Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
MR DOUGLAS
ALEXANDER MP,
MR GILE
LEVER AND
MS BARBARA
HENDRIE
31 JANUARY 2008
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon, Secretary
of State. Thank you for coming in for this evidence session on
Iraq. Just for the record, first of all, could you introduce your
team.
Mr Alexander: I am supported by
Barbara Hendrie, the Deputy Director for Iraq in our Middle East
and North Africa Department within the Department for International
Development, and Giles Lever, who is the Deputy Head of the Iraq
Policy Unit within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much
for coming in. As you know, the Committee has basically just decided
to take a single evidence session to try and bring us a little
bit up to date with developments, particularly, from your Department's
point of view, in Iraq in the light of changes. This Committee
in this Parliament has not visited Iraq. The Committee in the
previous Parliament did. We have simply taken a bit of informal
evidence, some written evidence and obviously a submission from
the Department itself but a number of questions have been raised
with us. Clearly, the situation deteriorated in the course of
2006-07 and obviously you will bring us up to date on where you
think we are now. How much did that deterioration in security
affect the ability of the Department actually to carry out its
work within Iraq? Was it seriously compromised?
Mr Alexander: Of course it is
the case that sectarian violence within Iraq had an effect on
the Government's ability to function effectively and, while we
welcome the steps that have been taken both by the multinational
forces and by the Iraqi forces themselves, which have resulted
in a reduction in the number of hostile incidents in recent months,
the main focus of our effort has been in supporting the capacity
of the Government of Iraq to support the development of its own
people. So it is right to acknowledge that the violence contributed
to a security context which placed further challenges in the way
of the Iraqi Government in their endeavours to improve the health,
education and wellbeing of the people of Iraq.
Q3 Chairman: We are coming to that.
Obviously, the figures were horrendous at the peak of that insurgency,
when it was estimated that casualties were maybe 3,000 a month.
That was certainly the figure for February early last year, and
US military casualties were up to a peak of 120 in May. The figures
now look better, although, if you ignore the previous figures,
you would not really be very comfortable with even current levels
of casualties if you were the American military or Iraqi civilians.
Nevertheless, the argument is that the "surge" has brought
that level of violence down. Is there any comparable opportunity
for a surge in improving the quality of lives? Has it created
space that will enable more development activity to be delivered?
In that context, how will your Department be able to operate to
fill that space, if you feel the space is there?
Mr Alexander: Firstly, let us
take the trends. It is right to acknowledge that the violence
has been declining but equally that it remains very high. In that
sense, it might be helpful to share with the Committee some of
the figures that have been brought to our Department's attention.
In June 2007 hostile incidents spiked across the whole of Iraq.
Baghdad was experiencing 87 serious attacks, including mass casualties
every day. In comparison, over one week of January 2008, this
month, there were only 513 hostile incidents reported across all
of Iraq. So while progress is against a very high level of residual
violence, it is clearly welcome and it is real on the basis of
information that comes to us. I had the opportunity to visit Iraq
in December and to meet with and discuss the situation with General
Petraeus, the American commander in charge. I think it would be
fair to identify a number of factors which in turn affect the
development context which have contributed to the reduction in
those levels of violent incidents: the success of the military
surge, involving an additional 30,000 extra troops; the increased
capacity of the Iraqi security forces themselves; a ceasefire
declared within Iraq by the Shia militia affiliated to the Sadrist
movement; and the role of the Awakening councils, not just in
Anbar province, which has received a great deal of publicity,
but actually across other Sunni provinces both near to Baghdad
and more generally across the country. So there are a range of
different factors which account for the reduction in violence
that has been seen. The effort by not just the Department for
International Development but also the other international players
has consistently been to try and secure the wellbeing and the
development objectives that the Government of Iraq has set and
while we recognise that there is scope, given the reduction in
violence, for further action to be taken, it is only right to
acknowledge that there are also considerable non-violent challenges
affecting the Government of Iraq. The politics at the centre of
the Government of Iraq has not been as constructive and as effective
as we would have wished over recent years, although in recent
weeks and recent months there has been some more optimistic and
more hopeful signs. More generally, the sectarian character of
the violence that has been experienced has affected the political
framework in which decisions are taken but there is no doubt,
for example, in the south, where I had the opportunity to visit,
as well as in Baghdad we have seen some real progress in recent
months. For example, the reduction in the level of violence has
contributed to an environment in which, for example, I was able
to meet with Prime Minister Maliki alongside the Governor and
the Provincial Council within Basra itself. That was a good example
of where the politics had effectively been stuck for some time
but, partly in light of the initiative that the Prime Minister
had taken, partly in light of the improving security situation,
there was significant movement back in December in terms of the
scope for further investment within the economy in south-east
Iraq.
Q4 Chairman: Thank you for that.
We have had information obviously about the activities and approach
of General Petraeus, which seems to be quite sophisticated, and
the various alliances or deals or whatever you may wish to call
them to try to lower the temperature but the question that you
are left with—and I appreciate this is not your Department's
responsibility but it will determine the space—is if the
surge ends and a scale-down of American troops then takes place,
has a permanent reduction in violence been achieved as a result
of those measures or is the real danger that it will simply revert?
In other words, what will fill the space is not, sadly, development
opportunities but a resurgence of the insurgency.
Mr Alexander: I think it would
be a brave individual to speak with certainty in terms of predictions
and certainly General Petraeus, when I spoke with him, would be
the last to express any form of complacency given the real progress
that has been achieved under his watch. In that sense, I think
you are right to recognise that new opportunities have arisen
as a result of the progress that has been made but that makes
it incumbent on all of us, whether military, diplomatic or development,
to try and seize that opportunity. I would be cautious against
suggesting that development can take the place of political reconciliation
because I think I certainly left Iraq with a very clear sense
as to quite how central is the responsibility of the Iraqi Government
itself and indeed on the political leadership of Iraq, because
it will be vital if we are to see the kind of progress that you
anticipate in terms of development efforts yielding results that
we see progress in relation to political reconciliation as well
as simply the security environment. That is not to diminish the
security environment but politics remains absolutely fundamental
both to the security context in Iraq and also to the capacity
to achieve the development objectives that have been set. A very
basic fact probably makes that point: Iraq is not per se
a poor country; it is a middle-income country with very considerable
oil reserves, notwithstanding the degradation of the infrastructure
both for exploration and transportation of oil as a result not
just of recent activities but under-investment over many decades.
My recollection is that the oil exports yielded revenues in the
region of $32 billion in the last year alone. So it is not simply
in terms of development a matter of importing money into a desperately
poor country. It is helping to build the capacity of the Government
of Iraq to spend its own money in the interests of the Iraqi people
and, again, that is in large measure contingent upon the leadership
of the institutions of the Government of Iraq, both at a provincial
level and at a central government level in a way which allows
for real progress to be made. Certainly General Petraeus in his
conversation with me was keen to emphasise the importance not
simply of the work we are supporting through the Prime Minister's
initiatives on economic development in the south, principally
in Basra, but also the importance of, through our colleagues in
the Foreign Office, emphasising to the centre the vitality of
the relationship between the centre's actions and economic development
within the regions. So, for example, legislative change: while
there has been progress in recent weeks on what is commonly known
as "de-Baathification", the de-Baathification laws,
there is still much work to be done, for example, in terms of
passing legislation on provincial powers. That is essentially
characterising the relationship between the centre and the regions,
devolution in our parlance, and also the Hydrocarbons Bill, the
facility to secure investment and to be able to get oil resources
flowing because, as I say, this is a country with very considerable
oil reserves. If you are able to crack the ability of those oil
reserves to be removed in a way that yields income and revenue
for the people of Iraq, then that is a very considerable step
forward. Barbara, maybe you can say a word in terms of economic
development?
Ms Hendrie: We are focusing, as
the Secretary of State said, on trying to encourage and enable
the Government to spend the considerable resources that it has.
There are many reasons why that is difficult and challenging.
Security is one but we do find that we are able to meet with government
officials, we are largely confined to the international zone,
as you will know, but many government offices have now set up
liaison contacts in the international zone so we are able to meet
counterparts at a relatively high level in government on the economic
sphere. Where we find it difficult is to meet mid-level officials
and to actually get out to ministries to mentor side by side with
units that are trying to, for example, implement federal budget
systems. But we do make progress. We have openings to provide
policy advice. We have been quite successful in discussions with
the Government on the macroeconomic programme and leveraging in
support from the IMF[1]
and the debt relief side. We are working very closely also with
the World Bank on a public finance management programme for the
Government to try to get the public finance management expenditure
systems working to get the money out to the provinces and moving
through the systems. It is frustrating, it is difficult, we are
impeded in what we can do but, within that constraint, we do feel
that there are opportunities and we are making some progress.
In Basra we are largely confined, as you will know, physically
to the air station now but what we have found there is that actually
provincial government officials are quite keen to meet with us
and to take our advice and training, and we are able to meet with
them in the commercial section of the airport fairly regularly.
Even when some of the political contacts have fallen away because
of disagreements with the Governor, our technical counterparts
in the directorates and the committees of the provincial council
have continued to meet with us. The other mechanism we use to
get around the security constraints is we have workshops in third
countries, so Kuwait or Dubai, and that is actually quite useful
because we are able to bring ministers and officials from Iraqi
government institutions together in a context where they probably
have more dealings with each other in a concentrated forum than
they do in their normal operating environment in Iraq and we find
that we get quite good spurts of activity and capacity-building
in that sense.
Chairman: I think we might want to explore
in more detail where that takes us.
Q5 John Battle: To follow up on that,
if we take as read, as it were—not for granted but as read—the
difficulties of the circumstances in which you work, I am tempted
to ask about the response that Barbara gave, Secretary of State.
It is a top-down attempt to settle things down. I am trying to
get a perception of what Iraq is like now because the pictures
I see on TV are usually when there has been another bomb, people
taken to a hospital that is half destroyed, so the level of destruction
that you are starting with. I do not even imagine that the work
is development action. It is almost humanitarian assistance at
this stage. I wonder what your picture is, because I get the impression
that there are still people who are hungry, need to be fed because
there are food shortages, there is not enough water and sanitation
across the country. I wonder what your assessment of the humanitarian
situation is. Is it getting worse? Are there more poor people
than ever before that you are trying to reach with humanitarian
aid? What do you see as the picture?
Mr Alexander: Let me try and characterise
the humanitarian context as we see it. Firstly, it is right to
acknowledge to the Committee in those circumstances that you described
it is quite difficult to get accurate statistical information
but the United Nations estimates that there are about 2.2 million
internally displaced people in Iraq and a further 2 million Iraqis
who are refugees across the region, approximately 1.5 million
of those being in Syria and approximately 0.5 million being in
Jordan, though independent estimates suggest that those numbers,
for example the numbers in Jordan, may be somewhat lower. It is
hard to identify the displaced populations and their needs for
two reasons: firstly, there are very few camps on the borders
of Iraq. The pattern of dispersal is that people tend to move
to communities either within Amman in Jordan or Damascus within
Syria, and it is estimated that somewhat less than 3% of the displaced
people outside of Iraq are living in camps, so it is not a visible
community in a way that in other parts of the world it would be.
Similarly, the security situation within Iraq constrains the ability
to give an accurate assessment as to how many of the people who
are internally displaced within the country are living. That being
said, the World Food Programme estimates that approximately 4
million people in Iraq are food-insecure and many Iraqis have
come to rely on the PDS, as it is known, the public distribution
system, which was originally devised in the context of the hardship
following the Iran-Iraq war but is one functioning piece of the
Iraqi state that continues to operate. That basically involves
all Iraqis being eligible for rations from the PDS but there are
real difficulties in terms of corruption, lack of capacity, people
being on the list who frankly should not be, but the GoI, the
Government of Iraq, continues to manage the PDS system and that
is one of the principal mechanisms by which food is distributed.
Indeed, the World Food Programme recently announced the start
of a $126 million programme to address urgent food needs amongst
internally displaced people both within Iraq and Iraqi refugees
within Syria. That is broadly how I would characterise the position
in terms of food scarcity and number of displaced people. If you
want, we can speak in more detail in terms of other sectors.
Q6 John Battle: We may ask for more
detail about the displaced people and, of course, if people are
in camps, they are easy to identify and locate but if the Government
of Iraq sources are suggesting that a third of the population
now live in poverty and, of course, grades of that, and they then
think that 5% are in absolute, extreme poverty, my question—and
we are International Development, not Defence or Foreign Affairs,
with a focus on the poor—how are they being reached? Even
at the most desperate level for humanitarian assistance, I do
not know whether the UN agencies or whether the International
Red Cross can actually get to the people. I understand your problem
in the green zone but what about those other agencies? Can they
operate on the ground in the villages and in the other towns and
cities? Is it possible?
Mr Alexander: The ICRC[2]
has principally been working through the Red Crescent. Maybe,
Barbara, you can say a word or two both in terms of distribution
mechanisms but also share with the Committee the figures in terms
of infant mortality, which in some ways challenge the perception
that there has been a uniform deterioration given there are some
contrary statistics.
Ms Hendrie: Starting with the
ICRC, which is one of our main partners for immediate needs and
the sort of extremes of vulnerability and poverty, they rely heavily
on the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, who have quite a good coverage
across the country. That is not an easy relationship. There is
a lot of money now coming into the system.
Q7 John Battle: There are enough
resources then? It is reaching the people that is the problem,
is it?
Ms Hendrie: There are probably
enough resources coming in for the delivery mechanisms that there
are at the moment on the ground, and in fact, there is a danger
of overloading the Iraqi Red Crescent system. We have just learned
recently that actually there has been some disagreement between
the ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent, partly based on reporting
and fiduciary issues. There is always a danger when you start
funnelling huge amounts of money into a delivery system which
is actually quite fragile and thinly spread. The ICRC itself also
has something of a presence—we do not want to talk about
it too much because they have asked us not to profile it—but
we feel pretty confident that they are able to get out and about
and see what is happening. Having said that, it is still, as the
Secretary of State said, very difficult to know what exactly the
picture is. We get statistics from different sources. We have
had some very alarming statistics produced recently in the Medact
report about the health services in Iraq.[3]
Q8 Chairman: We will come on to that.
Ms Hendrie: It is very much in
our minds but we are also getting other statistics. For example,
UNICEF[4]
produced recently their 2006 multiple indicator cluster survey,
which is pretty authoritative, as good as you could get for the
moment in Iraq, looking at a whole series of indicators, and what
those suggest is that child nutrition has actually stabilised
and indeed slightly improved if you look across stunting, wasting
and underweight indicators, and are now roughly, according to
their statistics, comparable to Egypt. That is a set of figures
which one has to weigh in the balance. The other set of figures
is under-five mortality, which has become slightly worse. We are
now at a situation of something like 41 per thousand, which is
never ideal, but again, is roughly comparable. So it is not to
say that things are not bad but that actually getting a clear
picture on the ground is very challenging.
Q9 John Battle: I want you, in a sense,
to dispel a perception that I have got, and even in another conflict,
in the Vietnam war, and even in Britain, we have floods. Is there
a pocket of people cut off that no-one is reaching and you need
a helicopter to drop food to make sure they do not starve? Even
in the Vietnam war there were food drops to some villages where
people were starving because they got cut off. Of course, there
were pamphlets and leaflets as well. Leaving that aside, in Iraq
are all the people being reached who are in desperate need? Are
you confident that the tentacles of the organisations can get
there? Is there the capacity and possibilities, whether protected
by military convoys or whatever, to reach the people in most desperate
need? I know that is not a development question of how we are
rebuilding and rebuilding the infrastructure but will we find
a village in 10 years' time that was totally cut off where the
people starved to death as a result of nobody reaching them? That
is the image I am really trying to dispel.
Mr Alexander: I could not give
you the assurance that you are looking for in terms of our footprint
in Iraq. We rely heavily on the international mechanisms that
are there, principally the United Nations, although I did take
the opportunity when travelling to Iraq to stop off in Jordan
to meet with David Shearer,[5]
who has recently been appointed to improve the coordination of
the international humanitarian response, and I have to say he
struck me as an outstanding individual, who will have some responsibility
both for what is happening regionally but also for what is happening
in-country.
Q10 Chairman: We met him when we were
in Palestine.
Mr Alexander: Really, a core part
of his task is to be able to surface and to render transparent
some of these issues because, while we tend to work through the
United Nations, the ICRC and other international bodies, it really
has not been for us to have that comprehensive overview but we
recognise absolutely, as you say, that we need to make sure that,
notwithstanding the very real security and violence challenges
that are faced, that work is being taken forward principally by
the Government of Iraq itself but supported by the efforts of
the international community, perhaps more effectively than it
has been in the past.
Q11 Ann McKechin: Secretary of State,
you mentioned earlier about the new World Food Programme which
has just been started. Can you just confirm whether the UK is
directly contributing to that programme?
Mr Alexander: We do contribute
to the WFP[6]
generally. In terms of the new appeal that is going out, yes,
my recollection is that we are in terms of the $125 million or
so appeal that is out at the moment.
Ms Hendrie: Our response has been
internally through the ICRC and externally through UNHCR.[7]
I am not sure in fact whether we have specifically contributed
to the WFP effort. We will look to contribute under the consolidated
appeal which we expect in mid-February but what we have done is
focus for short-term needs on the ICRC and for displaced people
in the region on the UNHCR. We have also contributed through the
IRFFI[8]
trust fund. As you know, the money there goes out to a number
of different UN agencies.
Mr Alexander: Forgive me. It is
not $125 million. It is $126 million which has just been announced
by WFP. In that sense, they have only just launched the appeal
but we will make sure that we are co-ordinating in terms of what
we do with other parts of the UN system.
Q12 Ann McKechin: A new food security
unit has also been established in the Ministry of Planning and
Development Coordination. In your view, has that made any impact
on actually improving the current distribution of food in the
country?
Mr Alexander: The principal mechanism,
the PDS, of which I have already spoken, remains the key mechanism
by which the Government of Iraq distributes resources and it has
been there for some time. It is not perfect but our sense to date
has been that this is the best instrument available within the—I
was going to say "armoury"—the repertoire of the
Government of Iraq given its long-standing capacity to get food
out to communities, but maybe, Barbara, you could say a word or
two in terms of the support for the efforts to reform the PDS,
which has been that principal mechanism of food distribution.
Q13 Ann McKechin: Perhaps just before
Ms Hendrie responds, is there any plan by the Government of Iraq
or by international donors about continuing the scheme indefinitely
or is there some sort of end date that they are trying to reach
or a greater level of targeting in how the system operates?
Mr Alexander: The necessity for
sustained delivery of food essentially on a rations basis is contingent
upon not just the security situation in terms of the capacity
of people to move about, take their place within a functioning
market economy, but also the capacity of the Government itself,
and in that sense, clearly, one would want to move away from a
situation whereby in perpetuity people are reliant upon food rations
to sustain themselves. On the other hand, this mechanism has been
in place now for many years within Iraq, reflecting the very troubled
history of that particular country but ultimately these judgements
are judgements that have to be made by the Government of Iraq
in terms of at what point you can transition away from what is
essentially a humanitarian response to an identified need to a
position whereby there is sustainability of food supply for the
country.
Ms Hendrie: As the Secretary of
State said, there is a sense of strong entitlement under the PDS
and, where we have opened up policy dialogue with the Government
on reform, there has always been that hurdle to overcome. Our
concern at the moment is that the Government is now looking at
the PDS system, but very much looking to revise the criteria on
eligibility, which we have some concerns about in the current
situation given the levels of internal displacement and vulnerability.
We would much prefer that they focused on reshaping and revising
the mechanism of the PDS to make it more effective, with a gradual
move to a more targeted system, probably a cash transfer basis
but at the moment revising criteria for eligibility is of some
concern, particularly given the levels of conflict and sectarian
violence.
Q14 Ann McKechin: The World Bank
suggested that subsidies of this nature have negative economic
impacts because where you tend to have ration books, you will
tend to have a black market, and there actually seems to be quite
heavy evidence of that already. I just wonder, when you are talking
about cash transfers, that would seem to me one way of better
targeting but also avoiding the distortion element. Is there any
research going on about that, trying to assist the Iraqi Government
so that they can devise an appropriate financial package?
Mr Alexander: I would simply say
in response that cash transfers is no guarantee of a lack of corruption,
in the sense that public financial management, if put in place
effectively, can both assist and remove the difficulties in terms
of corruption with food distribution and equally be the foundation
on which cash transfers can operate. In other countries in which
we operate as DFID we would clearly seek to transition towards
cash transfers as a mechanism of social support rather than direct
transfers of food, for all the good development reasons of which
you speak, but I would not under-estimate the scale of immediate
humanitarian need that is faced. My recollection is that the estimate
is that if PDS were to break down, approximately 45% of the population,
that is, 12 million people, would find themselves food-insecure
and in that sense the instrument itself of PDS, while far from
perfect, reflects the circumstances in which it has been called
to operate, that is, the inability of people to operate as part
of a functioning market economy, the inability of people to be
able to move around with a degree of security, and the limited
capability of the Government of Iraq. Are we unyielding in our
determination to support as one of our key objectives in DFID
the capacity of the Government of Iraq and individual ministries
to assist them in the kind of evolution that you describe? Absolutely,
but I would not under-estimate the scale of need to which PDS
is presently being addressed.
Mr Lever: I would just add that
the reform of the PDS is not purely a humanitarian issue; it is
also bound up in some ways with politics. As you know, the economic
geometry of Iraq, if I can put it that way, between the centre
and the regions has not yet been worked out as well as the political
geometry. There are encouraging signs that the different parties,
Prime Minister Maliki and the other parties, are committed to
pushing ahead with the debate on provincial powers and the decision
on when the timing is right to go for a more substantive overhaul
of the PDS, as I say, I think will be bound up with these political
decisions to some extent, and therefore it is very much a judgement
that the Iraqis need to make. We would recognise of course the
problems with the PDS, the fact that a lot more money, many times
more money is spent on administering the programme than on the
actual value of the food itself, and our sense from talking to
Iraqis in the technocratic ministries is that they also recognise
and understand that problem but, because of political sensitivities
and the need to map this kind of centralised distribution system
on to whatever geometry is eventually drawn up in terms of power
between the regions and the centre, we think it is very much for
them to make the judgement as to when is the right time to look
for more widespread reform.
Q15 Mr Singh: Secretary of State,
we have been told that the health system in Iraq is in disarray
and we all know what has been going on in terms of the levels
of violence but is this description true all over Iraq? I can
imagine why it is true in Baghdad and the north but is it true,
for example, in Kurdish Iraq? Is it true in the south, where the
same levels of violence have not been experienced? If it is, what
is the cause?
Mr Alexander: I think it is fair
to say that the Iraqi health system faces enormous challenges,
many of which actually pre-date the 2003 action that was taken.
There were literally decades of under-investment and mismanagement
within the health system, and an increased number of vulnerable
people and the security situation have added to the challenge
that the health system is facing. In recent years we have seen
the specific targeting of doctors and nurses, which is not limited
to a single geographical area but has manifested itself in a number
of areas by insurgents and many, perhaps as much as half of the
population of doctors and health professionals within Iraq as
a consequence have left the country. About 20% of Iraqi children
under five are now missing routine medical vaccinations, as one
example of where the system is under strain. One in five Iraqi
children are showing signs of stunted growth, diarrhoea rates
are rising due to water shortages, and so it is right to acknowledge
that there are very real challenges being faced within the health
system but, of course, there is a range of different experiences
in different parts of the country. The general security situation
in the Kurdish part of northern Iraq is significantly more benign
however than the Sunni triangle, Anbar in the centre or indeed
Basra and the related provinces in the south.
Q16 Mr Singh: Is it true to say then
that the Government of Iraq has no writ beyond Baghdad and has
no working system whereby it can allocate money or support health
services elsewhere?
Mr Alexander: I would not accept
that description in the sense that, although there are very real
security challenges, I think the risk is that inadvertently we
slip into parallels, for example, with Afghanistan, where the
challenge is often put saying "Does the writ of the Government
run outside of Kabul?" I think in fact the character and
nature of the challenges that Iraq faces are very discrete and
very different. While you have broadly the Sunni triangle in the
centre of Baghdad, which remains a diverse city, and you have
the Kurdish region in the north and the Shia population in the
south, the Government in terms of ministers are able to move around.
When I was in Basra myself I met not just with the Deputy Prime
Minister and the Prime Minister but other ministers who were themselves
in Basra that day. In that sense, there are functioning ministries
and the writ does and should run across the country but it is
right to recognise there are very real challenges affecting the
health service in every part of the country.
Mr Lever: If I could just add
a word on the general politics rather than the health service,
I think the problem is perhaps less the central government's writ
running in certain areas as it is that Iraq formerly was a very
highly centralised state, with very little representative democracy
or accountability at local levels and very little ability to develop
effective local political structures. That is an area where certainly
there have been very encouraging improvements since 2003. Although
some sections of the populace boycotted provincial council elections
in 2005, in other places there was a good turn-out and one of
the focuses of our activity in Basra has constantly been to try
to develop and empower the capabilities of the Provincial Council
and the Provincial Development Committee. The big challenge for
us and for the Government of Iraq and for the local authorities
themselves is trying to make the relationship between the centre
and the provinces work effectively, make the Government in the
centre more responsive to the needs and the ambitions of these
local representative bodies when there is no tradition in Iraq
of them doing so.
Q17 Mr Singh: Given that clean water
is so important to health and the health system, what efforts
are we and the international community making in terms of water,
to make sure that clean water is available to Iraqis and to the
Iraqi health system?
Mr Alexander: You are right to
recognise water is essential. As I say, the figures in terms of
diarrhoea reflect the difficulties that have already been manifested
as a consequence of the poor infrastructure. There have been longstanding
problems in terms of water within Iraq, which again pre-date 2003.
It is one of the areas that the Government of Iraq itself has
identified as a priority in terms of infrastructure. While it
is not one of the identified areas of priority that we as the
Department for International Development have focused on, we are
supportive of the efforts of building the capacity of the Government
of Iraq to actually meet that kind of challenge.
Ms Hendrie: I would just add as
well that a lot of the work on water and sanitation is happening
through the mechanism of the IRFFI fund, and you have UN agencies—it
is cluster D, health and nutrition, although we do not have clusters
any more in IRFFI; we have sectors—that is putting the primary
emphasis on that. So a lot of our support has been channelled
through the UN agencies who work on that issue because it is such
a massive set of issues that it seemed to us better to make a
contribution to the UN system, which can work at that scale and
tackle those issues.
Q18 Mr Singh: Are there any signs
of things improving in water and sanitation?
Mr Alexander: I defer to official
expertise.
Ms Hendrie: Patchy. Again, the
diarrhoea statistics are worrisome. We will probably come on to
a discussion about IRFFI because it is such a central bit of the
effort in Iraq but it has been very difficult to get a sense of
the impact of those programmes. What we have are the proxy indicators
on child nutrition and diarrhoea. It is not our sense that there
is a major water supply or quality catastrophe. One of the things
that we watch is the health indicators for people who are actually
leaving Iraq, where you can actually monitor people crossing borders.
At the moment there are not signs that there is severe malnutrition
or water-borne diseases. We have to use these proxy indicators
to try to understand what is happening. At the moment it is not
our understanding that there is a disaster but, obviously, it
is a key area that needs to be watched carefully.
Mr Alexander: One of the areas
where we are working in Basra is in relation to water towers,
affecting one of the poorest communities within Basra. On completion
of these water towers, they will be the tallest buildings within
the city of Basra and in fact provide very significant additional
support and clean water to one of the poorest communities within
Basra.
Ms Hendrie: Thank you for mentioning
that because I think it is one of our more heroic projects, which
has had to be implemented in one of the most volatile parts of
Basra city through co-operation with Iraqi engineers, who go out
and monitor and move the project forward and then take pictures
and videos and show us what is happening. A lot of the security
for that project is actually provided by the community itself
and by the tribal leaders, who know that that water supply is
going to be vital for their communities. It will provide 250,000
people with a clean water supply. It is also a very good example
of where we have collaborated closely with our military colleagues,
because we are constructing the foundations of the towers to hold
the water and then the military has done the piping to take that
water actually into key bits of the city.
Mr Alexander: Mott MacDonald,
the British engineers—I actually had the opportunity to
meet with them when I was in Basra—have been overseeing
the work and, as I say, the completion date, as I recollect it,
is a couple of months' time; it is March 2008. The work will be
completed, we anticipate, on time and, as I say, they will be
the tallest buildings in Basra. Reflecting our informal discussion
earlier at the Department, I was wondering when I saw these very
large buildings as to whether it provided a new branding opportunity
for the Department for International Development but I am not
sure that it would assist the sustainability of these towers if
a large Union Jack were to be embossed across the front of it,
so I think probably less is more when it comes to branding of
these towers.
Q19 Mr Singh: It is a real shame
that such developments do not get the publicity they deserve.
In terms of the health professionals leaving the health service,
there is a report by the Iraqi Parliament in May that 80% of physicians
have actually left their posts. Is the Iraqi Government making
any efforts to coax them back?
Mr Alexander: There is very limited
evidence in terms of people returning at the moment but I think
it is hard to disaggregate the particular incentives that could
be offered to health professionals from the general security situation.
I think perhaps inadvertently in the course of this session we
have underplayed the scale of decline in violence that has been
witnessed notwithstanding the truth that it remains at unacceptably
high levels but it seems to me that if you are a professional
with a family contemplating the option of being able to work elsewhere
within the region, whether in Damascus or in Amman or further
afield, one of the very key considerations would be the security,
the personal security of yourself and your family. In that sense,
all of these issues are related but a very key aspect is the violence.
Mr Lever: I would just say briefly
that, depending on the range of indicators that you look at, all
the indicators that we are seeing suggest very significant drops
in violence now from the peaks that were achieved -"achieved"
is perhaps the wrong word—in 2006 and in early 2007 down
to levels that were last seen in around 2004-05. So you would
be talking, depending on the indicator of your choice, about maybe
a 60% drop or an 80% drop from the high points, the worst points
that we saw earlier on. It is a very significant improvement in
the security situation, we believe.
Mr Alexander: One other point,
in terms of medical training; you are right to acknowledge that
our colleagues, not DFID but the Department of Health, have undertaken
to help train 400 Iraqi doctors over the next two years. That
was an initiative announced last year, in 2007, so there are efforts
being made in the international community in light of the significant
numbers who have left Iraq in recent years.
Mr Singh: I hope they do not all come
to work here!
1 International Monetary Fund Back
2
International Committee of the Red Cross Back
3
Medact, rehabilitation under fire, 2008 Back
4
The United Nations Children's Fund Back
5
UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq Back
6
World Food Programme Back
7
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Back
8
International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq Back
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