Memorandum submitted by Saferworld
A. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
— The Government should continue to
make the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) a foreign policy priority and
continue to champion an ATT of the highest standards, reflecting
states' existing obligations under international law, including
the UN Charter, UN embargoes, human rights and international humanitarian
law.
— The Government should introduce a
"presumption of denial" for arms exports to an agreed
list of "countries of concern", ie countries where there
are particular human right concerns. The list should be agreed
with the Foreign Affairs Committee and Committees on Arms Export
Controls.
— The Government should use the ongoing
review of the UK Export Control Act to close existing loopholes
in UK export controls by introducing full extraterritorial controls
on brokering of all conventional weapons, introducing an effective
system for monitoring the end-use of UK arms exports, and increasing
controls on overseas production by UK companies.
— More resources should also be made
available for the investigation and enforcement of possible breaches
of these controls.
B. SUMMARY
Although the UK Government has taken a strong
lead on arms export controls at national, regional and international
levels in recent years, there are still transfers of defence equipment
and technology originating or being organised from the UK which
are reaching unstable states or embargoed countries. The Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, against which
arms licences are assessed, states that the Government will not
issue an export licence "which would provoke or prolong armed
conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts" or
"if there is a clear risk that the proposed equipment might
be used for internal repression". However, Saferworld's comparison
of the recent FCO 2007 Human Rights Report with the Government's
strategic exports controls figures highlights how British equipment
is being authorised for export to 18 of the top 21 countries identified
by the FCO as "major countries of concern" for human
rights abuses (1).
Of particular note were licences issued for
exports to China. The value of licences has tripled since 2006
to a value of £215 million, despite an EU arms embargo. There
is also concern over the high volume of equipment licensed for
export to countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both countries
highlighted in the Government's own Human Rights report for their
poor human rights records and issues surrounding stability but
which are regarded as key allies in the "fight against terrorism".
Saferworld believes that real efforts must be
made to rectify this inconsistency between policy and practice.
In addition to any concerns regarding China as a final destination,
China is acknowledged to be a significant exporter of arms to
countries with very poor human rights records. Therefore, as well
as fully applying human rights criteria when granting export licences
to ensure that British military equipment and technology cannot
be used for internal repression and human rights abuses, the Government
must be satisfied that there is no risk of military goods produced
by countries such as China using UK technology ending up in countries
such as Burma, Zimbabwe and Sudan.
C. THE ARMS
TRADE TREATY
The global arms trade continues to contribute
to conflict and undermine development efforts by international
donors. Irresponsible exports of arms to developing countries
have a devastating human impact and implications for security
and protection of human rights in the "countries of concern"
identified by the FCO. A recent report by Iansa, Oxfam and Saferworld
reveals that the cost of armed conflict to Africa is around $18
billion per year, costing each country, on average, 15% of its
GDP and totalling more than all annual international donor aid
assistance combined (2).
The FCO 2007 Annual Report on Human Rights rightly
points to the positive steps taken by the Government in developing
the UK's position on arms exports and the admirable international
leadership demonstrated in promoting an international Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) (3). In acting as such a forthright champion of the
ATT, the UK has generated considerable momentum for the initiative,
with around 100 countries submitting their views on a treaty to
the UN Secretary General. A UN Secretary-General report collating
Member States' views will now be presented to the UN General Assembly
and an international Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is currently
considering in detail the feasibility, scope and draft parameters
of a treaty.
However, with discussions set to intensify during
these ongoing GGE meetings, it is critical that the Government
maintains its commitment to the process and works with other governments
to help secure this treaty. This will require the Government to
make consistent effort to make the case for the merits of an ATT
both to supportive governments, to ensure they are not encouraged
to compromise on key points, and to less supportive states to
persuade them to support the ATT. This commitment to an ATT must
remain a foreign policy priority for the Government and be a feature
of bilateral and multilateral discussions.
D. UK ARMS EXPORT
AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
Saferworld's analysis of the FCO's 2007 Annual
Report on Human Rights and figures on UK's strategic export controls
revealed that, despite repeated criticism (4), the Government
has continued to export controlled equipment to 18 of the top
21 countries identified as "major countries of concern"
for human rights abuses (5).
Saferworld remains concerned that the Government
is not taking sufficient account of its own assessment of countries'
human rights records when making export licensing decisions. Despite
stating that it will not issue licences to countries where "there
is a clear risk that the proposed equipment might be used for
internal repression", the Government's own records show that
it continues to export military equipment to countries with poor
human rights records.
In the case of several of these countries, the
risk of diversion of equipment is also of concern as the UK Government
does not do enough to check what happens to arms exports once
they leave the country. There is subsequently little way of ensuring
that arms are not used for acts of terrorism or do not find their
way to criminal gangs, "pariah" states, paramilitaries
or war lords. For example, concerns have long been held over the
links between the Colombian Government and right-wing paramilitary
forces within the country; Israel has in the past failed to honour
explicit end-use monitoring undertakings; and China, Israel and
Pakistan have all been identified as serial proliferators of military
equipment or technologies.
Also of concern has been the Government's willingness
to issue export licences for components that will be incorporated
into weapons systems in the recipient country and then exported
onward. Over £5.5 million worth of incorporation licences
were granted to the United States, including components for combat
aircraft and military heads-up display (HUD) units. The US has
previously incorporated UK made HUD units into F-16 fighter jets
which were subsequently exported to Israel. Under current UK law,
it is highly unlikely that such equipment would be allowed a direct
transfer to Israel. China, Israel, Russia and Turkey are also
all incorporating countries—none of which would be regarded
as having export control standards equivalent to those of the
UK.
During 2007 exports of equipment which could
be used in the commission of human rights abuses were approved
to:
China
"With only limited reforms introduced since
autumn 2006, violations of basic human rights continue...".
(6)
Despite an EU-wide arms embargo on China which
prohibits the Government from transferring combat systems to China,
exports to China have tripled since 2006, with licences to the
value of £215 million granted for inter alia: technology
for the use of military utility helicopters; production equipment
for military utility helicopters; technology for the production
of military aero-engines; technology for the production of military
communications equipment; technology for the production of military
utility helicopters.
In addition to the risk that some of this equipment
could be used in connection with human rights abuses within China,
it is worrying that it is also supporting China's capacity as
a defence producer. This creates further risks for human rights
abuse as China is one of the main suppliers to countries such
as Burma and Sudan. More recently, there has been widespread media
coverage of a Chinese ship carrying arms destined for Zimbabwe.
While the arms shipment, ordered from China before the 29 March
2008 elections, has yet to be delivered, it is a salient reminder
of the opaque Chinese arms export policy and, therefore, the risks
associated with exporting components to China.
This case and others highlight the real necessity
for the UK Government to implement and enforce a "no re-export
without permission" clause into each and every export licence
for all controlled goods and technology including components for
use in controlled goods. A re-export clause would require the
exporting state to gain the permission of the UK Government before
onward export of any UK-origin products.
Colombia
"We continue to be concerned about the human
rights situation. Ordinary Columbians continue to bear the brunt
of the conflict, with human rights defenders, journalists, teachers
and indigenous communities the targets of threats, intimidation,
kidnappings, murders and forced displacement". (7)
Export licences to the value of £2 million
were granted for inter alia: components and technology for heavy
machine guns.
Israel
"The UK remains concerned about the human
rights situation... We are particularly worried by Israel's failure
to improve Palestinian movement and access; the continued construction
of settlements and the barrier in the West Bank and whether Israel's
use of force is necessary and proportionate". (8)
Export licences to the value of £14 million
were granted for inter alia: aircraft military communications
equipment, components for airbourne electronic warfare equipment,
components for combat aircraft and unmanned air vehicles.
Russia
"The past 18 months have seen a shrinking
of the democratic space in Russia... The North Caucasus remains
fragile and vulnerable to human rights violations. We remain deeply
concerned about ongoing reports of extra-judicial killings, torture,
abduction and arbitrary detention in the region". (9)
Export licences to the value of £57 million
were granted for inter alia: components for military utility helicopters,
assault rifles and biotechnology equipment; chemicals used for
chemical production and military utility vehicles.
Pakistan
"The UK is concerned about human rights
issues in Pakistan... Recent changes in the political landscape...
have brought a number of human rights issues in Pakistan to the
fore...". (10)
Export licences to the value of £65 million
were granted for inter alia: components for combat helicopters,
large calibre artillery, air-to-air missiles control equipment
and technology for the use of air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles
launching equipment.
Saudi Arabia
"The human rights situation in Saudi Arabia
remains poor". (11)
Export licences to the value of £45 million
were granted for inter alia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles;
components for combat aircraft, heavy machine guns; sniper rifles,
military communications equipment and weapon sights.
The Government's exports to Saudi Arabia are
worrying not only for their potential use to commit human rights
abuses, but also due to issues relating to alleged corruption
in arms deals. Furthermore, large deals of this kind may also
affect the strategic military balance in the volatile Middle East
region thus impacting on the procurement decisions of states such
as Israel and Iran.
E. IMPROVING
THE UK'S
ARMS EXPORT
CONTROLS
The irresponsible export of arms has a massive
impact on human rights, security and development in the developing
world. Controlling the arms trade must therefore remain a priority
for the FCO. Saferworld is pleased that the 2007 Human Rights
Annual Report recognises this but the Government needs to put
this into practice by committing to strengthening national legislation
on arms export controls.
The Government's ongoing review of the 2002
Export Control legislation provides a valuable opportunity to
go further than the existing commitment to extend arms export
laws to control extra-territorial brokering and trafficking of
small arms (12) by pledging to extend the controls to cover the
brokering of all conventional weapons. There should also be a
commitment to undertake clear and effective monitoring of the
end-use of UK arms exports and ensure that British companies wanting
to produce weapons overseas first have to apply to the UK Government
for a licence. It is vital that the Government also makes more
resources available for the investigation and enforcement of possible
breaches of these controls.
A commitment to closing the loopholes in UK
arms export controls and properly enforcing those controls to
prevent the transfer of weapons that would be used to breach human
rights or undermine peace and security or sustainable development
sends a strong signal that the Government is committed to preventing
irresponsible arms transfers and would strengthen its advocacy
position internationally as it seeks to push for the creation
of an ATT and work towards the delivery of an effective legally-binding
instrument.
Notes
(1) The Annual Human Rights Report covers
the period from late August 2006 to 31 December 2007. The statistics
for arms exports were taken from 4 Quarterly Reports on Strategic
Exports over 1 October 2006—30 September 2007 and include:
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, July-September
2007
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, April-June
2007
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, January-March
2007
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, October-December
2006
(2) Africa's missing billions, Iansa,
Oxfam and Saferworld, 2007.
(4) UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human
Rights Report Annual Report 2007, March 2008, Cm 6916. Pages 18-19.
(5) The Quadripartite Committee (Committees
on Strategic Export Controls) and the Foreign Affairs Committee
have consistently urged the Government to apply full human rights
criteria when granting export licences.
(5) To four of these 18 states, licences
were granted for the export of dual-use goods only (dual-use goods
have both military and civilian uses), while licences were granted
for the export of strictly military goods to the other 14. Strategic
or controlled goods are those that do or can have military value.
(6) ibid 2, page 134.
(7) ibid, page 139.
(8) ibid, page 158.
(9) ibid, page 166.
(10) ibid, page 172.
(11) Ibid, page 172.
(12) The Government published its initial
response to the 2007 Review of Export Control Legislation on 6
February 2008: http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/page39910.html
Saferworld is an international independent NGO
that works to prevent armed violence and create safer communities.
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