Further memorandum submitted by David
Clark, Chairman of the Russia Foundation[108]
UK-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE LITVINENKO AFFAIR
I have been invited to submit additional written
evidence to the Committee following the diplomatic measures taken
against the Russian Federation by the UK Government on 16 July
2007 and the retaliatory measures announced by the Russian Federation
three days later. As the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said
in his statement to the House of Commons, the UK Government's
actions were prompted by the decision of the Russian authorities
to reject a formal request from the Crown Prosecution Service
to extradite one of its citizens, Andrei Lugovoi, to stand trial
in the UK for the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a naturalised
British citizen and former Russian intelligence officer, in November
2006.
Below I set out the main conclusions that I
believe need to be drawn from this episode along with some thoughts
about the implications for future policy towards Russia.
THE UK'S
DIPLOMATIC MEASURES
On 16 July the Foreign Secretary informed the
House of Commons that the Government had received a formal response
from the Russian Deputy Prosecutor General refusing a UK request
to extradite Andrei Lugovoi. In response he announced that the
UK would be expelling four accredited Russian diplomats, suspending
bilateral visa facilitation negotiations, amending certain existing
visa arrangements and reviewing cooperation with Russia in a series
of other, unspecified areas.
The Russian response was received on 19 July
when the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement announcing
that the British Ambassador to Moscow had been informed that four
of his diplomatic staff were being expelled and that bilateral
visa restrictions were being introduced in a "mirror-like
fashion". It also said: "the measures announced on July
16 by the British side make continued Russian-British cooperation
impossible in the fight against terrorism at this stage."
In assessing this exchange I would like to make
the following points:
— Given the gravity of the crime committed
on British soil and the refusal of the Russian authorities to
cooperate in bringing the main suspect to trial, the measures
taken by the UK Government were reasonable and proportionate.
This was not, as has been suggested by some, an ordinary murder
of the kind that routinely happens on British streets. It was
one that involved the use of an extremely dangerous radioactive
substance, causing widespread contamination, fear and disruption
in the process. The Health Protection Agency had to spend £2
million screening 47 locations and more than 1,000 individuals.
— Although the diplomatic measures
were officially a response to the Russian Federation's refusal
to act on an extradition request, there is no doubt that part
of the reason for the tough line taken by the UK Government was
a strong suspicion of Russian state involvement in Mr Litvinenko's
murder. The nature of the radioactive isotope used makes it extremely
unlikely that it was organised and carried out on a purely private
basis. The only question in Whitehall appears to be whether the
operation was politically sanctioned or organised by rogue elements
within the Russian state security apparatus.
— Either way, it was necessary to put
down a marker that this sort of incident would meet with a stiff
response. For good or ill, the UK will remain one of the most
important destinations for Russians wishing to live and work abroad,
including those who have fallen out of favour in the Kremlin.
A failure to act would have risked inviting more problems in the
future. Those inclined to use violent methods to advance their
interests within Russia must be deterred from exporting them to
the UK and elsewhere.
— Apart from the expulsion of four
Russian diplomats and the measures relating to visas, the Foreign
Secretary also promised to "review the extent of our co-operation
with Russia on a range of issues". It is not clear whether
this review has been completed or what the outcome is likely to
be, but there is a strong case for withdrawing the legal privileges
Russia currently enjoys as a designated Category 2 status country
under the terms of the 2003 Extradition Act. This means that the
Russian authorities are no longer required to provide prima facie
evidence when submitting an extradition request because their
legal system is deemed to meet a certain standard of integrity.
When asked whether Mr Lugovoi could be tried in Russia, the Foreign
Secretary replied that this was out of the question because "both
the UN and the EU have reported that the law in Russia is applied
selectively". Clearly, in that case, Russia's Category 2
status has become anomalous.
— The reaction from Moscow indicates
that the diplomatic measures taken by the UK were well judged
and targeted. Although the Russian authorities were clearly stung,
the largely symmetrical nature of their response suggests a desire
to avoid escalating the crisis through direct confrontation. President
Putin's statement downplaying the "mini-crisis" and
urging a return to normal relations was particularly noteworthy.
The view of UK officials is that he came under pressure to take
a more hardline approach, but chose instead to follow the advice
of more moderate elements within his circle. If so, it has influenced
the internal dynamic of Kremlin decision-making in a positive
way.
— The impact of Russia's announcement
that bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism is currently "impossible"
is not yet clear. The Russian Foreign Ministry claims that this
is the result of a UK decision to "suspend cooperation with
the FSB", although no such measure has been publicly announced.
Even so, this ought not to prevent cooperation on counter-terrorism
matters since the main point of contact would normally be the
foreign intelligence service, the SVR. This would appear to be
a symbolically provocative move on Russia's part, but not necessarily
one with significant operational consequences. Russia does not
have extensive intelligence assets in the countries of greatest
concern to the UK, although it can be a useful source of information
about the illicit arms trade. As a precaution, the Government
should make it clear to the Russian authorities that they will
be held responsible if they are found to have withheld information
that would be operationally useful in the fight against terrorism.
— Although the official fallout from
the Litvinenko affair appears to have been contained, UK-Russia
relations are likely to remain tense on a number of levels for
the foreseeable future. An already discernible pattern of unofficial
and deniable acts of hostility towards UK interests has continued
and perhaps escalated. The organised intimidation of British Embassy
staff by ostensibly private political groups and the bureaucratic
harassment of the British Council by the Russian authorities are
now familiar tactics. In August, the BBC World Service become
the latest target after its local partner, Bolshoye Radio, was
ordered by the Russian authorities to stop broadcasting World
Service content or lose its licence.
WIDER ISSUES
Although the Litvinenko affair is a bilateral
dispute between the UK and Russia, it has wider diplomatic implications
that need to be considered. It is also clear from the UK Government's
efforts to secure the public support of key allies that the UK
cannot achieve its objectives by exclusively bilateral means.
In that respect, the following observations can be made:
— The very public efforts of the Russia
government to divide the EU and deter it from adopting a common
position in support of the UK ultimately failed. Despite a warning
from Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister that the EU "should
not give in to attempts to turn relations between Russia and the
EU into a tool to achieve unilateral political goals", the
Portuguese Presidency issued a statement on behalf of the EU on
18 July expressing "disappointment" at Russia's stance
and urging cooperation with the UK. However, the statement took
two days to emerge and there were reports that a minority of Member
States were reluctant to become involved. EU solidarity ought
to be more forthcoming to a Member State in the UK's position.
— It was encouraging that the new French
government offered very full and forceful support within 24 hours.
This was particularly impressive given France's close political
relationship with Russia and her extensive economic and energy
related interests there. Ministers should build on this by working
closely with their French counterparts in developing policy towards
Russia. However, it was disappointing to note the more equivocal
stance taken by the German government. The nature of the Grand
Coalition poses a problem in this regard. Although Chancellor
Merkel takes a firmer line than her predecessor, the SPD controlled
Foreign Ministry consistently pursues a more emollient approach
towards the current Russian government. The UK Government needs
to work more intensively with EU partners to develop a common
analysis of the problems caused by recent Russian behaviour and
the measures needed to influence it in a positive direction.
— The UK and the rest of the EU need
to see the Litvinenko affair as part of a trend in Russia's external
posture that can only be addressed collectively. The UK is certainly
not the only country to have experienced recent problems in relation
to Russia. Within the EU, Estonia has been the target of cyber-attacks
launched from Russian territory as part of a dispute over a Russian
war memorial, Lithuania is subject to an ongoing oil embargo following
its refusal to sell its Majeika Nafta oil refinery to a Russian
company and Poland has seen various agricultural exports banned
following a deterioration in bilateral relations. Beyond the EU,
there have been politically motivated energy supply interruptions
against Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine. Georgia, long subject to
Russian military interference in its internal affairs, claims
that a Russia military jet violated its airspace and dropped a
missile on its territory on 6 August. In an echo of the Litvinenko
affair, President Yushchenko of Ukraine complained in early September
that Russia was providing sanctuary to people wanted for trying
to murder him by poisoning three years ago.
— In each of these cases the country
in question has received negligible international support and
has been left to deal with Russian behaviour on an almost entirely
bilateral basis. Unfortunately, the UK has been among those countries
reluctant to get involved. An appeal from the Georgian Government
for the UK to provide technical assistance in verifying its claims
concerning the Russian air incursion was ignored. It is perhaps
time to ask whether the west's failure to adopt a stronger and
more united approach is one of the reasons why the Russian Government
has felt increasingly able to employ coercive and illegitimate
means in advancing its external goals.
CONCLUSIONS
The Litvinenko affair should not be seen as
a temporary bilateral problem. It is the symptom of a long-term
process of political estrangement that has its origins in Russia's
evolution away from democracy and towards a more authoritarian
and nationalist style of politics. Among the consequences of this
is a determination on the part of Russia's ruling elite to suppress
political opposition, reconstruct a sphere of influence in the
post-Soviet space and pursue diplomatic relations with the west
according to zero-sum principles. A newfound confidence as an
"energy superpower", combined with a deeply felt sense
of grievance about the past, means that Russian leaders are willing
to act outside the rules and norms of the international community
whenever they feel able. As a country with global interests, a
democratic orientation and a large and growing Russian expatriate
community, the UK cannot avoid feeling the impact of this trend.
A narrow bilateralism, in which each Russian
transgression is treated as a separate issue, will not arrest
this process. It needs to be replaced by a comprehensive and multilateral
approach that draws on the UK's considerable diplomatic assets
as a member of key international bodies. The aim should be to
shape Russian perceptions of how best to advance its interests,
blocking and punishing the coercive and illegitimate use of power
while opening peaceful and legitimate avenues of progress. For
example, the EU should be willing to begin negotiations on a bilateral
free trade area once Russia accedes to the WTO, but this should
be made conditional on Russia's willingness to accept fair market
rules in the energy sector.
An essential part of this must be a greater
willingness to insist on Russia's compliance with the international
laws and instruments by which it is already bound. Russia's violations
of its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe are serious
and systematic. So is it refusal to comply with the Energy Charter
Treaty. But until now there has been no cost to Russia. It needs
to be made clearer to Russia that it cannot continue to enjoy
privileged status as an international partner unless it is also
willing to respect the obligations involved. Effective judicial
cooperation is only one aspect of this, albeit an important one.
108 The views expressed in submission do not necessarily
reflect those of the Russia Foundation or individual members of
its Advisory Council. Back
|
