Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120
- 131)
WEDNESDAY 23 MAY 2007
LORD TRIESMAN
OF TOTTENHAM
AND NEIL
CROMPTON
Q120 Mr. Moss: Do you therefore agree
with Sir Richard Dalton that the provision of that consular access
to the detainees at Irbil and the release of Jalal Sharafi were
a "very helpful coincidence"?
Lord Triesman: They were certainly
a coincidence. If they improved the atmosphere, they improved
the atmosphere. But I can assure the Committee in absolute seriousness
that there was no such trading whatever.
Chairman: That brings us to the US dimension.
Q121 Mr. Pope: I am interested in
the reaction of our closest allies, the Americans. They had a
US navy fleet on manoeuvres in the Gulf at the time, and it was
reported in the press that the Pentagon offered to adopt an aggressive
military pose towards Iran, perhaps including low flying by American
planes over Revolutionary Guard bases, and that that offer was
made to the British Government. Can you confirm that the offer
was made and that we declined it, preferring to pursue a more
diplomatic route?
Lord Triesman: The United States
had two carrier battle groups—I believe they were the Eisenhower
and Nimitz groups. Each contains quite a large number of ships,
and the two would obviously have sizeable air power based on them.
Their plans and manoeuvres, as I understand it, had been formulated
a long time in advance. In general, such manoeuvres involved them
staying on the Iraqi side of the waterway and inland. In the past,
they have certainly involved them flying over oil installations
on that side of the border, both at sea and inland. We simply
expressed the view—at this stage I would rather go no further—that
low flights, even over the oil platforms, would not be helpful
in trying to conduct the discussions that were going on.
Q122 Mr. Pope: It looks with hindsight
like that was the right call to make. I wonder whether the difference
of opinion between allies has done us some damage in Washington.
A number of articles have been written—I shall get into
trouble if I keep quoting John Bolton, because I quoted him earlier,
but he said that the British response was characterised by a "passive,
hesitant, almost acquiescent approach", and that the Iranians
had "probed and found weakness" in the allies. Writing
in The Sunday Times, Andrew Sullivan said that many of
President Bush's allies "harrumphed" at the pusillanimous
nature of America's closest ally. Can you tell us, from your own
dealings with the American political establishment, whether those
views are widely held by people in the Bush Administration? If
so, is our standing damaged?
Lord Triesman: I have not dealt
extensively with the Bush Administration on this question, although
I am obviously aware of the general track of discussion. There
is no doubt in my mind that we were not in tremendously different
places over what was needed during those days.
I understand that John Bolton takes an entirely
different view about how and when we should deal with Iran. It
is not my view or that of this Government. I profoundly hope that
it is not the view of any major party in Westminster. What we
wanted to try to achieve—it is different from John Bolton's
view of what it is necessary to achieve, as he expresses it—was
the most rapid and effective diplomatic extrication of our people
from a bad place, and that is what we set about doing. I tried
to describe earlier the variety and choices that we made tactically
as we went through it and their flexibility. My feeling, if I
reflect on it, is that were we to have chosen other tactics with
a group such as the Revolutionary Guards in control of our people,
we would probably be having this hearing about how we were going
to extract them rather than whether we had extracted them.
Mr. Pope: Not for the first time, I am
grateful that we are not represented by John Bolton. Thank you.
Chairman: Minister, the important issue,
then, is who was relatively helpful to us at that crucial moment.
Q123 Mr. Purchase: From the FCO's
written evidence, we learn that a number of key capitals responded
to our calls and assisted as they could and when they could. It
would be interesting to find out which states did not respond
to our calls for help. Could you help us with that?
Lord Triesman: I will not go through
the list of those who did, but there is a useful guideline to
what happened. While we were trying to generate support and pressure,
Iran was trying to generate support and pressure, too. We were
all calling people throughout the region and the international
community to generate that support. I think that they were profoundly
unsuccessful, and we were successful. If I was asked about those
who were not particularly helpful—
Q124 Mr. Purchase: Call out the names.
Ms Stuart: Alphabetically.
Lord Triesman: That is not so
hard because it is not a long list, and I can do alphabets. Thinking
of a permanent member of the Security Council, I do not think
that we had as much help from Russia as I would have wished. I
did not expect us to get a huge amount of support from Venezuela,
and we did not. If you look at it in Security Council terms, it
was interesting that the Foreign Secretary's discussion with Foreign
Minister Li of China produced very rapid help and a good response.
In terms of response and pressure, that bilateral effort had been
incredibly successful. It was even the case that some states in
the Middle East which we had not expected to make vociferous offers
of help did so.
Q125 Mr. Purchase: You certainly
got the alphabet right between Russia and Venezuela, but we did
not get much further than that. Perhaps we could go the other
way around. Which countries would you say gave the most help in
persuading the Iranians to be a little more co-operative?
Chairman: It would be helpful if you
followed up this exchange with a written letter to the Committee
because it would be good to know those who were helpful and those
who were less helpful. Would you do that for us?
Lord Triesman: Yes, I will certainly
do that.
Q126 Mr. Purchase: I was not demanding
it to be in alphabetical order.
Lord Triesman: I will certainly
do it by letter. It is important in this context to say that a
significant number of Arab and Islamic states, or the secular
Islamic states—I make that distinction because Turkey played
a significant role in this—were very willing and very vigorous.
At one stage, we were told that Mr. Mottaki was complaining that
one of the reasons he could not speak to us more often was that
he was on the phone all the time to all of those people who were
phoning him.
Chairman: Thank you very much. Now for
the last area, but by no means the least, the media dimension.
Q127 Sandra Osborne: May I take you
to the time after the sailors were released and brought back to
the UK? Can we look at how the media here were handled given the
level of public concern at the time? There was a press conference
and Lieutenant Felix Carman read out a prepared statement in which
he said that those involved had been told by the Iranians that
if they admitted that they had strayed into Iranian waters they
would be released and sent back in a plane very soon. If they
did not admit that, they could face up to seven years in jail,
which may have had something to do with the sailors' reaction
while they were in Iran. More controversially, the MOD allowed
the sailors to sell their stories to the newspapers, which was
met with quite a lot of public comment. Newspapers—presumably
those which had not received the story—were critical of
the MOD in that respect. What was the FCO view of that and was
it consulted in any way about it?
Lord Triesman: I believe that
it was a significant mistake.
Q128 Chairman: On that, there was
a wider issue of Foreign Office policy. Would you like to express
any general Foreign Office view as a matter of policy as to the
desirability or otherwise of serving armed forces personnel selling
their stories while still in Her Majesty's service?
Lord Triesman: I am not sure that
we have a formal policy on what the armed forces and the MOD should
do about it, so I am expressing the view that I take, which I
suspect is probably well shared around the FCO, which is that
it is undesirable. I would make exactly the same point about serving
diplomats or Ministers in the FCO or other Departments. We work
in a very sensitive world. Whether we use the word "negotiation"
or not, these are very intricate, difficult discussions that can
easily go wrong, and future discussions can be hopelessly prejudiced
by unhelpful conduct from the past. For those reasons, I come
to the conclusion that I have expressed to the Committee.
Q129 Sandra Osborne: May I follow
up briefly? You said that it was a significant mistake. Did the
MOD seek the FCO's advice? Is that the advice it was given?
Lord Triesman: I think that Tony
Hall, in his inquiry into the press handling, will probably be
able to set out all that detail, and I hope it will be to your
satisfaction. My understanding—I really do rely on the full
facts being explored in that inquiry—was that the advice
would have reflected exactly what I have said.
Q130 Chairman: On that point, there
is an important issue for the Committee. I wonder, Minister, whether
you could kindly follow up Sandra Osborne's question and let the
Committee have a note as to what consultation took place between
the MOD and the FCO, and on what dates, on whether service personnel
should be allowed to sell their stories.
Lord Triesman: I shall certainly
do that.
Q131 Andrew Mackinlay: On 25 April,
Mr. McCartney, your fellow Minister, told Westminster Hall that
the Hall inquiry would be available in May. Is that still on target?
Lord Triesman: To the best of
my understanding, it is.
Chairman: Thank you. We are now going
to end the public session.
[For Q132 to Q138—See 6th Report of Session
2006-07, HC880, Ev21]
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