International Development Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 27-39)

RT HON DOUGLAS ALEXANDER MP, MR MARTIN DINHAM AND MS SUSANNA MOOREHEAD

12 NOVEMBER 2008

  Q27 Chairman: Good afternoon, Secretary of State, and thank you very much for coming in again to give evidence to us. I am advised that there is a series of votes at 4.17, so that is our time constraint and we will end at that point. I wonder if you could just introduce your team for the record?

  Mr Alexander: Martin Dinham, who was with me last week, Director General International, and Susanna Moorehead, who is our new Executive Director, a full-time Executive Director, at the World Bank based in Washington.

  Q28  Chairman: Thank you very much. Obviously the prime purpose of this evidence session is to discuss the annual general meetings of the IMF and the World Bank and your Department's engagement. I wonder—and we have given you notice of this—given the topicality if we could just briefly get an update from you about the situation in Goma and eastern DRC.[8] First of all, if I could just ask you a straightforward question, what is your understanding of where the situation is at the moment and obviously in terms of your own Department?

  Mr Alexander: The situation remains dire, I am afraid. Sporadic fighting continues to cause displacement and to hamper the humanitarian effort which we and others are making. The estimates of IDPs[9] that we have received this week vary considerably, but OCHA[10] believe between 50 and 100,000 are displaced as a consequence of fighting over the last two weeks, and that obviously comes on top of the very significant numbers who have been displaced since the beginning of the rainy season in August. Access remains a problem around the front lines of the fighting, although in other areas agencies are active. For ourselves, DFID is responding with food aid through the World Food Programme and other humanitarian supplies through UNICEF.[11] Our critical priority, along with the rest of the Government, is to try and secure the end of the fighting so that relief agencies can actually get the supplies to those who need it and the IDPs can in turn return home.




  Q29 Chairman: Thank you for that. When we did our report into the World Food Programme those of us who were in Ghana visited the crisis station there and they told us they could reach any crisis point in the world within 48 hours and yet they do not seem to have been able to do that here in eastern Congo. We have seen on our television screens indications of people being without any food or support for more than two days. What accounts for that? There was some sort of comment about having to assess the need, which was pretty visible for anybody to see.

  Mr Alexander: I think the single biggest contributor is the conflict rather than the geographic location in terms of the constraints at the moment. On Friday, as you are probably aware, we announced £2 million for WFP for food needs and on Sunday, the first two of six flights from Entebbe in Uganda to Goma arrived carrying water purification tablets, plastic sheeting and water containers for UNICEF. The last of these flights we anticipate will arrive this afternoon, and we expect to allocate the remainder of the £5 million which I announced by the end of this week once proposals and needs assessments come in. Two DFID humanitarian advisers are on the ground in Goma as we speak to assess the situation and coordinate with implementing agencies. So there are flights landing this afternoon. Two of six have already landed and we anticipate the others will arrive shortly.

  Q30  Chairman: Those of us who visited eastern Congo two years ago, which I think included certainly Hugh Bayley and myself—and we were not in Goma but we were in Bukava, which is the other end of the lake—what came across to us was the lack of functionality of the Congolese state, and in particular the lack of an effective army, the lack of an effective police force. Right now obviously in an international crisis you just have to provide first-aid and try to stop the fighting, but in the longer term, given the UK's contribution to the DRC—which I have to say looks as if it is lower than it was and you might explain if that is the case, and if so why—what is being done to try and ensure that there is a government effectively in Congo which has the capacity to create order and space because ultimately it seems to us that without that these kind of crises are just going to flare up all the time?

  Mr Alexander: Again, I think one has to start with an analysis of the circumstances in eastern DRC. It is impossible to clearly envisage a security solution to what we are witnessing without a political resolution, and in that sense the particular conflict involving General Nkunda that we are witnessing at the moment has deep political roots reflecting ethnic tension. Those have been exacerbated by both the availability of arms within the region and also the expectation and discovery of significant natural resources, which have contributed to the problems. So while there are issues in relation to capacity building, I would also not want to underestimate the centrality of finding a political resolution. That is in part why our Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, travelled to the region with Bernard Kouchner the week before last. It is why Lord Malloch-Brown, if I recollect correctly from the discussion we held in Cabinet on this on Tuesday, will be travelling back to Kinshasa either later this week or early next week, and it is why we are strongly supportive of the efforts which are being made within the African Union and elsewhere to try and find a way forward because I think while it is true that there are considerable challenges facing the government in the DRC, it is the endemic nature of the conflict which is the biggest single factor explaining the difficulties in terms of the eastern DRC in particular. So in that sense it is not for us an either/or between development support or political efforts. The difficulty is we need to see political leadership being exercised, not simply within DRC but also in Rwanda as well, to try and find a political way forward from the conflict.

  Q31  Chairman: I think we understand that. Hugh Bayley might want to come in on this, but when we visited the DRC my recollection is that DFID's aid budget was in excess of £70 million and in fact I and the foreign minister at the time turned the turf for the new DFID offices and we were the biggest single donor. The current contribution is £42 million, which suggests that we have reduced the amount of funding. Was that projected or is that because we have actually difficulty in spending it because of the constraints of operating within the DRC?

  Mr Alexander: Forgive me, I do not have the figures but I will happily provide them to the Committee, but I suppose I would add the important caveat that the only measure of our commitment to a country is not the quantum of resources but it is for the reasons you have said, and it may be that there are exactly the capacity constraints of which you speak, but I will be very happy to set that out in writing for the Committee.[12]

  Chairman: Thank you for that. If we could now move on to the main session.

  Q32  John Battle: I just want to ask as a starter, what assessment now has the Department made of the countries most vulnerable to the financial crisis, after the shocks which have gone on in the last few months?

  Mr Alexander: This is a conversation we last had a couple of weeks ago. We have been continuing to work on a grid of essentially the metric vulnerability for all of our PSA[13] countries. I think, if we have not already, we should be able to facilitate the provision of that to the Committee. Essentially, the first wave of this crisis, both rising fuel prices and rising food prices, is at the moment impacting more severely on low income countries than the impact of the financial crisis, but we are already seeing the reach of the financial crisis moving beyond the core of the financial system now to the middle income countries, and in that sense the response which has been put in place both by ourselves and by others reflects the fact that we need to in particular maintain our Productive Safety Nets commitment because of the vulnerability of many of these countries. You may have seen the statement in The Guardian and in other UK newspapers this morning of the latest assessment by the World Bank. The estimate was originally that about 100 million more people had been pushed into vulnerability to hunger and poverty as a result of the food and fuel price rises, if I recollect, taking the numbers vulnerable globally up to 967 million. In addition to that now in light of the anticipated global downturn, they are estimating along with the IMF broadly a 2% drop in global output with the effect, they judge, of an additional 20 million people being pushed into poverty for every 1% reduction in global growth. So that would mean in addition to the 100 million which took the number up to 967 million, as of yesterday the Bank was estimating that a further 40 million people are now vulnerable to poverty.


  Q33 John Battle: If I may say, DFID is quickly developing a good reputation internationally for developing rather sophisticated, if I may call them, tools of analysis. So I was rather attracted to the idea that you mentioned in your last evidence—the matrix of vulnerability. But is it developed across Whitehall? Do you involve the Treasury in it? I am almost tempted to ask could we apply it here as well. What is its reach, or is it just to do with finance? The answer you have given me suggests it is wider than financial, it takes the food prices as well into account. How useful is that matrix and how good is it across Whitehall, and are other departments involved in that research work which your Department is developing?

  Mr Alexander: Clearly, we work very closely with the Treasury in terms of their leadership in relation to the IMF. I would also emphasise that there has been significant joint working, not least anticipating this weekend's meeting on 15 November, with the Cabinet Office fulfilling its traditional role of coordination. There is a whole web of relationships now which are operating, broadly to better understand the impact of the global crisis, not simply globally but, as your question anticipates, here at home as well. The Prime Minister has spoken about this both publicly and privately. He is seized of the fact that in many ways many of our challenges over the last decade have been internal to the United Kingdom. The nature of these global challenges demands that we are able to respond in different and more flexible ways as a government. Now, I would not claim that we have had the final word on that but, for example, the establishment of the Department of Energy and Climate Change was a reflection of the concern to ensure that we had a government which was reflective of the new emerging challenges we were seeing and we have worked extremely closely with Number 10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, anticipating this weekend's events, to ensure that albeit the primary focus of the meeting which will take place in Washington will be on the IMF and on financial stability, we seize the opportunity of the G20 meeting in Washington to set a framework for a positive outcome to the Financing for Development Conference a fortnight later in Doha, and that we anticipate the potential for further discussions, not least around reform of the Bank, to ensure that development features prominently. In that effort, I have to say, I would pay tribute to the American administration, who in the letter of invitation to this weekend's meeting very helpfully, from our point of view, specifically identified the impact of the global financial crisis on developing countries and that gave us a locus and an opportunity to argue strongly both in discussions which have taken place between governments ahead of the meeting and in our internal discussions that there needed to be a clear recognition of the needs of developing countries even at the stage of this preliminary conversation in Washington this weekend.

  Q34  Chairman: Is the matrix which you referred to something you can share with us?

  Mr Alexander: I do not see why not.[14] Martin, do you want to say a word or two in terms of this development?

  Mr Dinham: Yes. Just to pick up, we have been working, as the Secretary of State said, extremely closely with the Treasury, Number 10 and the Cabinet Office on this, both in terms of sharing our analysis and vulnerability matrix with them and also ensuring that we feed in—there has been no push back about this at all—the interests of the developing countries being taken fully into account in any movement on the financial systems.

  Q35  John Battle: So your 22 Public Service Agreement countries have had some say in the drawing up of the matrix, have they, and in the analysis?

  Mr Dinham: Where we have had feed in on this is from our country offices, which are obviously very close to the situation in the country, feeding in as part of the overall analysis. So it is not just people in the centre doing this, it is getting information from the field.

  Mr Alexander: Essentially, it itemises the countries down the side and then runs across external and reversible flows to give us a sense as to the openness of the economy and vulnerability, particularly in terms of liquidity. Secondly, macro-fundamentals, the degree of fiscal vulnerability, levels of inflation, current account balance. Then trade, to give us a sense in terms of where they are on trade, oil export dependency, given the centrality of oil, and in particular vulnerability to food price hikes, how much do they generate their food internally or are they importing in terms of food. That gives us a sense as to where each country is.

  Q36  John Battle: If I may say as well, that macro-analysis, let us call it that, is most welcome, and going to the global meeting, excellent. Someone said to me recently the effect on remittances alone is going to sink some economies, so as well as trade flows, capital flows, domestic investment and remittances, having a grid of all that lot together. But then if I was looking from the micro end of the telescope and I was in one of the countries—take Ethiopia—I might be asking the question, how specifically will the matrix be used to deliver me bankable goods? What can I bank on as a result of the matrix and will it just be short-term or is it a long-term restructuring of the financial arrangements and development assistance?

  Mr Alexander: I would not want to over-emphasise the matrix and under-estimate the enduring relationships we have with these countries. If you take the example of Ethiopia, as I mentioned to the Committee during my last appearance, I had just had two and a half hours with the Prime Minister, at which a significant portion of our time was spent not only dealing with the domestic issues I have spoken about to the Committee before in terms of the need for a nutrition study in the Somali region and the approach of the Government there, and indeed the issue of the NGO law, but also a broader discussion in terms of the level of vulnerability in Ethiopia given the progress which has been made in a country which has had 7-8% growth for more than five years. In that sense, while this is a useful tool, it does not take the place of that iterative dialogue which we sustain with the countries in which we work on an ongoing basis. If you look, for example, at the additional money which has gone in, the money we have put into the whole of Africa, the support that is going into Productive Safety Nets within Ethiopia, I think that is a very good example of where we have been able to act flexibly and quickly, not least in a country like Ethiopia where it is not simply that in certain parts of the country there is already significant vulnerability to hunger, but actually over a sustained period of three years of drought, much of the asset wealth has been hollowed out of other sectors of the country as well, which means the resilience within the economy is much lower, which is why we need to ensure that the Productive Safety Net continues to operate.

  Mr Dinham: Just to add, as the Secretary of State has said, we are engaging with partner governments specifically on the crisis as we speak, particularly countries in Africa, so working with Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and indeed Ethiopia on the analysis of the constraints to growth and how they might develop growth strategies. As part of the response to the food prices, which has obviously now moved into this wider situation, we have provided £15 million as social protection for Ethiopia. We have brought forward budget support, which we are going to provide to Malawi specifically to help deal with -

  Q37  John Battle: So to extend my telescope analogy, the matrix is really quite focused, sharply focused you would say, country-specific?

  Mr Dinham: It is, but it provides us with a backdrop for the actual detailed case by case discussion, because this has got to be country owned really, how we go about it.

  Mr Alexander: I would make two points. One is that we, like every other government, are working hard to understand the global character of what is a global crisis, and in that sense the matrix is a useful tool. It is not the last word, but it is a useful tool in giving you the capacity to see how this is impacting. But that is supplemental to the individual dialogue we are having, to ensure a country-led approach which reflects the particular circumstances in each individual country.

  John Battle: Good.

  Q38  Hugh Bayley: Just to follow up, I am impressed with the way the Government is responding in producing this matrix, but it is not just a matter of the vulnerability, country by country, of the economy. The economic downturn is going to have impacts, as John Battle describes, on trade, on remittances, on migration, and if we are to have a pro-development response we need a cross-government response. I noticed Martin Dinham said that you were working on the matrix with Number 10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, but in terms of a full policy response are you working with the Home Office on immigration, for instance, with BERR on trade? Is it really going to be a whole government response?

  Mr Alexander: The last time I spoke about trade and investment issues with the Secretary of State was at BERR yesterday. The last time I spoke with the Foreign Office and with David Miliband on issues relating to development was yesterday. I chair the National Security and International Development Cabinet Sub-Committee on Africa, which is a forum which brings together the Home Office, the MoD, the Foreign Office and ourselves along with the Cabinet Office. In that sense there is a web of relationships which admittedly are working in a changing, and fast changing, set of conditions and circumstances, but I can assure you that we are working very closely with every other relevant government department to make sure that we, in the first instance, understand the nature of the changing global backdrop in which we do our work but in which other government departments do the same. Frankly, if many of us have made speeches for many years saying the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is a false one, we have all had an object lesson in that truth in the last four to six months and I think the way we are working as a government and between departments reflects that recognition. We are actually working very closely together.

  Q39  Mr Singh: Secretary of State, our Prime Minister has emphasised that in terms of the global crisis, one nation cannot follow its own path but we have to have concerted global action, which brings me to the IMF, which has now brought out its emergency lending facility and at the same time it is operating its traditional standby facility, and the impact of the traditional standby facility on Iceland, for example, is that interest rates have gone up to 6%, while in this country and across the world we want interest rates to go down. Is the IMF pulling in the same direction in terms of concerted global action, or is it pulling in a completely different direction?

  Mr Alexander: I think it is difficult to be prescriptive as to the effect of the intervention and response of the Fund in different countries because in fact it varies depending on the particular circumstances, which may cause individual countries to make an approach to the Fund in circumstances of severe financial difficulty. In that sense I am not sure that in every circumstance the response which was taken, say for example in the United Kingdom with the financial credibility that we continue to hold in the international marketplace, is directly analogous with other countries who find themselves speaking to the Fund and asking for those resources. The new facility which has been created in terms of the Special Liquidity Facility does not attach conditions and in that sense is available without conditions to those who require it. There is a very limited number of conditions in relation to other forms of lending which are available from the Fund, principally in relation to macro-economic stability, because whilst we can get into a theological discussion about conditionality, it is important to recognise that if the Fund is making funds available we do need to ensure that there are other policies in place within that country which do not themselves ensure that good money is not going to yield the result in terms of stability that we would want to see.


8   Democratic Republic of Congo Back

9   Internally displaced persons Back

10   UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Back

11   UN Children's Fund Back

12   Ev 22 Back

13   Public Service Agreement Back

14   Ev 22 Back


 
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