your
previous question. It does have an effect, but it depends on what
sort.
Q74 Mr. Purchase: Given that the
Security Council could continue to strengthen the sanctions, do
you feel that the international consensus about that would start
to fail if the sanctions regime were toughened?
Dr. Ansari: There are enormous
difficulties. It is hard to predict what the Russians and, to
a lesser extent, the Chinese will do. I think that the Russians
are unlikely to give support. It is clear that the current Iranian
Government, in particular, are counting on that. If you are going
down that route, it means that you have to be a little more selective
and precise. Basically, it is having an effect. It is a country
that runs on trade. You are cutting the source of its ability
to trade.
Q75 Mr. Purchase: In a slightly different
direction, it has been argued that the United States should perhaps
drop its demand for enrichment suspension and move towards negotiations
without preconditions. What signal would that send to Iran if
it were to happen?
Dr. Ansari: There are two schools
of thought. One is a sense of irony and disappointment. Some elements
in Iran say that, when the previous President was offering all
sorts of things, Iran was ignored, but when a President runs a
holocaust conference, Iran is offered talks. There is a certain
bitterness among elements of the political elite in Iran. They
feel that that is counter-productive.
That said, I have always been in favour of the
Americans engaging Iran on an unconditional basis. That does not
mean that a compromise is made, but just that you start talking.
You can voice your disagreements openly. It is not a problem.
The question is whether the Iranians would turn up. The classic
case is that, when the Americans put tentative feelers in that
direction, the Iranians tend not to show. A real cat and mouse
chase is going on. It is not always clear whether the Iranians
would show if the Americans offered full-blown talks.
Q76 Mr. Purchase: In a nutshell,
you would advocate a pragmatic process of negotiation.
Dr. Ansari: Yes.
Q77 Andrew Mackinlay: I have been
listening closely to what you have been saying. Let us consider
the Americans being engaged or in dialogue with the Iranians,
as EU3 has. The position of Her Majesty's Government is that they
are still the exporters of terror. That is the Iranian regime.
As recently as this month, Prime Minister Blair reiterated that
point. In a sense, I am bewildered. There is nothing to show from
the dialogue that has taken place. Some years ago, Jack Straw
referred to constructive engagement, but we are where we are.
There is no indication that they are prepared to concede anything.
It is the position of the British Government that they are, as
we speak, exporting terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Dr. Ansari: If I were to accept
that premise that they are exporting—
Q78 Andrew Mackinlay: That is what
the Government say.
Dr. Ansari: Let us be honest.
Let us be pragmatic about this; it is not the first time that
we have talked to people we do not like. We have just seen a result
in Northern Ireland. That obviously involved talking to people
who were conducting terrorism. We could talk about South Africa.
There are many different cases. Taking that assumption, it should
not preclude us from opening up different levels of engagement.
Sometimes people take the words "engagement" and "dialogue"
to mean a comfortable cup of tea somewhere. I do not think that
any discussion with Iran will necessarily be amiable. It will
be fairly tough.
The problem with the EU3 negotiations with Iran
was that there was an elephant in the room. It was America. Even
if it was not there officially, it was always in the back room,
and in actual fact the negotiation was not bilateral: it was trilateral,
in the sense that the Europeans constantly had to go back to Washington
to check that things were okay.
The other thing is that the Americans have shifted
position considerably in the past two to three years.
Q79 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes, but my
point is that, as of this afternoon, there is nothing to show
either for the EU3 engagements or for any American change of position.
As of today, the Iranians remain the exporters of terror.
Dr. Ansari: If you want to go
into detail, let me give you a very good and simple example of
how policy incoherence has sometimes made life rather too difficult
for us. A reformist president held out the hand of co-operation
after 9/11, and was rewarded with an accusation of being part
of an "axis of evil". Let us be frank that that makes
life difficult. The so-called moderates in the regime are actually
ill rewarded for their efforts, and we suddenly find ourselves
faced with a hard-line Government.
I have always been one of those who have argued
that the Iranians are responsible for their own politics, but
I also think that in a globalised community we have a hand in
such affairs, and that we should have handled things somewhat
more coherently. I must say that, even in the run-up to the parliamentary
elections in Iran in 2004, when the hard-liners seized the Parliament
through wholly fraudulent means, the EU position and to a lesser
extent the position of the US were both pretty poor. Nobody protested.
I know for a fact that even at the time there were Iranians from
the moderate to the pragmatic who were calling for a response
and saying, "Where are our European friends?" You are
right that to some extent things have regressed, but I do not
think that we are ourselves wholly innocent of the charge of having
failed.
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