Written evidence submitted by the Britain-Russia
Centre
THE BRITAIN-RUSSIA
CENTRE
The Britain-Russia Centre (BRC) (full name The
Britain-Russia Centre and The British East-West Centre) is the
longest established UK non-government organisation dedicated to
working with Russia and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS).
Starting life as the "GB-USSR Association",
a membership organisation dedicated to sustaining dialogue and
contact with the countries of the then Soviet Union, the new geo-political
situation of the 1990s led to a shift in emphasis away from UK
government core-funded membership activities to project-based
work with a variety of donor agencies as a non-profit and consultancy
organisation.
BEWC is proud of the role it has played in sustaining
contact and debate with the region for over 45 years, often in
very difficult circumstances.
We remain engaged across the CIS with parliaments,
public sector bodies, civil society organisations and businesses—providing
information, training, consultancy and other services that support
positive processes of sustainable social, political and economic
development in the CIS.
Contact details:
The Britain-Russia Centre, Willcox House, 42
Southwark Street, London SE1 1U. Tel: +(0)20 7378 8222. Fax: +(0)20
7378 8333. (www.bewc.org)
Q1: In the Centre's experience, what is the
current climate for NGOs in Russia, particularly those working
with foreign partners?
Summary:
— NGOs are a mixed bag and it is in
everyone's interests (including the NGOs') for criminal elements
to be identified and prevented. Russia should be supported in
that endeavour.
— However in a state with a clear history
of authoritarianism and little history of NGOs as free-speaking
and free-standing entities, there are understandable concerns
about opportunities for the abuse of power by the state to crush
what it perceives as potential or actual opposition (even when
it appears unnecessary to do so).
— Aspects of the legislation passed,
and of apparent state policy and the day-to-day realities of public
administration provide grounds for such worries.
— NGOs are fearful therefore that their
role is not sympathetically understood and indeed that it is being
undermined by a state that is becoming more rather than less inclined
to control or destroy them. Foreign connections may, in different
ways, attract or repel such pressures.
Text:
The climate for all NGOs in Russia, be they
connected with foreign partners or not, is currently one of considerable
caution.
The recent legislative changes have a rationale
that all governments would recognise—to prevent the creation
and activities of organisations with objectives that include terrorism
or other criminality.
The legislation does however also create opportunities
for the state apparatus to control all or any civil society organisations
in ways that are inimical to, for example, freedoms of expression,
assembly etc and thereby to the underlying ability of civil society
to perform its role within the checks and balances of a democratic
society.
Similarly the associated re-registration required
recently of NGOs in Russia has two possible interpretations: as
a practical measure of tidying up the legal status of organisations,
which reflects a valid need to regularise matters and prevent
NGO status from screening illegal activity; but on the other hand
a bureaucratic obstacle to enable exclusion of NGOs that for one
reason or another are simply not agreeable to the state.
The apparent centralisation of power within
Russia and the "return of the state" into many areas
of life have been recurrent themes of recent western discussion
about Russia. Judgement of the degree to which these trends are
negative (sinister, inefficient, corrupt, anti-democratic, redolent
of USSR etc) or positive (necessary for national and international
security, global status and competitiveness) is in part a question
of subjective views on the role of the state in general but also
the needs of Russia in particular. Views differ widely on these
issues.
There is always—and perhaps it should
be so—an atmosphere of mutual scepticism and scrutiny between
state and non-state organisations. This works best in the interests
of society where part of the equation is a strong and reliable
rule of law to ensure that both "sides" are accountable
and are unable to intimidate, rather than persuade, the other.
The rule of law in Russia, while we do see positive signs of its
evolution, is not sufficiently established or reliable to provide
this assurance at present.
A closely related concern is the growing but
ill-regulated bureaucracy in Russia. This creates (whether by
accident or design) both time- and resource-consuming obstacles
that affect civil society and business alike. It also furnishes
opportunities for abuse of official powers (whether by policy
or individual graft). If/as NGO capacity to press for reform is
reduced, so any momentum for reform from this quarter will decline.
Finally, the issue of connection to foreign
partners. Assumptions of espionage and/or political interference
by/via NGOs still run deep in Russia (perhaps not always without
foundation) and NGOs also make easy targets for nationalistic
or punitive gestures. Foreign connections can also suggest enviable
resources that may be susceptible to extraction or direction.
More legitimately, there are also concerns that such NGOs create
opportunities for funds that are improperly earned, transferred,
accounted or taxed. Foreign connections can also lend some strength
to local NGOs in terms of international awareness of their existence
and experiences. Frankly however this is a relatively weak tool
to deploy if the state is willing to brush off short-term hand-wringing
by external commentators whom it can present as interfering in
its sovereign affairs.
Q2: What, if anything, could UK policy do
to promote democracy, human rights and civil society in Russia
more effectively?
Summary:
— Russia tends to react badly to external
commentary on these areas, which it often sees/presents as foreign
interference based on misunderstanding of Russia and double standards
by a UK unable to see the beam in its own eye.
— UK should make its views robustly
clear on both principles and particular cases, but these reactions
must be fully researched rather than knee-jerk and made in the
context of recognising common UK-Russian objectives where they
occur and the challenges that these can present for Russia.
— Development of democracy, human rights
and civil society are most successful when home-grown. Assistance
from UK should be framed in the context of looking for ways to
create space for local initiatives.
— The role of a multiparty system based
on an acceptance of the role of opposition as a positive force
for better government is not applied in Russia but is a key issue
for safeguarding democracy. Inter-parliamentary support should
focus on this but UK development assistance in this area has fallen
away.
— Education as a means to impart democratic
values is a sensitive area but UK could assist further in providing
information/discussion focused on the intriguing paradoxes inherent
in a democratic system.
Text:
There is a Russian saying: "If you want
to see a foreigner make a fool of himself, ask him to talk about
Russia".
This saying reflects perhaps the complexity
of Russia, but also a common Russian attitude to foreign opinion.
Some of the experiences that Russians can (perhaps selectively)
point to as derived from listening to foreigners' opinions on
Russia mean that the honeymoon period on simply taking western
advice ended for most Russians in the 1990s.
Many Russians subscribe to the view that Russia
is "uniquely unique" and thus unlikely to benefit from
models that work elsewhere. While often critical in private of
their country's leadership and performance—they quickly
become very prickly if this criticism is public and in particular
if this comes from outside (something they perhaps have in common
with the British!). There is also a "With us or Against us"
mentality. These frames of mind may on occasion be nonsense—but
they must be taken into account.
A balanced approach can be difficult to achieve
when our views of Russia are formed or affected by the unrelentingly
negative news coverage Russia receives in the UK. Russians see
(and are sometimes encouraged to do so by the presentation of
western media stories in Russia) many double standards in this
coverage and this exacerbates a feeling of not being understood
or appreciated for their positive achievements and contributions.
Our view is that over time the development of
a middle class in Russia will be a key factor leading to pressures
for more democratic government. Some observers have noted that,
while the oil revenues are the big story in the Russian economy,
there has also been a consumer boom delivered by a growing middle-class.
As the population becomes more prosperous and more interested
in participation in decision-making processes, it will be less
convinced of the need for strong, centralised and de facto single-party
government.
This general context underlies our answers below
on the three points (Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Society).
They share many aspects, but in particular that what makes them
work (or fail) is the degree to which they are locally created,
understood and accepted by a society and the relative priority
given to them at a particular time.
DEMOCRACY
The UK may have—over hundreds of years
and two World Wars—arrived at a system that, while far from
perfect and still in evolution, works for us. The very considerable
challenge for Russia is to find a system that works for Russia
as quickly as possible.
Russia has a democracy—albeit a "managed
democracy"—that was unimaginable 20 years ago. However
the organs of the state and civil society responsible for ensuring
that democracy is transparently practised and sustained are subject
to the pressures discussed in our answer to Question 1.
Among the current Russian state's concerns is
a fear of losing control over centrifugal forces that could lead
to geographic break-up, along with loss of power and associated
global standing. Many open wounds remain from the traumas caused
by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The UK's realistic role as a genuine partner
to Russia is primarily to encourage both the model that Russia
develops and its implementation to fall within the standards and
agreements subscribed to by the international community.
A key theme that the UK could assist with as
an outside entity is the role of parliamentary opposition and
multiparty democracy. For many post-soviet union citizens and
politicians alike politics (including in a democracy) is understood
to be about gaining power through defeating your opponents and,
once in power, continuing to confront and if possible destroy
them in order to rule without the interference or "destabilisation"
of opposition voices. Consensus or concessions are seen as weaknesses
and should only be used to further a longer-term agenda of destruction
of the enemy.
In the UK there is a long tradition of opposition
that has engendered a greater willingness to acknowledge opposition
as a valid and useful part of government (and a training ground
for future opposition governments). This may sometimes be understood
intellectually in the CIS, but it is seldom carried through in
practice in the post-soviet approach to parliamentary life. The
opposition remain the enemy and a threat to be dealt with rather
than having a contribution to make. The paradox that the quality
of government can depend on the quality of its opposition is not
well understood—or at least practised—in Russia. This
fans out into a wider willingness (or lack of it) to consult NGOs
and others in a collaborative way and relates to the points made
under Question 1.
BEWC's work has involved seeking to spread awareness
of the governance advantages of multi-party democracy. One example
has been taking cross-party groups of MPs to participate in discussions
with post-soviet parliaments across the CIS on issues of transparency,
public scrutiny of finance and other issues.
Apart from the personal learning and contact-building
benefits of this process, a key and consistent lesson we see being
noted by the recipient countries is through direct observation
of their counterpart UK parliamentarians of widely different parties
and opinions working practically together to refine views or achieve
improved legislation.
DFID, who funded some of our earlier work in
this area, no longer supports such initiatives for three reasons:
a) they are now focussing on large-scale projects (a profound
mistake in our view, and based on administrative convenience);
b) DFID now precludes itself from working in Russia as the country
(rather than the people) is no longer poor enough; c) work with
parliamentarians does not involve direct work with the poorest
in society. We suggest that this UK policy direction should be
reviewed in respect not only of Russia but also the wider CIS
region.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Advocacy by UK
In Russia, and across the neighbouring states,
NGOs have tended to have a high profile on human rights issues
exactly because the legal system is not picking up cases and/or
being able to process them. Foreign states, often rightly, add
their concerned voices to these NGOs in an attempt to shame or
encourage the state to address them. This is a drawn out affair
and can quickly become about diplomacy rather than the rights
in the case.
Nevertheless advocacy by the UK of human rights
both in principle and in individual cases remains a means by which
the UK can assist the cause of human rights in Russia. This must
however be subject to the caveat that any such interventions must
be soundly researched rather than knee-jerk and the likely responses
from Russia thought through and prepared for in advance.
Building local capacity
Human rights are protected in the UK, on occasions
even frustrating the wishes of the state, by legislation, by a
judiciary that is independent, by legal professionals with the
necessary skills, and by citizens who are able and willing to
access advice and support. NGOs are thus only one a part of this
system.
The main challenge in Russia (and more widely
in the CIS) is enabling the legal profession to fulfil its role
in enforcing citizens' human rights, initially via the local court
systems and if necessary by international ones. This boils down
to two elements: availability of professional lawyers and judges
in the human rights field; and adequacy of the courts system to
operate free from interference.
In our view the development of a middle class
in Russia combined with the progressive rise of a generation that
does not have a deep attachment to the centralised control models
of the soviet era, is likely to be the main motor for change—and
certainly more significant than any outside interventions.
External assistance should therefore look at
two elements: support for the development of local professional
capacity, and support for democracy-oriented education/information.
External assistance can, through support for
targeted training, help in making available to the Russian population
a sufficient number of legal professionals with human rights expertise
and experience to enable real and sustainable shifts in expectations
and enforcement. As time goes on this cadre, combined with rising
prosperity and the wider changes in society, will push human rights
higher up the agenda, will result in cases being robustly taken
up and resourced locally and will encourage the Russian state
to participate more actively in international human rights standards
and monitoring.
BEWCs work on human rights in the region over
the last decade has centred on the development of local professional
capacity. Starting with young lawyers and law students we have
increasingly worked also with legal professionals and the judiciary.
A spin off benefit has been the number of alumni in some countries
who, even if no longer practising human rights lawyers, have since
achieved places in the government administration.
The FCOs Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) has
been, with small but highly targeted support to the work of BEWC
and others in the region, achieving some real successes here.
If GOF can continue to act on a bilateral basis through small,
timely and relatively flexible and unbureaucratic projects, the
UK will continue to contribute very positively in this area. DFID
now mainly eschews small bilateral projects and considers human
rights lawyers as too rich to be able to work with. This has meant
they have again not been engaged here.
On the question of education, there is an obvious
link between, on the one hand, an understanding gained at school
as to the functioning, in particular the checks and balances,
of democracy, its links to economic and other policy-making etc;
and on the other the mental attitudes and models taken into later
life. The UK has relatively little opportunity to affect the overall
Russian education system (which is itself in decline) and it is
also not easy to see how this could be done without accusations
of disseminating foreign propaganda. To the extent that it can
do so—for example via online resources—it would be
useful to highlight issues such as the paradoxical importance
of opposition and multi-party democracy referred to above.
CIVIL SOCIETY
Civil society organisations are the non-elected
(self-appointed) representatives of a diversity of local interest
groups. They have a valuable role to play but the degree to which
they can lay claim to representing other people as opposed to
representing their own views is usually limited.
This is particularly the case with NGOs that
are branches of, created by or receiving support from foreign
organisations. As discussed above, the Russian authorities are
sensitive on these issues, even where NGOs are doing valuable
work that the state itself should be carrying out.
Assistance in the form of training for NGOs
on how to organise themselves has been going on for many years
and from many sources. It is likely that there is little further
need for this currently.
Outside support can assist NGOs—and in
"NGOs" we suggest should be included the professions—through
technical training and support relevant to the NGOs' target audience.
This, combined with vigilant—but even-handed—moral
support where appropriate either publicly or through inter-governmental
channels is where UK can contribute.
Q3. Are the current difficulties in the UK-Russia
bilateral political relationship having any effect on the climate
for UK individuals and organisations working in Russia or with
Russian partners (businesses, educational and cultural organisations)?
Bilateral political difficulties can result
in a chilling of the atmosphere for companies and others from
the UK and, for example, a return to Cold War style accusations
of espionage etc or obstructiveness over visas and other bureaucratic
issues.
However, as with the Russian state's re-occupation
of "strategic" economic sectors and enterprises, the
superficial story of state bullying—while not always absent—can
mask more complicated and less one-sided realities. In the business
community there are well-publicised concerns about bureaucracy,
corruption and state interference. However, those businesses affected
do not seem to be leaving Russia—and this suggests the risk-to-reward
ratio is still positive.
There is certainly at present an element of
both foreign and local businesses and other organisations and
individuals being anxious to avoid upsetting the Kremlin for fear
of inviting disfavour. This is unhealthy and could develop into
a restrictive and claustrophobic atmosphere that will benefit
neither country if allowed to grow. However it is not easy to
see how UK policy can be determined in respect of this or the
degree to which such issues can be given priority over larger
international and bilateral issues.
The path which we believe needs to be taken
is to show publicly a greater understanding of, and interest in
partnering with, Russia on the many issues where we have common
cause. This is not to water-down any of the values or objectives
that UK holds as important, and which it should robustly pursue,
but these do need a new and more balanced context. The current
atmosphere—a tendency to selective finger-wagging on one
side, and an increasingly irritated resentment on the other—is
not the way forward.
Britain-Russia Centre
May 2007
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