[*** Asterisks denote that part of the
written evidence that has not been reported because it is covered
by the House of Commons' sub judice resolution.]
Submission from Human Rights Watch
1. As in previous years Human Rights Watch
welcomes the FCO's Annual Report on Human Rights for 2008. The
report provides important analysis of the most serious and significant
human rights crises and themes around the world and sets a useful
standard against which the public can measure the British government's
performance in addressing human rights abuses through the various
policy instruments at its disposal.
2. The report's analysis of the human rights
crises and themes it addresses is for the most part sound. In
the following paragraphs Human Rights Watch highlights what it
sees as some of the report's important weaknesses and omissions,
and areas where the report's analysis of specific human rights
problems could be matched by a stronger UK government response.
3. Use of torture material from third countries.
Human Rights Watch is extremely concerned about language on use
of torture material from third countries on page 15 of the
report. The relevant language reads (emphasis added):
We see our human rights and counter-terrorism
agendas as generally mutually reinforcing, and aim to incorporate
human rights throughout our counter-terrorism work. This is both
because we believe it is the right thing to do and because respect
for human rights is essential to achieving our broader goals.
At the same time we need to be open in acknowledging challenges
and difficult decisions in some areas.
One example is the question of the use of intelligence
provided to the UK by other countries. The provenance of such
intelligence is often unclear—partners rarely share details
of their sources. All intelligence received, whatever its source,
is carefully evaluated, particularly where it is clear that it
has been obtained from individuals in detention.
The use of intelligence possibly derived through
torture presents a very real dilemma, given our unreserved condemnation
of torture and our efforts to eradicate it. Where there is intelligence
that bears on threats to life, we cannot reject it out of hand.
What is quite clear, however, is that information obtained
as a result of torture would not be admissible as evidence in
any criminal or civil proceedings in the UK. It does not matter
whether the evidence was obtained here or abroad.
4. This language echoes that in the recently
revised UK counterterrorism strategy CONTEST II, which states
on page 76:
Intelligence from the security and intelligence
services of other states is vital to our own security and has
repeatedly enabled us to disrupt attacks planned against the UK
or UK interests. In most cases the source or sources of this intelligence
will not be disclosed to the UK. If it is clear that the intelligence
has come from a detainee the service providing it will rarely
volunteer the circumstances in which the detainee is being held.
If it is established that material has been obtained
from a detainee by torture, it would not be admissible in criminal
or civil legal proceedings in the UK as part of the case against
an individual, regardless of where it was obtained. But as the
House of Lords recognised in judgements in 2005 any intelligence
which has been received may still be used to investigate and to
stop terrorist attacks.
5. Human Rights Watch acknowledges that
in A and others vs. The Secretary of State for the Home Department
the House of Lords concluded that reliance on third country
material obtained under torture is lawful for intelligence and
policing purposes. In our view, the Law Lords misinterpreted the
scope of the obligation to prevent torture under the UN Convention
against Torture. They also failed to consider the consequences
of their ruling for the practice of torture in third countries.
6. In light of recent allegations of the
complicity of members of the UK security services in torture carried
out in third countries, we question why the UK government continues
to assert the right to rely on third country torture evidence
for intelligence purposes.
7. No one would dispute that the UK should
act where it receives intelligence of a possible threat to life.
But intelligence material does not arise in a vacuum. It arises
in the context of a relationship between the British security
services and a foreign intelligence service. The *** case makes
clear that the relationship between British security services
and the security services in countries with poor records on torture,
such as Pakistan, carries a risk of British complicity in that
torture when the British position is that it can and should use
evidence obtained by torture.
8. At a time when the conduct of the security
services in relation to complicity in torture in third countries
is the subject of a criminal investigation, and when the government
has agreed to publish the guidance given to members of the security
services in relation to the detention and interrogation of suspects
overseas, it is difficult to see the assertion of the right to
use this material as anything other than an attempt to leave the
door open to torture material and to continued uncritical cooperation
with security services in countries with poor records on torture.
9. We urge the Committee to question the
Foreign Secretary on the purpose of this assertion and in particular
to explain how it squares with the UK government's commitment
to ensure that the security services are not complicit in torture
in third countries.
10. Deporting foreign national terrorist
suspects Human Rights Watch remains firmly opposed to reliance
on diplomatic assurances, whether contained in memoranda of understanding
or otherwise, as a means of removing national security suspects
to places where they face the risk of torture. We set out our
concerns in an October 2008 report Not the Way Forward
on how the UK appears to be playing a leading role in promoting
use of these assurances and attempting to persuade its European
partners to support them.
11. We note that the UK government did not
seek to appeal the ruling by the Court of Appeal in AS & DD
upholding a lower court decision that two Libyan nationals could
not be removed because of the risk of torture on return, notwithstanding
the memorandum of understanding between Libya and the UK. We recommend
that the Committee question the Foreign Secretary on whether the
MoU between the UK and Libya is therefore moribund.
12. We intervened in the case of Othman
and RB & U vs. The Secretary of State for the Home Department
before the House of Lords reiterating our opposition to the use
of assurances as means of returning suspects at risk of torture
in Jordan and Algeria respectively on the grounds that such assurances
are unreliable and that their use constitutes a dangerous loophole
in the non-refoulement obligation under the UN Convention on Torture
and European Convention on Human Rights.
13. We were disappointed at the decision
by the Law Lords, which is the subject of a pending challenge
to the European Court of Human Rights. We note in that context
a series of recent decisions by the Strasbourg court rejecting
diplomatic assurances on the facts, including the Grand Chamber
decision in Saadi v. Italy. In light of the acknowledged risk
of torture for national security suspects in Jordan and Algeria,
we hope that the European Court of Human Rights will take a similar
view when it considers the Othman and RB & U cases.
14. Abuse of UK nationals and residents
overseas. Human Rights Watch welcomes the decision by the Attorney
General to refer to the police allegations of the involvement
of members of the British security services in the torture of
***. In this context we refer the Committee to the evidence provided
by Human Rights Watch to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on
February 2 2009 and to be found on our website: (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/02/uk-should-investigate-role-torture-pakistan)
15. We also welcome the decision by the
UK government to publish the guidance given to members of the
security services in relation to the detention and interrogation
of suspects overseas (subject to the caveat above about the assertion
of the right to rely on torture material for intelligence and
policing purposes). We support the focus of the Committee on these
questions.
16. We remain of the view that the scale
of the allegations requires a full independent judicial inquiry
into UK complicity in torture and unlawful detention in third
countries in the context of countering terrorism, including an
examination of whether the policies of the UK government contributed
to that abuse.
17. We also consider that the government
should legislate to close the apparent loopholes in section 134 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and section 7 of the Intelligence
Services Act 1994 which appear to immunize from prosecution
British agents who commit torture (and other criminal acts in
the case of the ISA) if they were to commit the acts with the
authorization of the government. We note that the UN Convention
against Torture, which section 134 is intended to implement,
contains no such exception to the obligation to prosecute those
responsible for torture. Indeed the Convention specifically prohibits
reliance on orders from superiors or a public authority as a justification
of torture (Article 2).
18. Promoting a low carbon high growth global
economy. The FCO's Annual Report on Human Rights rightly highlights
the negative impact of the global economic crisis on economic
and social development in the poorer parts of the world. This
concern could be more explicitly linked to human rights. There
are signs that the crisis will not only have an impact on economic
and social rights, particularly in poorer parts of the world but
also on political and civil rights throughout the world.
19. For example the crisis is likely to
exacerbate the problem of mistreatment of migrant workers by employees
and middle men. It is also likely to lead to further abuse of
the rights of migrants in general by states. The crisis also raises
concerns about government restrictions on freedom of expression
and association in the face of economic and environmental protest,
and about the capacities of donor countries like the UK to respond
effectively to humanitarian and human rights crises around the
world because of a severe tightening of government budgets.
20. It is regrettable that the report demonstrates
a certain reluctance to criticise the human rights records of
countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Nigeria which receive
significant sums of UK development assistance. The provision of
UK development assistance should make the UK readier, not more
reluctant, to criticise the abuses of recipients.
21. Prevent and resolve conflict. In its
discussion of what it calls the Middle East peace process the
report fails to note, let alone comment on, the absence of any
human rights or international humanitarian law component in the
program of the Annapolis Conference or statements of the Quartet
during the period covered. The report also does not indicate if
human rights and international humanitarian law had any place
at all in UK policy with regard to Israeli-Palestinian issues.
The discussion cites attacks by Palestinians and fatalities among
Israelis and Palestinians over the year and during the fighting
in Gaza which began on 27 December, but fails to observe
that many of these attacks, by Israelis and Palestinians, involved
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
22. The report's coverage of the Georgia/Russia
conflict rightly highlights the recommendation to allow access
to independent monitors and humanitarian organisations. However,
the narrative mainly concentrates on the politics of the conflict
rather than on the human rights issues: for example it refers
to the humanitarian crisis without referring to the human rights
crisis that precipitated it and notes that displaced persons are
unable to return without a discussion of why this is the case.
23. The report on the conflict in Sri Lanka
between government forces and the LTTE rightly states that the
prevalent culture of impunity is one of the main obstacles to
peace in Sri Lanka. Since the report's publication there has been
a serious escalation of fighting. There is now an urgent need
for the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians from the
so called No-Fire Zone where hundreds have been killed in recent
weeks. There is also a need to end the ban on independent monitors
and journalists from entering the conflict area. In the longer
term those providing humanitarian assistance to the many civilians
displaced by the conflict need to ensure that they avoid supporting
the long term internment of civilians in the government's so called
"welfare villages".
24. The United Nations. Human Rights Watch
remains concerned that the United Kingdom continues to adopt a
hardline position with regard to the Security Council not being
bound by human rights. This is of most concern in peacekeeping
and other similar operations authorised by the Security Council
and targeted sanctions. By illustration the Government's position
in the Al-Jedda case on detention by UK forces in Iraq appears
to be that a Security Council Resolution implicitly authorises
indefinite detention without judicial review. On the issue of
sanctions the UK adopted the most hardline position of any European
state intervening in the Kadi and Al Barakaat case concerning
whether the targeted sanctions regime derived from UN Security
Council Resolutions violated the right to a fair hearing of individuals
and companies named in the Resolutions. The UK's position was
that the Security Council is not bound by any law, including jus
cogens. The ECJ ruled that the EU measures did violate the applicants'
right to a fair hearing, as they were not able to challenge there
being named and having assets frozen. However Human Rights Watch
is not aware of any UK steps to ensure that Security Council Resolutions
do not lead to human rights violations, either in sanctions or
in the actions of UN-authorised peacekeeping operations.
25. With regard to the Durban Review Conference
in April 2009 Human Rights Watch wrote to the Foreign Secretary
in early 2009 to express our concern that the United Kingdom
was publicly threatening to pull out of the Conference. However
we were satisfied with the constructive role the UK subsequently
played in that Conference in obtaining an agreement that led to
a dropping of language on defamation of religion. The UK's position
was in notable contrast to several of its European and other allies
who boycotted the Conference, despite having obtained the language
they wished.
26. Rule of Law. While it is understandable
that the report limits the number of countries it includes in
the list of "major countries of concern", it is nonetheless
important that it should find space elsewhere in the report to
comment on countries with particularly poor human rights records.
In our view there are a number of countries of real concern from
a human rights perspective which get hardly any mention in the
report. Egypt, Jordan, Eritrea and Libya are examples. At the
least there should have been a discussion of the routine use of
torture, restrictions on freedom of expression and association,
repression of civil society and the narrow or non-existent space
for political participation in these countries.
27. Afghanistan. Because of the strategic
importance of Afghanistan and the UK's military role there, there
is an inevitable danger that human rights concerns will be trumped
by strategic ones. For example the report glosses over the important
issue of civilian casualties of NATO and ISAF airstrikes. Despite
operational improvements, significant numbers of civilians continue
to be killed in such airstrikes, inflaming public opinion and
undermining the government. Contrary to what is stated in the
report, denials and lack of transparency have made the situation
worse. In August, US forces bombed the village of Azizabad; the
UN, the government, and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
said more than 90 civilians were killed. The US initially
denied that any more than seven civilians had been killed, but
weeks later raised the figure to 33. Increasingly under joint
command, the US and ISAF have now agreed to hold joint investigations
with the Afghanistan government. Too often a faulty condolence-payment
system has not provided timely and adequate compensation to assist
civilians harmed by US and ISAF actions.
28. While UK officials and political leaders
have been vocal in their rhetorical support for human rights,
including women's rights, they have recently been actively promoting
negotiations with opposition groups, including the Taleban, with
little regard for the implications of such deals for human rights.
Civil society and women activists in particular are calling for
greater transparency regarding such negotiations, and the inclusion
of women in any peace talks and conflict resolution. The passing
of the Shia law in March 2009 by the Parliament and the President
shows how easily women's rights will be traded by the Afghan government
in spite of complaints from the Western backers.
29. The assessment in the FCO report of
the state of the Afghan media is unduly optimistic. Human Rights
Watch is soon to publish a report on this subject. The majority
of Afghan journalists interviewed in the course of our research
say they believe that press freedoms have been deteriorating since
2005-06. The reasons they give include not only the growth of
the insurgency, and the weakening of the government, but also
the growing strength of anti-democratic forces within government
and parliament opposed to a critical media. Threats, intimidation
and the murder of several journalists have had a chilling effect.
Most journalists interviewed say they self-censor when it comes
to reporting corruption, narcotics, and conflict.
30. The FCO's report is also overly positive
on the media law. Although this law was passed, it has not been
enacted because it is being blocked by the President and Minister
of Culture. This is a direct challenge to the legitimacy of parliament
and the constitution. The parliament will soon call the Minister
of Culture to account for the "missing law". The British
government should do the same.
31. The British government should also push
for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty in Afghanistan
in particular as the court system is so flawed.
32. Belarus. While the report addresses
the right issues, its assessment of the government's human rights
record is overly optimistic. For example the report states that
all of Belarus' remaining political prisoners were released in
2008 without noting that some of those same prisoners were
imprisoned again later in the same year. The report correctly
notes that NGOs face expensive registration fees and excessive
legal requirements. But it should also have noted that acting
on behalf of an unregistered organization is considered a criminal
act under Article 193.1 of the criminal code. Many of those
detained following their participation in public protests were
charged under this article.
33. The report says that that the "head
of ideology" at the presidential administration suggested
to journalists that the new media law may be amended in light
of their concerns. However the report fails to mention that the
law requires all media to register, including existing registered
media and online media. This means that authorities have the power
to deny a license to publish to any outlet they deem undesirable
on re-registration.
34. Burma. The report's entry on Burma mirrors
Human Rights Watch's reporting and analysis. It states correctly
that the constitutional reform process "lacks all credibility".
We urge the UK to continue to take this line as long as progress
remains non existent. The UK should urge its EU partners to do
likewise.
35. The report's comment on forced labour
in Burma provides one of the best analyses by a government of
the limitations of the ILO mechanism introduced to address the
problem. The report's analysis of the shortcomings of humanitarian
assistance in Burma is similar to that of Human Rights Watch.
It is also commendable that the report mentions the problems in
Chin State, on which we reported in January 2009.
36. China. The report's entry on China is
generally good. The report rightly mentions that the temporary
relaxation of restrictions on foreign journalists in China introduced
in the run up to the 2008 Olympic Games were subsequently
made permanent. However it fails to mention that journalists continue
to be harassed and obstructed as usual. The report notes, again
rightly, that people weren't allowed to protest at the Olympics
"protest zones". However it does not mention the arrests
and convictions of aspirant protesters such as Ji Sizun.
37. Colombia. The report fails to adequately
discuss the fact that paramilitaries and their successors have
infiltrated some of the highest levels of government. More than
seventy members of the Colombian Congress—including approximately
35% of the Senate—are under investigation or have been convicted
for rigging elections or collaborating with paramilitary groups.
Nearly all the congresspersons under investigation are members
of President Uribe's coalition. The Uribe administration has repeatedly
taken steps that could undermine the investigations and keep the
influence of these mafias in the political system intact. High-level
government officials, including Uribe himself, have repeatedly
attacked the Colombian Supreme Court, which started what are known
as the "parapolitics" investigations. The Uribe administration
has also blocked efforts to sanction the political parties involved
and clean the political system. This problem should be an important
focus of UK policy, as it will define the future of the rule of
law and democracy in Colombia.
38. The report also fails to adequately
discuss the frequent practice of extrajudicial executions of civilians
by the Colombian Army. For years there has been mounting evidence
that many units of the Colombian military have been committing
killings of civilians, then passing them off as guerrillas or
paramilitaries killed in combat. The Office of the Attorney General
of Colombia is investigating cases involving more than 1,000 such
victims. While the report mentions the high-profile case of the
killings of several young men from the Soacha neighborhood in
Bogota, it is crucial that both the UK and the Colombian government
recognize that the problem goes far beyond that one case, and
that Colombia must take action to eliminate incentives within
the military that may be contributing to this practice.
39. Cuba. The report correctly points out
that, in spite of some small steps, there has been no significant
improvement in the state of human rights in Cuba. The report mistakenly
notes that musician Gorki Aguila was arrested in August on charges
of "social dangerousness" but later "released without
charge." He was released and the dangerousness charge was
dropped; but he was charged with public disorder, fined 600 pesos,
and ordered to pay the fine in 300 weekly installments. Few
"social dangerousness" cases, however, receive as much
publicity as Aguila's, and nearly all result in conviction through
closed summary trials. For example, on 7 April 2008, Norges
Vázquez Suárez, the leader of an independent union
of bicycle taxi drivers (bicitaxistas), was sentenced in a summary
trial to four years for "social dangerousness". He had
been arrested and charged shortly after staging a nonviolent protest.
40. DR Congo. The report inadvertently exposes
the gap between the UK's stated ambitions and its actual achievements.
Firstly, there is the failure of the international community (Europe
and the UK included) to act decisively in the autumn of 2008 as
hundreds of thousands of Congolese in North Kivu were displaced
and thousands more killed or brutalised in renewed fighting involving
government forces and an array of local militias. There were calls
for direct European intervention to protect civilians and rein
in those promoting the violence. Instead, the international community
relied on a failed formula: a short-term political fix among those
responsible for the crisis, notably President Kabila of DR Congo
and President Kagame of Rwanda and their local proxies. This was
underpinned by encouraging joint Congolese and Rwandan military
action against the ethnic Hutu FDLR militia in the Kivus. One
wave of military action against the FDLR in 2009 has merely
resulted in extensive FDLR reprisal attacks against civilians.
Hundreds have been killed. A second round of action against the
FDLR is likely in the near future, with the same likely consequences.
41. These problems point to a wider failure
in the international community's strategy. Firstly, it has the
wrong set of priorities. The top priority should be sustained
commitment to resolving the DR Congo's grassroots problems. The
starting point for this should be ensuring that civilians are
protected from all rapacious groups, including the Congolese army,
neighbouring governments and their proxies. This is still not
happening.
42. Western countries made much of the December
2008 UNSC resolution authorising the UN peacekeeping mission
(MONUC) to increase its strength by 3,000. They insisted that
this force would be in place quickly. Five months on and the force
has not been agreed never mind deployed. And the situation on
the ground in eastern Kivu has begun to deteriorate again. UN
agencies have been sounding the alarm in recent weeks about increasing
civilian vulnerability. (In Kosovo, the West sent in 60,000 troops
and police. In DRC, a country the size of Western Europe with
no infrastructure, the UN mission (MONUC) is barely 17,000 strong
and spread over four different conflict zones.)
43. While MONUC has some leadership and
management weaknesses, its principal failing has been a lack of
resources and international political backing. The UK has taken
a "sticking plaster" approach: some money here and some
money there, but never enough. The UK and the EU should commit
a serious contingent of troops to the UN mission, especially in
those areas that MONUC needs (rapid response, logistics and Special
Forces). Alternatively they could put a complementary EU force
in separately.
44. The second priority should be action
to arrest and charge those responsible for serious crimes. Decisive
EU military intervention—buttressed by the International
Criminal Court (ICC)—in the Ituri region of DRC in 2003 helped
stabilise the region and restore a semblance of the rule of law.
Ituri militia leaders were arrested and have gone on trial in
The Hague. One indicted Ituri war criminal, Bosco Ntaganda, has
become a major perpetrator of crimes in the Kivu region, and was
directly implicated in a massacre of over a hundred people at
Kiwanja last autumn. Yet, as part of the quick political fix in
2008, Bosco was made an officer in Kabila's army. Instead of demanding
his arrest, the UK and others have turned a blind eye, sending
a clear message to would-be human rights abusers in the DRC that
they can avoid prosecution. This helps neither the search for
lasting peace, nor justice.
45. The UK report does not mention Orientale
province and the disastrous Ugandan-led (and UK-US backed) attempt
to corner and eliminate the LRA rebel group in December 2008.
The consequences were devastating for local civilian populations,
hundreds of whom were butchered in revenge killings by the LRA.
Again, civilian protection was at the bottom of the list of international
priorities (MONUC was not even forewarned) and again civilians
paid the price of "quick fixes" which ended up fixing
nothing. The report also makes no mention of South Kivu. This
part of eastern DRC has enjoyed relative stability in comparison
to its northern neighbour. But there are increasing concerns that
likely Congolese and Rwandan military action against FDLR groups
there could spark the same kind of civilian displacement as was
seen in north Kivu in 2008. Nor does the report mention Ituri
province, where tensions between armed groups are increasing.
46. The UK report rightly focuses on the
governance challenges facing the DRC. But it does not say enough
about Kabila's increasingly authoritarian rule. The report makes
much of the UK ambassador's outspokenness on human rights abuses.
But he was silent when Kabila recently forced out the (independent)
president of the National Assembly, Vital Kamerhe. The UK is a
major aid donor to the DRC and appears to be ignoring this disturbing
trend towards authoritarianism as DRC heads towards possible elections
in 2011.
47. North Korea. The report states that
since July 2008 co-operation between North Korea and international
humanitarian organizations has improved, resulting in food aid
being distributed, for the most part, to the right people. This
contradicts what Human Rights Watch has learned from US government
officials who are involved in food aid to North Korea. We would
therefore be interested in hearing more about the improvements
in co-operation and what evidence the UK has that the food aid
is actually reaching the intended targets. The report also states
that North Koreans are subject to arrest and detention without
trial. This is generally true for those who have committed "political
offences", but not necessarily for those who have committed
common crimes. The report says that some 12,000 North Koreans
have resettled in South Korea. The number now stands at over 15,000.
48. Iran. The pages on Iran correctly identify
many of the serious human rights violations in that country, although
we would recommend in the future greater attention to freedom
of association issues and, in the discussion on freedom of expression,
the accelerating crackdown on web journalists and bloggers. The
report could have contained greater discussion of the UK's efforts
toward improving human rights in Iran. The report states that
the UK government "raised human rights concerns with Iranian
officials on at least 40 occasions" but provides few
examples. Given the UK's engagement with Iran on strategic and
economic issues, it would be helpful to know at what level human
rights were raised and with what results.
49. Iraq. The report rightly notes documented
and well publicized allegations of cases of abuse in Iraqi prisons,
and that overcrowding in detention facilities remains a major
human rights problem. But the report fails to mention systemic
and severe problems that plague Iraq's criminal justice system.
Defendants often endure long periods of pre-trial detention without
judicial review, and are not able to pursue a meaningful defence
or challenge evidence against them. Abuse of detainees, typically
with the aim of extracting confessions, appears to be common,
tainting court proceedings.
50. The report is silent on FCO actions
that have undermined the human rights of Iraqis, such as the FCO's
handling of sexual abuse allegations concerning female Iraqi contractors
at the British Embassy. After the FCO became aware of the allegations,
it delegated the investigation to the same contracting firm involved
in the misconduct. Despite a strong rebuke from the foreign affairs
committee of Parliament, the FCO has refused to accept responsibility
for any wrongdoing or to conduct an independent investigation.
This posture seriously compromises the ability of the FCO to credibly
promote respect for human rights outside of the Embassy when it
cannot even protect vulnerable Iraqis working within it.
51. Of further concern was the handing over
of the last detainees held by British forces to Iraqi authorities
in December 2008, despite the risk of the death penalty and torture,
and an interim measure request from the European Court of Human
Rights to the United Kingdom not to carry out this act. We believe
this is the first time the United Kingdom has ignored such a request
from the ECHR which risks undermining the authority of the Strasbourg
Court. This case is now proceeding rapidly to a final hearing
in Strasbourg.
52. Israel and OPT. The discussion of Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories is comprehensive, and
in several areas (eg administrative detention) improves on the
2007 report. The discussion appropriately emphasizes the
humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Human Rights Watch welcomes the report's
explicit concern about allegations of war crimes during Israel's
military operations in Gaza, and Israel's obligation to investigate
those allegations. However we regret that the report did not refer
to Israel's poor record when it comes to investigating unlawful
attacks by its forces, and the consequent need for an independent
international investigation into serious violations of the laws
of war by all parties to the conflict, Palestinian and Israeli.
53. The report correctly notes that Israel
remains the occupying power in Gaza under international law, which
requires Israel to "co-operate in facilitating the passage
and distribution of relief consignments." However the report
fails to mention that international humanitarian law further imposes
on Israel a positive duty to safeguard the health and welfare
of the population under occupation, and must refrain from attacking,
destroying, or withholding objects that are essential to the survival
of the civilian population. The report also fails to note that
Israel's comprehensive blockade of Gaza, which preceded the December-January
hostilities and continues today, violates international law. This
is in contrast to the report's commendable citing of international
humanitarian law with regard to Israeli settlements and demolitions
of Palestinian homes.
54. In its discussion of abuses by Palestinian
forces, the report rightly criticises the abuses of Hamas forces
in Gaza, but gives little attention to violations by Palestinian
Authority (PA) forces in the West Bank. This is particularly unfortunate
given the important role of the UK, which the report notes, in
providing support for PA police. Although most violations have
been attributed to Preventive Security and the General Intelligence
Service, rather than the police, it would be helpful to know what
steps, if any, the UK took to raise issues of torture and arbitrary
detention with Palestinian security officials.
55. Pakistan. Human Rights Watch is pleased
to note that the FCO has followed our recommendation to include
Pakistan as a major country of concern in the 2008 report.
The entry on Pakistan is generally good. However, while the section
on counter-terrorism expresses UK concern about reports of human
rights abuses perpetrated by Pakistan's intelligence and police
authorities, including illegal and arbitrary arrests, enforced
disappearances, extra-judicial killings and torture, it conspicuously
fails to mention allegations of UK complicity in any of those
abuses or the fact that British citizens have also been victims
of such abuse. For more details we refer the Committee to Human
Rights Watch's testimony to the Joint Committee on Human Rights
cited in paragraph 14 above.
56. The section on Border Areas states:
"We urge that all military action and security measures are
part of a comprehensive approach to tackling the threat from violent
terrorism and that it occurs within the parameters of international
human rights standards." However, there is no mention of
the repeated drone attacks by the US that have resulted in a high
numbers of civilian casualties and that Pakistan's government
has repeatedly called on the US to end these attacks. Such attacks
inflame public opinion and undermine the government.
57. Russia. The report covers all the main
issues, but it could have been more hard-hitting in its critique
of Russia's human rights record in 2008. While the report generally
cites other organisations rather than the UK's own observation
when criticising the government, it does not always carefully
attribute evidence of positive developments. For example it welcomes
"the government's action to combat racist attacks" without
specifying what that action was or how effective it has been.
58. The section on media freedom and safety
of journalists fails to mention how long-standing the problem
of impunity for violence against journalists is and doesn't give
a full sense of the magnitude of the problem. Russia is one of
the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists with
more than 14 outstanding unsolved murders of journalists
in the last nine years.
59. The section on racism and xenophobia
is rather cursory. It welcomes an empty rhetorical statement on
the subject by President Medvedev in his inauguration address,
but makes no mention of migrant workers as common targets for
racist violence or of the rhetoric of the government and the state-controlled
media that creates a permissive climate for hate crimes or anti-migrant
violence.
60. On Chechnya, the report cites "steady
improvements in stability and security". This is a superficial
analysis that ignores the high costs in human rights terms of
achieving "stability" and the methods used to achieve
it. The report notes ongoing allegations of torture and pressure
on the local media and NGOs to restrict their activities or any
criticism of the government, as if these are somehow separate
from security and stability and not part of the methods used to
get there. The report fails to identify those leaders who are
well known to be responsible for the repression in Chechnya. The
report's coverage of Ingushetia and Daghestan is sound.
61. Notably absent from the entry on Russia
is any serious discussion of economic or social rights issues,
the lack of democratic accountability, corruption (including the
weakened judiciary) and Russia's lack of cooperation with international
institutions. The report does urge cooperation with the Universal
Periodic Review process at the Human Rights Council, but does
not mention lack of cooperation with UN special mechanisms (especially
the special rapporteur on torture), Russia's recalcitrance at
the Council of Europe or problems in implementing European Court
of Human Rights judgments against Russia and Moscow's failure
to ratify Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
62. Saudi Arabia. The UK continues to tread
carefully around the issue of human rights in Saudi Arabia, arguing
for example that "many of our concerns regard punishments
proscribed by Islamic Shari'a law, a legal system supported
by most Saudis" (emphasis added). What the report fails
to mention is that the Saudi authorities allow no free discussion
of what Shari'a really is and block all alternative interpretations
to its own exceptionally harsh one. The report suggests that support
for Shari'a equates with support for the harshest punishments.
Yet many other Muslim countries which implement Shari'a manage
to do so without chopping off hands and heads.
63. In reality most of the FCO's concerns
about human rights in Saudi Arabia rightly have to do with the
poor quality of the judicial system. This has nothing to do with
Shari'a and everything to do with an abusive system of governance
and lack of accountability and transparency. In fact many of the
most abusive features of the Saudi justice system are contrary
to Shari'a.
64. Somalia. The report describes abuses
committed by insurgent fighters in Somalia as fact, and abuses
by Ethiopian and TFG security forces as "reported."
In reality the evidence of war crimes and other serious abuses
by Ethiopian and TFG forces in Somalia from late 2006 through
the end of 2008 is overwhelming and undeniable. This is not
just a semantic difference. For example the report notes that
the UK has "raised its concerns with the Ethiopian government
regarded alleged human rights abuses by its troops in Somalia."
But the UK government cannot engage effectively around these issues
with either the Ethiopian government or the TFG unless it takes
the position that these serious abuses have without question occurred.
65. The report states that the UK remains
"one of the few major donors to the UN Development Programme
led effort to develop a full justice system," an effort that
includes assistance to the TFG police. The report does not note
that the provision of direct assistance to TFG police forces under
this programme has in the recent past been alarmingly free of
human rights conditionalities. Even as TFG police forces committed
serious conflict-related abuses and violent acts of criminality
against civilians in Mogadishu, the UK and other donors assisting
the police forces developed no effective mechanism to insist on
effective TFG responses to such incidents. The current commissioner
of police, Abdi Qeybdid, is implicated in serious abuses and should
be replaced as a condition of any further donor assistance to
the police forces. UNDP actually pulled back from providing direct
assistance to the police because of these and other problems,
in spite of donor pressure to do the opposite.
66. The report notes the UK government's
support in principle for a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) in Somalia,
which we welcome. However that support is too equivocal and the
report strongly implies that now is the wrong time to set up such
a mechanism because of difficulties gathering evidence and possibly
that it could generate insecurity for humanitarian agencies. These
concerns are overblown. Firstly, the task of gathering evidence
about the most serious crimes in Somalia is a time-consuming one,
not a one-off mission to be carried out in the space of a few
weeks, and it needs to begin as soon as possible. Secondly, the
longer the delay in beginning to gather evidence the more that
evidence will tend to degrade and disappear over time. The expressed
concern that a CoI—a mechanism purely focused on gathering
evidence and entirely distinct from any eventual mechanism of
accountability—could exacerbate threats against humanitarian
and UN agencies is not backed by evidence or commentary. Humanitarian
agencies operating in the field should be left to speak for themselves
on this matter. We believe a CoI should be established immediately
under the UN Security Council. Thorny questions about accountability
mechanisms are better left for later and will need to be resolved
through Somali-led processes.
67. The report notes that the UK government
expected Somaliland's presidential elections to be held in March
2009. These polls have been delayed again for a further six months.
There are worrying signs that the government's commitment to holding
these elections and doing so in a free and fair manner is growing
more equivocal with time. In light of these recent events the
UK government should articulate a plan to use what leverage it
has to ensure that free and fair elections take place without
further delay.
68. Sudan. The paragraph on the International
Criminal Court (ICC) says the right things about impunity, but
says nothing on the campaign led by some African and Arab states
to have the warrant for Sudanese president al-Bashir deferred
(under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council
can intervene and defer ICC prosecutions). Given the nature of
the crimes committed in Darfur, the clear political/military chain
of command and Bashir's failure to cooperate with the ICC on previous
warrants, the UK should make clear that a deferral of this warrant
would be unjustified. The notion that justice can be traded for
peace is a false one. The victims of abuse in Darfur have a right
to justice and the world must tackle such crimes head-on if they
are to hope to prevent future mass atrocities.
69. Syria. The report's coverage of Syria
fails to cover some important issues. For example it does not
mention the violations committed by the Supreme State Security
Court (SSSC), an exceptional court with almost no procedural guarantees,
which in 2008 sentenced at least 75 people to long prison
terms. There is also no mention of the continuing information
blackout imposed by the Syrian authorities on the shootings by
Military Police of rioting inmates in Sednaya prison last July.
70. While the report notes that the Foreign
Secretary did raise human rights issues during the visit of the
Syrian Foreign Minister to London, and during his visit to Syria,
Human Rights Watch remains concerned that the UK, along with other
Western states, raised such issues in a marginal fashion and often
as an afterthought. Syria's emergence from its international isolation
in 2008 requires the development of a clear policy of engagement
on human rights issues in that country.
71. Our concern is that if Syria starts
to cooperate with the UK, the EU and the US on regional political
issues, external pressure for improvements on the internal political
front will diminish—as it has for Libya and Egypt. This
would be short-sighted because a Syria that permits a free flow
of information and internal debate about national interests and
priorities is a Syria more likely to act responsibly in the region.
72. Turkmenistan. The report attributes
to Turkmenistan "a readiness for dialogue with the international
community over Turkmenistan's fulfilment of human rights obligations."
While it is true that Turkmenistan does now participate in international
human rights forums, participation alone should not be mistaken
for a readiness for real dialogue or as a sign of willingness
to reform.
73. The report fails to mention that the
Turkmen government continues to deny the very existence of human
rights problems in the country. On political prisoners, the chapter
highlights the release of Saparmyrat Seyidov without mentioning
that the he served his full prison term. There is no mention of
important political prisoners such as Annakurban Amaklychev, Sapardurdy
Khajiev (affiliated with Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation), and
Mukhametkuli Aymuradov. The report fails to mention the enforced
disappearance of those accused in the alleged 2002 plot against
President Niazov, including former foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov,
his brother Konstantin Shikhmuradov and former ambassador to OSCE
Batyr Berdyev.
74. The report hardly covers the serious
problem of torture in Turkmenistan. It mentions the stifling of
the emergence NGO but does no mention threats to human rights
activists and independent journalists, threats that often intensify
during the visits of foreign dignitaries. While the report mentions
the unofficial blacklist which prevents some people from travelling
abroad, it does not specify who is subject to such bans and why
(eg, relatives of exiled dissidents and activists).
75. In its future work on Turkmenistan Human
Rights Watch urges the UK to focus on individual cases of political
prisoners, victims of enforced disappearance and individuals on
the travel ban blacklist and to push for access to the country,
including to places of detention, for independent human rights
monitors.
76. Uzbekistan. The report rightly notes
ongoing problems on a broad range of issues but it also tends
to emphasise positive developments which, in the view of Human
Rights Watch, is hardly justified by the facts on the ground.
For example the discussion of the review of Uzbekistan by the
Committee against Torture opens on a positive note, even though
core finding of the Committee was overwhelmingly negative.
77. On human rights defenders the report
notes the arrest and trial of Akzam Turgunov and Solijon Abdurakhmanov,
but fails to mention that the US and EU have clearly called for
their sentenced be reviewed. The report could have reiterated
the common EU position that all imprisoned human rights defenders
should be freed.
78. Regarding trials, the report acknowledges
that international observers do not always get permission to attend
the officially open trials. But the report should have been clearer
about the secrecy and chaos that often surrounds trials in Uzbekistan
and about the total lack of independence of the judiciary, the
problems local human rights defenders face in accessing court
hearings, or the fact that lawyers are often not notified or notified
at the last minute about their clients' hearings.
79. Regarding religious freedom, the report
focuses mostly on of the problems faced by non Muslims, and gives
little idea of the extent and severity of the problems faced by
independent Muslims: the thousands of religious prisoners who
are accused of membership of "extremist" or other banned
religious organizations, are convicted in unfair trials where
evidence and confessions obtained under torture are widely accepted,
and who are sentenced to lengthy prison sentences with no real
certainty that they will ever be freed.
80. There is also no mention of complete
lack of accountability for the Andijan massacre, nor of the lack
of an independent judiciary. Without an independent judiciary,
the much-hailed habeas corpus reform cannot be considered such
a great success.
81. Vietnam. The report states that there
has been progress as well as setbacks in Vietnam's respect for
civil and political rights. Our research shows that there was
no significant progress during 2008. The main reason why the numbers
of arrests of political and religious dissidents declined in 2008 is
that dozens of people were arrested, forced to cease their peaceful
political activities, or fled Vietnam during government crackdowns
in 2006-07. While Vietnam has made important strides in poverty
reduction and economic reforms in recent years, it remains completely
intolerant of peaceful dissent or any challenges to its one-party
rule and it has a long way to go in ensuring the right to freedom
of religion.
82. The report highlights progress in the
government's legal and judicial reform programs and the National
Assembly's more active role in the lawmaking process. However
peaceful expressions of dissent and unsanctioned religious activities
continue to be criminalized, primarily through imprecisely defined
"national security" provisions in the Penal Code; and
most trials fail to meet international fair trial standards.
83. The report highlights attacks on media
freedom during 2008 and the UK's intervention during the
year on key cases such as the arrests of journalists for exposing
corruption. It neglects to mention the government's controls over
the internet, including stiffened regulations on internet usage
imposed during 2008.
84. The report mentions government proposals
to greatly reduce the scope of the death penalty. But it fails
to note that such proposals have been pending for some time now,
that there is significant opposition from some Vietnamese legal
experts to removing the death penalty for crimes of corruption
and bribery, and that no initiatives are under consideration to
remove capital punishment for national security crimes such as
espionage, which has been used to charge and imprison people for
peaceful expression of their right to free speech. The FCO should
urge the Vietnamese government to sign the Second Optional Protocol
to the UN ICCPR on the Abolition of the Death Penalty.
85. The report fails to mention Vietnam's
extremely harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions,
particularly on death row, and the use of torture in detention.
While detailed information about prison conditions in Vietnam
is difficult to obtain, the FCO should raise questions about prison
conditions and insist that the Vietnamese government provide greater
access to and information about prisons.
86. The report fails to mention Vietnam's
violation of international labour standards, by forbidding workers
from organizing unions that are independent of the Party-controlled
labour confederation and banning strikes not approved by the official
confederation. The report also fails to mention the harassment,
imprisonment, and placement under house arrest of independent
trade union advocates, and the February 2008 appeals trial
that upheld the imprisonment of three labour activists on charges
of "abusing democratic freedoms".
87. On the issue of freedom of religion,
the report does not note, as it did in its 2007 report, that
in practice the government maintains its control over religious
organizations. In addition, progress and improvements in religious
freedom have been uneven and inconsistent in implementation, depending
on the religion and the locality.
88. The report makes no mention of ethnic
minority tensions, such as the imprisonment or house arrest of
Khmer Krom Buddhist monks and ongoing land rights protests in
the Mekong Delta, demonstrations by Montagnard Christians in April
2008 in the Central Highlands, and ongoing arrests and imprisonment
of Montagnards for peaceful expression of religious and political
beliefs.
89. The report makes no mention of abuses
against women and children in Vietnam, which continues to be a
source of and transit point for women and children trafficked
for forced prostitution, fraudulent marriages, and forced domestic
servitude to other parts of Asia. Sex workers, trafficking victims,
street children, and street peddlers—officially classified
by the government as "social evils"—are routinely
rounded up and detained without warrants in compulsory "rehabilitation"
centres, where they are subject to beatings and sexual abuse.
90. Zimbabwe. The report does not focus
sharply enough on the need for increased pressure on Zimbabwe
to effectively end impunity for past human rights abuses by ZANU-PF
and its allies in the army, prison service and police. Serious
human rights abuses continue unabated partly because perpetrators
enjoy impunity for their actions and know that they have the support
and protection of the state. There is an urgent need for justice
sector reforms to restore rule of law. Such reforms would include
scrapping all repressive legislation and replacing it with laws
that comply with international human rights standards. There is
also a need for independent commissions to select Zimbabwe's future
judiciary. Too many of the current incumbents are tainted by association
with ZANU-PF.
91. The FCO human rights report could have
highlighted the role of the Mugabe regime in creating and perpetuating
the humanitarian crisis through adverse economic policies and
practices (notably the role of Zimbabwe's central bank) and rampant
corruption particularly at the Grain Marketing Board. There is
a direct link, as shown in Human Rights Watch's "A Crisis
Without Limits" report, between the humanitarian crisis and
the underlying political crisis.
92. The report does not set benchmarks to
be met by any new government in Zimbabwe before development aid
flows can resume. The FCO should announce such benchmarks including
governance and rights reforms to be measured in actual behaviour
as well as specific steps that authorities in Zimbabwe should
take to ensure greater accountability and transparency. It is
now clear that no sustainable resolution to the political situation
is possible without a demonstrable commitment to genuine reforms
by the Zimbabwe authorities. This must include a clear commitment
to hold to account those responsible for past human rights abuses.
93. For the time being, the UK should maintain
its high levels of humanitarian aid (but avoid delivering aid
directly to the government) and press for the retention of targeted
EU sanctions against those individuals responsible for serious
rights and governance abuses.
24 April 2009
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