Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence


APPENDIX 43

Memorandum submitted by Dr Ian Forbes

  This submission is intended to complement the evidence submitted to the Committee by the Royal Academy of Engineering. Dr Ian Forbes was a member of the Royal Academy's Working Party on Privacy and Surveillance, and contributor to the Academy's Report, Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance: Challenges of Technological Change. His submission includes additional reflections, in response to the specific concerns of the Committee's Inquiry.

PRINCIPLES AND THEMES

  The organising principle of the Report of the Royal Academy of Engineering is that protecting privacy, achieving greater levels of security and maximising utility will always generate dilemmas for individuals, government and organisations. The development and use of technologies leading to a so-called surveillance society are associated with a wide range of dilemmas. Nevertheless, efforts to strike satisfactory balances are essential, and can be successful. The costs of not recognizing and addressing these dilemmas include a decline of public trust, inefficient allocation of resources, and avoidable failures.

UPSTREAM ACTIONS

    —    The design of any system that collects and processes personal data must have a primary focus on privacy.

    —    IT projects that include the collection and processing of large amounts of data must have thorough risk assessment procedures and effective implementation mechanisms.

    —    Accepting that failures will occur, incorporate appropriate procedures.

    —    Make reciprocity a design feature.

PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE

    —    People occupy many roles, so it should always be possible for an individual to keep these roles separate, and to preserve the distinction between identification and authentication.

    —    Data sharing should only carried out when there is an explicit need and reason.

    —    Personal data should only be used for the purposes for which consent has been given.

    —    In general, public agencies should not be allowed access to private databases.

    —    Public record databases should be under the control of autonomous agencies, not government.

    —    Penalties for misuse and abuse of personal data should reflect the damage and distress that the system failure or crime causes.

CCTV, SOCIAL GOODS AND THE CITIZEN

  New and emerging technologies which explore and exploit the capacity to collect, store and manipulate data about citizens and their behaviour are much deployed by industry and the police and security services. Much of the debate, and much policy, focuses on the security aspects of the way that organisations use these technologies for profit and convenience. In relation to crime and security, the emphasis is almost entirely on public safety.

  This is especially true for surveillance technologies involving cameras. There are serious concerns about the proliferation of this technology, and the quickly-evolving capacity digitally to store, interpret and transmit human images. At present, these technologies are largely restricted to users who want to prevent, monitor and sometimes punish certain behaviours, despite the lack of evidence that surveillance alone is effective. Apart from the problems associated with general invasions of privacy, specific problems of predictive profiling of some sectors of the community arises with the increased capacity to identify individuals, and target apparently "deviant" or "unusual" behaviour. The design assumptions that are built into these technologies are as important as the assumptions of the human operators of these systems. Failures in any of these systems expose the fragility of public trust, and can contribute to a lack of trust not just in the systems, but government and its agencies.

  Hardly any attention has been paid to the positive uses of this technology. Communities have long had a justifiable interest in their public spaces, in who uses them and how. However, local communities and citizens under surveillance have few if any opportunities to see and learn from what the vast number of cameras see. The uses and benefits of this technology are currently under the control of the operators, who effectively own the images and data of citizens without having gained their consent. Unless and until ordinary citizens are given an active stake and a determining say in the processes and practices of camera surveillance, new and socially beneficial uses of these surveillance technologies will emerge only very slowly, or not at all. A new approach is needed, which introduces a climate of candour and a requirement of reciprocity, so facilitating creative input from communities and citizens. Finally, creating opportunities for citizens to contribute to the design and use of these systems will help broaden the basis for trust.

Recommendations

    —    The right to conduct surveillance should generate reciprocal rights for those under surveillance.

    —    Purposes, placement, conditions of use operating practices and personnel should, by law, be subject to consultation, agreement and challenge by those under surveillance.

PUBLIC POLICIES AND PRIVACY

  The full range of policy tools should be employed:

    —    improve privacy law;

    —    initiate new legislation to set high design standards, require best practice implementation and make compensation for system failures routine and costly to operators—in other words construct an effective incentive structure;

    —    increase the powers for the IC, including audit power and greater penalties;

    —    establish a new body to oversee the collection, retention and use of bioinformation (including DNA profiles, fingerprints, facial images and so on);

    —    encourage and reward industry initiatives;

    —    government and its agencies need to set the highest standards;

    —    introduce reciprocal rights for those who supply personal data in any form;

    —    facilitate debate on privacy and security dilemmas; and

    —    inform and consult widely on policy options.

THE CASE OF PRIVACY IMPACT STATEMENTS

  PIAs are not a proven mechanism for producing effective change or reliable information.

  They may have the unintended consequence of diverting energies into a new bureaucratic procedure—and a new wave of consultants—that fails to lead to productive change. (The experience of EIS is instructive.) PIAs, in other words, could work against privacy.

  Many PIAs would quickly gravitate toward being a standard, defensive document, containing:

    —    Predominantly obvious conclusions, with similar findings reproduced in almost all PIAs.

    —    Disclaimers about important aspects of privacy impact which are characterised by uncertainty.

    —    An assessment that will never identify an unintended and unforeseeable consequence.

    —    Assumptions that all other things remain constant. Changes of circumstance, technology, legislation and practice could vitiate any PIA at any point after its completion.

Recommendation

  Monitor the introduction of PIAs in Canada in order to assess their efficiency in protecting privacy, their bureaucratic efficacy and opportunity costs.

INFORMATION ON DATABASES

Recommendations

    —    Personal data should never be scored in unencrypted form.

    —    The minimum amount of data should be kept for the minimum amount of time.

    —    Personal data in large databases should be checked regularly with data subjects to ensure that they are accurate.

    —    If a database contains personal data about many people, or vulnerable people, the database access software should be developed to very high standards of security engineering.

    —    If data are lost, individuals affected must be informed and compensated swiftly.

    —    Systems should be designed to keep an automatic audit of when the data are accessed and by whom and especially when data are changed.

    —    Profile-based decision systems should be open, accountable, contestable and non-discriminatory.

    —    The national DNA database should be used only to store the DNA profiles of those individuals involved in criminal proceedings.

June 2007





 
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