Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
106-119)
LORD MALLOCH-BROWN
KCMG AND STEPHEN
LILLIE
2 JULY 2008
Q106 Chairman: Minister, thank
you for coming. We are pleased to see you again. It was only a
few weeks ago that you were talking about human rights; now we
are dealing with a regional issue. We also welcome Mr Lillie—I
do not think that you have previously been before the Committee.
May I begin by asking a brief question about UK relations with
South Korea? How would you assess them at the moment?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Very good.
You have chosen a difficult area, because in the case of both
South Korea and Japan, my briefings are always loaded with terms
like "never been better", and I think that that makes
it hard for you to find issues.
Chairman: We shall try.
Lord Malloch-Brown: Obviously,
the one thing that I would say about South Korea at the moment
is that we are following the current political crisis with close
interest. As I am sure that you are all aware, the row that has
flared up over the resumption of US beef imports is having an
astonishing effect on the new President's popularity. It is one
of those honeymoons that has ended very abruptly—something
that we know nothing about, of course—and the row has driven
his approval ratings below 20%, leaving perhaps the prospect of
a Cabinet reshuffle when the Assembly resumes in September. With
the one caveat that we are not quite sure how dynamic foreign
policy can be in the coming months, I think that things are very
good.
Chairman: We shall come on to some South
Korea-related questions later on, but we are going to begin with
a focus on North Korea.
Q107 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
when we were in Seoul in May, we picked up a degree of anxiety
that, with the Bush Administration coming to its end, the American
President might be looking around to achieve a foreign policy
"success"—in inverted commas. Since then, the
Bush Administration have announced that they are planning, possibly
within 45 days, to remove the status of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and to begin
the process of lifting sanctions. Do the British Government believe
that that is a timely move by the American Government, or do you
think that it is premature?
Lord Malloch-Brown: However much
President Bush wants a success—I am sure that he does—I
think that the Six-Party Talks process has been very well grounded.
None of the steps that are being taken avoid the necessary time
for verification. For example, the core issue at the moment is
the disablement of the reactor at Yongbyon, which is going slower
than had been hoped. That is partly due to deliberate stalling
by the DPRK, but there are also some health and safety issues.
The next stage is for Pyongyang to agree to actual dismantlement.
We saw rather dramatic photographs and TV coverage of the cooling
tower coming down in front of the international press. That was
the first step, but it is not the whole thing. While it is right
that last week the US took steps to remove the DPRK from both
the Trading with the Enemy Act and the list of state sponsors
of terrorism, the latter will take some 45 days, which allows
time for the declaration that Pyongyang has made to be verified.
The US is proceeding, but it has a very hawkish lobby domestically
that is cautious about any kind of diplomatic agreement with the
DPRK because of doubts about the honesty of its declarations.
Combined with that is the Bush Administration's own history. Initially,
they were against this kind of approach and they have come round
to it somewhat reluctantly. All that means that President Bush
will not do anything imprudent. He will move cautiously on this
matter right until the end.
Q108 Sir John Stanley: When we
were in Japan and Seoul, we were told that only a few days previously
the Americans had sent a lorry through the 38th parallel to Pyongyang
to collect the DPRK's evidence of verification. The lorryload
of boxes was then brought back to South Korea and they have no
doubt been shared among the members of the Six-Party Talks. I
appreciate that the British Government are not a member of the
Six-Party Talks, but can you tell us whether they have had access
to the verification material supplied by the DPRK? Are the Government
satisfied that the DPRK has complied with its verification obligations
under the agreement of October last year?
Lord Malloch-Brown: We do not
have access to that material and we would not seek it. We do not
see ourselves as a front-line player in this matter. Neither we
nor the EU are members of the Six-Party Talks. There are countries
with an extreme interest—greater even than that of the US—in
ensuring that what is in those boxes stacks up. Obviously, South
Korea has a particular interest, as does Japan. Those documents
will be examined by people with a deep inherent scepticism. As
I said, the US has given itself 45 days for the initial verification
period. The documents will have to pass the truth test with a
lot of very cautious people. While we are not part of that process,
we are confident that it will be rigorous.
Q109 Sir John Stanley: It has
been reported that the Bush Administration are still to be satisfied
on whether the verification obligations have been complied with
in relation to the documentation supplied so far. If that is the
case, are the British Government satisfied that the US Administration
will not lift sanctions or end the designation of the DPRK as
a state sponsor of terrorism until they are absolutely satisfied
on the verification point?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes, we are
satisfied that the US will be very cautious about this matter.
It deliberately made the declaration last week while giving itself
time to be satisfied. As far as I know, you are correct that it
is not yet satisfied.
Q110 Chairman: Thank you very
much. Will you say a little more about the influence and the pressure
that the international community apart from the US might have?
Lord Malloch-Brown: On?
Chairman: On North Korea.
Lord Malloch-Brown: First, one
has to say that the members of the Six-Party Talks include the
circle of countries with the most direct and important influence.
The rest of us are in the second row of this. For a long while,
the EU has tried to play a constructive role—we have been
generous providers of food aid, but we have also sought in our
diplomacy to be something of a bridge between the DPRK and the
outside world. Often that has been limited to small cultural and
other programmes to try and open the eyes of that very closed
regime to the outside world. However, I do not think that we should
overestimate our own direct influence. Supporting the Six-Party
Talks is the most important thing that we can do.
Q111 Mr Purchase: The axis of
evil idea caught the imagination for a time. I am pleased to hear
you say that Britain does not feel that it has a front-line role
in that. From what I could understand and gather on the trip that
we made, it seems that the North Korean regime is in deep decay—it
is literally unsustainable for very much longer in its present
form. Does the Foreign Office have a view about whether the North
Koreans would have any capability worth talking about of doing
anything at all with their nuclear technology—in terms of
being aggressive?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Certainly,
the tests have shown so far that what weapons the DPRK has—its
rockets—are not particularly accurate, and certainly do
not have much of a range. I do not think that Europe, for example,
is at any risk at this stage from the DPRK. However, that little
part of East Asia is a pretty tight neighbourhood, and you can
hit Japan or South Korea with a quite primitive weapon, because
they are close.
Q112 Mr Purchase: But that is
not really what I am asking you—I understand that. Do you
believe—or does anyone outside certain propagandists—that
North Korea, even if it had the intention, has any serious capability
to launch even to Japan?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It could not
sustain any kind of nuclear military effort against Japan beyond
a first strike, but we have to remain wary of, or alert to, the
possibility of a once-off nuclear weapon or flight of nuclear
weapons—or the launch of a very small number with the character
of a dirty bomb—that could nevertheless do significant civilian
harm. The DPRK would have no follow-up capability, but it has
and still retains a very large land army, which continues to pose
a threat to South Korea. The fact is that any rational calculus
of military options by a regime engaged with the world and weighing
their options sensibly would lead it to conclude that, in any
major confrontation with the region, it would come out the worst
very quickly. I completely accept that point. The issue is the
irrationality of the leadership that is equipped with such damaging
if not accurate weapons, and feeling that it is forced into a
corner, where it takes some kind of last-stand political-military
strategy.
Q113 Mr Hamilton: Minister, it
is almost exactly 10 years since the missile test of the Taepodong
2 on 4 July 1998, which alerted the world to what North Korea
was trying to do with its missile arsenal and to its proliferation
of missiles. My question concerns how the international community
has tried to stop that proliferation, although we know that the
regime has deliberately been selling those missiles to all sorts
of undesirable countries throughout the world to gain foreign
exchange. How effective has the international community been in
trying to stop that proliferation?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I might well
ask Stephen to come in and supplement this. As always with such
things, the first thing is the issue of good intelligence: really
knowing exactly what has happened. Secondly—it is one of
the secondary drivers for the whole Six-Party agreement—is
the idea that one does not want to leave a rogue regime like that
outside the framework of international agreements where it can
export such technology. We have all seen the photos of the Syrian
site and its alleged similarity to sites in North Korea. Perhaps
I should know better. Stephen, perhaps you could say what we know,
verifiably, of DPRK exports of those technologies.
Stephen Lillie: I think that North
Korea's proliferation activities are one of the key concerns in
terms of UK policy towards North Korea—it is not just its
indigenous programme, but its proliferation and, of course, its
human rights record. Much of the UK's counter-proliferation activity
has been directed against North Korea, but the very fact that
it appears to have provided technology to Syria is in itself an
indication of the continuing threat that it poses. That is why,
in seeking a declaration from North Korea in the Six-Party Talks,
the US has been anxious to obtain some kind of accounting by North
Korea of its proliferation activities. Our understanding is that
the declaration itself probably does not include that commitment,
but there have been other discussions with the US to address it.
I would also say that the two Security Council resolutions from
2006, following the missile test and the nuclear test, are very
much directed at the proliferation threat. It is important to
keep in mind that whatever is happening in the Six-Party Talks
and between the US and North Korea bilaterally, those two Security
Council resolutions remain in force.
Q114 Mr Hamilton: Minister, you
and Mr Lillie referred to the human rights record. While we were
in Korea, we had the privilege of meeting Mr Kang, the author
of the book "The Aquariums of Pyongyang", which is recommended
reading as an account of human rights violations. Is there any
evidence that the UK and the international community are having
any effect on such dreadful violations? We heard, for example,
that it was a criminal offence to open the back of a radio set
and de-tune it from the Government channel. Being discovered to
have broken the rules has the most appalling consequences. What
effect are we having?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I think limited.
With our EU partners and Japan, we sponsored a resolution at the
March session of the Human Rights Council extending the special
rapporteur's mandate, but, as I understand it, he cannot get into
the country. Although we are pressing Pyongyang through our embassy
there for access, the fact is that it is a country that continues
to abuse human rights on a massive, systematic scale. We use every
opportunity that we can to raise the issue bilaterally, as well
as pressing for a UN presence. Again, that is the cost of a country
that has essentially opted out of the international system. Our
ability to influence things there is very limited.
Q115 Mr Pope: On human rights,
there is the issue of the Japanese abductees. When we were in
Japan, Mr Illsley and I met with the families of Japanese citizens
who have been abducted. That was obviously a distressing meeting.
It is a big issue in Japan. Is it an issue that the British Government
will raise bilaterally with DPRK?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes. We have
been trying to support the Japanese efforts on this in every way
that we can. There have been some quite positive bilateral talks—hosted
by the Chinese, but between Japan and DPRK—in which the
DPRK authorities agreed to reopen the investigations. As you will
have gathered from your briefing in Tokyo, the numbers are quite
small. There are only 19 officially recognised abductees. However,
you will also know from your visit to Tokyo that it is a dramatic
issue in Japan, over which Governments fall and Prime Ministers
get chosen. It has a huge emotional attachment. So, yes, we do
support the Japanese. The good news is that, because it is such
a priority for the Japanese, the DPRK understands and within the
general coat tails of the Six-Party Talks' progress, the Japanese
are getting some traction on this now.
Mr Pope: That is welcome. It is easy
to lose this issue in the bigger picture of nuclear weapons and
so on. I am very reassured that the British Government will raise
it.
Q116 Mr Moss: Do the Government
hold out any hope that under the current regime there is any prospect
of economic reform or any improvements in human rights in the
country?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes, in that
obviously the fundamental purpose of the Six-Party Talks is to
secure an end to the nuclear programme. Its broader purpose is
to normalise relations and to begin to open up the country to
both the flow of ideas and people, and to get them a bit more
engaged in the international community. Through the bilateral
efforts of the EU and countries such as ourselves, but also through
international organisations, there is an effort to get a few more
North Koreans engaged in economic training. That is sometimes
only in China, but that is now not a bad place to learn about
market capitalism. At the margins there are educational initiatives,
technical assistance and even work that the British Council is
doing to get people a bit more engaged. The hope is that the Government
themselves might become slightly more reformist. If you were to
stage it, it demonstrates some of the communist reform initiatives
of Castro at a certain point, allowing a small enclave for overseas
industrial investment and a little bit of liberalisation of prices
in some areas. However, the fundamental state system is still
in place. One has to assume that before there is the necessary
root and branch reform, it is likely that there would be a change
of Government. Stephen, do you want to add to that?
Stephen Lillie: What the North
Koreans have clearly not done is made the Chinese calculation
that embracing economic reform will ensure the sustainability
of their own system. They have taken rather the opposite view
and fear very much that moving down a real process of economic
reform would be the beginning of the end and, similarly, with
any kind of relaxation on human rights. There are a number of
things that happen around the edges. They are willing to look
at very limited areas that would open themselves up to trade,
for example. Even on human rights, we have seen some reports from
non-governmental organisations suggesting that when there is international
pressure and international attention, there are limited changes.
For example, there are reports that suggest that the North Koreans
have stopped the practice of forced abortions on returnees from
China, but the big picture—the overall trend—is still
rather pessimistic.
Chairman: I apologise for the break.
If there is more than one vote we may have a problem. Assuming
that there is only one vote, we will be back in 15 minutes. If
there are more votes it will be 30 minutes, but hopefully there
will be only one.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—
Chairman: The meeting now has a quorum
and shall begin. I do not know when the next vote is, but it is
not immediately, so we will do as much as possible before the
next disruption to our proceedings.
Q117 Mr Moss: Since the election
of the current President, there has been a move away from the
sunshine policy of his predecessors to such an extent that we
have been told of a significant deterioration in North-South relations.
Are the Government concerned about that and about the implication
of any lasting breakdown in North-South Government relations?
Lord Malloch-Brown: No. In a sense,
it increases the need to hold the North to an even higher standard
of verification of its actions. Some held the view that the last
President had perhaps become too much of a hostage to getting
progress under the sunshine policy. We view the basic policy as
remaining unchanged, but with a good dose of scepticism added.
I do not think that people in South Korea want their Government
to close down progress with North Korea, but it must meet an even
higher standard of veracity. For now, basic policy is intact and
the impact of the new President, if anything, will be to make
things move more slowly and cautiously.
Q118 Ms Stuart: Minister, I want
to probe a little further about Britain's approach. We say that
the UK has a policy of carefully targeted engagement with the
North Koreans. One the suggestions for what we could do to influence
that was to have more student exchanges. Can you tell us what
your priorities are in that respect and where you think that we
are going?
Lord Malloch-Brown: At the moment,
in that area, we are limited to three British Council English
teachers. They are not teaching English directly to students,
but they are teachers of teachers. There is the prospect of a
fourth one, I think.
Stephen Lillie: There are two
there at the moment.
Lord Malloch-Brown: There are
two teachers there and a third is going. I am not sure what the
situation is regarding scholarships.
Stephen Lillie: We are trying
to get the North Koreans to identify two candidates for a Chevening
scholarship as part of our flagship programme. The difficulty
so far has been for the North Korean side to identify the right
sort of person with the right level of English. We have indicated
that we would show some flexibility on the English language requirement
if they could come up with somebody suitable.
Q119 Ms Stuart: And how would
you define suitability? We met some young North Koreans whose
English was absolutely excellent, but we were told that North
Korea should be looked at as four different economies and four
different circles of society. Will you look at whether such people
come from only the political elite? How will you decide whether
they are suitable, other than just by the English? Is that the
only criterion?
Stephen Lillie: It is very difficult
to decide because, clearly, whoever they put forward will have
come through some kind of pre-selection process and therefore
might not be the person who would come through an open procedure
that we would conduct. Having said that, we nevertheless see value
in people coming here and being exposed to the way in which we
do business and how we organise ourselves in this country. There
would have to be some compromise.
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