House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Dr Alex Marshall, Defence Studies Department, King's College London, Joint Services Command and Staff College

1. The committee on the role of Russia in Global Security has invited responses on a broad range of security related topics, and therefore must forgive a response that will often seek to merely summarise rather than engage in depth across so many numerous policy areas. In broad outline, this paper will argue that dialogue and even cooperation with Russia remains far more attainable from a UK perspective than many commentators may presently wish to credit; but that such cooperation is also highly conditional upon a better understanding of Moscow's own perspective, and on genuine negotiation rather than confrontation taking place. In short, the bilateral relationship between the two countries could be considerably improved, but this would remain entirely dependent on the UK's own willingness to maintain an independent policy line from other states, and even take the lead over key issues. Such an approach is invariably conditioned by a cost-benefit analysis; this author maintains the view that the costs of not taking such an approach still considerably outweigh whatever benefits might accrue from subsuming the UK approach to the more confrontational stance of other countries. As this paper will go on to argue, Russia continues to merit an individualised UK approach simply because it is a very special case (which is not the same as saying that a "special" relationship in the traditional transatlantic sense could therefore be attained—merely that a better relationship with Russia still offers potential benefits on a scale that certain other countries never can and never will match).

2. None of these conditioning premises, it should be noted, fundamentally contradict either the FCO's own stated list of "international priorities", nor indeed the Cabinet Office's own more recent recognition of the need to "continue to work closely with Russia." [35]Nonetheless the implementation of such an approach will, I suggest, require developing a new program for engagement that would mark a genuinely fresh start. Before moving on to broader strategic issues and then outlining what such a program might comprise, it must be noted that in the particular Russian-UK bilateral arena, the one issue which could potentially catalyse an attitudinal shift allowing such a new agenda of engagement a fair chance to develop would be that regarding the position of Russian asylum seekers in London, most notably Boris Berezovskii and Akhmed Zakaev. From the very outset therefore, this paper would strongly recommend redoubled measures to resolve these long standing issues in a manner mutually satisfactory to both sides. The present author fully appreciates the difficulties such an issue presents, not least in terms of the UK courts system; however he would only point out that if a tactical issue comes to disproportionately affect a strategic relationship, then it is wholly normal for the state affected to then take extraordinary measures to resolve it. If the Berezovskii issue were to be elevated to the same category of bilateral issues as Guantánamo Bay, or the extradition of an extremist Muslim cleric back to his country of origin, then an accord could probably be struck relatively quickly; Berezovskii's most recent statements publicly advocating the violent overthrow of the Russian government would appear to justify such an approach.

3. To better explain and contextualise what follows, the paper seeks first to answer the question of what Russian foreign policy itself seeks to achieve in the world according to its own statements; it will then examine two critical policy areas—Russian relations with the "near abroad", and Russia's potential and still mostly untapped role as a partner in the war on terror. In the process, I will also examine the question of Russia as both a potential military threat and ally, and Russia's military alliance structures (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, or CSTO, and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or SCO).

4. THE CONVENTIONAL DEBATE

The present author fully accepts that his own views on the possibility and even the need for greater partnership and dialogue may appear to travel perversely against the tide of most current orthodox analysis. In fact what follows is consciously intended as a measured riposte within a debate in which, in several important ways, all sense of balance and proportion risks being lost. Conventional perspectives on Russia today are too well known to require lengthy reiteration here. There has always been, and today there remains firmly entrenched, a view that Russian foreign policy has and always will remain incorrigibly imperialistic. The election of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation in May 2000 was generally interpreted as a return to semi-authoritarianism in Russia by much of Western—most notably British and American— political and public opinion. Putin's image in many Western eyes was tarnished from the very start by his past history as a KGB agent in East Berlin. The growing self-censorship of the Russian media, the murder by unknown assailants of prominent dissidents like Anna Politkovskaia, the perceived "bullying" of its nearest neighbours through what the American Vice President Dick Cheney in 2006 labelled "energy blackmail", and most recently her threats to withdraw from the CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) treaty, have all been interpreted by many in the West as indicators of a Russia returning to greater authoritarianism internally, and to what some have labelled as "outdated" geopolitical views on the world externally. To go by conventional analysis, one would conclude that Russia is re-emerging as a threat to the West in both "hard" and "soft" security terms, and should therefore be increasingly regarded as an enemy. Such worrying apparent trends were certainly reflected in the report of the US Council on Foreign Relations on Russia last year, chaired by Senators John Edwards and Jack Kemp, which warily advocated "selective co-operation" with Russia in future rather than any kind of "broad partnership, which is not now possible".[36] This present paper however aims to present a series of points that argue instead the need for reinvigorated re-engagement by the UK, and the construction of a new type of pragmatic yet expanded partnership. In the view of this author, the UK should not adopt the US approach of "selective cooperation", but should rather continue to seek partnership across a broad range of issues with the Russian Federation, by engaging with Russian foreign policy formulations on their own terms. To allow a "Cold Peace" to emerge in Europe, as American Secretary of State Strobe Talbott once feared would occur during the 1990s, would damage both European and UK national interests needlessly. Moreover a "Cold Peace" is not only unnecessary, it is eminently avoidable given that Russia is no longer a state driven by an aggressive political ideology, nor one openly seeking territorial conquests. [37]In the same breath, to deal briefly with one of the other most recently fashionable foreign policy paradigms, engaging instead in a new "Great Game" with Russia for influence and military access in Central Asia, as some American analysts such as Professor Stephen Blank of the US Army War College appear to advocate, represents an enterprise that is neither desirable nor affordable from the UK perspective. [38]As far as the Russian-UK relationship is concerned, constructive engagement, not containment or competition, ought to be the dominant theme.

5. The main obstacle to strategic partnership however remains, as the American Council of Foreign Relations report on the American side itself identified, one of trust—"[t]he mutual confidence that partnership requires is missing." [39]In the case of Britain, the single biggest blow to public confidence towards Russia has undoubtedly been the Litvinenko affair. However, for this very reason, the present author believes that redoubled efforts should actually be undertaken to create the conditions for more open partnership and dialogue. To bring this about however, Russian perceptions and national interests also need to be taken into account to a far greater degree than they have in the past; true partnership requires accommodation by both sides. It will certainly never emerge by merely appearing to forge an implacable bloc of "Western Unity", as the Council on Foreign Relations report for example advocated. [40]Such an approach is handicapped firstly by the fact that such a bloc is inherently unattainable in any case; secondly because it carries the underlying risk of manipulation by individual nations that are currently excessively "Russophobic" (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania); and thirdly and finally because the mere rhetorical invocation of just such a "bloc" creates a narrative of exclusion and submission already acutely sensed by many Russian policy makers.

6. Russian politicians feel that since the early 1990s Russia, having in the Soviet period engineered the most remarkable and bloodless retreat from ideological deadlock ever seen (including active participation at the covert level in forcing through democratic change in Czechoslovakia), has nonetheless thereafter been forced to relentlessly make yet further and now—excessive concessions—in particular over NATO expansion, proposed NATO exercises around the Crimean Peninsula, and over the appearance of American military bases in Georgia. The "colour revolutions" in Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during 2003-04 did little to advance the cause of democracy in the region (President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia remains a deeply authoritarian figure, albeit now a pro-American one, whilst the Ukraine descended into economic and political anarchy rapidly following the "Orange" Revolution there), but have instead served only to further fuel the cynicism of the indigenous populations of these countries towards the democratic process, and to simultaneously increase Russian distrust of the role of Western NGOs in the whole of the former Soviet space. The most recent diplomatic row over the positioning of missile defence sites in Poland and the Czech Republic therefore reflects less their actual threat to the Russian nuclear arsenal—which, as even Russian statesmen admit, remains absolutely minimal—and more exasperation that, once again, Russia has not been consulted nor its interests taken into account. It is the great weight now attached to relatively minor phenomena which make the present diplomatic moment particularly critical.

What are the goals of Russian foreign policy?

7. For the sake of brevity and analytical clarity this paper will assume that the statements of Russian foreign policy are sincere. This is not to claim that they are not underpinned by Russia's desire to advance its own national interests—such in fact is the natural condition of every nation's foreign policy. Nor is it to suggest that such statements provide an infallible template of understanding—the present author fully concurs with the view that "[f]oreign policy making in most developed countries is a highly intricate and messy process that involves many subjective and even random elements." [41]But it is to presuppose that they offer the best starting point from which to consider afresh the possibility of renewed engagement and negotiation. Starting from this basis, I would suggest that the possibilities for engagement to mutual advantage are actually rather more numerous than it is traditionally assumed. Though Russian foreign policy has gone through a number of permutations since 1992, the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 and the statements of Igor Ivanov's successor as Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, still offer the most reliable insight into the goals of Russian foreign policy today-all the more so since the foreign policy making process in Russia has now stabilised considerably, and future radical shifts in direction appear highly unlikely.

8. The Russian foreign policy concept of 2000 set out to "influence general world processes with the aim of forming a stable, just and democratic world order, built on generally recognised norms of international law, including, first of all, the goals and principles in the UN Charter, on equitable and partnership relations among states." It saw as essential to "form a good-neighbour belt along the perimeter of Russia's borders, to promote elimination of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation." For my own purposes I would particularly highlight the emphasis the policy placed on "mutually advantageous [emphasis added] pragmatism." "This policy is maximally transparent; it takes into consideration the legitimate interests of other states and is aimed at seeking joint decisions." With specific regard to NATO, the document went on to add that "on a number of parameters, NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with the security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them. This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new strategic concept, which does not exclude the conduct of use-of-force operations outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO." Furthermore, "[s]ubstantive and constructive cooperation between Russia and NATO is only possible if it is based on the foundation of a due respect for the interests of the sides and an unconditional fulfillment of mutual obligations assumed." The foreign policy concept also added however that "[i]nteraction with the states of Western Europe, primarily with such influential ones as Britain, Germany, Italy and France, represents an important resource for Russia's defence of its national interests in European and world affairs, and for the stabilisation and growth of the Russian economy."

9. The framework of engagement that this foreign policy document represents (partnership and legal equality within a multipolar world; the centrality of the UN; suspicion towards NATO but with an emphasis on the need for continuous joint consultation and negotiation) requires further contextualisation via more recent developments and statements. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking to the Duma in May 2005, stated that Russia did not desire to join the EU or NATO, but preferred to cooperate with these organisations as an equal [emphasis added]. Summarising developments within the NATO-Russia Council more recently, Lavrov went on to comment that cooperation within that forum remained under-utilized- although a consensus had unquestionably been formed in combating terrorism, narcotrafficking, and regional crises in some areas. He expressed concern, however, that NATO's remit for action at the most recent Riga summit had increased, without parallel declarations that NATO's freedom of action remained constrained by the UN, and re-articulated Russian concerns over the actual movement of infrastructure and military forces closer to Russia's borders. [42]

10. It has been felt necessary to briefly outline the publicly stated goals, aims and concerns of Russian foreign policy for the very reason that the present author has no interest in the outdated art of "Kremlinology." During the Cold War it was common practice to attempt to measure potential shifts in Soviet policy in both the domestic and international sphere by speculation over the role of individual personality and the rise and fall of "court favourites". Whilst to some degree this approach has value in assessing the political stance of any advanced state (and could equally be potentially applied, for example, to American governmental structures), this author feels its real utility has been often overrated, and that the Cold War itself demonstrated the distinct limitations and even dangers of such an approach. Not the least of these dangers is that it potentially creates the false and misguided impression of leverage where in reality it does not exist—that by courting one set of actors within an internal power struggle, one might influence policy and simultaneously advance one's own national interests. With regard to the policy making process of the Russian Federation, whilst it is undoubtedly shaped by competing internal interest groups, for the UK to believe that it can itself shape that process by external manipulation or targeted support would today constitute a dangerous illusion. The best point for open engagement remains the existing explicitly stated set of foreign policy concerns, which possess the further virtue of having evolved to a stage of great consistency and relative stability. Lavrov's stance represents a natural evolution of Ivanov's views, which in themselves were a natural development and evolution of those of Evgenii Primakov.

Russia and the "near abroad"

11. Russian relations with its so-called "near abroad", most particularly with Poland, the Baltic states, the Ukraine and Southern Caucasus, constitute the theatre within which political tensions have grown greatest in recent years, and where the need for UK and wider EU/NATO re-engagement with Russia's concerns and interests is arguably most critical. There are three intertwined agendas creating conflict here- political rhetoric and programs based on contested historical memory, military competition and military alliance politics, and energy security. The best way to make progress, in the view of the present author, would be to decouple these three sources of tension, trading progress in one area for concessions in another, and thereby achieving a real reduction in tensions overall.

12. The best way to engage Russia as an energy partner will be set out in my conclusions. Regarding political tensions, one must note a general increase in authoritarianism in some instances, and nationalist extremism in many areas of Eastern Europe—the blame for growing tensions in this region does not lie solely with Russia. [43]It would be extremely helpful from the point of view of broader Russian-European relations, for example, were Estonia to not merely desist from disassembling memorials to Soviet war dead, but also abstain from raising monuments to fascist fellow-travellers from the Second World War. These are not simply "internal matters" for the Estonians alone to resolve; they impact extremely poorly upon the development of a balanced, consensus-based, cross-European historical approach to the Second World War (a struggle in which, as historians have recently reiterated in studies based on primary source evidence, the Soviet Union probably contributed more than any other single state to combating and eradicating the threat of fascism in Europe). [44]A broader based Pan-European approach to the history of that period would certainly not amount to wholly rehabilitating Stalin—a project in which none in the Russian government today are truly interested—but it would amount to re-centring historical studies of the Second World War upon the Grand Alliance-upon those forces that actively fought fascism rather than collaborated with it. Within that framework, memorials to Soviet war dead today merit as much respect as the eternal flame in Paris or the Cenotaph in London. Russia has long recognised Stalin's individual crimes during the Second World War, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Katyn massacre; it is disappointing, however, that a broader, more dispassionate and more pan-European perspective upon the Second World War, one that acknowledges and memorialises Russia's positive contribution to the overthrow of fascism, has not emerged in the wake of such steps. Poland is another state which, in its relations with Russia, appears today more bent upon reiterating the errors of the 1920s inter-war period rather than learning from them. Neither the UK nor Europe more generally benefit from such tone-deaf historical ignorance; in the same vein, the American President's recent comments in Riga—that the Yalta agreement was in his view unjust—reflects the worst kind of ahistorical pandering to local audiences. [45]Regardless of the Bush administration's views today, the Grand Alliance of the Second World War made agreements to which all parties were fully privy. The Second World War as a historical case study would potentially provide the focus for a broader cultural understanding on all sides that would help further cement a Europe "whole and free" with Russia in it; so far no politician or set of cultural initiatives has successfully advanced such an agenda, despite the opportunity provided by the fast approaching 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of that conflict. The UK, as a subordinate partner and occasional interlocutor in the historical Grand Alliance, would appear ideally positioned to set such an agenda as a further step towards facilitating a broader strategic engagement with the Russian Federation.

13. The manner of dealing with contested military alliance architectures in a potentially more mutually beneficial manner will be dealt with at greater length in the next section and conclusion. Russia today is a prominent member in two major alliance structures—the CSTO (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and SCO (Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Neither group presents a direct threat to Western interests, although that is not how the latter in particular is often portrayed. [46]If properly engaged with in a pragmatic fashion, they in fact present opportunities for considerably greater burden sharing. Facilitating such an engagement, however, requires both more positive talks, and a clearer demarcation of lines of responsibility and common action than has so far occurred.

14. The Russian armed forces themselves represent a force in transition, and therefore pose little immediate threat to any of their neighbours. Whilst modernisation plans are underway to update nearly half of all Russian military hardware by 2015, including changes to the MiG-29, Russia's premier air superiority fighter, as well as the introduction of a new class of nuclear submarines equipped with the Bulava-30 solid fuel SLBM (a sea-based version of the Topol-M), the latter in particular has been dogged by repeated failures during the design and testing process. [47]Russia's proposed new fleet of eight "Borei" class subs would moreover still pack significantly less megaton delivery payload than already existing American platforms (1.15 tons in 12 silos per boat, compared to the 2.8 ton payload of a Trident II D-5 in the 24 silos of an Ohio-class boat), and would very likely also be outmatched by the planned replacement for the Vanguard-class of nuclear submarines recently announced by the UK. Russian military reform, practically a frozen debate during the 1990s, has made some progress more recently with the introduction of contract-service soldiers, alongside more capable close air support platforms (modernized fighter-bombers and attack helicopters), the majority of which have been deployed in the North Caucasus. [48]However, the million-strong Russian armed forces are also only now facing up to a number of serious crises. Of these, none is of greater import than the unspoken but very real manning crisis now about to befall them as a consequence of the demographic disasters of the 1990s. Between 1992 and 1994 the Russian population declined by some two million, the highest rate ever recorded in peacetime. The much smaller pool of available children born during that period is now approaching draft age. The introduction of a one year rather than two year conscription term furthermore means that the vast bulk of the Russian armed forces "human material" will now be even less well trained than in the past, a phenomenon already felt in regard to the new generation of urban-combat configured BMP-4 Armoured Personnel carriers, whose updated systems are now too sophisticated to be entrusted to normal conscript use. It will take a minimum of 30 years for the current modernisation program of the Russian armed forces to produce a more capable and professional force, an outcome that is anyway far from guaranteed.

15. Though not the formidable potential enemy it is sometimes portrayed as, however, the Russian security forces still possess assets which could bring considerable benefit were greater partnership and a division of responsibilities to be on the agenda instead. The Russian intelligence services possess an invaluable level of insight on Islamic extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia which ought to make a continuation of the intelligence sharing agenda already created since 2001 a prominent priority. Russian Special Forces remain highly capable, and Russian anti-terrorist practices have a robustness which remains attractive to other countries. Within Central Asia, Western interests would in fact arguably be well served and further advanced, were the Russian armed forces to take up a greater burden of the anti-terrorist struggle in that particular region. [49]Finally, Russia possesses the technology to actually contribute substantially to a future missile defence shield, were such an enterprise to ever be pursued in a manner that actually includes rather than explicitly excludes the Russian Federation, and Russian collaboration in the tracking of rogue fissile material and the collaborative Russian-US project to establish a radioactive isotope "signature bank" represents an enterprise that ought to be continued and further fostered as an important deterrent against potential future nuclear proliferation.

The "War on Terror", Central Asia and Afghanistan

16. Central Asia and Afghanistan present the theatres where more positive engagement and a process of mutual concessions and fairer negotiations would potentially bring the greatest benefits. In both regions the final answer to local conflicts and crises lies at the regional level. Strategy ought to be performed from the perspective that the Western military and political presence in the region is temporary; so far NATO has shown little public interest in grasping this nettle. Afghanistan is a country that throughout its history has been a victim of geography, a contested zone between its nearest neighbours. The stabilisation of Afghanistan will therefore be truly ensured not by Western investment—which will very likely never come in sufficient quantities—but by the development of greater economic and cultural interconnections and burden sharing amongst its nearest regional neighbours. NATO needs to therefore remove the impression that it is engaged in a "war for influence" in the region, if it is to develop a longer-term strategy to ensure Afghanistan's stable and sustainable development. An Afghanistan serving as a conduit of trade and communication, in which all the regional neighbours become significant but not dominating stakeholders, is the best hope for the stabilization of Afghanistan itself. The establishment of a north-south energy conduit via a Russian-backed hydroelectric consortium in Central Asia could be supplemented and balanced by the development of greater east-west traffic between Iran and China. An Afghan army substantially equipped with cheap and wholly adequate Russian military equipment could moreover also provide the hard security required for the creation and development of a prosperous Indian "investment zone" in the south of Afghanistan. For this to occur the army itself must be cooperatively transformed from a NATO-friendly but ineffective "auxiliary force" into a truly combat capable body, able to independently protect not only Afghanistan's physical territory but also its airspace. Five years after 2002, this remains a distant prospect, suggesting the need for redoubled efforts, and the drawing in of greater investment and cooperation from the most powerful military neighbours (Russia, China and India). Finally, the wait inherent in establishing suitable educational infrastructures in Afghanistan in order to develop a literate civilian bureaucracy could be substantially bypassed, and the process significantly accelerated, by providing subsidised training programs for younger Afghan students in Russian, Indian, Central Asian and Chinese universities—institutes capable of giving a world class education at a fraction of the cost of most western educational establishments, and bodies whose existing infrastructure moreover more closely corresponds to local economic realities (thereby avoiding the risk of creating a "spoilt" educational elite who, having been exposed to the higher standards of living enjoyed by many in the West, might then fail to actually return to Afghanistan in the requisite numbers).

CONCLUSIONS

17. UK foreign policy towards Russia runs the risk, through the force of momentum and habit, of becoming outdated and ineffective. In 2006 for example, the two greatest scandals to scar the UK-Russian bilateral relationship on Russian soil were the "spy scandal over the rock", and the associated tale of British financing of Russian NGOs. The present author is not qualified, nor ought he to be, to comment on the veracity of these allegations, or of the value that the British government attached to or derived from such activities if they did take place; but if they did occur, it would appear on the surface that any benefits were considerably outweighed by the wider strategic costs created by their exposure. Continuing to support and maintain civil society and democracy promotion projects within a country which no longer feels it requires lessons from the West, is no longer a supplicant for financial aid, and has come to associate such activities instead with active political subversion and interference, achieves little of positive benefit, and verges on becoming acutely counter-productive. To borrow for a moment the comparative lens suggested by Sergei Ivanov most recently in an interview with the Financial Times, one might consider the reaction of British public opinion were opposition parties within the British political establishment suddenly discovered to be gaining the majority of their funding from foreign governments. The counter will of course be immediately made that Britain is a mature political democracy, whereas Russia is not—but this also misses the point. Russians today have evolved their own manner of democratic system which they feel conforms to their own unique historical, cultural and geographical inheritance, and they also value stability and the economic growth it has brought about extremely highly. Given President Putin's consistently high ratings in the Russian opinion polls—between 70-80%—Russians are unlikely to abandon the systems and practices he has instituted anytime soon. The American government has already been steadily reducing funding to and scaling back Freedom Support Act activities, and the UK should mirror this trend in its own sphere. Such activities had a certain role to play during the 1990s (though even then their effect was often over-rated), but are increasingly inappropriate today in a Russia which is steadily more prosperous, possesses a growing middle class, and which since the 1930s already possessed a highly literate and educated society. The focus ought now to shift to engaging with the Russian political classes in their own area of stated greatest interest-the business sphere. Fears over general trends within the Russian political class, and over Russia as a secure energy provider, could both be considerably alleviated by greater engagement at the sub-governmental level. The capacity for Russian political life to evolve under its own volition as a product of internal re-assessment and analysis should never be under-estimated. No Western lobby group after all compelled Khrushchev to initiate De-Stalinization during the 1950s, nor did Mikhail Gorbachev require external advice to initiate glasnost. As the current generation of silovarchs[50] become ever more exposed to Western business practices and customs, via mutually profitable enterprises, the prospect of Russia's political elites continuing to evolve in a manner that presents no immediate strategic threat to the West actually remains extremely strong. [51]

18. Redoubling diplomatic efforts to engage Russia (rather than developing ultimately counter-productive approaches to contain, bypass or isolate it, that being the approach most recently suggested by Julia Tymoshenko) [52]requires not merely an abandonment of the outdated policies of the past, but a new and consciously organised program of positive diplomacy, akin to the specifically designed "first hundred days" by which any new government plans to make its mark in office. The important difference, of course, is that diplomatic activity must unfold and the momentum then be sustained not across days, but over the course of many months and years. As a tactical "first step" that could unlock the potential for more positive strategic momentum in the bilateral relationship, this paper has already indicated that it favours providing resolution over the status of certain individuals abusing their asylum status in London. Reinvigorated negotiations between the two governments should aim to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome, with Britain receiving greater cooperation in the Litvinenko investigation as a consequence, but Russia also retaining the right to try all those responsible on its sovereign territory. Of necessity these negotiations should proceed as far as possible out of the media spotlight. If this individual tactical issue were considered to be too difficult however, the FCO possesses a wealth of diplomatic expertise, and the author is confident that another similar tactical issue with the potential of unlocking much broader strategic discussions could be found. However the difficulties presented within the bilateral relationship over the status of Berezovskii in particular should not then be downplayed—efforts to resolve this as rapidly as possible should be redoubled and ongoing.

19. Having unlocked the possibility for greater dialogue through small measures which cost little but generate greater goodwill, UK policy makers ought then to take the lead in a program that engages with Russia on a number of broad strategic fronts simultaneously. As this paper has already implied, areas urgently demanding greater discussion and dialogue include the expansion of NATO (most particularly over the manner that it occurs), even greater intelligence cooperation in the war against terror, removing the perception that Russian investments in the UK are regarded as a strategic threat, and the potential establishment of a joint NATO-SCO or NATO-CSTO body, the latter to provide an institutionalized discussion forum facilitating the sharing of approaches and greater burden-sharing towards the problem of stabilizing Afghanistan, all within the overall context of managing complete NATO withdrawal from the region.

20. Given that Russia is unlikely ever to be a member of NATO (the costs of transforming the Russian military to NATO standards alone would be prohibitive), the nature of NATO itself needs to be reconsidered yet again, in particular the role of the NATO-Russian Council, which has so far been a relatively ineffective forum. Both the UK and NATO itself needs to recognise that the potential acceptance of new members such as Georgia, the Ukraine, or Azerbaijan, without a process of intensified dialogue with Russia as well, presents a quantifiably different order of challenge from the absorption of states like Romania or the Czech Republic. The nearest historical equivalent for understanding this problem would be the Cuban missile crisis, itself triggered of course by the Soviet Union's desire to repay the appearance of American missile bases in Turkey by presenting a geographically symmetrical level of threat to the American continent. Readers will remember that that crisis was only resolved in the end by what was effectively, behind the scenes, a climb-down by both sides. Today this clash of interests remains at the moment more political than military, but this happy condition needs to be more capitalised upon by Western leaders. If Russia's stated foreign policy ambition today is that Georgia remains militarily "neutral" for example, the most immediately obvious diplomatic route towards meeting such a desire halfway lies in reconsidering NATO's approach to states like Georgia and the Ukraine, and offering the possibility of engineering a mutually binding NATO-Russian or EU-Russian security guarantee over these countries instead. Such an approach of course risks the charge that the West is engineering a second Yalta, or sacrificing these smaller countries interests to assuage Russia, but again, these objections miss the point. Russia is uniquely disadvantaged by the sheer size of its armed forces (amongst many other factors) from ever fully joining NATO as it is currently constituted and configured. It is precisely this very fact which sabotaged the optimistic premises of President Bill Clinton's approach to NATO expansion—"no surprises, no rush and no exclusion"—from the very outset; the last condition was simply never credible, as even Yeltsin certainly recognised. [53]On the other side of the equation, Russia has shown neither the desire nor the capability for territorial aggrandisement, nor is it likely to do so within the immediately foreseeable future. Whatever its other difficulties with its immediate neighbours, Russia today does not present the kind of immediate hard security threat to them that makes traditional-style NATO membership an urgent priority—no matter what their own perceptions may be. The absorption by NATO of a state like Georgia also presents a uniquely difficult set of problems over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The current official NATO position guaranteeing Georgia's territorial integrity for example exists in complete contradiction to the territorial and cultural facts on the ground, where the Abkhaz have been seeking separation from the Georgians ever since their first emergence as a conscious nation in 1918, and the South Ossetians, if polled tomorrow, would (again) vote unanimously to join their ethnic brothers in North Ossetia. [54]Mutual security guarantees over the territorial sovereignty of these territories by contrast would both bind Russia closer to the West, and mark a happy revival of policies first proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. It would also mark a healthy evolution of NATO, which, due to ongoing revelations over uneven burden sharing and inefficiencies during its current out-of-area operations in Afghanistan today, risks devastating exposure not only as a "two-speed" alliance (comprising the "ABCD" states[55] and "the rest"), but also the larger and even more dangerous implication of becoming exposed as a strategic anachronism. Such need not be the case—but NATO itself requires further positive rather than reactionary or defensive evolution and reform, a positive process of greater engagement that would also acknowledge that the world generally is inextricably evolving towards a "multipolar" rather than a "unipolar" global moment.

21. A similar approach of open engagement possesses the potential to defuse the debate over missile defence bases; although this area is complicated by the fact that it is almost entirely a purely bilateral issue between Russia and the United States. Nonetheless, Russian offers to develop a joint anti-missile defence shield represent the kind of diplomatic offer which it costs relatively little to pursue, and if actually developed might bring great benefits to both sides, broadening the strategic relationship. The United States has already responded to Russian criticisms of its proposals by engaging in direct talks with Moscow; the UK should itself encourage such efforts, and be furthermore prepared behind the scenes to investigate and suggest practical and implementable measures that might heighten its actual viability (making a last-minute refusal by either side to go further, always a possibility, more difficult to tactically negotiate).

22. In conclusion, this paper advocates the rollout in the nearest future of a new engagement agenda between the UK and Russian Federation that would both better reflect the consolidation of democracy within Russia that has occurred since the end of the 1990s, and the existing and most likely future global security environment. The paper has suggested a range of actions running from the purely tactical at the bilateral level to the broadest strategic level, with the intention that, if implemented as an organised program, progress at the tactical and bilateral level would unlock the potential for subsequent greater engagement at the broader strategic level. Such a program, implemented steadily over at least five years, would in sum look something like this:

(i) Settlement of tactical disputes affecting the Russian-UK bilateral relationship.

(ii) Institution by the UK of a cultural program of conferences, films, tours and documentaries creating a broad Pan-European historical perspective on the Second World War, one grounded in the historical fact of the Grand Alliance. The approaching seventieth anniversary of the end of hostilities in 2015 offers an apposite moment for reflection on this point.

(iii) The fostering of a climate of ever greater economic interaction between the Russian Federation and UK, embedding the Russian silovarchs in the global economy, and removing the perception that the UK is hostile to Russian business or investment.

(iv) Redoubled dialogue over possible NATO entry for Georgia, the Ukraine or Azerbaijan, taking into account both the difficulties this presents Moscow as a "special case" not itself able to join NATO, and the uniquely bitter territorial disputes affecting Georgia, with the follow-up option to then explore the creation of binding mutual security guarantees rather than offering full membership status for these states instead.

(v) Expansion of existing anti-terrorist intelligence sharing and NNPT activities with the Russian Federation as and when opportunity arises.

(vi) Greater dialogue with SCO and CSTO structures, with a view to expanding cooperation and a longer-term transfer of burden sharing of security concerns in the Central Asian arena. Afghanistan to be cooperatively transformed into a stable state in which all regional states enjoy a near equal burden of investment and security, thereby facilitating the future full-scale and peaceful withdrawal of NATO and US forces from the greater Central Asian arena.

May 2007