Examination of Witnesses (Questions 27-39)
MR ANTONIO
TUJAN JR
AND MR
HOWARD WHITE
29 APRIL 2008
Q27 Chairman: Thank you very much for
coming in. You have both been listening to the previous evidence
session so you will understand the context. It is very good of
you to come along. Perhaps you could briefly introduce yourselves
for the record.
Mr Tujan: I am Antonio Tujan,
the international director of IBON. It is a research and education
NGO based in Manila in the Philippines. I am also the current
chairperson of the Reality of Aid Network, the global, north-south
network of NGO platforms which monitor aid.
Mr White: I am Howard White. I
have spent most of my career as an academic working, amongst other
things, on issues that affect aid management. For the last five
years I have been leading the Impact Evaluation Programme of the
Evaluation Department of the World Bank and I am now the head
of the new International Initiative for Impact Evaluation.
Q28 Chairman: Which likes to call
itself 3ie. We have obviously been looking at the Paris Declaration
as part of the framework for coordination. When we were in Ghana,
we got some slightly negative feedback from the Ghanaians about
the commitment of members of the Paris club, if you like, and
the expectations for the forum that is going to take place in
September. From your point of view—you can be as frank as
you wish—how well do you think both the donors and of course
the recipients, because they are part of the process, have lived
up to the commitments that they have made under the Paris Declaration?
If you are able to quantify it or be specific, that would be helpful.
Mr Tujan: I just arrived from
Ghana this morning where we had the results of prior research
that began in preparation for Accra. In this process they raised
a number of key points that civil society in Ghana is particularly
interested in on the questions of gender equity, environment and
production. They felt that there is a large gap between what they
thought was necessary and could bring Ghana along the path forward
and what has been delivered. The monitoring survey that was conducted
by the OECD in 2006 has shown that there has been a very low level
of performance to the Paris Declaration commitments. To a certain
degree this is understandable because, on the one hand, it was
a new survey and our indicators were unclear and so on. The new
survey is presently being processed. There are initial results
and the peek into that that was announced by the EDCDE in Bangkok
last week was that there is a slight improvement. In short, it
is still slight.
Mr White: Forgive me if I take
a slightly longer-term view, but I think it is very useful to
do that. When the Paris Declaration was first signed, there were
no particular grounds for being optimistic. This is not the first
declaration the international community has made and it is certainly
not the first that will not be met. It is not the case that aid
coordination is a new idea. The DAC[12]
has existed for well over 40 years, going on for 50 years. The
DAC was founded as an aid coordination body, so what has it been
doing for the last 50 years? There was mention in the last session
that the multilateral agencies are there to play a coordination
role. This is patently not the case. No one thinks the EU is coordinating
the aid of the various EU donors on the ground in the recipient
countries. The multilateral agencies, by and large, are not playing
that role either. We come into a context where general declarations
and the history of aid coordination have not done terribly well.
We have to ask ourselves what is different now. What has changed
that will mean this might actually work? There are two sides you
have to look at because the Paris Declaration talks about aid
coordination and about recipient control. I would rather say "recipient
control" than "ownership" because without control
there is no ownership. I think the modest progress that has been
made is on the aid coordination side amongst the donors themselves.
The progress towards recipient control has been very slight, if
there at all. Without that, there is very little incentive for
the recipients to get seriously engaged with the Paris agenda
and very little likelihood that the Paris agenda is realised.
Let us look even on the aid coordination side at whether there
is some modest movement. I think we have to recognise that change
there is necessarily slow. Institutional change is slow, unless
you are talking about stroke of a pen reforms which you can do
just by signing a document. Untying aid is one example where the
UK indeed did that. Untying aid over the last decade is one success
story in aid coordination. You ask what the DAC has been doing
for 50 years: it was trying for a long time to get progress made
in untying, as has now happened. On day-to-day management of aid,
it is what is happening at the ground level in country programmes
that matters and there things take a very long time to happen.
You have the aid managers signing the Paris Declaration, but they
are not the people who are down there in the country programme
actually doing the work on a day-to-day basis. These are people
still in DFID for example who come from a background of being
project staff, project managers and are now having to change their
roles to be sector specialists and change the sorts of things
they look at. It is a very slow process. One thing I worked on
some years ago now was the predecessor of budget support, which
was import support, programme aid and various forms of macro support
like that. The Strategic Programme for Africa, the SPA, was trying
to coordinate the aid management of adjustment lending to Africa.
It took pretty much 10 years to get some alignment on import support
and disbursement of procurement systems, even though all the major
donors agreed on it. In that case a particular sticking point
was the World Bank. It was not until the World Bank introduced
its simplified disbursement procedures that it was possible to
coordinate just one particular aid programme to one particular
group of countries. When I think of a recent experience I had
in Bangladesh, you can arguably say you have had a health sector
programme in Bangladesh since independence. They have always had
very coordinated aid. When they started the health sector programme
proper in the 1990s, only a small amount of money was going into
the pooled finance. The rest was still projectised and even the
amount going to the pooled finance was not in the first project
part of the government procurement system. It was done as a separate
pool, managed by the Ministry, and it was not until six years
later with the second programme that they brought the procurement
system more in-line with the government procurement system. It
took a number of years to achieve that. These things take time.
I want to use Bangladesh to illustrate a previous point I made
about control because it really is my belief that donors are very
reluctant to relinquish control. Bangladesh is a very striking
case. I was there during the pre-negotiations for the health,
nutrition and population sector programme and we were discussing
with government officials the new strategy document. We had all
had a copy for the last couple of weeks. We were going in to discuss
it and the senior government officials would say, "We would
like to discuss that document with you but we have never seen
it." It was written by donor-financed consultants. This is
very peculiar in Bangladesh because it wrote its own five-year
plan and had the donors coming in on that, financing its plan
very successfully. Bangladesh in the 1980s produced the first
ever drugs policy for use with generic drugs and, against US and
World Bank opposition, introduced that policy. Suddenly, 20 years
later, the country cannot write its own strategy. When I asked
a senior health official about this, his answer was, "The
donors know what they want so why not let them write it?"
Chairman: We did get a complaint from
Afghanistan that donors were not telling them what was forthcoming.
I happened to notice a report from the Afghan Government about
forward expectations and the figure from DFID was zero. We all
know that DFID has a commitment and they can read our reports
and see it but they have not told the Afghan Government what it
is apparently.
Q29 Mr Singh: It seems that your
report on the Paris Declaration is, "Could have done a lot
better." What are your expectations for the High-Level Forum
in Ghana? What do you expect to come out of that? Is there a way,
if concrete commitments come out of that forum, that they can
be sustained and implemented?
Mr Tujan: In the first place I
would like to emphasise that the Paris Declaration has gone way
beyond the issue of coordination which was the agreement in Rome
in 2003. In 2005 in Paris, it became aid effectiveness precisely
because it was no longer about the donors coordinating. You bring
in the recipient countries and they were there in Paris. They
were spectators in Rome. They still felt like they were spectators
in Paris, so they said. The important thing was that in Paris
you already had the notion of ownership. The problem with the
Paris Declaration is that the notion of ownership in Paris is
about control. When you talk about control, it is about governance.
We do know that development is not just about governance; it is
about people. Therefore, you will find that in the Paris Declaration
CSOs[13]
are not there. Parliaments are not there. The commitments to accountability
are very thin because obviously you cannot have proper accountability
without democratic systems. That includes other players. That
is why in Accra there is a movement beyond Paris. So in a sense
we are moving in three-year stages in terms of commitments. It
appears that in Accra there is going to be discussion now on democratic
ownership, recognising that ownership means the whole process
in a recipient country. That includes CSOs, parliaments, media
and so on. There is a discussion of putting in CSOs to enrich
the whole Paris Declaration which means you talk about accountability
with the CSOs in the picture. You talk about donor accountability
but it is no longer just governments. It includes citizens and
CSOs in the recipient countries. There is a lot more that is coming
in. Also, in the Accra Agenda there is language on conflict affected
states but that language so far as formulated in the first consultative
draft is very problematic. The important thing is it is there.
There is also language that is being pushed on the so-called cross
cutting issues on gender equality, human rights and environment.
Accra, by optimistic expectations, would be quite a movement forward
from the Paris Declaration and the discussion now is how to move
it forward. There are some sectors which are much more conservative
about it. Of course the question of implementation is another
story. It always happens that way, that implementation lags behind
commitment.
Mr White: By and large, I would
agree with that. There is great potential in Accra still, despite
my earlier pessimism. I always come out being an optimist in the
end. There is potential to try and realise the ideals of the Paris
Declaration, to use it as a means for empowering the recipients
to take more control of the use of aid funds. I fully accept that
recipient does not just mean government; it means all forces of
society. There is a great danger that Accra will result in noble
statements along those lines and very little that is concrete
will come out of it. It would be useful to think ahead as to how
one might practically engage in the process to look for concrete
things that come out of that that would result in improved aid
management practices where recipients take an important part in
that process. For example, something I have mentioned many times
on previous occasions, the DAC peer review mechanism should be
replaced by a recipient peer review mechanism whereby it is a
group of recipient governments that is doing the review of donor
performance, not DAC members.
Q30 Mr Crabb: Moving on to impact
evaluation, there seems to be some consensus that impact evaluation
is one of the keys to achieving better coordinated, more effective
aid. How credible do you think are the self-assessments that are
currently being carried out by DFID and other donors? How could
they be improved?
Mr Tujan: We have been referred
to the drafts of a study on that. Indeed, there is a plethora
of assessments that are being made. The question is how credible
are they to change behaviour. The OECD has embarked on a 12-country
evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration. I think
that is a process that can go forward, except that for civil society
we think there should be an independent monitoring and evaluation
process, which means it is not by the recipient countries and
it is not by the donor community, but an independent process.
To have that in place, we have to look at the aid architecture
because the question is who will now manage that process.
Mr White: In terms of the assessments
made by the development agencies, you have both the self-assessments
carried out by the operational side of the agency, and then you
have the evaluations carried out by the evaluation department
of the agency. Then you have the possibility of evaluations carried
out by some other, nominally independent body. To date we have
essentially the self-assessments which are the vast bulk of all
assessment work being done in any agency. Then, the evaluation
departments are carrying out a smaller number of normally thematic
or sectoral studies rather than project specific studies and you
do not as yet particularly have any systematic, independent evaluation
function which is the purpose of 3ie, the organisation I am heading.
For both the evaluation departments' work and the self-assessment
operations, the quality varies from agency to agency. I have worked
for many agencies and there are some like the EU where you know
that if you are critical you never work for them again. There
are others like the Swedes who love to be told they are bad and
do things wrong. The more critical you are, the more they like
your report. DFID falls somewhere between those on the evaluation
department side but on the self-assessment side DFID ranks pretty
badly in terms of the operational studies that are done, particularly
the routine completion reports. There is no quality-control function
on those, so managers can put in pretty much what they like. They
are not anyway particularly detailed studies. On the side of those
I would give a pretty low mark. On the side of the evaluation
departments I would give a reasonable mark of seven out of ten
or so.
Q31 Mr Crabb: In terms of the weaknesses
you have identified in the operational self-evaluation, how is
that manifested? What is coming out which is incorrect?
Mr White: Evaluations serve two
functions, accountability and lesson learning. I do not think
they can serve either function satisfactorily. It does not send
any clear signal about whether taxpayers' money is being used
effectively or not because there are biases in the reporting of
the outcomes of the interventions and it serves no lesson learning
purpose because it is not particularly well structured and there
is probably no lesson learning anyway. It is critical to draw
out lessons.
Q32 Mr Crabb: Could I ask Mr White
a couple of questions about the 3ie initiative? How do you intend
to ensure that it does not cut across any other similar initiatives?
How would you describe the specific unique added value that you
bring to this area?
Mr White: There are three sets
of similar initiatives of which 3ie is one. The first set of initiatives
are those undertaken by agencies themselves to have more impact
evaluations. The World Bank has been particularly active in that
area in what is called the Development Impact Evaluation Initiative,
DIME, which was initiated by the World Bank's research department.
Last time I checked the portfolio which was in January of this
year, DIME had 230 ongoing impact evaluations, which is a fantastically
large increase in the number of impact evaluations going on in
any one agency. There are other initiatives in the World Bank,
particularly the Impact Evaluation Fund which is also funding
impact evaluations of World Bank interventions. There are the
agency specific initiatives. They have a very clear role because
they are doing impact evaluations of initiatives funded by that
agency as part of the project and the system as self-evaluations.
The second initiative for which the World Bank's evaluation department
has a secretariat is NONIE, the Network of Networks on Impact
Evaluation. NONIE was created to create quality impact evaluation
amongst, in the first instance, the official development agencies.
It was created at a meeting of the DAC, the ECG, the Evaluation
Cooperation Group of Multilaterals, and the UNEG, the United Nations
Evaluation Group. It has since expanded to incorporate the evaluation
associations of developing countries, particularly AFREA, the
African Research and Evaluation Association. NONIE has no money
per se to do impact studies. NONIE's role is to create
awareness of the importance of quality impact evaluation and to
equip people with the skills to manage, interpret or read these
studies by producing guidelines on quality impact evaluation.
3ie's role is really rather different. 3ie's role is going to
be as a funder of quality impact evaluations and to carry out
advocacy work on evidence based policy making on the findings
of impact studies financed by 3ie and from other sources. I would
see quite a lot of complementarity between the roles of the different
initiatives. Also, the World Bank carries out direct capacity-building
work to create the capacity to do impact evaluation work in developing
countries. You have NONIE which is meant to be there primarily
to create demand and 3ie which is there to service that demand,
if you like, a demand that will emanate from developing country
governments which will then be filled by the money coming from
3ie. We have one example even though 3ie has not even started
yet. One of the NONIE sub-committee members is from the Pakistan
Rehabilitation Authority and 3ie is financing a study for him
on how you do impact evaluation of disaster relief. Given that
demand is created, the initiatives coming from the World Bank
and other agencies can also help satisfy that demand by having
better quality impact evaluation carried out within the World
Bank financed projects and so on. I believe particularly strongly
that it is important that the evaluation function rests with the
recipient governments and that they see the aid money as being
their money, which in the end it is. The evaluation is one way
of achieving this because they will see ways for those funds to
be used much better.
Q33 Mr Crabb: What do you think is
the likelihood of achieving some common quality standards across
all these different evaluation mechanisms?
Mr White: Surprisingly high. I
am now in 3ie but I was involved in setting up NONIE and at the
first meeting we had a couple of years ago I went in quite pessimistically,
thinking that like minded donors would all sign up. Then we would
have the UN, the French saying, "Oh no, it is not what we
want to do." Then we would have a middle group of donors
who were not one way or the other. In fact, there was unanimous
agreement in that first meeting, even from UNEG members, that
this was something we had to do. Whilst NONIE is having quite
a hard time keeping on board with the particular view of impact
evaluation which is being promoted, it is succeeding. I do not
think it is something that is going to happen overnight but I
believe the core supporters of both NONIE and 3ie will adopt common
standards very quickly. They will make sure the impact work they
do will meet those standards. There have even been movements by
previous non-supporters like the Danes, who have said now very
clearly, "We recognise the impact work we did previously
was not to standard. We are not going to finance work for that
any more. We are only going to finance studies that satisfy certain
quality standards." The UN system is, if you like, the Soviet
Bloc of moves to improve impact evaluation. I thought it would
be the last to crumble but at their meeting in Geneva last month
they did a pre-AGM session on impact evaluation and discussed
both NONIE, 3ie and UNEG's role in NONIE. They are formally represented
in NONIE, so there seems to be also some crumbling of the wall
there as well.
Q34 Sir Robert Smith: One of the
ways donor countries try to assist is through technical assistance,
providing expertise, advice and experts in-country. The Paris
Declaration requires far greater coordination and alignment with
developing country strategies. How can that technical assistance
be enhanced by coordination? What are the obstacles to better
coordinated technical assistance?
Mr Tujan: I will predicate that
with ownership. The reason why I am saying that is first of all
because under the Paris Declaration coordination is very important
for ownership. It does not mean that there is no coordination
acting without ownership. In fact there is. That can create problems
and is creating problems. We have the example of Indonesia where
you have donors coordinating around the World Bank but without
the ownership of the government, so in effect you have the donors
running different sector-wide projects and the Indonesian Government
is left out. On the question of technical assistance, coordination
is premised on the leadership that is exercised by the government
which would in fact enhance coordination such as clarifying first
of all which donor would be in the best position to provide the
technical assistance that is requested by the government. The
assumption of technical assistance with ownership is that technical
assistance is not simply provided by the donor; it is demanded.
It is demand driven and when it is demand driven and there is
coordination, then in effect the demanded TA will be paired up
with which donor has the comparative advantage and that way it
works better. The question of comparative advantage, the question
of improving the quality of technical assistance, I think is predicated
not so much on coordination but coordination under ownership.
Mr White: I would agree with that.
There are many historical examples of successful technical assistance
with Meiji restoration in Japan and reclaiming land in Essex,
where I come from, using Dutch technical assistance. Botswana
in the 1980s and 1990s was using government purchased technical
assistance. There is demand for international technical expertise
that can be purchased by government from the international market
for technical assistance. That market has been very seriously
distorted by the donors who have required governments to take
technical experts that the donor wants them to have, largely because
of the desire of the donors to retain control and the lack of
trust of the donor in the recipients' ability. I would agree entirely
with what Antonio was saying. The key here is to put the government
in charge of demand for technical assistance and only to supply
technical assistance that is demanded by the government and then
the coordination function falls into place.
Q35 Chairman: Is that an opportunity
for DFID to use its constraints on staffing more creatively? We
have discussed that in connection with other issues. For example,
instead of putting in technical experts on the DFID payroll, those
technical experts would be on the recipient government's payroll.
What DFID is doing is making a financial contribution to enable
them to strengthen their own technical assistance. Could that
be a better way of doing it?
Mr White: Absolutely, provided
those technical experts are demanded by the government.
Mr Tujan: Even more so because
the government will also be able to take certain technical experts
and they would come out cheaper.
Q36 Sir Robert Smith: The crucial
bit of coordination is ownership by the recipient country rather
than all the countries getting together and deciding what is needed?
Mr White: Yes.
Q37 Hugh Bayley: How fundamental
is ownership to aid effectiveness? Can you think of examples of
effective aid achieved without ownership?
Mr Tujan: The Paris Declaration
defines ownership as the most fundamental of the five principles.
It is the over-arching principle. Alignment, harmonisation, mutual
accountability are supposedly premised on ownership. Ownership
has four dimensions to it. First, there is the political dimension
which relates to state-to-state relations. After all, aid is a
function of development cooperation and international relations.
Also you have the problem of new administrations so when you have
elections new governments come in and it changes ownership because
it affects the political will of the recipient government when
there is a government change. Then there is the dimension of the
aid relationship and how that works when in the first place we
must understand that it is almost essentially two different social
systems at work. You have a very developed, industrialised country
that is providing assistance to a country that is coming out of
feudal or very undeveloped democratic systems and state mechanisms,
and where institutions are weak. Ownership in that relationship
is something that is negotiated. It is not automatic. It becomes
a function of political will and capacity. A country can have
the political will but not the capacity in its institutions to
be able to own development. That is why we have this problem of
ownership from the country side as well. The donor comes in and
has to assist in capacity building. Before long, the relationship
becomes paternalistic. It is a very difficult relationship when
you assume that the country owns its development but that country
may or may not have the political will or the capacity. The third
dimension is the question of democratic ownership. These countries
generally do not have good functioning democracies. Therefore,
ownership for them also has to be understood in the context of
how parliaments work, how civil society works and so on. There
is a fourth dimension of ownership and this is the ownership by
the poor themselves. They are the ones who are in the end the
objects of this development issue. Do they own their development?
If you build a dam or a bridge, how does it affect them? Do they
own that? Most often, they are the ones who are removed from their
own communities when somebody decides to dam their river. Ownership
is a difficult, complicated issue but in the end the decisive
dimensions are ownership in aid management and democratic ownership—the
middle two. I agree it is not easy to be a donor in a situation
where it is so easy to become paternalistic. Let us face it: ownership
is also about capacity.
Q38 Hugh Bayley: What you say obviously
is drawn in part from your own experience in the Philippines.
There is a difference between decision making and consultation,
but are you really saying in a state where you do not have an
open democracy, you do not have freedom of the press, you do not
have freedom of a civil society to criticise the government, you
do not have a multi-party system, that country ownership is a
bit of a sham? The donor will own the aid programme but it should
as a matter of good practice consult as broadly as it can with
the poor, with parliamentarians, with civil society and the state,
but because you have in liberal terms a malfunctioning state the
donor will ultimately retain decision making.
Mr Tujan: There is a great danger
in that relationship that the tendency is for the donor to own
it. While we keep saying ownership, ownership, ownership, it is
not an easy thing. My premise is not just based on the Philippines.
Our NGO works also in Indonesia, Africa, India and south Asia,
as we are an international NGO. What I would like to emphasise
is that you can have efficient aid. I would not say it is effective
aid. That is aid that is so very focused towards the delivery
of certain services, is completely transparent and so on. That
can happen but in the end how effective would that aid be in terms
of the poor? How would you measure the effectiveness of that aid?
In the end it should be measured by how it actually impacts on
the lives of the poor. That is why impact evaluation in the end
matters because it is not simply about delivering some support
efficiently. In the end, is it actually impacting on development?
When we talk about impacting on development, it becomes a complicated
process because development itself is a political and complicated
political process.
Q39 Hugh Bayley: Mr White, if ownership
is good practice as a means to an end and you are assessing the
technical efficiency and effectiveness of aid, should not the
Paris mantra be effectiveness, effectiveness, effectiveness, not
ownership, ownership, ownership? Measure the outcome and then
determine what is good and what is bad.
Mr White: The answer lies in the
relationship between the two so I will go back to the earlier
question because I think it does address that point also. Let
us not get carried away. Of course it would be possible to design
an intervention, target it and achieve positive development impacts
with no local consultation whatsoever. We have a lot of experience
of that. In conflict zones, we often have to do something like
that but vertical programmes also do that to a large extent. They
are designed top down, inserted top down. The expanded programme
for immunisation for example is a largely top down programme and
highly successful. It becomes horizontal over a long period of
time. We have an example now of the Millennium Villages Project
which is exactly that, a very top down intervention from donor
countries with no consultation or government involvement. They
claim it will show a very positive development outcome. That remains
to be seen. One problem is the political one. In working that
way you are setting aside democratic principles of consultation
which I will come back to. The second one is I genuinely believe
that you will undermine the efficiency and sustainability of the
activity by working in that way. You undermine efficiency because
there exist structures to deliver these services on the ground
throughout developing countries. There is a lot of nonsense spoken
about the lack of capacity in developing-country governments,
particularly at district level. It is not uncommon to find now
district-level workers who have bachelor's degrees and may even
have overseas master's degrees. The reason why these people are
not doing their jobs is because they are inadequately resourced,
not because of lack of motivation or anything else. I have one
example of a district building officer in central Zambia. The
World Bank and EU financed social fund was doing a lot of school
construction in the area and he was busy, going out visiting these
schools that were being constructed, inspecting the ones that
were under construction. I asked him, "How much of your time
do you spend looking at social fund constructive facilities?"
He said, "It is about 50% of my time or more." I asked,
"Does this not take away from doing your proper job if you
are spending all your time on this project?" He said, "No.
This is my job. Before there was nothing to do. I am a buildings
officer. These are buildings. There were no buildings before.
I just used to sit and read the paper." People like this
are there, able to implement these projects so why would you put
in parallel structures and say that these people do not have capacity?
These people do not have the money for their petrol to go to the
village. Like you, we went to one resettlement village in northern
Zambia. We took the resettlement officer. He had not been to the
village in three years because he could not afford to go there.
There was no way in which he could carry out his function simply
because of the lack of a couple of pounds a year, basically. You
create parallel structures where you say the capacity is not there.
It is not the lack of institutional capacity; it is the lack of
a very small amount of resources. In the end, you do not want
to run projects that are going to be externally financed forever.
You want to have these administered through the government aid
which is at district level where that money can be allocated through
district block grants. You have to work with these people so that
you have their buy-in. This comes down to the point about the
definition of ownership. I agree we need broad consultation but
let us not think that in developing countries you have a much
greater desire to participate and be consulted than we have in
our own country. You do not. The people you really need to involve
are those who are responsible for implementing the intervention.
If you do not do that you are not going to get very far. You need
to consult the politicians, both national and local, who are in
the area where the intervention is going to be carried out. Otherwise
you will not get very far. You will not get much support. You
need to have some sort of consultation with the beneficiaries
to make sure it is really what they want and that they understand
the nature of the investment. The call for general, broad consultation
should not be overstated. Back to your claim: effectiveness, effectiveness,
effectiveness. I absolutely would agree but there are aspects
of ownership that necessarily underlie that.
12 Development Assistance Committee, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development Back
13
civil society organisations Back
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