Further memorandum from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS
QUESTION 1
The Prime Minister has called for an arms embargo
on Zimbabwe. What steps has the Government taken to secure an
embargo, and what are the prospects for success? (The Committees
have raised with the Export Control Organisation reports that
a British company, Avient Aviation, may have assisted the transfer
of arms to Zimbabwe)
ANSWER
The Prime Minister said on 26 April that the
UK would support a moratorium on arms transfers to Zimbabwe until
a democratic government is in place. Since that time, we have:
— sought and achieved a briefing on
Zimbabwe in the UN Security Council 29 April 2008, the first since
March 2007, at which a number of UNSC members including the UK,
advocated a voluntary moratorium on arms exports by UN Member
States; and
— played a role in shaping the conclusions
of the 29 April EU General Affairs and External Relations Council,
which read, in part:
"The EU recalls that it does not supply
or sell arms, related materials or equipment which could be used
for internal repression in Zimbabwe. It encourages others to exercise
similar restraint at this time by introducing a de facto moratorium
on all such sales and welcomes actions which have already been
taken in this respect".
Going forward, we intend to maintain dialogue
with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries
regarding the importance of continuing to prevent arms transfers
destabilising Zimbabwe, and explore further how the international
community can support these efforts. We continue to press for
a moratorium internationally. We have been reassured by the Chinese
authorities directly that the original arms shipment that was
destined for Zimbabwe in April 2008 is now en route back to China
and has not been offloaded or rerouted to Zimbabwe by other means.
As Malcolm Wicks, MP Minister of State for Energy
at BERR, stated in his letter of 22 May to Dr Roger Berry, Chairman
of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, HMRC `the UK enforcement
body for export controls' is aware of the alleged involvement
of a UK company in a shipment of arms to Zimbabwe. He will provide
a further update to the Committees as soon as possible.
QUESTION 2
Given that the value of standard individual exports
licences issued for exports to China increased from £85 million
in 2006 to £227 million in 2007 does the embargo on arms
exports to China have any economic or commercial effect?
ANSWER
The EU arms embargo on China is implemented
in line with the EU Code of Conduct, which clearly sets out what
can and cannot be exported in line with specific criteria. The
EU embargo on China was imposed after the Chinese suppression
of the Tiananmen square pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989 and
its scope covers lethal weapons that could be used for internal
repression. It is important to note that it is not a "full
scope" embargo. The export of some controlled goods to China
was always envisaged and thus, increases in the volume of exports
for controlled goods that are not covered by the terms of the
embargo should not be seen as a barometer of the effectiveness
of the embargo. It is also difficult to assess the economic and
commercial impact of the embargo based on one year's figures,
and this needs to be assessed against a longer period.
The table below shows the value and number of
standard individual export licences (SIELS) from 2004 to 2007.
SIELS TO CHINA 2004 TO 2007
The table shows that since 2004 there has been a steady rise
in the number of SIELS approved, although the value has fluctuated.
In 2007 three unusually high value UK exports to China took
place. One was for enriched uranium (£124 million) to be
used by the Yibin Nuclear Element Plant for the fabrication of
commercial nuclear fuel in support of the Chinese civil nuclear
power programme. Another was for cryptography software (£23.8
million) that would enable the provision of Voice Over Internet
Protocol Services to be used by UT Starcom Telecom Ltd in China.
The final high value export was for nickel powder (£10 million)
to be used by Jinco Nonferrous Metals Co Ltd. for use in the process
of making nickel sulphate and chloride. These three high value
exports have distorted the overall figures for 2007 compared to
previous years. All three export licence applications were assessed
against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria and were approved following consultations with the appropriate
government departments and agencies. None were submitted to FCO
Ministers.
QUESTION 3
Does the behaviour of the Chinese authorities in Tibet justify
a strengthening of the arms embargo?
ANSWER
We continue to have serious concerns about human rights in
China. We cover human rights issues in depth with the Chinese
during our regular biannual UK-China Human Rights Dialogue, (the
last round of which took place in Beijing in January 2008). The
December 2004 European Council conclusions sent a strong political
signal of the continued importance of human rights in assessing
EU arms exports to China. The Code of Conduct, which is the primary
means of controlling arms exports, has set criteria regarding
human rights. In line with Criterion 2, HMG would not permit the
export of goods if there was a clear risk the export might be
used for internal repression.
On Tibet in particular, we continue to urge substantive dialogue
between the Chinese authorities and the Dalai Lama to resolve
the underlying human rights issues there. We believe that engagement
with China, not isolation, is the best way to encourage this.
Strengthening the arms embargo would do nothing to encourage dialogue,
and would risk isolating the Chinese Government in a way which
would make it significantly more difficult for us to raise human
rights concerns.
QUESTION 4
The Government's approach has been to engage in dialogue with
China. What has the UK to show for its efforts at dialogue with
China?
ANSWER
By engaging with China on arms and export issues, we are
able to share our best practice knowledge on export licensing
controls. We have been involved in an EU pilot project with the
Chinese, which has resulted in the production of guidance for
Chinese industry on internal compliance procedures. Continued
dialogue was also influential in allowing us to lend our voice
to that of African civil society when lobbying the Chinese on
the arms shipment to Zimbabwe throughout April this year. Overall,
we judge that the human rights situation has improved significantly
in China since 1989. The US has now dropped China from its list
of "countries of concern" in its annual human rights
report. By entering into dialogue with the Chinese we can encourage
greater transparency and foster the modernising of arms export
regulations and communicate our concerns openly; something we
could not do if we were not willing to engage with the Chinese
on arms issues. However, this willingness to enter into dialogue
does not influence our policy on arms exports to China. In line
with Code of Conduct criteria for arms exports, the UK does not
approve export of goods to the region if they would adversely
affect regional stability in any significant way. This includes
the potential for equipment to enhance significantly the effectiveness
of existing capabilities or to improve force projection.
QUESTION 5
There are reports that China is the main supplier of the Sudanese
armed forces—for example, Human Rights First (a New York
based human rights organisation) reported on 13 March 2008 that
China sold over $55 million worth of small arms to Sudan as the
violence escalated in Darfur. What is the Government's assessment
of the extent to which China is supplying arms to Sudan? What
can be done to stop these supplies?
ANSWER
The People's Republic of China does not publish details of
its arms exports, and last submitted data to the UN Register on
Conventional Arms covering its exports in 1996. It is therefore
not possible to provide accurate figures on either the total number
or value of Chinese arms exports to Sudan, and Africa in general.
On the specific issue of Sudan, we are building practical co-operation
with China as it seeks to improve its export controls. Within
this dialogue we encourage China to increase the transparency
of its arms exports. However, we believe the UN should extend
its arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan, as asked for in the
UN Sanctions Committee of 6 November 2007. The Foreign Secretary
raised the issue of Chinese arms exports to Africa, and Sudan
in particular, during his visit to Beijing in February 2008 and
we continue to engage in dialogue with the Chinese on this subject
on a regular basis.
QUESTION 6
The Government supports a legally binding instrument to prohibit
those cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.
How does the Government define unacceptable harm to civilians?
ANSWER
"Unacceptable harm" was a phrase conceived for
the purposes of the Oslo Declaration. The key task for those engaged
in the Oslo Process, and the wider international community, was
to find a balanced solution whereby those cluster munitions which
caused unacceptable harm were clearly defined and prohibited.
The humanitarian issue to address is minimising the potential
exposure of civilians to the post-conflict hazard of unexploded
sub-munitions. We are delighted that the text of the Convention
on cluster munitions adopted at Dublin achieves that objective.
In fact it does not seek to define unacceptable harm—instead
it defines and prohibits all cluster munitions. Article 2 of the
Convention makes clear that other munitions which have sub- munitions,
but which meet a set of cumulative criteria designed to avoid
indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded
sub- munitions, are not cluster munitions.
QUESTION 7
Dr Howells has stated that "we cannot exclude the use
of the cluster munitions that we retained in certain circumstances"
(HC Deb, 29 February 2008, cols 2020-21W). Can the Government
explain what these circumstances might be?
ANSWER
The Prime Minister announced on 28 May the immediate withdrawal
of all the UK's remaining cluster munitions. Therefore the circumstances
under which their use might previously have been contemplated
no longer apply.
QUESTION 8
If a so-called "smart" cluster had a failure rate
of more than one percent, should it be banned?
ANSWER
In the event, negotiations in Dublin led to agreement on
a set of definitions which did not specify a percentage failure
rate as a criterion for banning or excluding any particular weapons
system. All States present agreed instead that weight and number
of sub munitions, their ability to detect and engage single target
objects, and the presence of self-destruction mechanisms and self-deactivation
features were more important criteria for determining whether
or not a particular weapons system should be prohibited.
The UK is committed to improving reliability of all munitions,
with the aim of achieving lower failure rates and leaving less
unexploded ordnance. This is the humanitarian problem that all
those involved want to address.
QUESTION 9
The Committees understand that the OECD investigation in respect
of corruption is a "Phase Two" examination—a procedure
that, so far, only three countries, Ireland, Luxembourg and Japan,
have been subjected to. Does the Government consider that the
investigation is far from routine and brings into question the
UK's laws and enforcement arrangements for combating corruption?
ANSWER
The OECD recognises that our law is in accordance with the
minimum requirements of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, and
that the UK has fully or partially implemented 17 of the 20 recommendations
by the OECD Working Group set out in their Phase 2 report published
March 2005.
In light of concerns raised by the OECD in their Phase 1
evaluation of the UK, the Government legislated in the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 amending the existing law.
Following this, the OECD Working Group on Bribery concluded that
"the UK law now addresses the requirements set forth in the
Convention".
However, we recognise that the existing legal framework is
fragmented and in need of modernisation. We have been striving
to bring forward a new bribery law for some time. This has not
proved an easy task, but it is vital we get it right. We look
forward to receiving the Law Commission report and draft Bill
this autumn and our intention is to introduce a draft Bill for
pre-legislative scrutiny in the fourth session, as noted in the
draft Legislative Programme. This is the best and most effective
means to work up proposals for a new law.
With respect to enforcement, the UK has strengthened its
systems to combat foreign bribery by establishing the Overseas
Anti-Corruption Unit in the City of London Police in November
2006. Working closely with the Serious Fraud Office, they have
successfully increased the number of enquiries and investigations.
There are now 20 foreign bribery enquiries ongoing, and 46 allegations
under preliminary investigation. BERR has recently provided further
resources to increase the number of officers in the unit to 12.
QUESTION 10
Back in 2003 the Committees raised a number of concerns and
questions about the sale of air traffic control equipment to Tanzania.
According to press reports, investigators have now found more
than £500,000 in a Tanzanian minister's offshore accounts
in Jersey—see The Guardian report on 22 April. Are
there any lessons from the Tanzanian case for the British Government?
ANSWER
Andrew Chenge, Minister for Infrastructure resigned last
month following the ongoing BAE radar investigation by the Serious
Fraud Office, which had uncovered an overseas account of his worth
$1 million. The investigation is still on going, so we are unable
to comment on it at this time. The SFO has received good co-operation
from the Tanzanian authorities, the Prevention and Combating of
Corruption Bureau (PCCB).
The Government is committed to promote responsible business
conduct through transparency initiatives and effective self-regulation.
We welcome the defence industry's own commitment to this agenda,
shown by the Common Industry Standards (CIS). This is an excellent
start which we strongly support, and the newly formed Defence
& Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) within UK Trade and Investment
will be working in partnership with industry to achieve the widest
possible industry buy in and business commitment to the CIS.
QUESTION 11
Transparency International (UK) has proposed that the British
and Saudi Governments jointly set up a body to monitor the al-Salam
contract signed in 2007. Transparency International (UK) state
in evidence to the Committees that: "There will be a body
of opinion in Saudi Arabia that will welcome higher confidence
in the integrity of this contract, given the damage and embarrassment
caused by `Al Yamamah'." Do you agree with Transparency International
(UK)'s assessment?
ANSWER
Our experience is that the Saudi Government would not agree
to any arrangement that would result in the release of sensitive
information relating to their defence capability, which they would
consider to be against their national interest.
QUESTION 12
The Committees raised the export of armoured personnel carriers
and water cannons to Libya in 2007 and whether they could be used
for internal repression. The FCO replied that the level of risk
that the goods would be used contrary to Criterion 2 had been
mitigated to an acceptable level by the training and evaluation.
How does the Government respond to Human Rights Watch which states
that serious rights abuses persist: there is no free press, independent
organizations are banned, detainees are tortured, and political
prisoners are locked up and some of them have "disappeared"?
What assessment has the Government made of human rights in Libya?
ANSWER
We remain concerned with many aspects of Libya's human rights
record, including some of the areas mentioned by HRW in its report.
We continue to monitor the human rights situation in Libya closely.
Each export licence request is judged on its individual merits
against the consolidated export licensing criteria. Criterion
2 states that "the government will not issue an export licence
if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used
for internal repression". In the case that the committees
refer to, the following assessment took place:
(a) A detailed analysis of the situation in Libya following
the Benghazi riots.
— A recognition by the Libyans that the situation
needed to change—the Secretary for Public Security was sacked
and a new senior Libyan police structure was put in place to ensure
that it never happened again.
(b) The Libyan Police's successful completion of public
order and riot control training.
— This training had been assessed by two serving
UK police officers against the standards of current UK police
forces training.
— They placed particular focus on the "golden
threads" of human rights, conflict management, and risk and
threat management and command structures.
— An assessment, against the Consolidated Criteria,
was completed following this training to ensure that Criterion
2 concerns were met.
— The package surrounding these exports trained
the Libyan police in appropriate, human rights compliant, behaviour
and gave them the equipment to respond to threats in an appropriate,
non-lethal manner.
QUESTION 13
The UK plays a significant part in the Proliferation Security
Initiative which aims to stop illegitimate trade in weapons of
mass destruction and WMD technology. Does the UK Government have
the necessary powers to interdict ships and their cargoes on the
high seas?
ANSWER
At present the UK has no powers to seize goods subject to
export controls on the high seas, or to interdict ships on the
grounds that they are carrying such goods.
The 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the
SUA Protocol) will strengthen the international legal basis to
impede and prosecute the trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems
and related materials on the high seas in commercial ships by
requiring state parties to criminalize such transport. The Protocol
also establishes a mechanism to facilitate the boarding in international
waters of vessels suspected of engaging in these activities.
In broad terms, once the SUA Protocol comes into force and
the UK has ratified, UK enforcement officers will be able to board
a ship on the high seas and seize goods, where there is reasonable
grounds to suspect the ship is transporting WMD, or equipment
that could be used for WMD. Consistent with existing international
law and practice, SUA boardings can only be conducted with the
express consent of the flag state of the vessel to be boarded.
The SUA Protocol will only come into force after ratification
by 12 countries. Currently only three countries (Spain, Cook Islands
and St Kitts and Nevis) have ratified. The UK has signed the Protocol
but has not yet ratified.
PSI is a practical, highly effective mechanism for addressing
the very real threat of illicit trafficking in WMD and related
materials. The UK continues to participate actively in PSI. We
recently hosted a meeting of the PSI Operational Experts Group
in London (February 2008), and sent a strong cross-departmental
team to the PSI 5th Anniversary events in Washington (May 2008).
The initiative that led to the creation of the SUA Protocol was
driven by PSI nations, and at the recent Washington meetings PSI
participants adopted a declaration which encouraged all signatories
to the Protocol to work towards ratifying it.
QUESTION 14
Does the Government require legislation to give legal effect
to the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation? When will the
legislation come forward?
ANSWER
Legislation is required to enable the UK to ratify the SUA
Protocol. The necessary legislation is contained in the Transport
Security Bill, which has a place in the Draft Legislative Programme
for the fourth session of Parliament. The Department for Transport
has led preparation of the Bill.
QUESTION 15
What part does China play in the Proliferation Security Initiative?
ANSWER
China does not currently participate in PSI. However, existing
PSI participants and China would both benefit from working together
through PSI to build global capacity to combat trafficking of
WMD and related materials. China recently attended the outreach
session of the PSI 5th anniversary events in Washington.
QUESTION 16
What is the Government's assessment of the supply of arms to
Burma? Is the Burmese Junta actively seeking arms and who is supplying
them?
ANSWER
In October 2007 the Government undertook an internal review
into which states were supplying arms to the Burmese authorities.
The review made clear that there was no evidence to support allegations
that military equipment from either the UK or other EU member
states was reaching Burma in breach of the EU Embargo, including
via India. However, the report did highlight that the main arms
suppliers to Burma were in fact China and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.
QUESTION 17
There have been reports that North Korea has been selling rocket
launchers to Burma via a trading company in Singapore and that
Burma has also bought arms from China, India, Russia and Ukraine—for
example, Kyodo World Service, 3 April 2008. Assuming these reports
to be accurate, what can the British Government do to prevent
Burma obtaining arms supplies?
ANSWER
As there is currently no UN embargo in place against Burma,
we are limited in what we can do to prevent sales of military
equipment to the Burmese authorities from other states. However,
the UK through both our contacts bilaterally and within international
organisations, regularly raises our concerns with other states
about their arms export policies. For example, but not specifically
in relation to Burma, we regularly discuss with China its policy
on the export of military equipment, particularly in the context
of how these exports can have a destabilizing effect on fragile
states.
QUESTION 18
The recent gyrocompasses cases concerning Mr Salashoor showed
that dual use goods are not notified when they are moved between
EU countries, unlike items on the Military List. The export was
only picked up when the gyrocompasses were about to leave the
EU from Malta. Is this a weakness in the export control system
that needs to be plugged?
ANSWER
No. The important point is that a fellow Member State prevented
the export of concern leaving their territory. If that says anything
about the system, it is proof of its success, not its failure.
A good deal of work takes place within the EU to spread best
practice and bring newer states up to the standards of those with
longer standing export control systems. In recent times, there
has been an extensive Peer Review programme on a range of export
control issues, and a Commission-chaired Committee oversees the
practical implementation of the Dual Use Regulation.
QUESTION 19
The Committees have been pressing for the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports to be adopted as a Common Position since 2005.
What are the prospects for making progress on adopting the Code
as a Common Position?
ANSWER
We are in discussions at official level with all EU member
states to see how to overcome the reservations some had previously
expressed about the Common Position. These discussions are moving
forward and we hope they will lead to consensus being reached
in the course of the next six months. As a matter of principle,
we believe the adoption of the Common Position will greatly strengthen
the export control system across the Eupropean Union, changing
the status of controls from politically to legally-binding. Once
consensus is reached, the Government will move quickly to implement,
having already subjected the Common Position to parliamentary
scrutiny. The last formal EU ministerial discussion of the issue
took place at the General Affairs Council of December 2007.
QUESTION 20
Recent press reports indicate that the Slovak Republic has
licensed the export of 10,000 military missiles to the Sri Lankan
Government (Sme, Bratislava, reported on 7 April 2008 (according
to BBC Monitoring)). Where an EU country grants a licence which
appears to be breach the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports—in
this case Criterion 3 on prolonging internal conflict—what
can the UK Government do about it?
ANSWER
When these reports came to light, the FCO immediately sought
to establish the facts. Staff at our Embassy in Bratislava discussed
the reports with officials from the Slovakian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. They confirmed that the export of 10,000 rockets had
taken place, but a licence to ship a further 30,000 rockets had
been revoked.
The original Slovakian export is not in itself technically
a breach of the Code of Conduct, but clearly would be considered
undesirable when considered against Criterion 3. And under similar
circumstances the UK would have refused the export of this type
of military equipment to Sri Lanka at this sensitive time. We
are now liaising with the Slovenian Presidency and other EU partners
within COARM to consider how best to ensure that the Code of Conduct
is applied in a uniform manner across the all Member States, thereby
avoiding this type of anomaly in future.
June 2008
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