Written evidence submitted by the Conflict
Studies Research Centre Advanced Research and Assessment Group
UK Defence Academy
The Conflict Studies Research Centre's remit is
to analyse and give early warning of the potential for conflict
and its likely nature, in order to further understanding of the
military-political environment. Its research is conducted from
open sources, and the views expressed in this paper do not reflect
official thinking or the policy either of Her Majesty's Government
or of the Ministry of Defence. Some of its recent papers have
been referenced in this document: publications are available at
http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/
SUMMARY OF
MAIN POINTS
— The image of the West in Russia is
radically different from that which the West seeks to project.
— Similarly, Russian responses to Western
initiatives have been misinterpreted.
— A comprehensive reassessment of Western
thinking about Russia is therefore needed.
— Russia's newly assertive foreign
policy highlights the primacy of the United Nations and the dangers
of US hegemony.
— At the same time Russia seeks to
develop alternative international groupings, seeing itself as
a Eurasian power as well as a European one.
— To this end Russia is prepared to
exert leverage when it perceives advantage in doing so, particularly
through economic means in Europe and the former Soviet states.
— This domestic popularity of this
policy strengthens the Kremlin's incentives to pursue it.
— Over the short-to-mid term, it will
prove difficult to persuade Russia that this approach needs adjustment,
because of:
— the dynamics of the succession
process;
— the lessons drawn from "coloured
revolutions" and their apparent failure;
— the illusions of energy dominance.
INTRODUCTION
1. It is our view that a reassessment of
Western thinking about Russia is overdue. Until recently, its
dominant motif was partnership. It needs to be replaced
by a motif of realism. Realism is not the same as pessimism.
It rests on a mature understanding of differences between Russian
interests and our own, as well as a dispassionate acceptance of
differences of political culture and values. Only by adopting
a prudent set of expectations and hopes will we succeed in overcoming
misunderstanding, limiting tension and identifying areas where
we can cooperate to mutual advantage.
2. This reassessment should not be hindered
by fears of reviving the Cold War. The Cold War was an ideological
confrontation. Russian policy under Putin has been emphatically
unideological and "pragmatic": motivated by "the
strict promotion of Russian national interests" in cooperation
with any country—be it liberal, authoritarian or despotic—which
can advance these interests. Seen through Russian eyes, it is
the West which is ideological: evangelical, even aggressive, in
promoting democracy and wont to pronounce upon and intervene in
other countries' internal affairs. The Cold War was also a militarised
confrontation. Today, the "military instrument" in Russian
policy, albeit present, has taken a back seat to the economic
instrument. The Kremlin unabashedly regards trade, investment
and energy supply as means of securing political influence as
well as profit. The degree of economic interdependence and the
intensity of economic interaction that exists between Russia and
Europe constitutes a powerful impediment to the revival of Cold
War thinking and practice. Finally, the Cold War was a global
confrontation. Today, Russia does not seek recognition as a global
superpower, but as a regional great power. Even outside its declared
"zone of special interests"—the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union—its ambitions are limited,
although (as we can see in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Kosovo) its policies
may often be at variance with our own. Despite the uncertainties
and potential hazards of the presidential succession process,
there are sound reasons to hope that these post-Cold War realities
will remain.
3. Nevertheless, we should not be complacent
about the more prosaic reality confronting us: a disagreeable
relationship. There has been a process of disillusionment on both
sides, and it is important to understand the sources of this disenchantment
before considering what lies ahead.
4. First, the post-Cold War partnership
was established during a time of profound disorientation in Russia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was not a simple "triumph
of democracy", but in equal or greater part, the product
of economic disintegration and national revival, Russian and non-Russian.
After 1991, Russians had to adjust to the collapse of the political
system, the economic system, the defence and security system and
the state itself. Those briefly at the helm of policy (eg, Foreign
Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and,
initially, Boris Yeltsin himself) had extravagant expectations
about the willingness and capacity of the West to cooperate with
Russia on an equal basis, to incorporate Russia into the West's
economic and security organisations and legitimise Russia's primacy
in the former Soviet republics. In practice, the West's far more
modest terms and rules of partnership were accepted out of weakness.
By the mid-1990s, this weakness had compromised these "romantics"
in the eyes of the wider Russian policy elite and a large part
of the country's population.
5. Second, this elite did not represent,
in ethos or composition, a clear break from the Soviet elite.
Unlike Germany in 1945, Russia had neither been defeated and occupied,
nor had its institutions been overhauled by foreign authorities
and administrators. Unlike, for example, Poland and Estonia in
1989-91, there was no counter-elite in the wings and no civic
culture underpinning it. Instead, a combination of the most adaptable
and the most opportunistic manoeuvred for wealth and power, which
in these Darwinian conditions soon became synonymous. Therefore,
the comparison drawn by some at the time between Yeltsin's Russia
and Adenauer's Germany was misconceived on two counts. It overlooked
the tenacity of power networks, the legacy of weak civic instincts
and the prevalence of strong habits of mind: deference to authority,
disregard for the feelings of juniors, subordinates and ordinary
people, manipulation of outsiders, cultural insecurity and national
ambition. The comparison also bred unfounded hopes that the brutalising
dislocations of post-Soviet Russia would prove to be "birth
pangs of democracy" rather than a process that would discredit
it.
6. Third, and for these very reasons, the
basis of a new consensus in foreign policy emerged well before
Putin came to power. When in February 1993 President Yeltsin called
upon the UN and other international bodies to "grant Russia
special powers as guarantor of peace and stability" in the
former Soviet Union, he anticipated that the call would be taken
up by his Western partners. Yet by April 1994, he was warning
the Foreign Intelligence Service that "ideological confrontation
is being replaced by a struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics".
In October 1994 he warned the OSCE that NATO enlargement would
lead to a "cold peace" in Europe. Our ability to overcome
these obstacles to our satisfaction made it easy for some to conclude
that we had overcome them to mutual satisfaction. They had confused
Russian weakness and acquiescence with consent and agreement.
They had (in the words of a Russian parliamentarian to the House
of Commons Defence Committee in 1999) given insufficient thought
to the consequences of the "moral humiliation of a major
state".
7. The advent of President Putin, his broad
popularity and the legitimacy of his brand of "managed democracy"
need to be understood against this backdrop. In social terms,
Putin represents the coming of age of a new post-Soviet class:
moneyed, self-confident, impressed by the virtues of a strong
state, uncowed by the West and totally without nostalgia for Communism.
In political terms, Putin represents the revival of the state.
Under Yeltsin, Russia functioned less as a state than as an arena
upon which powerful interests competed for power and wealth, often
at Russia's expense. Under Putin, centres of power—the security
services, the armed forces, the defence-industrial complex, the
energy sector—have become instruments of national power:
the first of these, reshaped but with an institutional dominance
not seen in decades; the latter, after a spell of privatisation
under Yeltsin, largely resubordinated to state control or management.
8. There was also a concerted attempt to
ensure that policy "conform[ed] with the general capabilities
and resources of this country" [Sergey Ivanov in 2000]. Where
capabilities and resources were weak (as they then were in comparison
with the West), the leadership sought new openings and common
ground; where they were strong (as in Ukraine), policy became,
in the words of its Kremlin adherents, "cold", "harsh"
and "much tougher".
9. The radical breakthrough in relations
following the events of 9/11 was as brief as it was because it
reflected both sides of this Russian policy. President Putin immediately
grasped that the tragedy in New York and Washington had changed
the coordinates of world politics, and he rose to the occasion.
But whereas Western governments viewed these changes with foreboding,
he viewed them as an opportunity. It was the West that now needed
Russia. Confident that this was so, Putin prevailed against internal
opposition over the stationing of US military forces in Central
Asia: both in order to demonstrate Russia's value but also in
the calculation that a US dominated Afghanistan would pose fewer
problems for Russia's security than a Taliban dominated Afghanistan
and the spread of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. Putin resumed
co-operation with NATO (whilst maintaining "principled"
opposition to NATO enlargement), and warmly embraced Prime Minister
Blair's initiative to establish what became the NATO-Russia Council.
Yet in exchange, he anticipated major political trade-offs. With
fair justification, he assumed that the new partnership would
untie his hands against "Islamic extremism" in the north
Caucasus, which was juridically part of Russia. With less justification,
he assumed that the West would acquiesce in Russia's dominance
over newly independent states, which were not. He also assumed
that by conceding Russia's "right" to its own policy
in Iraq and Iran, the West could not object to this policy or
ask how it furthered partnership. By late 2003, a fresh round
of recriminations and disillusionment was under way.
10. If these cycles of disillusionment are
to end, then so must the illusions that fuel them.
(a) Russian Democracy. It goes without saying
that the internal evolution of Russia and its political culture
will play a large part in defining the "art of the possible"
in our relationship. But the art of the possible lies in judging
where we can and cannot be effective. In countries which have
set their sights on NATO and/or EU membership, internal affairs
have a legitimate place in our discourse, and this is accepted
by our official interlocutors in the western Balkans, Ukraine
and Georgia. But in Putin's Russia, where no such goals have been
declared, no such legitimacy is conceded, and such discourse arouses
resentment. That resentment is felt by a convincing majority of
ordinary people, a large part of whom perceive that our partnership
with Yeltsin's regime was a partnership with those who had ruined
their lives. The fact that much critical Western commentary coincides
with Russia's recovery—when incomes are growing and pensions
paid—has a counterproductive effect: it persuades Russians
that we simply prefer their country's weakness to its strength.
Therefore it would be unwise to "continue to assume that
if [we] speak loudly and insistently, Russia will heed [us] and
change its ways". [Dmitri Trenin, Foreign Affairs, July/August
2006]. Speaking "loudly and insistently" is counterproductive
in a second respect. It diminishes our credibility where it is
needed most: in questioning and, where necessary, opposing Russia's
external policy in areas that bear upon our legitimate interests:
relations with newly independent states, energy security, nuclear
proliferation, anti-missile defence and arms control. If we blur
the issues, so will Russia.
(b) The culture of security. With
difficulty but conviction, the EU and NATO have replaced a Cold
War view of European security with a post-Cold War view, emphasising
"common security" and an extensive post-modern agenda
of common challenges, including: state weakness, institutional
incapacity, interdependence, integration and devolution, multi-culturalism,
illegal migration and transnational organised crime. Russia, in
contrast, has replaced a Cold War view with a pre-Cold War (ie
pre-1914) view of security, based on the "balance of power",
great power prerogatives, "zones of influence" and geopolitics.
Its traditional emphasis on nation, state and power sits uneasily
alongside a European Union committed (at least rhetorically) to
"moving beyond" these defining features of the modern
world. In this schéma, President Putin's distinctive
innovation has been the transmutation of geopolitics into geo-economics:
the use of economic levers for political as well as financial
gain. Whilst Russians are careful to stress the purely economic
side of this equation with their Western interlocutors, in the
post-Soviet "near abroad", the politics of energy and
trade is unabashed and harsh. More than once, Georgia's government
has been told that if it reconsiders its relationship with NATO,
it will pay one price for energy but that if it continues on the
path to membership, it will pay another. In essence, the West
and Russia inhabit different coordinates of time. Were Disraeli
and Bismarck still in power in Europe, many Russians would understand
us better than they do now. We need to reconcile ourselves to
the fact that these differences are unlikely to recede soon.
(c) NATO. By planning and programming
standards—joint exercises conducted, joint forums established,
the volume of meetings and exchanges—NATO-Russia cooperation
functions at a high level. But in political and psychological
terms, it is at one of its lowest ebbs since the end of the Cold
War. The notion that NATO is anything other than a classical military
alliance is regarded as risible by Russia's military establishment.
The notion that NATO is not what it used to be—an anti-Russian
alliance—is, in Russian eyes, made equally risible by NATO
enlargement. NATO's determination to maintain an "open door"
to further enlargement, without excluding Georgia (the back door
to Russia's troubled north Caucasus) or Ukraine (whose capital
is regarded as the "mother of Russia") has clinched
the argument across virtually the whole political spectrum. Discussions
about the stabilising effects of NATO membership, the benefits
to internal security, destruction of surplus weapons and toxic
materials, force reductions and professionalisation, the demilitarisation
of police and border services, democratic control of the security
sector and the right of independent states to choose their own
models and partners are worthy but fall on deaf ears. Since the
mid-1990s, the premise of Russian military planning and policy
has been that any activity undertaken by NATO near Russian territory
is a threat to Russia. Within recent months, that sentiment seems
to have grown rather than diminished, and appears to shed at least
some light on several recent developments:
(i) The discernable rise in official as well
as covert Russian activity against NATO interests in Ukraine.
Last summer's dramatic protest against the UK-Ukraine PfP exercise
"Sea Breeze"—which had taken place in Crimea without
controversy over the past 10 years—unfolded according to
the classic template of Soviet style Cold War "active measures"
campaigns, with apparent input from Russian special services.
The protest, which appeared to benefit from intelligence and prior
planning, was adroitly inflated by the Russian dominated mass
media into a far larger event than actually took place. It arrived
at the high point of other Russian efforts to exploit the very
real shortcomings of Yushchenko's pro-NATO presidency and equally
evident divisions of "orange" forces on the eve of a
new (but soon to be aborted) pact of unity.
(ii) The astonishingly destructive and systematic
rioting in Tallinn (and attacks on diplomatic personnel in Moscow)
following the government's relocation of the Red Army monument.
Evidence linking Russian special services and active measures
professionals to these events is growing. Like the episode in
Crimea, the protests coalesced around a symbolic event, well publicised
in advance, that could be expected to mobilise people with real
divisions and grievances. One motif of Russian internal propaganda
during these protests has been that when Russia decides to act,
NATO is powerless.
(d) The campaign against the basing of
10 missile interceptors in Poland and a tracking radar in the
Czech Republic as part of the US Global Integrated Missile Defence
programme. Despite years of joint modelling and exercises
on missile defence under the NATO-Russia Council, two full briefings
on the deployment, in-depth technical expertise, Russian specialists'
knowledge of the physics and geography of the deployment, an increasingly
strong relationship between US and Russian missile defence professionals
and invitations to participate in the programme itself, the Kremlin
has plainly decided to treat any US and NATO explanation as null
and void. Russia is concerned that, whatever the current explanation,
such bases once established can in future be used to undermine
Russian strategic defences. Yet the Russian campaign also fits
a political pattern. The immediate announcement following the
visit of US Secretary Gates that Russia would suspend observance
of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was an obvious
insult. The campaign astutely exploits the concerns of those who
were not so assiduously consulted: the publics and parliaments
of NATO members affected by the decision—and the Ukrainian
President and MOD, who were initially preparing a negative response
until a belated briefing from the US Missile Defence Agency persuaded
them to endorse the programme. Moscow is concerned that this system
could in the future be used to undermine the potential of Russian
strategic forces. The missile programme also provides the long
sought excuse to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE) and Russia's obligations under the 1999 Istanbul
commitments, and also to threaten withdrawal from the Treaty on
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)—while creating uncertainty
as to what these steps actually mean, apart from NATO powers losing
their knowledge of where Russian forces are, how many there are
and the right to carry out challenge inspections. Finally, it
plays smartly into the agenda of generals who wish to see missile
budgets increased, of Kremlin power brokers who wish to ensure
that Putin is replaced by an equally tough successor and other
power brokers who want him to stand for a third term.
11. To date, the UK and most of its EU and
NATO partners have concluded that if the price of reconciliation
with Russia is the acceptance of a new division of Europe, then
the price is too high. This is a sound conclusion. A "grand
bargain" at the expense of small states would rupture the
cohesion of the EU and NATO and undercut the legitimacy of the
European project; it would create demoralisation, uncertainty
and instability across the Black Sea and Caspian regions; it would
also vindicate a Russian paradigm of security that is outmoded,
distrusted, damaging to Russia's neighbours and harmful to every
tendency in Russia that we seek to encourage. In answer to the
charge that we are isolating Russia, we can reply that Russia
is at risk of isolating itself.
12. Nevertheless, we need to weigh the consequences
of every action before we take it, and we need to understand the
perils of inaction as well. If NATO had been enlarged in 1995
instead of 1999, then Yeltsin's warning of a `cold peace' might
have come to fruition. But if we had failed to enlarge NATO at
all—and, by default, conceded to Russia the very veto it
sought—the states of the former Warsaw Pact would not form
part of the liberal, democratic and relatively secure system that
exists in Europe today; they would constitute a domain of anxiety,
intrigue and sadness. In today's world of resource scarcities,
insecurities in energy supply and dangerously armed, virulently
anti-Western movements and states, we have a major interest in
ensuring that the Black Sea region, the Caucasus and the Caspian
do not become domains of anxiety, intrigue and sadness. For this
reason, we cannot concede to Russia a prerogative to make choices
for others. For the same reason, we need to act in ways that stimulate
Russians to see their own choices clearly and, in time, realise
that the real threats to their security are not altogether different
from our own.
13. Over the short-to-mid term, this will
prove difficult for the reasons set out in this document. In essence,
there are three:
(a) the dynamics of the succession process;
(b) the lessons drawn from "coloured
revolutions" and their apparent failure; and
(c) the illusions of energy sufficiency and
dominance.
We perceive that the interaction of these factors
could make it very difficult to persuade Russia that its approach
needs adjustment.
HOW IS
RUSSIA GOVERNED?
14. On the basis of an unprecedented concentration
of political and economic power; and competition within the Kremlin.
Russia has moved from a system where (in Yeltsin's time) 50% of
GDP was controlled by seven relatively independent bankers to
one where 33% of GDP is controlled by companies chaired by five
senior Kremlin officials. This has resulted in:
(a) The dominance of senior officials with
backgrounds in security/intelligence services and "militarised
structures".
(b) Limited transparency: the ability to
know what decisions are made, where they are made, by whom and
why, a lack of democratic oversight, insufficient checks and balances,
little public accountability.
(c) Less flexibility: dysfunctional decision-making
with limited feedback mechanisms and strong disincentives to bring
bad news.
(d) A multiplicity of inter-sectoral links
and rivalries, coupled with weak regulatory institutions; and
(e) hence, multiple, overlapping agendas,
very difficult to disentangle.
This pattern of collusion and rivalry not only
has adverse effects on foreign countries; it also has adverse
effects on Russian interests abroad and at home.
15. President Putin's successor may struggle
for authority over the rest of the elite. Russian experts warn
that, during this period, "we should be ready for all sorts
of political conduct, including a possible crisis scenario".[1]
Between now and when Putin goes might there be a sharpening of
inter-ethnic and communal tensions? Manipulation of disorder to
mobilise support behind a strong, "centrist" candidate?
Are such scenarios controllable, or will they get out of hand?
The risk of tensions is heightened by the weakness of democratic
political culture. Most of the middle class appears to believe
that authoritarianism is an acceptable price to pay for prosperity,
order and international "respect". National and international
human rights monitoring are condoned but not encouraged by the
federal authorities.
16. The belief is prevalent that foreign
powers (particularly the USA) are giving strong financial backing
to pro-western forces in former Soviet states, and thereby bringing
to power anti-Russian leaderships (the "coloured revolution"
syndrome). The Rose Revolution in Georgia of 2003 and the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine of 2004 were seen by the Kremlin as US special
operations (a view supported by the majority of the Russian population),
not the product of civil society. Shortcomings and setbacks in
the post-revolutionary order, most visible in Ukraine, merely
confirm this dubious perspective. Hence, there arises the a belief
that Western (particularly US) concern about democratization and
human rights is merely a political weapon to expand western influence
and to delegitimize both the Russian political system and Russian
conduct in the international arena. The Russian leadership appears
to believe that foreign powers may attempt to back a coloured
revolution in Russia in March 2008, when presidential elections
are due to take place. In his State of the Nation address in April
2007, Vladimir Putin stated: "There has been an increasing
influx of money from abroad being used to intervene directly in
our internal affairs ... we recall the talk about the civilising
role of colonial powers during the colonial era. Today, `civilisation'
has been replaced by democratisation, but the aim is the same—to
ensure unilateral gains and one's own advantage, and to pursue
one's own interests." Paranoia about western subversion has
become more pronounced in recent months.
17. The Kremlin cannot afford to be insensitive
to public opinion, because it fears it. Most Russians fear disorder
and weakness, but also extremism. Therefore, a candidate's image
matters. Although 43% of people have already said they will vote
for Putin's candidate, this will not eliminate elite anxiety about
what the electorate think about the anointed successor; hence
a continued bias towards electoral manipulation.
18. Putin has received credit for real improvements
(eg the steady rise in disposable income), but those will be difficult
to sustain given worsening structural problems (endemic crime
and corruption, ossified bureaucracy, energy shortages). How will
his successor acquire credit? Can he address these problems without
attacking powerful elite interests (as Putin previously attacked
Yeltsin's "family")? Where will his allies come from?
Will the country's now politicised force structures maintain their
cohesion during this struggle, or will they divide? Most importantly
in terms of UK policy, given these uncertainties, can we assume
that Russia maintains its present direction irrespective of how
the succession process plays out? None of these questions can
be answered today.
19. Like Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin came
to power confronting foreign policy failure. This created a disposition
for flexibility in foreign affairs and a determination to address
underlying problems at home. But his successor will inherit at
least the appearance of success: in Chechnya, in seeing off coloured
revolutions and in using energy to recover lost influence. Misguided
as these appearances might be, what are the implications if the
new president perceives he is dealing with a divided West, NATO/US
failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, systemic crisis in the EU, a
more inward looking USA and the end of Euro-Atlantic enlargement?
ENERGY SECURITY
20. Much recent speculation has focussed
on Russia's propensity to use its position as an energy supplier
and transit country as a point of political leverage. The official
Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020 describes Russia's energy complex
as "an instrument for the conduct of internal and external
policy" and states that "the role of the country in
world energy markets to a large extent determines its geopolitical
influence". Nevertheless, the greater concern to customers
should be that Russian energy companies are seeking the quick
wins of acquisition of upstream resources in Central Asia and
downstream facilities in former Soviet Union/EU rather than making
longer-term investments in domestic exploration, exploitation
and capacity-building. There are justifiable concerns about the
sustainability of Russia's reserves, and given the murky and chauvinistic
business climate in Russia, foreign investment and expertise cannot
be relied upon to redress this balance. It is this that leaves
Western countries' energy security vulnerable in the long run,
not simply the customer-supplier relationship or company ownership.
Russia is possibly over-confident, and certainly inefficient,
in declaring its ability to develop new sources of production
and solve complex technological problems (eg Liquefied Natural
Gas) on its own.
21. Lack of consensus in the EU and our
negotiating style and strategy give Moscow much room for manoeuvre
in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, Russia's
domestic energy needs are growing much faster than anticipated
by the Kremlin. Russia's natural gas transportation network is
ageing and insufficient for sustained exports to all potential
customers. Even with widespread domestic conversion from natural
gas to coal consumption, as envisaged by the Russian government,
Russia will find it increasingly difficult to fulfil all its export
obligations without risking discontent at home.
22. Impending shortages of gas even for
domestic purposes, let alone export, will continue to increase
pressure on former Soviet neighbours and present new risks of
supply disruption to EU. For the same reason, Russia will seek
to maintain a stranglehold on Central Asian supplies and transport
routes—and will treat diversification schemes with hostility.
Gas shortages serve the financial interests of some Kremlin insiders,
but damage the interests of others. The Kremlin fears public unrest,
but rather than seeking to avert a sudden crisis, repression of
public dissent is more likely. The consequences of gas shortages
in 2015 may parallel those of bread shortages in 1905.
23. The EU's March 2007 Action Plan, if
implemented, will have far-reaching consequences. It will bring
the EU into partnership with countries seeking to develop energy
transport routes independent of Russia. They will address the
most acute energy security problem faced by several other new
member states: energy isolation, brought about by the eastward
orientation of pipeline infrastructure and the absence of electricity
connections to the rest of the EU. The EU's national energy "champions"
and their supporting governments are beginning to find themselves
on the defensive politically and legally. A growing number of
regulators and officials are insistent that the EU's competition
rules be enforced, even in the face of determined opposition from
Russia and powerful interests within the EU itself.
24. Russia's combination of overweening
confidence and congenital insecurity, of ambition and vulnerability
makes partnership with Russia difficult. Where energy is concerned,
this difficulty is felt in four respects:
(a) Divergent economic cultures. Russia
under Putin has experienced a considerable re-nationalisation
of economic power with a strong security service component. Like
the defence sector in Soviet times, the energy sector is now seen
by many as the engine of growth and modernisation. This has brought
short-term prosperity and the appearance of international success,
which makes it difficult for the EU to speak to Russia with authority,
let alone persuade it that its approach needs adjustment. To Russia's
energy mastodons, "markets" exist wherever money-commodity
relations exist, however unbalanced, inequitable or monopolistic
they are. To Russia, energy security is guaranteed by a strong
vertical of integration and control, rather than diversification,
liberalisation of markets, transparency and choice.
(b) The emerging deficit. Without
major restructuring and market liberalisation, Russia will not
meet projected energy demand at home or abroad. Production at
three of Gazprom's four major fields is already declining. Even
to maintain current levels of production, the International Energy
Agency calculates that 200 bcm [bn cubic metres] per annum will
need to be produced in new fields by 2015: a project which qualified
experts believe demands $11 bn p.a. in investment. But such investment
is not taking place. In the oil sector, the picture is no more
encouraging.
(c) An aggressive rather than productive
pattern of investment. Gazprom's current investment strategy
appears to be focused on compensating for Russia's emerging gas
deficit rather than remedying it. It also seems determined to
use every means at its disposal to derail new energy projects
that exclude Russia, such as Nabucco and the South Caspian Gas
Pipeline. By acquiescing in the policy, the EU risks making itself
hostage to Russia's energy deficit and whatever steps Russia takes,
or does not take, to address it.
(d) Geo-economics in the "Near Abroad".
Inter-elite ties, similar bureaucratic and business cultures,
as well as the multiplicity of economic linkages and dependencies
mean that energy will continue to provide Russia with opportunities
for geopolitical tradeoffs and inducements to limit the sovereignty
and independence of former Soviet neighbours. Upon whom will the
scissors close as Russia's resource constraints mount? The answer
is inescapable: energy dependent neighbours. This surely will
not diminish the risks of tension and instability in the former
Soviet Union.
25. The pattern of Russian energy investment
is patchy and does not inspire confidence; Russia's international
economic ambitions and business culture are still collusive and
opaque, close to the state, and monopolistic in ethos. This does
not apply solely in the energy sector, or only on Russian territory.
It impacts on the conduct of Russian business abroad and the interests
and conduct of their foreign partners. The EU Action Plan is eminently
sound, but dogmas, habits of mind and narrowly construed national
interests may stand in the way. Clarity is therefore needed from
the UK and the EU. We must ask how Ukraine, the countries of the
South Caucasus and the Caspian could help us achieve our energy
goals and we need to ask what we will contribute to these countries
in order to secure them.
Supporting material already published:
07/10 Energy Security: At Last A Response
from the EU, March 2007 James Sherr.
06/48 Gazprom in Crisis, October 2006 Michael
Fredholm.
DEMOGRAPHY AND
SECURITY
26. Russia rightly views its declining population
as a national security issue, and has sought to address it by
offering incentives to families, and encouraging immigration,
particularly of ethnic Russians from the former soviet states.
Neither of these measures has had marked success in the face of
alcoholism, a decrepit system of national health care and poor
living conditions. Reversing the decline will demand significant
changes in the political and cultural environment, to one where
the state is accountable to citizens rather than vice versa. There
is no sign that this is happening. Migrant workers from the Caucasus
and Central Asia are liable to suffer discrimination and physical
abuse, and the "threat" of Chinese immigration in Siberia
and the Russian Far East is much hyped.
27. The north Caucasus is a jigsaw of religions,
ethnicities and competing territorial claims. Violence, human
rights abuses and manipulation of constitutional processes for
the benefit of political elites are endemic throughout the region,
and not confined to Chechnya. It is hard to see how further trouble
can be avoided. Russians equate their own anti-terrorist struggle
with a heavy-handed approach to law and order. Not surprisingly,
many ethnic Russians are leaving the north Caucasus.
28. The Muslim component of the Russian
Federation—currently around 10% of the total—has a
far higher birth rate than the Slavic component. This will have
a profound effect on Russian society, politics and foreign policy,
not just in the north Caucasus, and is likely to be a growing
source of tension. Currently the Muslim population is not highly
politicised; there is no Muslim lobby. The influence of militant
Islam outside the northern Caucasus is limited, although it does
exist. Violent Slav chauvinism, by contrast, is already in evidence.
29. Despite the demographic downturn, Russia
intends to halve the term of conscription into the armed forces
from two years to one in 2008, while retaining the overall size
of the forces. This means doubling the number of conscripts drafted
each year at a time when there are not enough healthy 18-year
olds for enlistment. Recruitment and retention on contract service
have been insufficient to fill the gap. The timing of the change-over
to one-year conscription pose a risk of disruption and upheaval
in the armed forces, at or around the time of the 2008 presidential
election. The 18-month transition period has just begun, and the
authorities have acknowledged difficulties..
Supporting material already published:
06/53 Islam in the Russian Federation, November
2006 Dr Mark A Smith
06/47 Where Have all the Soldiers Gone? October
2006 Keir Giles
06/39 Russia's "Golden Bridge"
is Crumbling: Demographic Crisis in the Russian Federation, August
2006 Dr Steven J Main
05/36 North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching
Destabilisation, Aug 2005 C W Blandy
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
30. Russia inherited a grave environmental
legacy from the Soviet Union. Air and water pollution are extremely
high and have a deleterious effect on health. Spending on environmental
protection is inadequate, and most major projects are funded by
international institutions. Efforts to uncover information regarding
pollution at nuclear and military facilities is hampered by an
obsession with security and secrecy. Since 2000 environmental
controls and monitoring capacity have in fact been reduced. The
state places more emphasis on economic growth than countering
pollution. Public awareness of environmental issues remains low
despite efforts by NGOs to raise it, as well as lobby for environmental
conservation and controls. The leadership however is generally
averse to such activities, particularly those carried out in collaboration
with foreign partners.
Supporting material already published:
06/41 Russian Environmental Problems, September
2006 Dr Mark A Smith
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN
POLICY
31. Russian foreign policy presents a mixed
picture after seven years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The
changed tone of recent statements draws attention to Russia's
increased self-confidence, although the power disparity with the
USA remains considerable. Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich
Security Conference in February 2007, which depicted US foreign
policy as a major destabilising factor in international relations,
was a reflection of Russian frustration at the USA's continued
adherence to acting unilaterally, and to using military force
without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Moscow is now
seeking to pull other states towards its own sphere of influence,
particularly anti-US powers such as Iran and Venezuela, where
Russia's new relationship is also a form of revenge for US support
of Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is likely to be a strong feature
of Russian foreign policy over the next few years.
32. Moscow demands recognition as a European
great power, as well as a Eurasian one. Russia will attempt to
encourage the emergence of a less Atlanticist Europe: the EU is
seen as a major strategic partner, and Moscow is not opposed to
EU enlargement. The Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March
2007, also places much emphasis on bilateral relations with individual
European powers. It lists the most important partners as Germany,
France, Spain and Italy, and argues for the development of partnership
with Germany and France in particular. Significantly, the United
Kingdom is not included in this list. It may be that Moscow sees
the UK as too closely aligned to Washington to be an attractive
partner.
33. Russia proceeds from the position that
it is fated to be a great power, with a right to sit at the top
table of a multipolar international system. This has been a consistent
theme of Russian foreign policy since 1991. Consequently it also
opposes what it sees as attempts by the USA to establish a unipolar
system, in which the rules of the game are largely decided by
Washington and imposed on the rest of the world. Moscow fears
that a US led system will marginalise its influence in Europe,
the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. As the Russian analyst
Dmitry Trenin argued in summer 2006 in Foreign Affairs: "Until
recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system,
very far from the centre but still fundamentally a part of it.
Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia's leaders have given
up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their
own Moscow-centred system. The Kremlin's new approach to foreign
policy assumes that as a big country, Russia is essentially friendless;
no great power wants a strong Russia, which would be a formidable
competitor, and many want a weak Russia that they could exploit
and manipulate. Accordingly, Russia has a choice between accepting
subservience and reasserting its status as a great power, thereby
claiming its rightful place in the world alongside the United
States and China rather than settling for the company of Brazil
and India."
34. Russia now does have confidence in its
ability to survive outside the Western solar system. This is reflected
in the Review of Foreign Policy, whose opening paragraph notes
that: "In world politics the significance of the energy factor
has risen, mainly in access to resources. Russia's international
position has become significantly firmer. A strong more self-confident
Russia has become an important constituent part of positive changes
in the world." It argues that we have now come to a "defining
moment, when it is necessary to think about a new architecture
of global security, based on a rational balance of the interests
of all the subjects of the international community. In these conditions
Russia's role and responsibility have qualitatively risen."
35. President Putin's Munich speech reflected
an increasingly harsh attitude towards the USA that has developed
since May 2006. Although criticism of American unipolarity has
long been a standard feature of Russian foreign policy, the hard-hitting
tone is now quite different from that which prevailed in 2001
and 2002. Putin characterised the USA as a lawless power, which
although it constantly lectures Russia about democracy, behaves
in a very undemocratic way in the international system. He accused
the USA of the almost unrestrained use of force in the international
arena, and of consequently engendering further conflicts. Putin
considers that the consequence of this policy is the undermining
of global security, as no-one feels safe; this leads to nuclear
proliferation, as states seek to safeguard their security.
36. The president also found fault with
the current tendency towards violence rather than diplomacy in
international affairs. He criticised the Italian Defence Minister
for allegedly naming NATO and the EU as bodies which could legitimise
the use of force: "The use of force can only be considered
legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN". The
possibility of US military action against Iran continues to be
the subject of much speculation in the Russian press.
37. Putin contrasted Russia's openness to
investment with other countries' protectionism and with aid programmes
"that are linked with the development of...donor country's
companies", which "not only preserves economic backwardness
but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension
in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism,
extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts." To redress
these inequities, Russia is seeking to "interact with responsible
and independent partners," as Putin said in his peroration,
and will act with "a realistic sense of [its] own opportunities
and potential"'. Russia's international great power status
is undoubtedly popular at home.
38. Russia's re-establishment as a great
power rests on its ability to influence neighbouring states. Throughout
this process, the West has shown inattention and a slow, reactive
attitude, although there are visible changes in the approach of
Germany, France and the US. Western "sensitivity" in
negotiation is interpreted by Russia as weakness. Russia is not
deterred by US disapproval from developing closer relations (particularly
in the form of arms sales and energy deals) with states such as
Venezuela and Algeria. Putin's February 2007 visit to Saudi Arabia,
Jordan and Qatar also signalled the development of a more active
phase in Russian diplomacy. At the same time, Russian confidence
in its ability to shift the international orientation towards
multipolarity stems from its increasing energy wealth. As Putin
mentioned, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries'
GDP surpasses that of the EU, and "there is no reason to
doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global
economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence..."
39. The Russian leadership remains concerned
about continued NATO enlargement into former Soviet states. The
possibility of Georgia and in particular Ukraine joining NATO
in the next few years increases Russian feelings of encirclement.
The Russians still remember the promise made to Gorbachev in 1990
that NATO would not extend any further eastward than the territory
of the former East Germany, and feels that it has been deceived.
The US interest in developing oil pipeline routes from Central
Asia and Transcaucasia that bypass Russia is seen as part of this
encirclement.
40. Partnerships with China and India are
also seen as one of the means of promoting Russia as independent
actor in the international arena. Both nations are important customers
for Russian armaments (these two nations account for about 70%
of Russian arms sales (February 2006 figures)), and China is becoming
an important consumer of Russian energy, as well as an increasingly
important security partner. Russia is also likely to promote itself
as an anti-NATO power centre, and will continue to press for reform
of the OSCE which it sees as a subversive organisation, largely
because of its role in encouraging transparent electoral processes
in former Soviet states.
THE SHANGHAI
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
AND THE
COLLECTIVE SECURITY
TREATY ORGANIZATION
41. Russia has in the last few years again
worked to regain influence in central Asia which it once took
for granted. In this it has been largely successful, given the
common language, military and political background which the leaderships
share. In the Caucasus, however, only Armenia remains firmly in
a Russian alliance—albeit with some reluctance.
42. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) has recently gained visibility in the West. Originally intended
by China as an economic and confidence-building partnership, its
member states' main shared concerns are extremism, terrorism and
separatism, followed closely by organised crime, drug trafficking
and illegal migration. China will continue to be the unofficial
`senior partner' in the organisation. Russia obviously finds this
a useful vehicle for dialogue and influence, and has recently
floated the idea of closer links between the SCO and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which shares much of its
membership and whose multinational exercises appear to specialise
in counter-terrorist training, with Russia as the senior partner.
43. It is a continued point of aggravation
to the Russians that NATO has set its face against an institutional
relationship with either body, on the grounds that bilateral relationships
are perfectly adequate. Russia's relationship with China continues
to be one of mutual respect rather than enthusiastic friendship.
RUSSIA'S
RELATIONS WITH
TRANSCAUCASIAN COUNTRIES
44. The Caucasus—both north and south—constitutes
an area of direct and vital concern to Moscow, in particular to
the Russian military, who remain sensitive to penetration by influence
and threats to the territorial integrity of Russia from the other
two regional powers, Turkey and Iran. The spectre of NATO expansion,
increased Western activity in the Caspian Basin and a diminution
of Russian influence in the region remain constant irritants to
Moscow.
Azerbaijan
45. As well as continuing disturbances in Chechnya
and Ingushetia, Moscow is also faced with a serious upsurge of
violence in Dagestan and therefore wishes to see beyond its southern
border a stable state prepared to assist the Russian counter-terrorist
campaign. This was probably why Azerbaijan was able to come to
an early arrangement with Russia on the question of migrant workers;
remittances from the Azeri diaspora in Moscow provide a large
slice of income for people in Azerbaijan.
46. However Russia will strive to prevent
independent access to energy resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
and thus seeks to stop Baku becoming a major energy transit hub
through the laying of oil and gas pipelines on the Caspian's seabed.
Russia and Iran are adamantly opposed to the concept of pipelines
under the Caspian.
47. For Azerbaijan the most important point
in its relationship with Russia (and with the USA) is the return
of Nagornyy Karabakh (NK) to the vertical subordination of Baku
together with the seven districts currently occupied by Armenians.
To achieve this, Baku needs the efforts of both Washington and
Moscow. At some stage Armenia will have to relinquish the occupied
territories, if international law and United Nations resolutions
are to be observed. However, there are doubts over the efficacy
of Russia in the OSCE Minsk Group's mediation of the NK peace
process.
Armenia
48. With the removal of Russian troops from
Georgia to Armenia, Russia still has forces stationed in the South
Caucasus. Almost 10 years ago small, landlocked Armenia sought
security through a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance with Russia which incorporated a Russian military presence
to discourage any intentions which Azerbaijan and Turkey might
harbour against Armenia. There are regular high level military
meetings between Moscow and Yerevan.
49. Armenia is 80% dependent on Russia for
energy. Russia has a virtual monopoly in Armenia for the production
and supply of electricity. Through its pipeline monopoly Gazprom
supplies gas to Armenia via Georgia. The aggravations in Russo-Georgian
relations interrupted this supply, and Armenia has now diversified
supplies to Iran, under severe Russian constraints on further
export. The rise in the price of energy has been a major factor
in beginning to raise doubts amongst the Armenian population about
Russia's attractiveness as their single ally.
Georgia
50. The relationship with Russia is one of the
most important factors in Georgia's struggle for survival as a
state. The 200 year-old Russian legacy and its overwhelming presence
have tended to limit Georgian efforts and aspirations. Gas supplies
to Georgia are under Russian control. A Russian utility conglomerate
is in charge of providing electricity to households and industry.
Russia has been quite ruthless in the use of the energy lever
to influence Georgian policy. Georgia's long border with Russia
includes Abkhazia and South Osetia, both currently outside Georgia's
control, and these breakaway districts have in several ways facilitated
Russian efforts to exert leverage upon the Georgian government.
Supporting material already published:
07/09 Who's Afraid of the SCO? March 2007
Henry Plater-Zyberk.
07/05 Putin on International Security, February
2007 Mark Smith & Anne Aldis.
06/33 Azerbaijan: Permanently between Scylla
and Charybdis? August 2006 C W Blandy.
06/31 Russia and Central Asia: Current and
Future Economic Relations, July 2006, Dr Vladimir Paramonov &
Dr Aleksey Strokov.
DEFENCE
51. The windfall revenue from the high international
price of oil and gas has allowed the Russian leadership to spend
money on the state apparatus, as well as an assertive foreign
policy. Whilst Russia does not aim at reclaiming its old military
superpower status, it has begun once again to invest heavily in
defence and security, partly to redress the neglect of the 1990s.
President Putin is an enthusiastic Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, and has several times castigated them in public for failures
and shortcomings. His recent appointment of Anatoly Serdyukov,
the former head of the federal tax agency, as defence minister
signalled a desire to enforce improved financial discipline within
the defence ministry. Poor accountability, corruption and inefficiency
within the ministry and its relations with industry have probably
been identified as the main obstacles to defence capability building,
in particular on the procurement side. The defence industry's
almost total reliance on foreign arms sales over the last decade
or more (declared at about $6bn annually) is now slowly being
reversed. Other scandals such as conscript deaths, quartering
shortages and low-quality contract manpower continue to impact
on military readiness and public support, however.
52. Although none of the officially released
figures can be taken at face value, there have been dramatic increases,
quadrupling or more over recent years, in all indices of defence
spending. According to some estimates (and depending on widely
varying assessments of China), overall Russian defence expenditure
is now the second highest in the world after the USA. In addition
to ambitious plans for procurement of more advanced and capable
equipment and weapons systems, immediate and obvious effects have
already been seen: for instance in aviation units which are reporting
substantially increased levels of flying training hours for pilots—admittedly
from a very low level—thanks to increased supplies of fuel,
and improved personal equipment for airborne troops.
53. It should be noted that although defence
expenditure is notionally debated and approved by the State Duma,
the equipment shopping list and spending plans are in effect presented
to the Duma by the military as a fait accompli. This lack of civil
control extends into the Defence Ministry itself: Anatoliy Serdyukov
may be the first truly civilian Minister of Defence, but in the
absence of any kind of civilian secretariat, increased control
over policy and direction for the Armed Forces has been promised
to the General Staff.
54. Russia's 2000 military doctrine stated
that Russia had generic threats rather than specific enemies,
and many of these threats stemmed from non-state factors such
as internal and international terrorism. Today, plans for reformulating
military doctrine hinge once again on the perceived threat from
NATO, and the USA in particular. According to the General Staff,
Russia sees a specific and deliberate threat in the course of
the USA towards world leadership and its desire to entrench itself
in regions of Russia's traditional presence, and the use of military
force to circumvent international law. President Putin concludes
that "this requires the steady improvement of the country's
military organisation, including the maintenance of high combat
readiness for the nuclear deterrence forces".
55. Putin's Munich speech in February 2007
caught widespread attention, but his statement that "NATO
expansion has nothing to do with... security in Europe, on the
contrary it is a serious provocative factor that diminishes the
level of mutual trust, and we are fully entitled to ask against
whom this expansion is aimed?" did no more than summarise
previous complaints over breaches of commitments by NATO and over
the perceived destabilising influence of the USA. These concerns,
and his references to a new Iron Curtain, are strongly echoed
in popular media within Russia: the image, familiar from Soviet
times, of a map of Russia surrounded on all sides by hostile missile
systems is appearing more and more frequently—with the key
difference that NATO facilities on these maps are now at the borders
of Russia itself.
56. Senior Russian attitudes to the possession
of strong and capable Armed Forces have also developed from seeing
them as an essential attribute of great power status, to a tool
for specific tasks. In May 2006, President Putin set the task
of creating more permanent-readiness units to serve as a basis
for mobile and independent groups of forces "in any area
of potential danger"; there could be no return, he said,
to the situation on the resumption of intense conflict in Chechnya
in 1999, when of 1.4 million men in Russia's armed forces, only
55,000 could be fielded in conflict.
57. The frequency, intensity and scale of
conventional forces exercises has increased substantially, and
is now at its most intensive level since Soviet times. In 2006,
compared to 2005, both the number of parachute jumps carried out
by the Airborne Assault Forces and the number of exercises held
in conjunction with foreign military forces increased by 50% year
on year. The Airborne Forces in particular have been practising
airborne operations on regimental and brigade scale, while at
the same time restructuring with an explicit task of "being
ready to stop threats arising, even abroad". The Ground Forces
are once again carrying out divisional live-firing exercises,
and practised mobilisation of reservists 700 times in 2006. The
Air Force is promised a further 30% increase in the number of
exercises in 2007.
THE RUSSIAN
SECURITY AND
INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS
58. In a short biographical documentary
"Man's work" made in 1996 during the electoral campaign
in St Petersburg, Vladimir Putin described at length his devotion
to the KGB and his former colleagues. By the time he began to
run the country, it was evident that he would wish to strengthen
the state apparatus, suppress Chechen separatism, stem the crime
wave and be far less accommodating to foreign countries than his
predecessor. To do all that he had to put in top positions—not
just in the security apparatus—people he could trust. Most
of these were from St Petersburg and many of them served in the
KGB. This is a 50+ generation of men which regards the disappearance
of the USSR as a great tragedy and blames the West for many of
the problems which Russia has failed to address. They remain a
close-knit community, whether inside or outside officialdom.
59. The security and intelligence organisations
play an important role in both Russia's domestic and foreign policy.
The principal organ responsible for domestic security is the Federal
Security Service (FSB). After many reforms, the FSB has reclaimed
most of the components of the old KGB, including the Federal Agency
of Governmental Communication and Information, the Federal Border
Guard Service and two specialist anti-terrorist teams: Alfa and
Vympel. The FSB is very capable, and is headed by Army General
Patrushev, one of Vladimir Putin's closest colleagues. There is
no "fresh blood" in the leadership of the service, who
all began their careers in the Soviet KGB. Today, the FSB performs
its traditional tasks, which include all forms of counterintelligence
and security duties, guarding the national borders and conducting
signals intelligence operations. The service also coordinates
anti-terrorist operations and national and international anti-fraud
operations. In combating terrorism and fraud in Russia the FSB
is assisted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Its foreign
operations are led and supervised by the Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR).
60. The MVD's main task is policing the
country. Army General Rashid Nurgaliev, another former KGB officer
and subordinate of Gen Patrushev, is in charge of the Interior
Troops units stationed around the country to deal with large scale
internal problems, and the local rapid response teams. Like the
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs the MVD is
a "presidential ministry" controlled by the head of
state, a custom introduced by Bois Yeltsin. This status has not
been challenged by the Russian parliament.
61. In addition to standard security and
law enforcement duties and combating terrorism, the FSB's and
MVD's main tasks include close monitoring of public manifestations
of discontent, including non-violent, legal protests. It became
clear during the first conflict in Chechnya that the Russian special
services, the MVD Troops and the military were neither able to
penetrate the Chechen community nor to prevent terrorist attacks.
Since then much attention has been focussed on making these services
work effectively together. The problem of Russian organised crime
groups had also to be addressed. Criminal organisations grew rapidly
in the 1990s, and their activities became "internationalised".
The MVD was not trained to address the problem, since all crimes
involving foreigners had previously been the province of the KGB.
62. Russia's two main intelligence services,
the SVR and the Defence Ministry's Main Intelligence Directorate
(GRU) are facing new tasks as well as some of the old ones, which
for economic and political reasons were abandoned or scaled down
for more than a decade. The Russian intelligence services can
be expected to show renewed interest in the technological achievements
of other countries to speed up or shortcut Russia's own process
of technological modernisation. The civilian SVR's remit includes
tracking down terrorist and criminal suspects wanted by the Russian
judicial system. After the Beslan events it was authorised by
President Putin to physically eliminate terrorists operating against
Russia abroad. Recent Russian legislation empowering the pre-emptive
use of force overseas refers specifically to Defence Ministry
assets rather than to the FSB or SVR.
63. The events of 9/11 and the Beslan school
siege played an important role in encouraging the president to
strengthen the Russian security structures. Few in Russia question
the need for this, or the way the process has been conducted.
There has been no public or media debate on what sort of security
and intelligence services Russia needs. The general consensus
is that the bigger and stronger they are, the better. There is
little public interest in democratic accountability, quality control,
or the techniques used, as long as they kill terrorists, arrest
criminals and recover money from controversial oligarchs.
64. Sometimes confused and frustrated by
the legal procedures of liberal democracies, the Russian special
services can be expected to become more aggressive in tracking
down and taking drastic measures against enemies abroad, especially
amongst the foreign-based Russian community. The growing Russian
diaspora includes many rich people who may have abused the Russian
legal system. They will be expected to hand over what they have
stolen from the state, or encouraged to reach some ongoing accommodation
with it. In the most serious cases, like Chechen terrorist suspects
living abroad, they may become targets of kidnapping and physical
elimination.
65. As Russia grows in strength so will
her intelligence and security organs. Even when he ceases to be
the head of state, Putin and former KGB officers of his generation
will have enormous influence on how and against whom these organs
will operate. They will continue to play an important role in
maintaining internal security and fighting for Russian interests
abroad. Their actions are likely to reflect the needs and attitudes
of Russia's leaders: semi-democratic, non-liberal, rich, intolerant
of dissent and respecting only the strong. At the same time, Russia's
special services can be valuable partners when it serves their
interests, in pursuit of terrorists, criminals or sharing information.
The UK is likely to remain an area of high intelligence interest
for Russia. Nevertheless, British agencies should continue to
cooperate with them when it is appropriate.
Supporting material already published:
05/50 Russia's Special Forces September 2005
Henry Plater-Zyberk
C108 Vladimir Putin & Russia's Special
Services, August 2002, Gordon Bennett
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this paper
do not reflect official thinking and policy either of Her Majesty's
Government or of the Ministry of Defence
Conflict Studies Research Centre
May 2007
1 Aleks Arhangelsky, russiprofile.org 1 April 2007 Back
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