Written evidence submitted by Saferworld
A. SUMMARY
1. This briefing draws on a recent Saferworld
report on small arms proliferation, transparency and implementing
responsible arms export controls in Russia. [56]The
report is intended to help spark debate and further research on
small arms in Russia, but also raises concerns relevant for this
inquiry, including the export of Russian small arms and light
weapons (SALW) to Algeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Syria, Venezuela
and Yemen as part of an effort to expand Russia's export markets
in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America.
2. Russia is the second largest arms producer
and exporter in the world. It is also one of the world's largest
SALW producers and one of the most active countries on the world
SALW market. It continues to export a broad range of SALW types
and models. Increases in Russia's military and internal security
budgets and spending could signal an increase in SALW production
and trade.
3. There are major concerns about the quality
and implementation of Russia's arms transfer controls. The Russian
Government does not apply a criteria-based approach in its decisions
on licensing arms exports, such as that enshrined in the EU Code
of Conduct on Arms Exports. There are concerns that human rights
and the humanitarian situation in recipient countries are not
given priority in licensing exports, despite Russia's existing
obligations under international law (including international treaties)
and commitments to a variety of international, multilateral and
regional initiatives.
4. Public information concerning Russian
production and trade of armaments, especially SALW, is also often
difficult to obtain, inaccurate or shrouded in excessive secrecy.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the Russian Government
is subject to limited or no pressure from the general public,
as well as its own parliament, to become more "transparent".
5. The UK Government is one of the co-authors
of the UN General Assembly resolution on the international arms
trade treaty (ATT). The resolution won support from 153 UN Member
States. However, Russia was amongst 24 countries that abstained,
so it will be important for the UK Government to consider how
to promote international arms controls and the ATT with Russia.
B. KEY QUESTIONS
FOR THE
INQUIRY
What efforts are underway to promote effective
arms transfer controls in Russia?
How can the UK Government support efforts towards
greater transparency and accountability of Russia's arms trade?
What efforts have been made to engage Russian
decision makers on the benefits of increased public transparency,
for example, through the publication of detailed annual reports
on arms exports?
What measures is the UK Government taking to encourage
Russia to support the ATT?
C. THE VALUE
OF RUSSIAN
SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT
WEAPONS EXPORTS
6. Saferworld has collected a range of estimates
for Russian SALW exports for the period 2000-05 from a number
of reputable experts on Russian arms exports. Based on these figures,
Russian SALW exports are estimated to be worth somewhere between
US$60-200 million per year.
7. It is very difficult to discern SALW
trade patterns from the very partial data that is available in
open source materials. However, using Rosoboronexport's official
Russian arms export figures, and the assumption that Russian SALW
exports constitute somewhere between 2-5% of total arms exports,
a range of US$73-300 million per year has been calculated for
average annual Russian SALW exports for the period 2000-05. However,
these figures are still very rough estimates as SALW exports may
not constantly fall between 2-5% of all Russian conventional arms
exports.
8. The publication of comprehensive, detailed
and clearly structured information on national arms exports controls
is key to ensuring the highest possible levels of transparency
and accountability. Similarly to the practice of other major arms
manufacturing and exporting countries, Russia should produce annual
reports on its arms exports and imports, which, at a minimum,
should contain details of what arms and dual-use goods are exported
and where to.
D. SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT
WEAPONS EXPORTS:
DESTINATIONS
9. More important than the volume of Russian
SALW production and exports is the destination of those exports.
While arms exports patterns have traditionally been used to identify
a particular country's allies and enemies—ie based upon
to whom they will and will not sell—since the Yelsin era,
it has been assumed that the Russian Government has had few qualms
about selling arms to any state that seeks to purchase them, as
long as they are not subject to an UN arms embargo.
10. The Putin era has been characterised
by attempts to reduce the number of, or "integrate,"
enterprises producing arms in Russia. There has also been a reduction
in the number of state enterprises that are legally permitted
to engage in the international trade in arms. From 1 March 2007,
Rosoboronexport is now the only company with the right to engage
in foreign trade of military goods.
11. Rosoboronexport has reportedly been
providing credits to Russian defence companies to enable them
to begin production on export orders. For example, one such company,
Izhmash, required credit from Rosoboronexport to be able to start
serial production of AK assault rifles for a recent Venezuelan
order. Rosoboronexport officials also plays a key role in the
marketing of Russian arms to overseas clients by displaying their
wares at a large number of domestic and international arms fairs.
12. There are specific concerns about recent
efforts by Rosoboronexport to expand Russia's export markets in
a number of "unsafe" destinations in Africa, Asia, Latin
America and the Middle East. Moreover, Russian portable anti-tank
and surface-to-air missile systems and projectiles are reportedly
being sought by a large number of developing countries.
13. Some Russian analysts have acknowledged
that several recipients of Russian arms are regarded as "undesirable
arms recipients" in other parts of the world, with Algeria,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen recognised
as significant but "awkward" markets.
14. Saferworld's recent research finds that
established markets for major conventional weapons systems, such
as India, have purchased SALW from other suppliers in recent years.
However, Rosoboronexport has attempted to seize a share of not
only India's SALW market, but also the broader South East Asian
market as a whole. LW transfers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand
and Vietnam have been recently reported.
15. Saferworld shares Amnesty International's
concern that Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations
(UN) Security Council, has allegedly broken the embargo on supply
of arms to all parties in the conflict in Darfur. Amnesty International's
recent report, Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses
in Darfur, [57]indicates
that Russia is a major supplier of armaments to Sudan and produced
evidence that some of these weapons are being used in Darfur.
The Russian Government has however denied these allegations.
16. American and Israeli concerns have also
been voiced on a number of occasions with regard to Russian SALW
transfers to Iran and Syria. Russian SALW sales to Syria have
been a particular cause of concern for these states, due to suspicions
that Syria is diverting arms to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. In
2005 and 2006, Israeli officials reportedly presented evidence
that Russian anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and rocket propelled
grenades (RPGs) had been diverted from Syria to Hezbollah. The
Russian Government's October 2006 resolution on post-shipment
verification, which requires a follow up check by the exporter
that the goods were received and used as intended in the receiving
country, is thought to have been directly linked to these accusations.
E. LICENSED PRODUCTION
OF RUSSIAN
SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT
WEAPONS
17. The legacy of Soviet technology transfers
can still be seen in the large number of former Warsaw Pact and
developing countries that have production facilities and assault
rifle models that are merely copies of the AK assault rifle. Russia
has AK licensed production arrangements with Hungary, Israel,
Turkey, Kazakhstan, India and France and was in talks on licensed
production arrangements with China, Italy, the Czech Republic
and a number of other countries in 2006.
18. A licensed production agreement has
also reportedly been concluded with Myanmar, among others, though
information surrounding such deals remains difficult to obtain.
It is also worth noting that there is reportedly a clause in the
contract for licensed production of AKs in Venezuela that explicitly
calls for Russian consent to be sought and successfully received
before any Venezuelan-produced AKs could be exported.
19. At the same time, Russia is a keen advocate
of international arrangements, controls and punishments for the
unlicensed manufacture of arms, drawing attention to the issue
at various UN Programme of Action sessions and in other international
forums. However, as Saferworld's report highlights, there is most
likely an economic rationale behind the Russian calls for stricter
controls on unlicensed production rather than motivations relating
to the spread of armaments worldwide. [58]
20. The fact that more and more countries,
including Russia, are increasingly transferring technology, through
licensed production or other arrangements, to third countries,
which often don't have very high standards of arms transfer controls,
shows that there is an increased global spread of armaments that
requires global control standards. If a country cannot guarantee
compliance with those standards, a licensed production deal to
that country should never be authorised. The ATT seeks to establish
a set of legally-binding international principles to govern this
trade and curb the irresponsible transfer of weapons and ammunition
that serve to prolong and exacerbate violent conflict and human
rights violations, undermining development prospects.
F. RUSSIA AND
THE ARMS
TRADE TREATY
21. Russia is sceptical about the future
of the ATT initiative and has on numerous occasions cited, amongst
others, a lack of information by governments sponsoring the ATT
initiative, procedural reasons, the hasty pace of the process,
and the challenges of fully implementing, monitoring and enforcing
such a Treaty for its decision to abstain during the UN vote.
However, Russian officials have also described Russia's abstention
from the UN vote as a "positive signal" of Russia's
willingness to have a dialogue on the issue.
G. CONCLUSIONS
22. In democratic societies, transparency
in governmental policies and practice is a key feature for ensuring
public oversight and government accountability. This is particularly
important in a sensitive area such as production and trade in
arms, where the country's international image and reputation—as
a responsible arms producer and exporter—is at stake.
23. Greater transparency and openness in
this sphere would give Russia additional credit as a new democracy,
increasingly bringing its practices into line with those of its
international peers. To this end, a number of transparency measures
have been identified that could assist Russian policymakers and
expert communities to carry out well-informed analyses of the
state of the Russian SALW industry, trade and potential markets,
and also demonstrate that Russia is an open and responsible arms
supplier.
24. These include de-classifying enterprise
data on SALW employment, profit, sales and export figures; ensuring
Russian SALW-producing enterprises regularly publish comparable
sets of data on sales, exports and customers and providing the
UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database and the UN Register of
Conventional Arms with full, accurate and timely data on SALW
transfers. In addition, Russia should be encouraged to publish
a regular report on the value, volume and recipients of Russian
conventional arms transfers, including SALW.
25. Russia's role as a leading arms exporter
and international power means that its support for improved common
international standards in arms trade is essential. Saferworld
calls on the UK Government to work together with other EU Governments
to engage Russia in the process of setting and implementing these
international standards. As part of these efforts, the UK Government
should encourage and facilitate Russia's participation in multilateral
discussions around the international ATT. There is scope and indeed
a need to intensify policy dialogue and information exchange on
the ATT with Russia as the country's position will remain a strong
factor in future developments of the initiative.
Daniel Tyler
Advocacy and Communications, Saferworld
May 2007
56 Small arms production in Russia, Saferworld, March
2007. Back
57
Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses in Darfur, Amnesty
International, May 2007. Back
58
Small arms production in Russia, Saferworld, March 2007, p 39. Back
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