Conclusions and recommendations
Japan and South Korea: Regional relations
1. We
conclude that recent Japanese commitments to the international
fight against terrorism and to reconstruction efforts in Iraq
have strengthened Japan's relations with the United States, as
has the two countries' co-operation in developing a ballistic
missile defence programme in response to the nuclear threat from
North Korea. (Paragraph 38)
2. We reiterate the
conclusion in our 2006 East Asia Report that "productive
links between China and Japan are essential for peace and stability
in East Asia". In that Report we expressed regret at the
deterioration of the relationship to, as one witness put it, "the
verge of dysfunctional". We conclude that the successful
visit of Chinese President Hu to Japan in April 2008, and the
agreement concluded in June 2008 between the two countries over
exploitation of gasfields in the East China Sea, are positive
signs of an upswing in the relationship between China and Japan.
We recommend that the Government should continue to do whatever
it can to see that that this is maintained. (Paragraph 46)
3. We conclude that
recent indications on both sides of a wish further to improve
Japanese-South Korean relations are to be welcomed. Given the
important contribution which enhanced Japanese-South Korean co-operation
could make on a number of issues, especially policy towards North
Korea, we further conclude that the continuing capacity of the
Takeshima/Dokdo islets dispute to disrupt Japanese-South Korean
relations is regrettable. We recommend that the Government should
urge Tokyo and Seoul not to escalate the dispute and encourage
both parties to seek a mechanism for its lasting resolution. We
further conclude that the issue of the Second World War "comfort
women"—Korean and other Asian women obliged to provide
sexual services for the Japanese army—remains a painful
and emotive issue for the South Korean public and Government,
and that its importance should be recognised internationally,
including by Japan. (Paragraph 54)
4. We conclude that
there is a realistic prospect of Japan normalising relations with
North Korea, if progress can be made to resolve both the North
Korean nuclear issue and the issue of North Korea's abductions
of Japanese nationals, but that these issues should be resolved
separately. We further conclude that although the number of Japanese
nationals who were abducted by North Korea is small, even allowing
for the highest possible estimate, nonetheless it should be recognised
by the international community that this is an understandably
emotive issue for the Japanese public and Government. Like the
Prime Minister, we extend our sympathy and respect to the surviving
abductees and to the abductees' families. We conclude that the
British Embassy in Pyongyang has played a useful role in bringing
pressure to bear on North Korea in relation to the abductees.
We recommend that the Government should continue to give such
assistance as it can to Japan over this matter, and in particular
that it should encourage North Korea to proceed speedily to set
up the proposed reinvestigation commission, with a view to reaching
a final resolution of the issue and removing this significant
obstacle to the normalisation of North Korea's relations with
Japan. While recognising the importance of these country-specific
sensitivities, we further conclude that, in relations with North
Korea, the greatest interest of the international community as
a whole, including the UK, lies in denuclearisation. (Paragraph
68)
5. We conclude that
the recent moves on both sides further to strengthen the South
Korea-US alliance are to be welcomed. We conclude that the likelihood
of greater convergence between South Korean and US approaches
to North Korea should be especially useful. (Paragraph 76)
6. We conclude that
the growing relationship between South Korea and China is to be
welcomed as a potential factor for stability in East Asia, in
particular as regards the management of the risks posed by North
Korea, and on the assumption that there is no question of the
two countries aligning against Japan. We recommend that the Government
should make clear to the parties that it would welcome an early
agreement on the South Korean-Chinese maritime border. (Paragraph
83)
7. Particularly in
the context of the failure of the global Doha trade round, and
given our support for a strengthening of relations among regional
states, we conclude that bilateral and regional trade agreements
involving Japan and South Korea are to be encouraged, provided
that they do not prejudice economic access to local markets for
the EU nor undermine any remaining prospects for the conclusion
of a global trade agreement. We recommend that the Government
should remain vigilant in assessing the implications of such agreements
for the UK and the EU, and ensure that the EU maintains a similar
stance. (Paragraph 91)
8. We conclude that
North-East Asia is characterised by a set of interlocking and
highly delicate inter-state relationships. While there have been
improvements recently in some bilateral relationships, the region
continues to be marked by a number of historical and territorial
disputes which are potential sources of instability and obstacles
to enhanced co-operation. We further conclude that the states
of the region have a clear common interest in maintaining stability,
in the interests of perpetuating economic growth and enhancing
their international standing. We also conclude that, although
there is no question of replicating European institutions in East
Asia, there are some aspects of the European experience which
might usefully be drawn on in the region, in terms especially
of the mitigation of historical and territorial disputes, and
that the strengthening of standing forums for regularised security
dialogue among regional states would be welcome. We recommend
that the Government should continue to work with its East Asian,
European and US partners to encourage the further development
of regional security forums in East Asia. In particular, the Government
should convey to the US Administration its support for what appears
to be a shift in US policy towards promoting multilateral regional
frameworks in East Asia. We recommend that in its response to
this Report, the Government should provide an assessment of the
development of the various East Asian regional security forums
so far, and in particular of the likely impact of the apparent
shift in US policy and of prospects for the further institutionalisation
of the Six-Party Talks framework. (Paragraph 101)
9. We recommend that
in its work in East Asia, the Government should take every opportunity
to support initiatives aimed at developing a shared historical
understanding between the region's Second World War combatants.
We further recommend that the Government should build elements
of co-operation between regional states into programmes and projects
in the region that it might otherwise pursue bilaterally, for
example regarding climate change or research co-operation. We
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
should provide information on such work as it is already doing
to encourage co-operation between regional states in specific
policy areas. (Paragraph 102)
North Korea
10. We
conclude that the North Korean denuclearisation process in the
framework of the Six-Party Talks is difficult and imperfect, and
that there can be no certainty that it will lead to the elimination
of all North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. However, we also
conclude that the process has achieved a significant degree of
denuclearisation, namely a halt to plutonium production at Yongbyon,
verified by International Atomic Energy Agency personnel, and
significant dismantling of the facility. We conclude that the
fact that the agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks process
are similar in outline to the 1994 Agreed Framework—namely
denuclearisation steps by North Korea in exchange for energy supplies
and security gains through improved relations with the US—suggest
that this is the most effective basic deal for securing progress
in denuclearisation. We further conclude that, by better harmonising
the policies towards North Korea of the states most immediately
concerned, and by increasing the number of states signed up to
agreements and therefore the costs of defection, the Six-Party
Talks format is more effective than bilateral US-North Korean
negotiations, and may also have wider knock-on benefits for regional
security. We conclude that the leading role of China in the Six-Party
Talks is to be welcomed, and that the Government is correct to
identify China as key to North Korean denuclearisation. We therefore
conclude that the Government is correct to support the Six-Party
Talks process, including the priority which the process gives
to denuclearisation over other policy aims regarding North Korea.
(Paragraph 137)
11. Given the difficulties
in the denuclearisation process which arose in September 2008,
we recommend that the Government should make clear to Six-Party
Talks participants that it is willing to assist in any way that
might help prevent any further possible breakdown in the process.
We further recommend that the Government should make clear to
the incoming US Administration that it would welcome an early
commitment to continuing the Six-Party Talks and the policy approach
which they embody. We recommend that, in its response to this
Report, the Government should provide an assessment of prospects
for the international North Korean denuclearisation effort under
the new US Administration, in light of the latest developments
in the process and in the West's relations with Russia. (Paragraph
138)
12. We conclude that
the Government is correct to regard the North Korean case as having
wider implications for nuclear proliferation and for international
non-proliferation efforts. We conclude that it is important from
this perspective that North Korea should be returned credibly
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime as a non-nuclear
weapons state. We further conclude that the North Korean case
highlights important weaknesses in the current NPT regime, and
we recommend that policymakers should draw systematically on the
North Korean case, alongside others, in considering the future
of that regime. We further recommend that North Korea's ongoing
demand for civil nuclear power should be considered in the context
of both the international effort to end the country's nuclear
weapons programme, and current international discussions about
mechanisms for the future safe provision of such power to further
states. (Paragraph 143)
13. We conclude that
the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction (WMD) could provide a strong base of political, technical
and organisational experience for projects reducing the risks
associated with WMD activities in North Korea, when appropriate
political conditions are in place. We further conclude that the
willingness of the G8, including the UK, to consider expanding
the work of the Global Partnership beyond the former Soviet Union
is welcome. We recommend that, as part of the discussions that
are underway on the future of the Global Partnership after 2012,
the Government should consider with its G8 partners—and
especially the Six-Party Talks participants Japan, Russia and
the US—the possibility of Global Partnership involvement
in North Korea. We further recommend that the Government should
encourage Global Partnership participants who are also participants
in the Six-Party Talks to begin to explore the same possibility
with their North Korean interlocutors. (Paragraph 150)
14. We conclude that
North Korea appears to retain an active ballistic missile programme.
We further conclude that there is evidence that international
efforts to deny North Korea both assistance and customers for
its missile programme appear to be having some effect. We recommend
that the Government should continue to work with its international
partners to deny North Korea missile-related materials, equipment,
technology and overseas sales. We further recommend that, in its
response to this Report, the Government should provide an updated
assessment of the impact of current international measures against
North Korea's missile programme, including the transport of North
Korean missiles and missile components overseas. (Paragraph 161)
15. We conclude that
the North Korean regime is one of the worst human rights abusers
in the world, that its human rights practice is an affront to
the international community, and that the main reason that the
issue is not the subject of a larger international outcry is because
it remains too little known. We conclude that the work of the
FCO in attempting to address North Korean human rights, both bilaterally
and with international partners, is to be commended. Although
we conclude that human rights abuses are deeply linked to the
nature of the North Korean regime, we recommend that the Government's
efforts to address North Korea's human rights abuses should avoid
language which Pyongyang might construe as threatening, and should
be couched in terms of reference to specific obligations under
international instruments to which North Korea has signed up.
We further recommend that enabling the acquisition of more human
rights information from inside North Korea should be a major goal
of the Government's work, and that efforts should focus in particular
on securing access for the UN Special Rapporteur. We further recommend
that the Government should seek to co-ordinate its work on North
Korean human rights with that of the South Korean Government,
as Seoul's new willingness to raise human rights issues with Pyongyang
may come to represent an important strengthening of the international
effort in this field. (Paragraph 175)
16. Given the failure
of UN mechanisms so far to achieve any significant improvement
in North Korea's human rights practice, we conclude that the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) which North Korea is to undergo at the UN
Human Rights Council in December 2009 offers a major opportunity
to advance the international effort to secure improvements in
North Korean human rights, as well as to establish the credibility
of the UPR process. We recommend that the Government should engage
actively with Pyongyang and with international official and non-governmental
partners to ensure that the potential of North Korea's UPR process
is realised to the maximum extent possible. (Paragraph
178)
17. We conclude that
North Korea's longstanding food shortage is an avoidable human
tragedy and a matter of the gravest concern. Provided that conditions
are felt to be in place that ensure the receipt of aid by the
most needy, we recommend that the international community should
do everything possible to respond to the food shortage. We conclude
that the recent resumption of US food aid and expansion of World
Food Programme access and monitoring in North Korea are to be
welcomed. We recommend that the Government should point to the
ongoing food crisis when discussing with North Korean interlocutors
the possible advantages of further economic modernisation and
international opening. (Paragraph 190)
18. We conclude that
China is in breach of its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention
as regards its treatment of North Korean emigrants—specifically,
its failure to allow them access to a determination-of-status
process, and its practice of repatriation without ensuring that
deportees will not be subject to persecution, torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in North Korea. We
further conclude that China's practice as regards North Korean
emigrants places them in a distressing and dangerous situation.
Especially given its view that North Koreans in China include
people who are not economic migrants, we recommend that the Government
should press harder on the issue of Beijing's treatment of North
Korean emigrants, in its bilateral dealings with China, at EU
level, and at the UNHCR. We recommend that in this effort the
Government should prioritise the aims of: halting forced deportations
from China to North Korea; securing access to the Chinese/North
Korean border region for the UNHCR; and seeing the development
in China of a legal regime allowing the regularisation of the
status of North Koreans there, and above all of children with
a North Korean parent. We recommend that in its response to this
Report, and again in its 2008 Human Rights Annual Report, the
FCO should report on the progress being made towards these aims.
We further recommend that the Government should ensure that the
issue of Beijing's treatment of North Korean emigrants is raised
effectively as part of China's Universal Periodic Review process
at the UN Human Rights Council in 2009. (Paragraph 209)
19. Given what appears
to be rising interest in South Korea in pressing the issue of
China's treatment of North Korean emigrants, and given South Korea's
intimate connection with North Korea and its relationship with
China, we recommend that the Government should consult on policy
regarding North Koreans in China with the Government in Seoul.
(Paragraph 210)
20. We conclude that
the growing outflow of North Koreans from North Korea is creating
an emigrant population in several parts of Asia whose human rights
are systematically vulnerable. We recommend that the FCO should
ensure that its Posts in relevant locations are aware of the issue
and ready to assist both the individuals concerned and host Governments
as needed. (Paragraph 214)
21. We conclude that
the absence of market reform in the official North Korean economy
contributes to the international risks which the regime represents,
by failing to generate incentives for improved relations with
the West, and by fuelling the regime's need to generate income
from sales of weapons and illegal goods in the absence of alternative
exports. We further conclude that, although the forces working
against economic reform in North Korea are powerful, the Government
should not assume that there is no possibility at all of more
meaningful reform under the present regime. We recommend that
the Government should remain alert so as to identify and cultivate
any elements in the regime which may be open to further economic
reform. (Paragraph 228)
22. Given North Korea's
possession of WMD materials, we conclude that the degree of uncertainty
surrounding possible future political developments in the country
is worrying. We conclude that, given the lessening in the regime's
social control since North Korea's last leadership succession,
and the apparently enhanced likelihood that Kim Jong-il is suffering
from health problems, the international community should have
a set of co-ordinated plans in place for sudden change in the
situation in North Korea. We further conclude that, although the
parties to the Six-Party Talks would be the lead states in any
international response, the UK and the EU would be likely to be
called upon to assist and would have an interest in doing so.
We appreciate that there are reasons why it may be sensible not
to discuss plans in public, but we recommend that in its response
to this Report, the Government should provide assurance that such
planning is being undertaken. (Paragraph 234)
23. We conclude that
a breakdown in relations between North and South Korea would bring
to an end opportunities for valuable human contacts, and increase
insecurity on the Korean peninsula. We further conclude that it
is legitimate for South Korea to attach conditions to its co-operation
with the North. We recommend that the Government should continue
to support North-South engagement. (Paragraph 250)
24. We conclude that
the current arrangements for the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)—which
allow South Korean firms to escape the International Labour Organisation
standards to which they are subject at home, while providing non-transparent
transfers of hard currency to the North Korean regime—are
far from ideal. However, we also conclude that the contact between
North and South Koreans, and exposure of North Koreans to South
Korean business practices, which take place at the KIC are to
be welcomed; and that the KIC offers much better pay and working
conditions than are available elsewhere in North Korea. We recommend
that the Government should seek to use the leverage which is afforded
by South Korea's wish to see the KIC included in the South Korea-EU
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to encourage improvements in the position
of workers at the KIC, within a context of what is realistically
achievable, and without jeopardising either the FTA or the continued
operation and expansion of the Complex. (Paragraph 268)
25. We conclude that,
while the UK is not in the frontline of the international effort
to secure North Korea's denuclearisation, it occupies a special
position as a close US ally which has diplomatic relations with
Pyongyang. Especially given the difficulties into which the denuclearisation
process ran in August-September 2008, we recommend that the Government
should ask both North Korea and the US whether, coming to the
process as a fresh element, it could facilitate any meetings which
would help to strengthen the process. (Paragraph 273)
26. We conclude that
the Government is correct to make the aim of exposing North Korea's
people to alternative ways of life its top policy goal with regard
to engagement with that country. However, we also conclude that
the restrictions on relations which the Government has introduced,
to try to leverage progress on denuclearisation and human rights,
may be undercutting this goal. We recommend that the Government
should think more creatively about ways in which it might increase
contacts with North Koreans without simply benefiting the regime's
elite. We recommend that the FCO should discuss with interested
higher education institutions possibilities for hosting North
Korean students. (Paragraph 287)
27. We conclude that
the work that the British Council is doing in North Korea is to
be commended. We recommend that the British Council should expand
its work there if possible. (Paragraph 288)
28. We conclude that
the existence of a British Embassy in Pyongyang brings diplomatic
benefits to the UK, in terms of both bilateral dealings with North
Korea and the UK's position in regional and international North
Korea policy, and we recommend that its staffing and resources
should reflect its value. (Paragraph 290)
29. We conclude that
the UK's participation in the UN Command Military Armistice Commission
represents an important British commitment to peace and security
on the Korean peninsula, and we recommend that it should be maintained.
(Paragraph 296)
30. We conclude that
although there had been some risk of a disjunction opening up
between the evolution of the bilateral South Korean-US military
relationship and the formal responsibilities of the wider UN Command
for peace and security on the Korean peninsula, under UN Security
Council Resolution 84 and the Armistice Agreement, the UN Commander
and his team are making efforts to avoid this risk, and that this
is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should participate
actively in UN Command preparations for the transfer of operational
wartime command to South Korea in 2012. (Paragraph 305)
31. We conclude that
the Government's continued willingness to send officers to serve
in the UNCMAC Joint Duty Office and at the UNC Rear Headquarters
in Japan is a welcome expression of the UK's commitment to the
UN Command. We conclude that the agreement reached among the Command's
participating states to ensure the continued provision of an international
officer at Rear Headquarters is to be particularly commended.
(Paragraph 306)
Japan and South Korea: International roles
32. We
conclude that Japan has offered valuable support to the international
community through its very generous funding of peacekeeping and
reconstruction activities, not least in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We further conclude that the Japanese Government has displayed
political courage in deploying Japanese ground and air forces
to Iraq, and Japanese naval forces to assist in refuelling coalition
vessels conducting operations in the Indian Ocean, and that these
deployments are to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government
should continue to engage with Japan as a co-operative partner
in promoting international security and the fight against terrorism,
and to encourage Japan to expand its participation in UN peacekeeping
and international military missions as far as permitted by its
Constitution to do so. (Paragraph 326)
33. We conclude that
South Korea's growing willingness and ability to deploy its forces
in international peacekeeping and peace support operations are
to be welcomed. We further conclude that South Korea continues
to make valuable contributions to the international efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq in which the UK is also engaged. We recommend
that the Government should continue to encourage South Korea to
participate more extensively in international peacekeeping and
peace support operations and to enhance its capacities to do so.
(Paragraph 333)
34. We recommend that
the Government should, with its EU partners, continue to work
with Japan to develop a common approach on developing realistic
proposals for a reduction in emissions and other measures to tackle
climate change. (Paragraph 341)
35. We conclude that
recent signs that South Korea is coming to see efforts to mitigate
climate change as a potential source of growth, not an obstacle
to it, are greatly to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government
should continue to encourage South Korea to develop its efforts
against climate change, focusing on the potential which the development
of "green" technologies offers for the country to exploit
its industrial and technological strengths to boost growth and
reduce energy dependence, but still aiming to secure a concrete
national emissions reduction commitment which would help towards
the achievement of a global Kyoto successor agreement in 2009.
We recommend that the Government should ensure that British companies
are aware of opportunities for climate change-related projects
which open up in South Korea. We further recommend that in its
response to this Report, the Government should update us on progress
regarding the implementation of the bilateral Memorandums of Understanding
on climate change co-operation which were signed in May 2008.
(Paragraph 351)
36. We conclude that
Japan continues to play a positive role with regard to development
issues. We recommend that the Government should continue to work
with Japan in the G8 and other forums to press for the implementation
of the Millennium Development Goals. (Paragraph 357)
37. We conclude that,
from a low base, South Korea's growing willingness and capacity
to contribute to overseas development assistance are to be welcomed.
We further conclude that the Government is correct to encourage
and co-operate with South Korea in this area and recommend that
it should continue to do so, as an opportunity to shape the development
practice of a potentially important donor. (Paragraph 360)
38. We conclude that,
although the process of United Nations reform is currently stalled,
the Government is right in principle to support Japan's case for
a permanent seat on the Security Council, on grounds of Japan's
economic strength, size of population, commitment to democracy,
and ability to make continuing contributions to the finances and
work of the United Nations. (Paragraph 364)
39. We conclude that
South Korea's support for the UN and for UN reform is to be welcomed.
We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage
South Korea to enhance its tangible commitment to the UN. We further
recommend that the Government should seek to engage South Korea
fully with the UK's ideas for UN reform. (Paragraph 368)
40. We conclude that
support for whaling is culturally entrenched in Japan, and that
this state of affairs is unlikely to alter in the short term.
We further conclude that, notwithstanding this, the Government
is right to lobby its Japanese counterparts vigorously on this
issue, and to pursue all means at its disposal of dissuading the
international community from turning back the clock in relation
to the protection of whales. (Paragraph 375)
Human rights in Japan and South Korea
41. We
conclude that, although there is undoubtedly a high level of public
support for the death penalty in Japan, the moratorium on its
use in 2005-06, under Justice Minister Sugiura, demonstrates that
the Japanese Government is not necessarily immovable on this subject.
We recommend that the Government should continue to convey its
views on the death penalty to Japan, both directly and through
EU channels; and that it should encourage the Japanese Government,
if it remains committed to the death penalty, to reform the system
so as to eliminate the unnecessary secrecy and arbitrary delay
to which attention has been drawn by the UN Committee against
Torture. (Paragraph 387)
42. We conclude that
South Korea's 10-year record as a non-user of the death penalty
is to be welcomed. While we recognise that the issue is subject
to considerable domestic debate in South Korea, we recommend that
the British Government should continue to encourage the new Administration
and National Assembly in Seoul to move to formal abolition, as
one of the priorities in the Government's human rights work with
South Korea. We further recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government should update us on prospects for passage
of abolitionist legislation in the new National Assembly. (Paragraph
395)
43. We conclude that
there is compelling evidence that the 'substitute prison' or daiyo
kangoku system in Japan involves significant breaches of the rights
of suspects, and is likely to lead to miscarriages of justice.
We further conclude that the reforms to the system introduced
in 2006 are to be welcomed, but that there remains cause for concern.
We recommend that the Government should continue to press Japan
to modify the daiyo kangoku system to ensure that detention procedures
are consistent with its obligations under human rights law, and
in particular to ensure that interrogations are subject to some
degree of external monitoring in order to prevent abuses. (Paragraph
402)
44. We conclude that
South Korea has recorded major improvement in its human rights
observance since the advent of democracy two decades ago. We welcome
this. We further conclude that despite these significant improvements,
several human rights concerns remain, such as the policing of
demonstrations, the scope of free speech on the internet and the
rights of migrant workers. However, we recognise that these issues
also pose challenges to many other open societies, including the
UK. We recommend that, in a spirit of partnership, the Government
should continue to encourage South Korea to address human rights
concerns and to ensure that human rights are safeguarded in new
legislation and its implementation, prioritising the rights of
migrant workers, the development of alternatives to military service,
and reform of the National Security Law. We further recommend
that the Government should update us on the steps which it is
taking in these areas in its response to this Report. (Paragraph
408)
The UK and Japan and South Korea
45. We
conclude that the UK's trading relationship with Japan is of great
importance to both countries. We recommend that the Government
should continue actively to encourage British companies to seize
the long-term gains that the huge Japanese market offers, despite
the initial difficulties of penetrating that market. We further
conclude that the FCO is to be commended for its pro-active approach
in encouraging Japanese inward investment in the UK, and in particular
for its recent successful intervention to ensure that the implementation
of the points-based visa system did not act as a disincentive
to Japanese investors. (Paragraph 417)
46. We conclude that
the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement which is currently under
negotiation is a potentially effective means of securing further
opening of the South Korean economy and improved access for UK
firms, and that its early and successful finalisation would be
of great benefit to the UK and South Korea. We further conclude
that the FCO is correct to identify the services sector as a key
target for further liberalisation under the planned agreement.
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO update
us on progress in the negotiations, especially as regards access
to South Korea's services markets. (Paragraph 425)
47. We conclude that
the economic, commercial and research ties which have developed
between South Korea and the UK are to be welcomed, and that the
work in this respect of UKTI, the Seoul Embassy and other relevant
bodies is to be commended. We further conclude that, given South
Korea's level of development and rate of growth, and the existence
of generally positive sentiment towards UK partners, there is
considerable potential for the further development of such links.
In this context, we conclude that the lack of UK Ministerial representation
at President Lee's inauguration was regrettable. While we welcome
the recent Ministerial and other visits to Seoul from the UK that
have taken place and are planned, we conclude that a visit by
an FCO Minister, and the Foreign Secretary in particular, with
a significant economic component to the trip, would be appropriate,
in South Korea's 60th anniversary year, and as the South Korea-EU
Free Trade Agreement is being negotiated. We recommend that the
FCO should take every opportunity with its South Korean partners
to identify an early opportunity for such a visit. We further
conclude that the FCO and the Department for Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform should increase the ability of our Embassy
to support British business opportunities in South Korea. (Paragraph
430)
48. Given
the economic and strategic importance which the Government attributes
to East Asia, and noting the Minister's acknowledgement of the
value of university-level specialist regional capabilities, we
conclude that the Government should take steps to avert any risk
of East Asian studies in the UK again facing a crisis. As the
initial Government core funding for the White Rose East Asia Centre
is due to expire in 2011, we recommend that the Government should
start now to consult with relevant partners in the university
and private sectors with a view to developing follow-on core funding
that will allow, as a minimum, the maintenance of UK university-level
research and teaching on East Asia at its current level. We further
recommend that the Government should ensure that public support
for the development of regional language and other skills does
not focus unduly on China but gives due weight to Japan and Korea,
as important economies and cultures in their own right and vital
components of China's regional environment
.
(Paragraph 437)
49. We
conclude that the FCO's practice of ensuring that the UK sends
Ambassadors to Japan and Korea who speak the language of their
host state is to the UK's diplomatic advantage. We recommend that
the FCO should continue this practice. (Paragraph
440)
50. We
recommend that in its reply to this Report, the Government should
set out its assessment of the scope for expanding the British
Council's role as a provider of English-language teaching in Japan,
to cater for the large market of young people seeking English-language
skills. We further recommend that the Government should continue
to make efforts in its cultural promotion work in Japan to emphasise
the UK as a modern, creative, technologically advanced country,
and that it should, where appropriate, utilise the UK's status
as Olympic host nation in 2012 as way of highlighting this. We
conclude that the British Council in Japan is to be commended
for its emphasis on working with young people to deal with the
challenges of climate change.
(Paragraph 445)
51. We
conclude that the British Council is correct to identify the potential
for increase in the take-up of UK education services among South
Koreans, especially in light of the Lee Administration's push
to enhance English language provision in South Korea's state schools.
We recommend that the British Council should continue to pursue
these opportunities, while ensuring that UK universities are aware
of the need to demonstrate the value of UK study in a tough South
Korean market. We further recommend that, inasmuch as resources
allow, the British Council should seek to increase its British
cultural promotion work in South Korea, since the existence of
a modern and dynamic cultural profile will contribute to the attractiveness
of the UK educational offer. Given South Korea's history as an
Olympic host nation and its strong showing at the 2008 Games,
we recommend that the British Council should consider capitalising
on the approach of the 2012 London Games as a means of giving
focus to this objective. (Paragraph 455)
52. We recommend that
BBC World television should continue to seek opportunities to
increase its distribution in South Korea. (Paragraph 457)
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