Written evidence submitted by Jackie Gower,
Department of War Studies, King's College London St Antony's College,
University of Oxford
THE CURRENT
POSITION
1. The EU-Russia summit at Samara on 18
May failed to resolve any of the major issues currently causing
serious tensions in the relationship and inevitably led to pessimistic
media comment about a "crisis". However, as President
Putin, Chancellor Merkel and Commission President Barroso were
all keen to stress at the joint press conference after the meeting,
there is no question of a formal breakdown in relations between
the EU and Russia; both parties remain committed to creating a
"strategic partnership" and work will continue at both
ministerial level (in the Permanent Partnership Councils) and
in the numerous working groups and committees on the wide range
of specific issues already on the common spaces agenda.
2. One of the strongest reasons for believing
that up to a point it will be "business as usual" is
the high degree of economic interdependence that was stressed
by both President Putin and President Barroso: since enlargement,
the EU accounts for 52% of Russia's trade and is the largest source
of FDI, while Russia has become the EU's third most important
trading partner (after the US and China). This interdependence
is true also in relation to the energy sector, with Russia at
least in the short to medium term as dependent on EU markets as
the EU is on Russian supplies of gas and oil.
3. However, the failure to open negotiations
on a successor to the PCA which expires in December 2007 will
inevitably have negative consequences in that it casts a dark
political shadow over all other aspects of the relationship; it
is extremely unlikely that any major steps forward in translating
the rhetoric of the common spaces road maps into practice will
be possible until it has been resolved and the prospects for constructive
cooperation on international issues such as Iran, Kosovo and climate
change are diminished.
THE BACKGROUND
TO THE
CURRENT DIFFICULTIES
AND THE
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The impact of enlargement
4. Much has been made in the media coverage
of the current difficulties of the role played by the new member
states, especially Poland, Estonia and Lithuania. Poland continues
to veto the opening of the negotiations on a successor to the
PCA until Russia lifts its ban on imports of Polish meat. Even
if that issue is resolved, the Lithuanian Government is reported
to be willing to veto the treaty negotiations in protest at Russia's
suspension of oil deliveries to the Mazeikiu refinery. The summit
itself was overshadowed by the EU's deep concern at the reaction
in Russia (including an unproven but very damaging cyber-attack
on official web-sites) to the Estonian Government's decision to
relocate a highly sensitive WWII memorial, while the Russian authorities
alleged that a protestor in Tallinn had been deliberately allowed
to die.
5. There is no doubt that the enlargement
of the EU in 2004 and 2007 to include ten former Eastern Bloc
countries has had a mixed impact on the EU-Russia relationship.
On the one hand, it has increased its importance for both parties
with higher levels of trade and a longer common border with obvious
incentives for greater cooperation to resolve practical issues.
On the other hand, most of the new member states, unsurprisingly
with their bitter historical legacies, have a difficult relationship
with Russia and their accession has meant that bilateral issues
inevitably have become those of the Union.
6. In a European Parliament resolution on
8 May and at the summit press conference at Samara on 14 May,
the importance of demonstrating solidarity with those member states
currently experiencing difficulties in their bilateral relations
with Russia was stressed. It is undoubtedly right not to allow
Russia to use the "divide and rule" tactics which has
so often in the past undermined the EU's collective negotiating
credibility. However, there may be a case for considering how
diplomatic influence can perhaps be exercised to persuade some
of the more volatile new member states that their interests, as
well as those of the EU as a whole, might better be served by
a little more circumspection in relation to issues known to be
highly sensitive in Russia.
7. One area where this might be particularly
helpful is in relation to the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities
in Estonia and Latvia. The continuous complaint that the Copenhagen
criteria for EU membership were not strictly adhered to has allowed
the Russians to accuse the EU of "double standards"
whenever human rights issues are raised and weakened the EU's
normative credentials in Russian public opinion.
A widening gap on "shared norms and values"
8. The most intractable problems in the
EU-Russia relationship centre on issues concerning democratic
norms and values. The gap between western concepts of democracy
and the practice under President Putin's "sovereign democracy"
has widened significantly in recent years. It is clear that Russia
has not followed the path of political transition that we had
hoped for and on which EU policy had been predicated. The key
question therefore is the extent to which that policy needs to
be reconsidered.
9. It has been rather belatedly recognised
in Brussels that because Russia has no current ambitions for accession,
and no great need for aid, the EU has far less potential leverage
over her domestic political development than has been the case
with respect to candidate countries. The fact that would-be protestors
were blatantly obstructed from travelling to Samara despite knowing
that the world press was watching illustrated the Kremlin's complete
lack of concern about facing public criticism from EU leaders.
10. It may be tempting to conclude that
we should adopt a purely pragmatic/realist approach and drop the
normative agenda. However, to do so would inevitably mean lowering
our aspirations for a strategic partnership as the kind of "deep"
integration envisaged by the four common spaces concept clearly
depends on mutual respect for the rule of law and democratic norms
and values. It is also quite clear that no new agreement would
ever receive the EP's assent unless it contained a firm commitment
to shared values—and indeed that would probably also be
true for ratification by most national parliaments. It is also
important not to send out negative or cynical signals to the small
but courageous democracy movement in Russia that, for example,
the EU values uninterrupted gas supplies more than human rights.
11. Rather than abandoning the normative
agenda, the EU needs to adopt a more effective strategy than ritualistically
lecturing the Russian leadership about its democratic failings
or passing EP resolutions condemning violations of human rights.
There have been some encouraging reports about the potential usefulness
of the twice-yearly EU-Russia human rights dialogues that enable
a frank exchange of views out of the glare of the media. But ultimately
the EU has to accept that democratisation can only come from the
people of Russia. It may therefore be more useful to widen the
opportunities for ordinary Russians to inter-act with their fellow
European counterparts through providing financial support for
exchanges across as broad a cross-section of society as possible.
The wider context: a general deterioration of
relations between Russia and the West.
12. It is important to remember that when
EU and Russian leaders meet, inevitably issues beyond the purely
EU agenda influence the atmosphere and implicitly, even if not
explicitly, there are linkages. The current difficulties therefore
need to be understood in the context of a dramatic deterioration
in the state of relations between Russia and the West more generally,
and the US in particular.
13. President Putin in his speech to the
Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007 catalogued
a long list of grievances, including a rejection of the post-Cold
War order the US has sought to establish, disillusionment with
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the operation
of the OSCE, fervent opposition to the proposed installation of
US missile defence systems in the Czech Republic and Poland and
outrage at the expected move to recognise independence for Kosovo.
All of these issues impinge negatively on the EU-Russia relationship
and have contributed to what Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson
in a speech in Bologna on 20 April described as "a level
of misunderstanding or even mistrust we have not seen since the
end of the Cold War."
Prospects for the future
14. Under Article 106 of the PCA, the existing
agreement will be automatically extended annually unless either
party decides to terminate it. Both Russia and the EU have indicated
their intention to extend it so there is no immediate problem
although the failure even to open negotiations on a new agreement
will create a rather negative atmosphere.
15. It seems reasonable to presume that
Russia is not over concerned or it would have been willing to
lift the ban on Polish meat after reassurances from the Commission
that it had thoroughly investigated the allegations of irregularity.
Russia is entering a prolonged pre-election period during which
appealing to domestic public opinion is likely to be at a premium
and President Putin's "tough" line with the West plays
well in the Russian media. The expectation must be that over the
next nine months he is going to be even more uncompromising so
the prospect for a significant improvement in relations is not
good. Uncertainty over the identity and political orientation
of his successor also makes it difficult to envisage any real
progress in the negotiations on a new treaty, even if they are
formally opened, until after the March election.
16. There are well-founded fears that in
the run-up to the Duma elections in December this year and presidential
elections in March 2008, questions concerning the freedom of the
media and the role of NGOs and opposition parties, if not actual
electoral malpractices, will lead to heightened tensions between
the EU and Russia and cloud at least the next two EU-Russia summits.
17. Internal factors within the EU are also
not expected to be particularly conducive to a breakthrough in
EU-Russian relations. The new IGC to negotiate a replacement for
the Constitutional Treaty will be the main priority for the next
six months and then next year the planned reform of the budget
will dominate the agenda. The next two EU presidencies (Portugal
and Slovenia) are also known to have other priorities and there
is a real sense of lost opportunity after the disappointments
of the Finnish and German presidencies, for whom the new agreement
with Russia was a key goal. Hopes will now be pinned on the French
presidency in the second half of 2008 and President Sarkozy might
perhaps rise to the challenge.
18. The current official preference of both
the Russians and the EU is for a comprehensive multi-sectoral
agreement covering not only general principles and objectives
but also detailed provisions for the implementation of the four
spaces, including a substantial sector on energy. But this may
not be a very realistic strategy. It would require reaching agreement
on all sectors before any can be activated which inevitably will
mean unnecessary delays in areas where agreement may be easier
to reach than in others. Negotiations between the 27 EU member
states to reach a common negotiating position on each issue are
likely to be extremely protracted and ratification will always
be a hostage to the veto of one national parliament. It may be
more practical to aim for a shorter document establishing the
key principles and objectives for a strategic partnership and
the institutional and decision-making procedures and then negotiate
separate sectoral agreements if and when conditions are right.
It may be helpful to recall that the EU does not have an over-arching
bilateral treaty with the US or indeed with other major states
such as India or Japan.
How best to promote the UK's interests?
19. The UK's bilateral relations with Russia
are particularly strained at the moment over the murder investigation
of Alexander Litvinenko and Russia's demand for Boris Berezovsky's
extradition. It is therefore in the UK's interest to press for
a strong and united EU policy on Russia and greater discipline
with respect to "speaking with one voice" in line with
the positions agreed by the GAERC each year on key issues on the
EU-Russia agenda. This is particularly the case as there is always
the danger that other member states will strike bilateral deals
with Russia which might not accord with British interests.
20. It may be desirable to use our diplomatic
influence in the new member states, balancing reassurance of our
support for them in the face of Russian bullying tactics with
efforts to temper some of the more populist instincts to bash
the Russian bear's nose from the security of EU and NATO membership.
Jackie Gower
Department of War Studies, King's College London
May 2007
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