Submission from the Council of the British
Association for Korean Studies
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
In 2006, the British Association for Korean
Studies was asked to comment on the emergence of China ("The
Emergence of the People's Republic of China as a Regional Power
and Its Impact on the International System", statement prepared
20 April, 2006).
Much of what we said then is relevant to your
query regarding Korea and Japan.
Although the past is not a certain guide to
the future, it is the only guide we have. In order to understand
the "global security" of Korea and Japan in contemporary
times, we must clarify the nature of the historic cultural and
political system of East Asia and look there to see what patterns
there are. An examination of the East Asian past reveals the following
general patterns:
(1) East Asia (comprising China, Korea, Japan,
Vietnam, Tibet, and Mongolia) is a coherent cultural and political
sphere which has the area of "China" as its cultural,
political, and economic centre.
(2) When "China" is strong and stable,
the region as a whole is stable.
(3) When "China" is weak and internally
divided, the region as a whole is embroiled in war.
(4) Contiguous areas to this core region such
as Vietnam and Korea have long been self-aware of their socio-political
context, and traditionally have developed schemes to accommodate
Chinese power, while at the same time maintaining independence
and sovereignty.
(5) Japan has historically been in and out of
the Sinitic (Chinese) sphere. That is, its history has not been
patterned along the lines of a centralised state, because it has
the advantage of being an island and therefore it did not need
to create and maintain a Sinitic-style bureaucracy to mobilise
defences against land-based military threats. Korea has had this
necessity and that is why it did not descend into feudalism as
did Japan.
THE CULTURAL
AND HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND—CHINA
Chinese culture is the oldest continuous culture
on Earth, having a literary and canonical tradition (largely based
upon Confucian thought) stretching back to the fifth century BC.
Even today, the literary works which constitute this canonical
tradition can be read easily. Such accessibility to classical
thought and ideas has produced an extraordinary continuity in
literature and historical writing in the region so that ancient
aesthetic, philosophical, social, and historical views have been
created and re-created over millennia. General social, economic,
and political views, as well as views and observations about neighbouring
peoples, became firmly established by the second or third century
AD and have accompanied, if not motivated, the successive drives
to unify politically the mainland under bureaucratic autocracies.
Confucianism, the predominant philosophical
mode of East Asia, defined individuals as social entities, elaborated
an extensive moral system which limited governmental power, and
presented an economic system focused on concepts of national co-operative
activity to ensure general popular subsistence. As a consequence
of Confucian ideology, politics have been dominated by political
responsibility being vested in a regularised, bureaucratic institution
recruitment into which has been determined by objective examinations,
which in turn led to the creation of a non-feudal élite
class (the so-called literati bureaucrats). Attempts to establish
feudalistic aristocratic dominance over the "Chinese"
state have been quashed, dynastic rulers preferring intellectual
attainment over birth, defining status almost solely in terms
of performance in the civil service examinations. We may style
this system of governance as a "meritocratic" system.
Over the past two millennia, the key economic
zones of the world have always included China. For most of the
past two millennia, the Chinese economy was the most advanced
in the world, triggering the onset of globalisation through the
"Silver-for-Silk Trade". The scale of the Chinese economy
has usually dwarfed all others, containing within its domestic
sphere nearly every known agriculturally productive ecological
niche, often possessing the world's most advanced technology,
and using transport systems rivalled elsewhere only in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Although the standard of living in the Yangtze
River valley seems to have been on a par with northwestern Europe
until about 1800, from the mid- to late 19th century, Western
views of China have been blinded by a European obsession with
its own growth, and from the actual decline and collapse of one
of the world's greatest political and economic powers, the Qing
dynasty (1616-1911) of China. From the mid-19th century to the
mid-20th century, China passed through another period of "dynastic
change". However, by the end of the 20th century, it had
again embarked on a stable growth path which will probably take
it through most of this century and beyond.
THE CULTURAL
AND HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND—KOREA
AND JAPAN
Naturally, the brilliance of "Chinese"
civilisation has had a profound impact on neighbouring nations,
especially "Korea" and "Japan" which—not
appearing as viable, coherent political entities until the fifth
("Korea") and the seventh ("Japan") centuries,
benefited from nearly a millennia of advanced "Chinese"
civilization. The differences in socio-political organisation
among these three countries can be placed on a spectrum from "meritocratic"
(China) to "mixed meritocratic/aristocratic" (Korea)
to "aristocratic" (Japan). These differences deeply
affected traditional politics and helped create centralised, bureaucratic
states in China and Korea and feudal anarchy in Japan. Only from
the late 19th century has Japan moved towards a more meritocratic
recruitment model.
Although their heritages differed, the three
countries are now in the midst of a historical convergence and
can be expected to share and expand their mutual understanding
of bureaucratic/technocratic management. This convergence along
pragmatic lines also means that full-scale military conflict between
them is unlikely. If they are now internally stable and prosperous,
how might they be expected to interact?
EAST ASIAN
INTERACTIVE DYNAMICS
Each of the nations of East Asia perceived that
they had a particular place within the common East Asian cultural
sphere, and were perceived in turn by the Chinese to have a certain
place within it. Partly, this has been the result of geographic
propinquity. Koreans have long shared a land border with China
and have accommodated themselves over the centuries to this fact.
Japan is an island, and thus could join the Chinese socio-political
ambit when it suited their purposes. This does not mean that the
Japanese have not adapted Chinese civilization, quite the reverse.
But it does mean that Chinese culture has been made to fit Japanese
circumstances much more than has been the case of Korea.
The Emperor of China was considered to be the
Son of Heaven and the symbolic centre of the East Asian socio-political
system, which was composed of a series of hierarchical relationships
amongst the nations based upon a model of ideal family relations.
This idea of a "family" of nations derives from Confucian
philosophy. The emperor's mandate to rule his nation ("China")
was dependent on his ability to keep the peace and to satisfy
the subsistence needs of his subjects—an idea deriving from
the thought of the classical Confucian philosopher Mencius (372-289
BC).
The rulers of Korea in "traditional times",
however, never presumed to refer to themselves as "emperor",
but only as "king". This usage reflects the fact that
although the Korean élite thought of themselves as "equal"
participants in East Asian civilisation, their socio-political
position in the family hierarchy was perceived to be that of a
younger brother to an elder brother. To do otherwise, would have
implied that they were making a political claim that would have
invited unnecessary Chinese interest and subsequent interference.
In terms of pure power, the Koreans have presented
the Chinese over the centuries with both a loyal ally and a determined
resistor to political assimilation. Korean policy towards China
has always been a negotiated activity, either on the battlefield
as is the case with the ancient kingdoms of Koguryo± (4c
AD) and Silla (7c AD), or by political accommodation sufficient
to keep the Chinese out of Korean affairs as was the case with
the kingdoms of Koryo± (918-1392) and Choso±n (1392-1910).
From the late seventh century to the present, the Chinese have
rarely sought to control Korean territory, because the Koreans
always presented them with a very effective resistance. By the
same token, the Chinese have viewed Korea as a buffer state. Massive
Chinese assistance was provided in the 1590s to beat back a Japanese
invasion of Korea, and again in the 1950s to drive back the forces
of the United States and the United Nations.
When they have been able to do so, the Chinese
have committed massive resources to defend Korea—in alliance
with a Korean state—to drive military power away from their
Korean frontier. Again, when it has had the resources, China has
never allowed a hostile or potentially hostile power to dominate
Korea. However, China has almost never sought to dominate Korea
itself, being content that the peninsula is neutral or has a positive
attitude towards Chinese interests.
The Koreans have long appreciated these circumstances
and have profited from Chinese protection. When China has been
strong and stable as in the early Song (960-1126), Ming (1368-1662),
and Qing (1616-1911) periods, Korea has been at peace and has
prospered as in the early Kory± and the Chos±n periods.
When China was strong (as in the Ming dynasty) and the Japanese
mobilised to attack (as in the invasion of 1592), the Chinese-Korean
alliance repelled them. When China was weak and divided as it
was in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese sought to take
advantage of the situation, seized Korea, and then attacked China.
Traditionally, the aggressive state in Northeast Asia has been
Japan, not China, never Korea, and the Koreans have always been
allied with the Chinese. We should not expect that this pattern
will change. Although the Americans have provided stability in
the region since the end of the Second World War in 1945, they
can now retreat, because the Chinese and the Koreans are strong
enough to check the Japanese. This old equilibrium is re-emerging
and not to be feared, unless we fail to understand the history
and cultures of the East Asian cultural sphere and end up by being
excluded from it because of our ignorance.
In short, when China is stable, Korea is stable.
When Japan is also stable, then the region is completely at peace.
These are the current circumstances, but they could change. The
greatest current threats to regional stability arise from a North
Korea that might descend into civil war, or an outside power—such
as the United States or Russia— that might engage in a military
adventure.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
BRITISH POLICY
The greatest problem for British policy in the
East Asian region is the high level of ignorance about East Asia
which pervades contemporary British society. Unlike the United
States, Britain lacks a significant and successful East Asian
minority that can provide cultural background knowledge at all
levels. Consequently, it is imperative that we develop such high-level
expertise in our institutions of higher education. However, the
current record provides a dismal picture. Major higher education
institutions, such as the Universities of Durham and Sterling,
have eliminated almost entirely their offerings on East Asia,
destroying long-held (Durham) or nascent (Sterling) expertise.
Even a flagship institution such as the School of Oriental and
African Studies in London recently threatened to destroy its research
infrastructure by eliminating specialist librarians.
The problem is that the Government and our higher
education institutions have been driven by "managerialist"
views which consider long-term investment in strategic "knowledge
industries" (universities) to be foolish, for fear that the
current year's budget might show a deficit. To try and develop
long-term expertise on East Asia with a workforce that can be
sacked this year and re-hired the next is to play a fool's game
bred from the twin delusions that any need for information can
be provided by out-sourced consultants, and the belief that the
important diplomatic and commercial people speak English anyway.
In his 1986 report "Speaking for the
Future: A Review of the Requirements of Diplomacy and Commerce
for Asian and African Languages and Area Studies", Sir
Peter Parker stressed the need to have a well developed cadre
of people in this nation who had a good knowledge of Asian and
African languages and cultures. It would appear that, more than
20 years on, his lesson has still not been learned. Not to have
a significant financial investment in the creation of a cadre
of British citizens with a competent knowledge of East Asia contradicts
the commonsense approach usually taken towards developing scientific
expertise. If in science, why not in diplomacy and business?
Because of our ignorance about the importance
of building up long-term expertise, we may say that in world historical
terms, East Asians are colonising us. How better to control a
people than to learn their language (English) and their culture
and hope that they remain ignorant of yours? One might think that
the recent "China craze" in Britain would have beeen
good for Chinese Studies in general and East Asian Studies in
particular. However, not only are the actual resources that are
currently being committed to the development of the subject area
still risible, but the focus of spending is almost entirely on
the Chinese mainland. This latter issue ignores the key principle
of understanding the context of any situation. One fears that
the hype surrounding the "China craze" may be as transient
and vacuous as the wind.
Decision makers seem to be lost in a dream of
a billion-plus Chinese consumers all buying a British widget.
This is fantasy. The challenge is not to make a widget that all
Chinese want to buy; it is the Chinese who are making the widgets
that we are buying by the shipload. The challenge for us is to
keep the East Asian nations—who now trade among themselves
more than they do with the rest of the world—away from systems
of autarky and closed trading spheres. This means that the United
Kingdom must move upstream and develop expertise on East Asia
so that the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese will look to Britons
for sympathetic understanding, partnership, and the trust that
is bestowed on honest brokers.
This goal can be fostered by:
(1) the guaranteed and continued Government support
for all branches of East Asian Studies in the nation's universities;
(2) Government encouraging businesses and other
commercial bodies to provide bursaries for students studying East
Asian subjects, and by making it financially attractive for them
to do so; and
(3) encouraging businesses and other commercial
bodies to provide in-course or immediate post-course internships
for students who have studied a branch of East Asian Studies.
It should be made financially attractive for businesses and commercial
groups to provide these opportunities as this training is in the
nation's long-term interest.
(4) More specifically, in the cases of Korea
and Japan, we want to call attention to the following:
(a) The nearly complete lack of undergraduate
and graduate bursaries—It is a sad truth that few undergraduate
Britons choose to study East Asia, and is a dangerous trend that
the best graduate students do not come to this country, because
we have no money to support them. Universities in the US, Canada,
and Australia catch and keep the best and brightest.
(b) The nearly complete lack of post-doctoral
research appointments that would snare the best young scholars.
We propose that:
For Korean Studies alone, the Government should
capitalise a set of 12 full undergraduate and post-graduate bursaries
for use at the four institutions which teach Korean subjects in
the UK (SOAS, Sheffield, Oxford, and Cambridge).
The government should capitalise a set of six
post-doctoral research fellowships for the same institutions.
The BAKS Council could administer these bursaries
and fellowships, because it represents all four institutions,
and for several years has administered bursaries and internships
for undergraduate students to spend part of their course-time
in Korea, and to experience the business world of Korea.
Any successful short-term policy prescriptions
on East Asia will be dependent on the pursuit of a long-term policy
for the development of expertise on the region, as Sir Peter Parker
made quite plain over 20 years ago. Without the commitment to
a long-term policy of development, this nation will not only be
flying blind, but we will have nothing to offer East Asians in
the coming decades, who will increasingly become the world's dominant
force politically as well as commercially.
The Council of the British Association for Korean
Studies:
President: Professor James H Grayson
Immediate Past President: Dr James Hoare
Secretary: Professor Keith Pratt
Treasurer: Dr John Swenson-Wright
Members of Council: Dr Kirsteen Kim, Dr Grace Koh,
Ms Fumiko Kobayashi, Dr James B Lewis, Ms Jane Portal, Dr David
Prendergast
March 2008
|
