Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-54)
MR DOUGLAS
ALEXANDER MP,
MR GILE
LEVER AND
MS BARBARA
HENDRIE
31 JANUARY 2008
Q40 Chairman: So this is not a DFID project;
it is a project in which DFID is participating?
Mr Alexander: It is GCPP[15]
and will become part of the Stabilisation Aid Fund, as I recollect.
Ms Hendrie: That is right. As
of the end of this financial year it will no longer be a Global
Conflict Prevention Pool project; it will be part of the Stabilisation
Aid Fund, and in that sense it will become part of a broader effort.
So we have had the Ministry of Interior Capacity Building Programme,
the police work and various other law and order initiatives spread
across and managed by different departments. They will now all
come together under the Stabilisation Aid Fund so we can get synergies
between the two. On the Ministry of Interior project we are the
only civilian agency working in the Ministry of Interior—not
physically in it but with the Ministry of Interior to build capacity.
The only other group that is there is part of the multinational
force, their capacity-building arm, so it is quite a challenging
project for us. We have focused on the hard-wiring of the administration
of the Ministry, so nothing that would compromise us in terms
of the International Development Act—we focus on human resource
management, procurement systems, legal advice and getting basic
administration processes up and running so that the Ministry of
Interior can actually function as a department, and one of the
things we have seen in terms of impact is it shows you how fairly
straightforward administrative processes can have a political
impact in the human resource management. The Ministry of Interior
now has a system where, if it wants to let go of policemen or
employees of the Ministry because they are associated with sectarian
interests, they can do that on the basis of a performance review,
a proper human resources performance review. It gives the Minister
and his top team a set of tools to manage some of the tougher
issues the Ministry has to deal with. So that is a project which
has been quite a tough slog because security makes it very difficult,
but where we feel we have made reasonable progress—I would
not say significant progress. That might be too optimistic.
Chairman: It occurs to me this might
be appropriate for Afghanistan given the problems of the Ministry
of Interior there and lessons to learn!
Q41 Mr Singh: Going back to health
for a moment, and the capacity constraints of the Iraqi government,
but also the reserves that they have, why is it so difficult for
them that they cannot even buy sufficient antibiotics or medical
supplies for the hospitals? That seems a simple enough task to
me.
Mr Alexander: As I say, this is
not a sector for which we have lead responsibility in terms of
the international community. On one level, of course, you are
right, that it should be a fairly straightforward process in terms
of supply chains to be able to get materials in. On the other
hand, often there are genuine constraints in terms of physical
security and the ability to move supplies around reflective of
the security situation, and also I would not underestimate the
capacity work that needs to be undertaken at the central Ministry
itself even for the most basic procurement tasks. I was hearing
earlier in terms of the Ministry of Health some of the difficulties
that the sectarian nature of some of the politics in recent years
has imposed on the basic function of ministries, and in that sense
when you have politicians who have not seen their primary responsibility
in every instance as being the advancement of health policy but
rather having secured a Ministry and thereby sought to advantage
their own community by holding that particular Ministry within
the Government, then even some of those very basic tasks do not
get achieved.
Q42 Mr Singh: I only ask that because
whatever mistakes we have made or whatever we can be blamed for
in our handling of Iraq it seems unfair to be blamed for things
like this now, which the Iraqi Government could pay for, and yet
the public perception will be that somehow it is our fault.
Mr Alexander: That is a difficult
message for us to communicate because clearly we work very closely
with the Government of Iraq and we have to work with those who
are democratically elected, but on the other hand I think there
is a very clear responsibility on those who seek elected office
to work in the public interest and in that sense I would not diminish
the difficulties that the character of Iraqi politics has imposed
on even the most basic functioning of government in recent years
because, as I say, if people are concerned to advance factional
or sectarian interests at the cost of even the most basic tasks
of government departments, then you can have technical assistance,
you can have financial resources, but the leadership and orientation
of the work of government will be directed towards objectives
other than the ones we would all want to see.
Q43 Mr Singh: Moving on then, I have
said that the acronyms in the development business continue to
defeat me, and now I want to ask you questions about the IRFFI,
or the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. How
is this operating, and what is this fund delivering on the ground
to improve the lives of the Iraqi people?
Mr Alexander: Well, I am the Secretary
of State for International Development and I feel myself swimming
in a sea of acronyms on a daily basis, so we are on common ground
on that! The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
has been one of the principal vehicles for delivering international
donor assistance. It has two principal trust funds, one operated
by the World Bank, the other by the United Nations, and in total
about $1.77 billion has been committed to reconstruction funds
via IRFFI, which was established post the Madrid Conference, I
think, as the chosen vehicle by which not just the principal multilaterals
and the major donors but a number of small donors who did not
have the capacity to contribute funds directly, chose to contribute.
In 2004 DFID gave $127 million to IRFFI, but since then there
have been other mechanisms by which we have contributed funds.
In terms of where the funds go, in our judgment the UN and the
World Bank split project proposals, given that there are the two
trust funds, for approval to an Iraqi Strategic Review Board,
which is an Iraqi-led co-ordinating body led by the Minister of
Planning and Development Corporation, and almost 200 projects
have been completed or are under way under IRFFI funding, 178
under the UN trust fund and approximately 16 under the World Bank.
In terms of its utility, has it worked? We would say the following.
Firstly, it has been a useful instrument for ensuring the capacity
of smaller donors to make a contribution to the reconstruction
efforts, and contribute to the outputs we have described. There
is no doubt that there is scope, nonetheless, for improvement
in terms of co-ordination. Given my support for the UN as an institution
I do not wish to appear overly harsh but it can bring with it
in these circumstances bureaucracy and the need for stronger co-ordination,
and IRFFI is no exception to other bodies where the UN is essentially
involved. There does need also to be better alignment through
the International Compact for Iraq, basically the instrument by
which we are able to be sighted on the reforms and progress that
the Government of Iraq is making in return for the resources that
are being committed, and IRFFI more generally. A meeting was recently
held in Bari in Italy on 29 October. Looking at this whole issue
we made reforms to the terms of reference to ensure that IRFFI
is better aligned both with Government of Iraq objectives and
also with the Compact I spoke of. In terms of David Shearer, who
some of you may have had the chance to meet in Amman, I think
he is very much on the case in relation to IRFFI and sees some
opportunities for strengthening its functioning, so I think though
it has proved to be valuable, it is certainly not beyond improvement,
but David Shearer is the individual who we hope will be able to
move it forward.
Q44 Mr Singh: Are all the international
pledges to this fund fulfilled, and, secondly, I understand a
review is going to be undertaken which we will be participating
in. Did we call for this review and what prompted it?
Mr Alexander: The review, as I
understand it, is currently being arranged by the Donor Committee
and in that sense it was a judgment by the Donor Committee and
we contribute to the work that IRFFI takes forward, and that is
not so much looking at the functioning of IRFFI, as I understand
it, as much as the impact of IRFFI. The principal focus of the
review is not the structure per se of the institution as much
as what was the impact being achieved. Independent consultants
are going to be appointed, Canadians from recollection, who will
be looking at this whole issue but, as I say, I took the opportunity
when in Amman, and Barbara was with me, to talk to David Shearer
in terms of his thinking about the functioning of IRFFI, because
as well as ensuring that we have the right impact we also want
to make sure that the alignment in terms of processes is in place.
Ms Hendrie: One of the things
David has done is get rid of the cluster system, where money was
allocated to different clusters but actually those were not necessarily
aligned with either Compact or Iraqi Government priorities, and
replace them with sector working groups which have a foothold
in Baghdad. He has also shifted the attention of the IRFFI agencies,
or the centre of gravity of policy discussion, from UN agencies
based in Amman to working groups linked with Iraqi Government
counterparts in Baghdad, and that is something we have been consistently
messaging and pushing for, that the centre of gravity really needs
to be in Baghdad working closely with the Iraqi Government and
lined up with the Compact.
Mr Alexander: Obviously we are
supportive. The other point that I should have made, reflecting
back on the conference that took place in October in Italy, is
that one of the options that was raised, and was recommended indeed,
was that there should be more co-financing between IRFFI and the
Government of Iraq, and that really brings us back to one of the
central themes of this afternoon which is that if the Government
of Iraq has the resources, if you are trying to build the capacity
and leadership of the Government of Iraq on these projects, then
there is a question as to whether you get a greater impact in
dividend if you are able to co-finance which strengthens Iraqi
leadership, and also makes sure that some of the benefits are
being spent effectively.
Q45 Mr Singh: Are all the international
pledges to the fund fulfilled?
Mr Alexander: I am not aware there
has been a difficulty.
Ms Hendrie: It is rather a problem
of disbursement of the money in the fund. There is still money
in the fund that is moving very slowly through the system, partly
because of the Iraqi Government process for approving projects.
Q46 Ann McKechin: You were talking
about the appointment of David Shearer and the improvements you
believe he has made. Do you consider the UN now has a sufficient
staff presence in Iraq given that it had a much depleted staff
for quite a considerable period, until quite recently?
Mr Alexander: Given the tragic
events of recent years involving the UN within Iraq it is a matter
of great sensitivity both within the UN and within Iraq itself,
and given the engagement of the UN on the sanctions regime previously
there is sensitivity in terms of the engagement of the UN. That
being said, we are strongly supportive of the work that the UN
is taking forward within Iraq; we would hope that, as the security
situation improves not simply the UN but other members of the
multilateral family will be able to take a larger role within
Iraq, taking into account its status as a middle-income country
albeit with humanitarian challenges, but not simply did I have
the opportunity to meet with David Shearer in Amman but I also
met with the head of UN Operations within Iraq when I was in Baghdad
and communicated both our admiration for his leadership post the
events of the Canal Street bombing in recent years but also our
encouragement for the work of the UN within Iraq in the future.
Q47 Ann McKechin: You have mentioned
that the UN is increasingly engaging with different sectors of
the central government. To what extent do you consider it is making
appropriate use of civic society in Iraq, and NGOs in its work?
Has it been able to come out of the Green Zone to any extent and
engage with other people?
Mr Alexander: Before we come on
to civil society I think Giles has another point to add on the
UN.
Mr Lever: Obviously I would defer
to DFID on the specific agencies that are concerned with humanitarian
needs but I would just make a general point about UNAMI, the UN
Assistance Mission to Iraq as a whole. In 2007 UNAMI got a new
mandate in the form of Security Council Resolution 1770 and that
is really a very broad mandate for it. It is a very long menu,
if I can put it that way, of things it can do and the challenge
for the UN now is to decide in which areas it can add value. We
are very encouraged by the way the new Special Representative
for the Secretary General Mr de Mistura is tackling his role and
taking things forward. We have very close consultations and contact
with him in Baghdad; he is actively looking at areas in which
the UN can support both the political process and also issues
such as humanitarian concerns and refugees/IDPs. On security and
the UN having personnel in Iraq, I understand, although I do not
have any statistics I can quote, that UN numbers in Iraq have
been growing over the course of the past year. There is an issue
about the UN needing new premises in Iraq or in Baghdad, and that
is being taken forward within the UN system at the moment and,
again, Mr de Mistura is driving that forward and taking a very
active role. So broadly we would say the overall trends in terms
of UN involvement and engagement in Iraq recently are very encouraging.
Mr Alexander: Specifically on
NGOs it is the case that a number of the UN agencies work through
NGOs in terms of their humanitarian work, but it is also fair
to acknowledge that there was some disquiet among the NGO community
that they did not access more of the IRFFI funds at an earlier
stage, and in that sense it is clearly an area that does need
to continue to be worked on by the UN.
Q48 Ann McKechin: Finally, this is
the first large scale project where we have had a co-ordinated
One UN approach. Is it working effectively, and are there lessons
we can learn from the experience which we can use elsewhere in
conflict situations?
Mr Alexander: In terms of the
specifics we are encouraged by the leadership that has been shown
by the UN and by the UN head within Baghdad. I think it is suggested
that the number of staff be increased to 88 in Baghdad, from recollection,
and in that sense they are on an upward trajectory although they
are always mindful of personal security issues. I received relatively
positive feedback from them in terms of their experience of the
One UN pilot; that is not saying it is perfect, there is a lot
more to be done. We have, of course, as a British government been
extremely supportive of the One UN initiative. As recently as
this weekend I took the opportunity to speak both with Kemal Dervis
of UNDP and Josette Sheeran of the World Food Programme to discuss
with them how best we can see the kind of progress that we want
to on the One UN initiative, and I was thinking it is evolving
in the sense that if I had been in front of the Committee four
or five months ago—if I had been in front of the Committee
seven or eight months ago I probably would not have heard of the
One UN system but it was very high on the agenda when I came to
the Department, and over the summer we were working hard to see
how we could best advance the One UN agenda within the UN system.
Our thinking at that stage was to see how we could scale up the
number of One UN pilots from countries like Iraq and Vietnam as
quickly as possible and grow the legitimacy of the One UN system
by increasing the number of pilots. Partly I have to say on the
basis of a conversation I had with Kofi Annan when he was here
to talk to me about issues related to Africa, I took the opportunity
when we met in the Commons to say: "You have, with respect,
forgotten more about the United Nations than I have ever known;
give me your judgment about how best we can share the learning
that has been accumulated in countries like Iraq about the One
UN system. Should we aim for an ever rising number of pilots,
or should we seek to mainstream the learning of the One UN pilots
immediately?" And he said: "It is a private view, obviously;
I am no longer on a day-to-day basis receiving the information
but my long experience suggests you should mainstream those kind
of initiatives as quickly as you can", and in the conversations
I had this weekend both with Josette Sheeran of the World Food
Programme and Kemal Dervis of the UNDP that sentiment was strongly
echoed, that we now have enough learning out of One UN pilots
like Iraq, like Vietnam, and so on that we should be actively
seeking to mainstream those lessons as quickly as possible. So
in that sense Iraq is only one of eight pilots originally put
in place, but we have gained learning from there and from across
the whole of the range of pilots that are being operated, and
we are very much in the camp of saying that we need to try and
make sure that we now mainstream those lessons as quickly as we
can.
Q49 Richard Burden: Moving back to
the issue of civil society and, first of all, the three programmes
that you reported in September the United Kingdom had supported
and had been completed. Do you have any assessment of benefits
or problems that occurred from those? Any lessons?
Mr Alexander: Let me give you
some statistics briefly and then explain to you the judgment we
made in terms of the programme. Clearly it is a given that we
would want to see a stronger active civil society within Iraq
as in other development contexts. We have spent about a million
pounds on training 182 journalists in international journalism,
photojournalism, news feature writing and news security training.
Our £10 million programme has also led to the creation of
independent radio and television stations which in 2005 began
the first ever independent broadcasts principally in the south
of Iraq, and through the Civil Society Fund and Political Participation
Fund we supported partnerships between international and Iraqi
NGOs. In light of those kinds of achievement you might then say
why have you closed your civil society programmes? Because that
was the judgment that was reached and the programmes closed in
May 2007. Essentially it became increasingly difficult to identify
suitable partners, that being at the point of those maximum levels
of violence around July 2007, and ensure sufficient fiduciary
risk controls in the sense that it is not difficult to find people
who will take money, but organisations who are capable of having
the capacity to give us the assurance we wanted and reasonably
sought on behalf of the British taxpayer was proving increasingly
difficult. That is not to say it is not part of the development
story to say how do you build the capacity of small organisations
to provide that level of traditional risk assessment, but again
it reflects the fact that if you look at the core priorities we
identified provision of humanitarian support to those inside principally
but also outside the country, government capacity-building given
that the resources sit within the Iraqi Government, and, thirdly,
economic development in the south. Building that strong and active
civil society, while vital and important, was not one of the specific
areas that we identified for ourselves as being a priority working.
Q50 Richard Burden: So are you planning
a further phase of civil society support? Because back in September,
even though the previous one had come to an end, the indications
were then that you were planning a further phase. Has that now
been shelved?
Mr Alexander: We are keeping our
NGO funding under review, and we continue to fund a number of
NGOs through our humanitarian work, and in that sense I would
not sit here today and say we will not fund NGOs; indeed, we continue
to fund NGOs at the moment. Equally it is reasonable to be clear
that the focus of our work is on those three priorities—capacity-building
within the government, the humanitarian needs that have been identified,
and economic development in the south.
Q51 Richard Burden: Has any assessment
been made since funding ceased on those programmes about any effect
that has had? Even if it was difficult to maintain the funding
for the reasons you have said, has the cutting-off of funding
led to those kinds of projects collapsing, or are they carrying
on and finding other ways of doing it? Have other players moved
in to take them over? In other words, what is the impact of the
gap that is now there?
Ms Hendrie: Another factor that
fed into our review and thinking let's pause and take a breath
on the civil society side was that USAID[16]
had quite a massive fund for civil society work which was coming
on-stream and being contracted at around the time ours was coming
off-stream, and given that they were such a big player with several
hundred million US dollars it was not our sense that we would
be leaving partners high and dry, or leaving that sector high
and dry. We had a lesson learning workshop in January 2007 before
the project finally closed and learned a number of lessons, some
of which are general and some of which are quite specific to Iraq.
The specific-to-Iraq lessons were mainly about in that kind of
environment how incredibly labour intensive and high risk supporting
Iraqi NGOs in a responsible way was. We had a network of regional
advisers who would go out to meet civil society organisations
who were Iraqi nationals, and we were very conscious of the risks
they were facing in doing that job and then coming back to report
to us in the international zone, but that very high transaction
cost and in that environment very expensive input was something
that paid off for the particular period of time where those programmes
were running to support the political process and constitutional
parliamentary elections, but then afterwards we felt that actually
as there were big players like USAID on the scene it made sense
for us to take a breath and look and see where our comparative
advantage would be.
Q52 Chairman: Can I thank you for your
evidence? You have been very frank in terms of the challenges
and the difficulties and the uncertainties, as well as indicating
where you feel that DFID is being able to make a contribution
in what is a continuously difficult situation. I wonder if I might
slightly abuse the advantage of having you in front of us only
in as much as we will be deliberating our report on Afghanistan
next week? This morning there were two reports, one from Oxfam
and one from a US source, saying, in the case of Oxfam, that they
were facing humanitarian disaster or catastrophe and I think in
the American one that the lack of donor co-ordination could lead
to a failed state, particularly the lack of confidence between
the Afghan Government and the international community. I appreciate
that both of those came from sources which have an agenda, but
is there anything you feel you can say to us when we have a report
to write?
Mr Alexander: Yes. As you can
imagine, when I heard the Today programme this morning
I made an early phone call to the Department asking for sight
of both the reports. I think in fact there were three reports,
two American and one by Oxfam International, and in deference
to my need to prepare for this Committee they are sitting in my
box waiting to be read at the moment. That being said, I would
make the following observations. Given that 80% of our spend in
Afghanistan is through the Government of Afghanistan, we have
been unyielding in our support for efforts for greater donor co-ordination,
but I think it puts us in a somewhat different category than many
of the other donors in the sense that we have, for some of the
reasons in very different circumstances that we have been discussing
today, been keen to build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan.
Why has there been such emphasis there? Because in one of the
conversations I had with Paddy Ashdown he put it brilliantly where
he said: "We have a highly centralised state and a highly
devolved series of expectations in terms of service delivery",
and actually connecting the government in Kabul to the delivery
of services, whether it be by the Shura or by other mechanisms
at community level, holds with it a very fundamental question
for the future of Afghanistan, and in that sense our judgment
has been not simply to support efforts that are being made at
a local level but again to build the capacity of the central government.
In Development Questions yesterday, as you heard, I placed on
record our sorrow that Paddy Ashdown, for reasons we completely
understand, withdrew his name, but that does not diminish the
need for the co-ordination that the Oxfam report identified, and
in that sense there will not be a disagreement on the part of
the British Government in saying there needs to be a strengthening
of the efforts of co-ordination, but ultimately the judgment as
to who the Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan
is must lie with the Secretary General. I last saw the Secretary
General on Friday when it was still contemplated that Paddy Ashdown
was a candidate, but I think the Secretary General recognises
that, in the appointment of a Special Representative, there is
the opportunity to identify a figure who can achieve some of the
co-ordination that is required, but obviously, as Paddy put it
eloquently in interviews he did in the United Kingdom on Sunday,
in order to be effective that person also needs to enjoy the support
of the Government of Afghanistan, and in that sense it is not
simply a matter of finding somebody who is acceptable to the international
community; it is essentially to guarantee failure if the cost
of being the identified candidate of the international community
precludes that international community --
Q53 Chairman: It might also apply
that anybody who is likely to be an effective co-ordinator may
not have the approval of the Government of Afghanistan.
Mr Alexander: I am cautious of
saying this but I remember the line of Jimmy Maxton, the great
Scottish socialist, who said if you cannot ride two horses at
once you should not be in the circus, and in that sense one of
the reasons we were strongly supportive of Paddy Ashdown as a
candidate, although he was not a candidate of the British Government
we were supportive of him being a candidate of others, was because
he has very considerable political skills which would have allowed
him to navigate some of those challenges but, notwithstanding
his removal of his own name, there is still a pressing need to
identify --
Q54 Chairman: I do not want to push
you any further because we must let you go, but is this now delayed?
My understanding was that negotiations around Paddy Ashdown, I
know from having talked to him, had been going on for several
months and were nearing conclusion. He is now out of the frame.
February was the date. Does that mean it is going to take longer?
Mr Alexander: Clearly he has now
withdrawn. I cannot give you a timescale because ultimately the
Secretary General's office is in control—rightfully—of
the process, but certainly from conversations I had with the Secretary
General on Friday he recognised the importance and the urgency
of a candidate being identified. That was ahead of Paddy's name
being withdrawn but I do not think there should be any doubt that
the Secretary General recognises the importance and the urgency
of identifying a candidate who can help discharge the responsibilities
that have been identified.
Chairman: Thank you. That is a useful
little bit of extra evidence for our report.
15 Global Conflict Prevention Pool Back
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The United States Agency for International Development Back
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