Written evidence submitted by Major General
(retired) Peter Williams CMG OBE[59]
BREAKING THE LOGJAM: SOME THOUGHTS ON MOVING
FORWARD UK-RUSSIAN MILITARY-MILITARY COOPERATION
OVERVIEW
Unfortunately, the history of UK-Russian military-military
relations since the end of the Cold War has reflected the unspectacular
achievements of the programmes launched by our principal Allies,
as well as by NATO and the European Union. Churchill may have
asserted that "it is my firm belief that on the friendship
and understanding between the British and Russian people depends
the future of mankind"[60]
but this noble aspiration has not been realised in the following
six decades.
The reasons for this disappointing record are
complex, but in the military-military sphere there are four constant
preconditions for successful cooperation: (1) political will;
(2) robust structures and procedures; (3) realistic policies and
programmes; and (4) the necessary resources. The UK's efforts
to meet these four requirements have been greater than those of
many of our Allies, but have still not amounted to much when assessed
objectively.
NATO's own special relationship with the Russian
Federation reaches its tenth anniversary in late May this year
and it also sees the fifth anniversary of the reinvigorated structures
and processes that are overseen by the NATO-Russia Council. Well
defined policies, structures, procedures and programmes have been
developed by consensus and delivered in part, but the limited
success achieved has reflected the waxing and waning of the political
will and the manifestly inadequate resources devoted to the NATO-Russia
military-military cooperation project.
THE RUSSIAN
VIEW OF
CO -OPERATION
Co-operation with outsiders is not something
that automatically appeals to the Russian mentality. So-called
friends and allies have all too often proved to be unreliable
and so Russians have been used to relying on their own best efforts
to overcome threats to their national security.
At the core of the Russian view of the world
is a craving for "control" in order to stave off the
forces of "disorder" ("byesporyadok")
and this is also what motivates its officer class. The dramatic
history of Russia in the 20th century demonstrates why such a
cautious approach may be seen as prudent.
As a result Russian leaders prefer to manage
decline (or progress) in a controlled and independent manner,
rather than to attempt major changes of direction which might
prove so risky that they lead to a loss of control and a slide
into unmanageable disorder. There is no place for radical, mould-breaking
thinkers within the Russian security elite and their military
education system reflects this culture of cautious, self-reliant
conservatism.
Sharing sovereignty or responsibility for national
security by joining partnerships (of shared interests) or alliances
(of shared interests and values) is seen as a potentially dangerous
route for the government to explore. An exception may be considered
when the Russian Federation can dominate the organisation, as
was the case with the Warsaw Pact or today's Collective Security
Treaty Organisation, but the chance of being let down by one's
partners and allies is always borne in mind and is normally seen
as a risky option.
The consequence of this state of affairs is
that Russian political and military leaders will only countenance
military-military cooperation when its outcomes in no way threaten
the core values and objectives of the nation's security establishment.
It is for this reason that the Russian Ministry of Defence has
routinely rejected all Western offers to engage in a worthwhile
dialogue on defence reform. [61]
Thus the spectre of "disorder" hovers
behind every Russian decision maker who enters into a cooperation
arrangement with another country or an outside organisation. In
this regard the Russians remain very different from their Western
partners and are both destined and determined to remain so. [62]
THE EXISTING
APPROACH TO
CO -OPERATION
WITH THE RUSSIAN
MILITARY
Faced by this very different approach to the
idea of co-operation and the sharing of security responsibilities,
how best can the British military seek to build an enduring and
productive military-military relationship with its Russian counterpart?
The recent history of UK military-military cooperation
with Russia has been patchy and inevitably prone to being battered
by the changing tides of political relations at the grand strategic
level. The Royal Navy prides itself, to some extent justifiably,
on having formed a relatively close relationship with the Russian
Navy and the highpoint of this project to date was the rescue
of the Russian submersible in 2005 by a Royal Navy rescue vessel.
This event, however, embarrassed the Russian
naval hierarchy by highlighting its own capability shortfalls
and it did not actually demonstrate any real meeting of minds
or commonality of policy and operational concepts. The programmes
offered by the Army and the Royal Air Force have been even less
successful in reaching out to the Russians and in any sense affecting
or reshaping their military culture and modus operandi.
While the Russian armed forces have been being
reduced in size over the last decade or so, many millions of pounds
have also been spent from the UK defence budget on retraining
Russian officers and preparing them for civilian life. [63]In
Whitehall we have prided ourselves on the fact that this is something
that the British military does well and that the Russian Ministry
of Defence has been suitably grateful for our contribution in
this area.
Before congratulating ourselves too heartily
in this regard, though, it is worth noting that the Russian authorities
have apparently expended no funding on meeting its own avowed
intent to retrain retirees. In effect, this is evidently a project
of low importance to the Russians and an area into which they
have persuaded the UK Ministry of Defence to invest a large portion
of its limited funds for military-military co-operation with Moscow.
The result is that the all-important "control" of the
core values and objectives of the Russian Ministry of Defence
have not been diluted or reshaped by Whitehall's determination
to "do something to help the Russian to be more like us".
The Russians have similarly deflected the best
attempts of other Allies and of NATO collectively to influence
their military policies, structures and capabilities. For instance,
the complex programmes developed by the NATO Strategic Commanders
with their Russian counterparts have so far delivered disappointing
results where developing and delivering NATO-Russia military interoperability
is concerned.
SOME THOUGHTS
ON A
CONSTRUCTIVE WAY
AHEAD
Difficult though it may be to work closely with
our Russian military counterparts, there is no doubt that Russia
is too important a geo-political player for the UK to be able
to give up the effort to build effective cooperation with its
armed forces. And so, if constructive engagement is not only desirable,
but essential, how best should Whitehall be developing its military-military
cooperation project with Moscow? What are the principles on which
its programmes should be based and how can the desired outcomes
be delivered?
First, any British programme must be focused
on addressing common challenges, such as combating terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and on
improving environmental conditions. These topics, and others like
them, can be shown to deliver advantages to both parties and so
constitute a "win win" scenario.
Second, wherever possible, individual co-operative
projects must be seen as reciprocal, rather than one-sided. Russia
is not a supplicant nation seeking to transform its armed forces
by espousing NATO standards and procedures; instead, it expects
Allied countries to engage in two-way exchanges of information,
ideas and even personnel.
The Russian Ministry of Defence does not understand,
for example, why its UK counterpart feels that Moscow ought to
aspire to send students to UK staff colleges (such as the Royal
College of Defence Studies or the Joint Service Command and Staff
Course), when Whitehall appears to have no interest in sending
British officers on the equivalent Russian courses (such as the
General Staff Academy or the Combined Arms Academy).
It is worth noting that the NATO-Russia Council's
programme of military-military cooperation events already includes
short reciprocal staff courses. NATO experts travel to Moscow
to explain the Alliance's strategy, policies and operations to
Russian staff officers, while in return senior Russian officers
provide insights into Moscow's military thinking at courses held
at the NATO School in Oberammergau. These events have confirmed
that there is more than a grain of truth in the Russian assertion
that we have as much to learn from them as they have from us.
Another area where current efforts are clearly
very one-sided is language training. While we may criticise the
Russian military for not having anything like enough officers
who have been taught to operate in English, the military "lingua
franca" for most multinational operations today, the
British armed forces have all but abandoned the teaching of Russian
to our own servicemen and women. [64]The
Cold War may be over, but the lack of investment in Russian language
training does a disservice to one of the great languages and cultures
of Europe and Asia. We cannot hope to understand what makes our
military counterparts tick if we neglect the need to train a cadre
of our own personnel to speak Russian.
Third, whatever projects and programmes we may
seek to agree and launch with our Russian colleagues need to be
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, in their style and implementation.
Modest, quantifiable steps forward must be preferable to comparatively
grandiose gestures that fail to deliver their ambitious objectives.
This approach is, for example, the basis for
the NATO-Russia Council's initiative to create a real capability
for military interoperability with Allied forces in a small number
of Russian units. This programme is agreed by the 26 members of
the Council and its results are assessed annually by the Alliance's
Strategic Commanders, who report back to Brussels on the achievements
and shortfalls. It is generally accepted that it will take many
years to build the capability for NATO-Russia military interoperability,
but the path is clear, the benchmarks have been defined and agreed
and the degree of success can be objectively assessed at fixed
and frequent intervals.
Fourth, a great improvement could be anticipated
were Whitehall to seek to develop a consensus among our NATO friends
on a coordinated Allied approach to cooperation with our Russian
partner. Currently many Allied countries are offering military-military
cooperative initiatives and projects to the Russian Ministry of
Defence, but there is no one in the West who has an overview of
what is being proposed. [65]
The result is that, when considered as a whole,
there must be overlaps and gaps in what is being offered by the
individual Allies and by NATO collectively, but there is no way
to identify or remedy them. Furthermore, this gives the Russian
Ministry of Defence every opportunity to "cherry pick"
and to deflect any proposals that might present a threat, real
or potential, to the "control" of Moscow's core values,
policies and capabilities. Common sense suggests that some degree
of informal coordination in Brussels before offering national
and collective programmes to the Russian authorities would surely
pay great dividends.
Fifth and finally, there is the issue of the
resources committed to military-military co-operation with Russia.
Despite frequent public reaffirmations at summits and ministerial
meetings of the political will behind initiatives to collaborate
more closely with Russia, the resources devoted to the projects,
both in the agreed UK-Russia and NATO-Russia programmes, have
been decidedly modest.
If military-military co-operation and the goal
of a degree of effective interoperability between UK (and by extension
NATO) forces and their Russian counterparts really is an important
political objective, the commitment of considerable resources
to the project is essential. Talk is cheap, but education and
training can only be delivered at a cost and the ultimate goal,
creating the capability for combined joint operations involving
Allied and Russian forces, is going to be very expensive for all
concerned.
In conclusion, the challenges facing Whitehall
as it seeks to chart a steady and constructive course in its relations
with Moscow are complex and ever-changing and the area of military-military
cooperation reflects the grander picture. For very understandable
reasons, the Russian Federation continues to base its military
relationships with Western countries, such as the United Kingdom,
on a fundamental requirement not to lose "control" of
its sovereignty. No Russian leader is likely to enter into any
close partnership or alliance with outsiders that he cannot dominate
and so, for instance, the chances of London or Brussels (be it
in the form of NATO or of the EU) persuading the Kremlin to remodel
its armed forces along more Western lines must be negligible.
Nevertheless, once we have acknowledged these
basic constraints and the need to stay engaged with Russia in
the interests of our common security, there must be a strong case
for Whitehall to discuss its military-military initiatives with
fellow Allies and collectively within NATO before presenting a
set of targeted and well resourced proposals to the authorities
in Moscow.
Just as the Russian Ministry of Defence has
cleverly deflected our best efforts in the past, in future the
British authorities must focus its efforts on projects that will
deliver clear defence outputs in the decades ahead. For example,
retraining retirees can hardly provide lasting military benefits,
whereas spending money on introducing junior Russian officers
to the English language and to the British military "modus
operandi" can only pay dividends in the medium to long
term where interoperability is concerned. The same must be the
case where teaching British officers and other ranks the Russian
language and exposing them to Russian culture is concerned.
Having started with a quotation from Churchill,
it may be appropriate to end with one of his more famous remarks:
"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".[66]
In truth, I believe that the actions of the Russian authorities
are much less mysterious than the Prime Minister suggested; they
are governed by national interest and a deep-seated suspicion
that outsiders are seeking to undermine the fundamental requirement
for sovereign "control". However, working within these
constraints, effective military-military co-operation is not only
desirable in order to address common security issues, it is also
achievable and real progress can be made.
15 May 2007
59 The author was the first Head of the NATO Military
Liaison Mission in Moscow (2002-05). Initially he trained as a
Russian Interpreter at the Army School of Languages at Beaconsfield
(1979-1981), before serving two tours with the British Commanders'-in-Chief
Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany (1981-83 and 1987-89).
He remains interested in Russian defence and security issues and
is contactable on fraddsmeadow@hotmail.com Back
60
Churchill's Victory in Europe message to the Russian people,
8 May 1945. Back
61
The Russian MOD has repeatedly insisted that it is perfectly
capable of analysing any lessons to be learned from defence reform
programmes undertaken by other countries and that, given Russia's
unique geo-strategic characteristics, there is no point in listening
to detailed descriptions of how the UK or other states have tackled
these issues. Back
62
The author was warned by a Polish general that "if the Russians
had yellow faces and spoke an oriental language, you'd expect
them to be fundamentally unlike us. But in their case, although
they may look and even sound like us, they remain fundamentally
unlike us". Back
63
Official statistics and experts differ on the size of the reductions,
but there is a loose consensus that the armed forces have come
down from about 2.3 million in the mid-1990s to about 1.2 million
at present, of whom over 500,000 are officers. Back
64
In the 1950s more than 400 officers and other ranks were taught
Russian each year at the Army School of Languages; by 1980 this
figure had gone down to around 10 per annum; the current course
at the Defence School of Languages in Beaconsfield apparently
consists of less than a handful of British military students. Back
65
Only in the office of the Chief of the Main Directorate for International
Military Co-operation are all these different offers brought together
in a closely guarded composite document. Back
66
Churchill, broadcast talk, 1 October 1939. Back
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