Appendix: Government Response
CHANGES TO GOVERNMENT MACHINERY
Changes to ministerial responsibilities
[Recommendation 1; Paragraph 6] We welcome the
increase in the number of DFID ministers, which reflects the new
roles and responsibilities that the Department has taken on. However,
we are concerned that the Trade Policy Minister's brief may be
too wide, including as it does areas as varied as consumer affairs
and climate change. We recommend that the Secretary of State review
the alignment of ministerial resources and departmental priorities
within one year of the new arrangements having taken effect.
DFID now has four Ministers to cover its agenda,
with a dedicated Minister to manage its expanded role in trade
and development, in Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Gareth
Thomas. This has significantly increased DFID's capacity to cover
a broad range of issues and engage more actively with stakeholders
while also furthering more cross-Whitehall work. The UK Government's
active engagement in trade and development over the past six months
is testimony to this increased capacity. We note the Committee's
concerns about the width of the brief for the Trade Policy Minister,
but believe that the arrangements are correct and are working
well. It is also worth noting that trade policy was previously
combined with other responsibilities at Ministerial level.
[Recommendation 2; Paragraph 10] We are concerned
that there is inconsistent use of ministerial titles in official
materials. While some variation may be unavoidable, we believe
that it is important that Ministers' titles should correctly reflect
their roles and responsibilities, and that these should be used
consistently across Government. This is particularly true during
a period of change and transition when stakeholders and the public
need to be given clarity and certainty. We therefore recommend
that the Ministers review the use of their titles by their departments
and resolve any confusion quickly.
We do not consider there to be any confusion as regards
Ministerial titles in DFID or Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform (BERR). The three Ministers involved in the new Government
arrangements are Secretary of State DFID Douglas Alexander, Secretary
of State BERR John Hutton, and Parliamentary Under Secretary of
State DFID and BERR Gareth Thomas.
Cabinet Sub-Committee on Trade
[Recommendation 3; Paragraph 14] We welcome the
Minister's assurances regarding the coordination of trade policy
formulation and trade promotion activities. We recommend that
the Trade Promotion Minister be invited to attend all meetings
of the Cabinet sub-Committee on trade to ensure that overall trade
and development coherence is not undermined by divergent approaches.
The Cabinet sub-Committee on trade is composed of
the Secretary of State for International Development (Chair);
the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the Secretaries of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs; for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform; and the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department for International
Development and Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform Gareth Thomas MP. Other Ministers may be invited to attend
as appropriate. The Trade Promotion Minister is routinely
invited to the sub-Committee.
[Recommendation 4; Paragraph 16] We are concerned
that ad hoc decisions made by committee on which Minister is leading
on which issues could result in a less responsive system, undermining
any coherence benefits of the new arrangements. We recommend that
the Government publish a comprehensive list of which Minister
has lead responsibility for each individual issue or negotiation
to increase transparency and minimise confusion.
We have found no difficulties with the arrangements.
We have a single Minister for Trade and Development who covers
the whole of the trade policy agenda. The fact that which Secretary
of State leads on which issues is decided on an ad hoc basis simply
reflects the emphasis on collaborative working between DFID and
BERR: both Secretaries of State maintain an interest in the whole
of the trade agenda and we avoid the potential for issues to become
regarded as belonging to one Department or another.
Joint Trade Policy Unit
[Recommendation 5: Paragraph 20] We support the
concept of a joint Trade Policy Unit as a component of improved
trade and development policy coherence, and we hope that the Government
can make the Unit work in practice. We recommend that the Minister
for Trade Policy monitor closely the impact on coherence and effective
team-work of the Head of the Trade Policy Unit spending the large
majority of his working week at BERR and only one day a week at
DFID.
The nature of trade work implies a significant part
of international lobbying, cross-departmental work and cooperation
with stakeholders from all walks of life. This is not bound to
any specific location of staff. The Director of the Trade Policy
Unit (TPU) and all TPU staff interact frequently through face-to-face
meetings, email, phone contacts, and dual locations in both DFID
and BERR. Many TPU staff also work remotely at times and travel
is frequent. In these days of technological capability, split-site
working is common and does not have any negative impact on effectiveness.
The Director of TPU takes part in weekly DFID top management meetings
and weekly meetings with the TPU leadership team in addition to
the time he spends working in DFID. We will of course keep all
aspects of TPU working under review. But we see no greater difficulty
in working between two buildings than we do in working effectively
across Europe and internationally.
[Recommendation 6; Paragraph 21] We regret that
interested parties have had to wait until mid-October, more than
100 days since the changes took effect, to gain a better understanding
of how the changes and new structures are likely to work in practice.
We are concerned that there continues to be a lack of clarity
and transparency over the mechanics of trade policy decision-making.
We believe the Government should have been—and should in
future be—more transparent and pro-active in setting out
clearly the implications of such changes.
The Government has communicated these changes to
a wide range of stakeholders since this summer. Ministers have
organised several meetings to discuss this with our key stakeholders,
including roundtables with NGOs and the business community respectively
in the summer to discuss the new changes to Government machinery.
We have also provided information on the respective websites of
DFID and BERR.
[Recommendation 7; Paragraph 22] We are pleased
to note that the Minister has quickly ensured that the BERR and
DFID websites both now feature new pages and sections on the Trade
Policy Unit and its work, in response to our call for the out-dated
material previously available to the public to be replaced. This
matter is of particular importance given the role of departmental
websites in informing the public of how Government works.
We agree on the importance of providing up-to-date
website information. We will continue to provide updates and
information on our work on our external websites on a regular
basis.
The changes in practice: ensuring improved coherence
[Recommendation 8; Paragraph 26] We broadly welcome
the machinery of Government changes, though we have some reservations
about the way in which these have been carried out. We believe
that the development emphasis, the new lines of responsibility,
and new Cabinet and official-level structures have the potential
to improve trade and development policy coherence to the benefit
of developing countries. We are concerned, however, that excessive
complexity and new layers of bureaucracy may have the effect of
undermining any improved coherence resulting from the changes.
We remain unclear as to how the changes will be evaluated for
their ability to deliver a more coherent trade policy and more
effective 'joined up Government'. We support suggestions for a
clear work plan for DFID under the new arrangements and for a
publicly elaborated cross-departmental strategy for the future
of UK trade policy. We hope to see far greater visibility of the
new structures than has been hitherto the case. We recommend that
the Government ensure that both DFID and BERR include trade in
their annual departmental reporting.
We are pleased that the Committee broadly welcomes
the machinery of government changes. We believe these changes
have bedded down well and the new arrangements are now working
effectively. There has been significant interest and reporting
on these changes since the summer. DFID has for many years played
an important role in trade policy-making, bringing the development
dimension to the fore, and focusing on delivering better trade
deals for poorer countries. This has been taken forward in harmony
with the then DTI, and will continue under the new arrangements.
Through the joint Trade Policy Unit, we are now jointly taking
forward our UK trade policy objectives on important trade negotiations
like the Doha round of trade talks and Economic Partnership Agreements.
We have committed to review these arrangements regularly, with
a view to making improvements where needed.
We are in the process of developing a single set
of objectives for the Trade Policy Unit, which will be updated
annually. We have set up a dedicated Communications team, with
staff from both departments. As is the case today, both DFID and
BERR will continue to report on their trade activities in their
annual departmental reporting, and will ensure that the new arrangements
are fully reflected.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
[Recommendation 9; Paragraph 28] We were concerned
to hear that developing countries may have lost confidence in
the response of developed countries to their views. Now that DFID
has been granted greater influence over the UK's trade policy,
we hope that, in the UK's case at least, lost confidence can be
restored.
The UK has placed the concerns of developing countries
at the heart of our trade policy for many years. We are lobbying
for trade solutions that are beneficial for developing countries,
and that also provide substantive technical and financial support
to help build developing countries' negotiating capacity.
WTO Doha Development Round
[Recommendation 10; Paragraph 31] The critical
issues for the Doha Round remain the same as at the time of our
last Report. As we noted in March 2007, World Trade Organisation
members need to show the requisite political will to reach a deal.
Developed countries should reinvigorate the process with unilateral
moves or draw the process to a close if it is irretrievably moribund.
The Government should continue to make the case for unilateral
moves with other EU Member States. Again, we encourage the UK,
EU and all negotiators to approach Doha with sufficient flexibility
to succeed.
The UK government remains fully committed to an ambitious,
pro-development outcome to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations,
and we believe it will be possible to reach agreement on the DDA
in 2008. Revised texts on agriculture and on non-agricultural
market access will be produced in the coming weeks. It is important
that we continue to support the Geneva process by seeking to resolve
outstanding issues. We therefore need all parties to engage constructively
and flexibly in negotiations—now is not the time to harden
positions. We have taken—and will continue to take—every
opportunity to press for this, both within the EU and with other
WTO members.
Economic Partnership Agreements
[Recommendation 11; Paragraph 34] We welcome the
European Commission's belated recognition of the need for a 'Plan
B' in the form of agreement on the goods-only element of Economic
Partnership Agreements, given the imminent threat of disruption
to exports facing developing countries at the end of the year.
We agree. The UK urged the Commission to focus on
getting goods-only agreements signed by the end of 2007 in order
to allow duty and quota free access for African, Caribbean and
Pacific countries on 1st January 2008 and minimise
trade disruption. The focus on signing goods-only agreements
resulted in 35 countries signing Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) by the end of 2007. 32 countries have decided to trade
under the Everything But Arms initiative which leaves just 10
countries facing the Generalised System of Preferences.
[Recommendation 12; Paragraph 37] Time is rapidly
running out for the Economic Partnership Agreement talks, with
the approach of the end-of-year deadline. In our previous Report,
we called on the EU to undertake planning to request a waiver
extension should EPAs not be concluded in time. We note that views
vary on whether a waiver extension is realistic, but we also note
that there has been little sign of any preparations by the European
Commission for this wholly predictable situation until very recently.
Some countries will simply not be ready to reach even a goods-only
EPA deal by the end of the year. The Everything But Arms option
available to Least Developed Countries is, in our view, a viable
alternative. But there appears to be no viable, pro-development
alternative plan for those non-LDC countries that do not agree
goods-only deals with the EU by the end of the year. The difficulties
facing these countries is a matter of great concern to us. We
agree with the Trade and Development Minister that the basic Generalised
System of Preferences in particular is not an acceptable alternative.
We expect the UK Government to make this case vocally in its discussions
with other Member States and the Commission, and to ensure that
a more acceptable alternative is offered.
35 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) before the end
of 2007 deadline. A further 32 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
have chosen to trade under the Everything But Arms initiative,
benefiting from duty free quota free access into European Union
markets. The remaining 10 non-LDC ACP countries may still sign
an EPA during 2008-09 and the UK continues to urge the Commission
to be flexible in these negotiations. On 10 December, the UK,
along with the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, made a declaration
setting out our continued concern for non-LDCs who had not then
initialled an agreement and urged the Commission to show flexibility.
For the 10 non-LDCs that have not signed an EPAf
we expect minimal, if any, trade disruption due to their current
trade patterns with the EU.
[Recommendation 13; Paragraph 38] We are uncomfortable
with the implication that goods-only EPAs are only 'stepping stones'
to full agreements, given the EU's previous commitments to include
other issues only where individual countries or regions actively
seek to do so. We are also concerned about the possibility that
these interim deals may lack development components. We recommend
that the Government push for inclusion of aid for trade provisions
within these deals.
To date, the Caribbean is the only region that has
completed negotiations on a wider set of issues, such as investment
and services. Other countries have stated that they would like
to negotiate these issues in the coming year. We believe that
the provisions for further negotiations on these issues afforded
by the current interim EPAs should be fully explored by ACP partners
but there should be no pressure on ACP regions to conclude negotiations
in these areas if they do not wish to.
The UK is firmly against making development assistance
conditional upon the signing of an EPA. However, it has been agreed
with all regions that development cooperation provisions should
be made available for trade needs that EPAs will incur. Programming
of the European Community's 10th European Development Fund (EDF)
offers a unique opportunity to synchronise trade policy decisions
taken in the EPAs and the programming of EDF resources.
Both the European Commission and European Union Member
States made aid for trade commitments in 2005. These commitments
are to scale up aid for trade to €2 billion per year by 2010,
€1 billion from the Commission and €1 billion from Member
States. 50% of this increase has been committed to ACP countries
and the UK is lobbying hard for these commitments to be met.
Regional Preparatory Task Force meetings have been
held in each ACP region and in Brussels in order to identify aid
for trade needs within each region. We are pleased that the European
Commission is making good progress in setting out how it will
support these needs from EDF funds. Member States have begun the
process of sharing information to promote a coordinated approach
for supporting aid for trade in the regions and we are engaged
fully in these discussions.
[Recommendation 14; Paragraph 40] We welcome the
fact that new rules of origin, which we expect to enhance developing
countries' ability to benefit from improved market access, are
to be an integral part of Economic Partnership Agreements. However,
the loss of Cotonou rules of origin for any country not reaching
a goods-only or full EPA by the end of 2007 serves to compound
the potential disruption for these countries in moving to less
generous arrangements, such as the Generalised System of Preferences.
We recommend that, in its reply to this report, the Government
gives its view as to whether Cotonou rules of origin could be
maintained for countries unable to agree a goods-only deal.
The Cotonou agreement, including its rules of origin,
expired on 1 January 2008. ACP countries that have not yet signed
a goods-only or full EPA continue to benefit from preferential
access to the EU under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
subject to meeting that scheme's rules of origin. We are encouraging
such ACP countries, and the Commission, to continue to work towards
an agreement. The UK is also urging the Commission to fulfil its
commitment to make early progress in implementing revised GSP
rules of origin, which should deliver increased simplification,
transparency and market opening to facilitate increased ACP and
other developing country exports to the EU.
PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE TRADE
Bribery and corruption
[Recommendation 15, Paragraph 43] We welcome the
continuation of the role of Ministerial champion for combating
international corruption. We would be concerned, however, if the
transfer of responsibility from the Department for International
Development to the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform meant that these matters were now seen largely from a trade
perspective and that development concerns were neglected. We do
not agree with the Government's view that the visibility of the
role is of secondary importance: championing an issue by definition
requires a high profile. We recommend that the Government prepare
a plan for promoting the role and the associated action plan and
that it share this with the Committee within two months.
John Hutton was appointed by the Prime Minister as
Ministerial Anti-Corruption Champion last July, a Cabinet-level
role that reflects the importance that the Government attaches
to this issue. Combating bribery and corruption remains an important
part of our work to reduce poverty in developing countries, fight
organised crime and terrorism and maintain the reputation of our
financial institutions and international businesses. John Hutton
is committed to progress the Government's anti-corruption programme
and he has been actively engaged in raising the fight against
corruption with stakeholders and in developing the second UK Anti-Corruption
Action Plan. John Hutton will chair an informal Ministerial Committee
to take this agenda forward, including the development of a medium-term
strategy to address the drivers of corruption.
The second Action Plan includes a communications
plan to raise awareness of the UK legal framework and the risks
of international bribery and corruption with priority target groups.[1]
The approach is to primarily target businesses, the Regulated
Financial Sector, professional groups, Crown Dependencies and
Overseas Territories where financial services are critical. These
groups are on the front-line of eliminating foreign bribery and
money laundering and more can be done to help business contribute
positively to this agenda.
[Recommendation 16, Paragraph 45] We ask the
Government to inform us in response to this Report: how many cases
and allegations of trans-national bribery have been referred to
the Serious Fraud Office for investigation; how many have been
investigated by the SFO and closed without charges being brought;
how many cases are currently under investigation; and when the
Government expects the first case of trans-national bribery to
be brought before a UK court.
The Serious Fraud Office has provided the following
information. The Serious Fraud Office (and National Criminal Intelligence
Service) have received 126 allegations of corruption in total.
14 bribery enquiries have been begun and one has been discontinued.
Six enquiries have been begun relating to other offences. There
has been no action on 34 allegations because they could not be
substantiated; or did not relate to offences of bribery; or repeated
previous allegations. Preliminary investigations on 33 allegations
have been closed without a formal investigation beginning due
to insufficient evidence. 39 allegations are under preliminary
investigation
[Recommendation 17; Paragraph 49] There are questions
for the Government to answer about the UK's implementation of
the OECD Anti-bribery Convention and whether the decision to halt
the BAe Al Yamamah investigation is consistent with the Convention.
We are concerned that the UK has failed to act expediently on
recommendations from the OECD Working Group on Bribery. We recommend
that the Government make every effort to resolve all these issues
during the forthcoming review conducted by the Working Group and
that it make a clear commitment that time will be found in this
or the next parliamentary session to enact the new legislation
recommended by the Working Group.
The Director of the Serious Fraud Office has repeatedly
stressed that he alone took the decision to halt the investigation
into BAe System's activities in Saudi Arabia on the grounds of
national and international security, and that he was not put under
any pressure to do so. We are confident that the decision was
compatible with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
The OECD Phase 2bis review is not an inquiry and
will not focus on the decision to halt the investigation into
BAe System's activities in Saudi Arabia. The UK is one of four
countries undertaking such a follow-up review, which will focus
on the UK issues raised in the OECD Secretariat's June 2007 follow-up
report; namely, progress with law reform, the UK's framework for
criminal corporate liability, UK law enforcement effort, and the
Convention's article 5 and prosecutorial discretion. The Government
is working closely with the OECD Secretariat on preparations for
the review and we look forward to the Examiners' on-site visit.
We believe that the UK has fully implemented the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. While successful prosecutions can
be and are made each year, the UK law on bribery is complex and
fragmented and the Government is committed to its reform. The
Government have asked the Law Commission to undertake a thorough
review into the bribery law of England and Wales and prepare a
draft Bill. We have asked them to look at the full range of structural
options and to treat this review as a priority. This referral
to the Law Commission, far from side-tracking reform, is the best
means to take forward law reform in this field effectively and
quickly. The Law Commission have published a detailed consultation
paper setting out their proposals for reform, to run until 20
March 2008, and we expect them to publish their final report and
draft Bill in the autumn. We shall then consider their report
and draft Bill closely and will be seeking to bring forward legislative
proposals as soon as is possible.
OECD Guidelines and Risk Awareness Tool
[Recommendation 18; Paragraph 53] The National
Contact Point is a key instrument for national-level implementation
of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. It is therefore
of paramount importance that the UK Contact Point is a well-resourced,
credible body. We share the concerns that some key stakeholders
have raised about both the effectiveness and impartiality of the
NCP. We recommend that the Government undertake a review of the
impact of the 2006 restructuring of the NCP and of the resources
available to it.
A Steering Board has been created which has oversight
of the National Contact Point. The Steering Board has a clear
role to ensure the NCP is following the complaints procedure correctly
and provides a route for the parties involved in a complaint to
raise concerns they may have in the way a complaint was handled.
The Government has committed to reviewing the new NCP arrangements
to ensure that they are working effectively.
[Recommendation 19; Paragraph 55] We will follow
with interest the progress of the Global Witness complaint against
Afrimex as a test case for the restructured UK National Contact
Point. We believe it is unacceptable that the Government has not
investigated the activities of Alfred Knight, nor even contacted
the company, despite the findings in our Conflict and Development
Report and the evidence taken in that inquiry. We call on the
Government to be pro-active in these matters generally and to
investigate the case of Alfred Knight's activities in the Democratic
Republic of Congo in particular. We expect the Government to provide
us with a full report of its past, current and planned action
in connection with the Alfred Knight case within six months.
The NCP investigates all complaints received. So
far no approach has been made regarding Alfred Knight. We would
of course investigate if a complaint were raised. This reflects
the primary aim of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
which is to provide a platform for the parties to reach a mediated
settlement. Therefore a complainant is required for a mediation
process to occur and to be meaningful.
This view reflects the All Party Parliamentary Group
on the Great Lakes Region report: 'The OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and the DRC' published in February 2005. The APPG
examined the role of a complainant in this process and clearly
stated that an important element of the Guidelines is to mediate
between the two, to try and seek resolution and issue statements.
The APPG report notes that "two parties must be involved
if the NCP process is to have meaning—if it is simply a
dialogue with the accused company alone, the credibility of the
Guidelines is undermined and NCP statements risk being perceived
as being one-sided and lacking in impartiality".
The National Contact Point has written to Alfred
Knight requesting a meeting to explain the Guidelines and the
Risk Awareness Tool for Weak Governance Zones.
[Recommendation 20; Paragraph 58] We recommend
that the Government assess the initiatives taken by Canada and
the USA to promote the OECD Risk Awareness Tool, with a view to
drawing up a UK plan for its promotion within six months. We also
recommend that the Government look at the case for contributing
to a fund for a web-portal for the Tool, which we believe could
encourage its active use.
The NCP promotes the Risk Awareness Tool alongside
the OECD Guidelines when appropriate. For example, the Awareness
tool is publicised alongside the Guidelines on the website; has
been outlined in bilateral contacts with a number of companies;
and will be included in final statements, including a Specific
Instance as appropriate.
The NCP is currently working with the team in DFID
responsible for conflict and resources work to establish the best
way to use and promote the tool.
The NCP will approach key Embassies and DFID country
offices to request they provide a link to the Risk Awareness Tool
on their websites. The NCP has agreed to provide £10,000
to the OECD to support the web portal.
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
[Recommendation 21; Paragraph 61] We welcome the
progress on encouraging resource-rich countries to adopt the Extractives
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). We recommend that the
Government continue to pursue this actively and to promote the
Initiative as a model for other sectors. We also recommend that
Ministers at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DFID make
greater effort to agree and coordinate an active lobbying strategy
for a UN General Assembly resolution which would establish the
EITI as a global standard.
DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
work together to promote and support the Extractives Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) globally. DFID works closely with
the UK Mission to the UN in New York (UKMIS) to support the proposed
UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution that will be tabled by the
Government of Azerbaijan (GoA). DFID and UKMIS are working with
the GoA, EITI Secretariat and other international partner governments
(Norway and Germany) to draft the resolution and promote it to
UNGA members.
DFID also works with FCO Embassies and High Commissions
to support the EITI Secretariat in engaging with country governments
that are implementing or have shown an interest in implementation
of EITI. This is in line with the FCO strategy review for future
working on EITI. In 2007 DFID and FCO overseas posts played a
vital role in helping the EITI Board to assess its list of implementing
countries. As a result, EITI has established a definitive list
of countries that are actively implementing the Initiative and
adhering to its principles, which is vital to its credibility.
DFID is currently a member of the EITI Board which
has overall responsibility for the Initiative and is also a member
of the Management Committee, which manages the EITI Multi-donor
Trust Fund used to fund implementation work.
Conflict resources
[Recommendation 22; Paragraph 63] We reiterate
our view stated in our Conflict and Development Report that the
Government needs, as a matter of urgency, to push for an internationally
agreed definition of conflict resources. We encourage the Government
to work closely and actively with those of a like mind towards
agreement at the UN and to make more visible to stakeholders its
support for the initiative.
The nature and complexity of the links between natural
resources and conflict require a comprehensive response if it
is to be successful. We are aware of the strong arguments in favour
of pushing for an agreed definition of "conflict resources".
However, we are of the view that a definition would not in itself
substantially help to address the illegal trade in natural resources
and conflict effectively and its usefulness therefore needs to
be considered in a broader context. A UN Security Council debate
on Conflict and Natural Resources in June 2007 initiated by Belgium
and supported by the UK demonstrated how sensitive the issue is
for many countries; seeking agreement on a definition in the UN
would in our judgement prove difficult, be extremely slow, and
require significant effort with no guarantee of success.
We agree that the appropriate course of action is
to work with other like-minded governments in developing a more
comprehensive strategy to tackle the links between natural resources
and conflict. This might involve the inclusion of natural resource
issues in the mandates of peacekeeping missions; the creation
of a permanent centre of expertise within the UN system; and strengthening
the role of the Peace-building Commission. We will seek a UN Secretary-General's
report to assess these options and raise the profile of the issue,
and we continue to work cross-Whitehall and with external stakeholders
on this matter.
Department for International Development
4 February 2008
1 See Annex for further detail on the second UK Anti-Corruption
Action Plan Back
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