House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Lord Janner of Braunstone Q.C. Vice-Chairman of the Britain-Israel Parliamentary Group

SUMMARY

1. The All-Party Britain-Israel Parliamentary Group is listed in the Register and Approved List for All-Party Parliamentary Groups. Its purpose is "to create a better understanding of Israel, and to foster and promote links between Britain and Israel". The All-Party Britain-Israel Parliamentary Group receives administrative support from the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), who assisted in the preparation of this report.

2. This submission discusses current Israeli policy where it impacts on the humanitarian and development situation in the Palestinian areas, which is the subject of the International Development Committee's current inquiry.

3. In the summer of 2005, Israel disengaged from Gaza. It is actively engaged in direct, bilateral negotiations with the Palestinian Authority to conclude a final status agreement, with the aim of reaching such an agreement by the end of this year. The negotiations are predicated on the understanding that only a two-state solution will end the conflict between the two peoples.

4. In the face of ongoing attacks on its own civilian population Israel is making continuous efforts to ensure the transfer of humanitarian supplies and aid to Gaza's citizens.

5. The Israelis living in towns and villages around Gaza have suffered seven years of rocket and mortar fire in which over 6,000 rockets and mortars have been fired.

6. Israel has shown great restraint in responding to these attacks.

7. When Israel's military has responded they have been measured and proportionate. It has been complicated by the cynical exploitation of the Palestinian civilian population by the Hamas leadership. Israel is making significant efforts to avoid large-scale military activity in Gaza including non military responses.

8. Calls on Israel to talk with Hamas ignore the fact that the Hamas leadership in Gaza refuse to talk to Israel. Dialogue with Hamas would mortally wound the cause of secular Palestinian nationalism, would send a worrying signal around the region, and would encourage Iran and its proxies. Despite the weaknesses of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership, it remains the only option for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel continues to make significant concessions to the PA in the West Bank.

9. Despite the difficulties of negotiating with Hamas, Israel is engaged in contacts to de-escalate the level of violence and bring Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier who was kidnapped in June 2006, home. Previous attempts at unofficial ceasefires were quickly broken by Hamas.

10. Israel has no permanent enemies and is willing and able to negotiate, provided its needs—having a negotiating partner who can provide genuine acceptance of Israel and deliver on security guarantees—are met.

11. The UK government gives £31.6 million of aid to the Palestinians, which is 0.64% of DFID's annual budget. However, the International Development Committee has focused disproportionately on this aspect of DFID's work. 25% of reports and inquiries have been on aid to the Palestinians and on Israeli policy.

ISRAELI OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS GAZA

The voluntary acceptance of residual responsibility for a civilian population after vacating a territory is unprecedented in international law. This is despite the continuing and increasing rocket attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza (over 6,000 rockets have been fired since 2001) and the risk Israel's citizens run in ensuring supplies reach Gaza.

12. In January 2008, the Israel Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, affirmed the position that Israel is no longer in control of Gaza, and that its obligations were determined by the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza.[24] However, in its ruling, the Court noted that:

The State of Israel is required to act against the terrorist organisations within the framework of the law and in accordance with the dictates of international law, and to refrain from deliberately harming the civilian population located in the Gaza Strip.

13. However, the Court recognised that the civilian population of Gaza had become reliant on Israel for the supply of goods and services over the years of occupation, and that even after the end of its effective control, Israel should take note of this. This voluntary acceptance of residual responsibility for a civilian population after vacating the territory is unprecedented in international law and shows the lengths Israel is willing to go to prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

14. This is despite the continuing and increasing rocket attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza (over 6,000 rockets have been fired since 2001) and the risk Israel's citizens run in ensuring supplies reach Gaza.

15. Since its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005, the territory is no longer under the "effective control" of Israel. There are no Israeli soldiers or police stationed in Gaza. The Palestinian government raises taxes, enforces its laws and governs its citizens. In these circumstances, Israel is unable to organise Palestinian civilian life in Gaza. Hamas itself appears to accept that Israel is no longer occupying Gaza. In February 2008, an official Hamas representative stated that Gaza is no longer occupied.[25]

16. Despite Israel defining Hamas-controlled Gaza as a hostile territory in the face of ongoing attacks on Israeli civilians, the Israeli security cabinet adopted a resolution in September 2007 which stated that any restrictions placed on the movement of people and supplies into Gaza would be:

17. The Court has also noted that Israel's obligations toward the Palestinian population are not conditional on Palestinian compliance with its own obligations. This is despite evidence that Palestinian terrorists consistently breach international law, for example by the use of human shields[27], Israel takes all precautions to minimise civilian casualties.

18. Following Israel's policy of reducing its involvement in the Gaza Strip, Egypt has announced that it will be supplying electricity to the Strip.[28] This is a positive development that sees growing regional responsibility for the future of the Palestinians in Gaza.

ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO TRANSFERRING VITAL SUPPLIES TO GAZA

Israel is committed to preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza by ensuring that humanitarian supplies, including food and medical supplies get through. Patients from Gaza are been treated in Israel's hospitals. This is despite terrorist attacks against the crossing points and the fact that some of the supplies that are being allowed into Gaza by Israel (such as sugar, fertilizers and pipes) are used in the production of home made rockets to attack Israel.

19. It is critical that the international community as a whole, and DFID in particular, are made aware of the efforts made by Israel to ensure the uninterrupted supply of humanitarian assistance in the face of ongoing provocation by Palestinians, whose only aim can be to prevent supplies reaching the civilian population. It must also be remembered that Israel has no control over the distribution of goods and fuel once they enter Gaza.

20. In addition, Israel is ensuring the flow of humanitarian supplies to Gaza despite that fact that some of these supplies (most notably sugar and fertilisers) are been used by militants to build rockets, which are then fired on Israeli civilians.

21. During fighting between Fatah and Hamas forces in June 2007 much of the equipment at the Karni crossing, the principal commercial crossing point between Israel and Gaza, was destroyed. The terminal's operators, who were affiliated with Fatah, are no longer willing to run the crossing. Given this, Israel is unable to operate the crossing.

22. The inability of the Palestinians to find people to operate the terminal has also ensured that it remained closed.

23. Despite this not being Israel's doing, to prevent a humanitarian crisis, Israel has transferred aid shipments into Gaza through the secondary Kerem Shalom and Sufa crossings, a situation that remains in force at present. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) coordinator commended Israel for averting a humanitarian crisis by finding these alternatives.[29]

24. Since Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007, an average of 100 truckloads of aid and supplies reach the civilian population of Gaza each day. In total, 465,000 tonnes of supplies have been transferred. On 1 April 2008[30] as an example:

— 51 trucks entered Gaza through Karni Crossing containing: wheat, sesame, corn, coffee and soy.

— 56 trucks entered Gaza through Sufa Crossing containing: fruit, rice, sugar, dairy products, meat, fish, flour, carrots, garlic, pasta, cleaning products and school books.

— 18 trucks entered Gaza through Kerem Shalom Crossing containing: soap, rice, meat, oil, sugar, coffee and animal vitamins.

— 13 trucks donated by Egypt entered Gaza through, through Kerem Shalom Crossing containing: rice and sugar.

25. In its judicial review of the situation, the Israeli Supreme Court (sitting as the High Court of Justice) found that 2.2 million litres of industrial diesel fuel per week that Israel supplies to power the Gaza power generating plant at Nusseirat is adequate to ensure humanitarian needs. Israel also transfers 75,000 litres of diesel fuel for emergency and humanitarian vehicles.

26. The Nusseirat power station only supplies 60 MW of Gaza's electrical needs. Israel supplies 120 MW with a further 17 MW coming from Egypt. Israel has never stopped this flow of power. The Israeli power station which supplies Gaza is in Ashkelon which itself has been fired upon by militants in Gaza.

27. No consignments of medicine or medical supplies have been refused entry by Israel.[31] Indeed, since the beginning of 2008, 84 deliveries of medical supplies have entered Gaza.[32],[33]

28. The absolute number of referrals of Gazans to Israeli hospitals rose from 4,934 in 2006 to 7,176 in 2007, an increase of 45%. Over the year as a whole, 82% of requests for referral in 2007 were approved. More, rather than fewer, Gazans were treated in Israeli hospitals in 2007. This, it should be noted, was during the year when Hamas took control of Gaza, and intensified its campaign of indiscriminate shelling of Israeli civilians. What may be unprecedented are the efforts undertaken by Israeli authorities to ensure that Gazans continue to have access to high-quality healthcare, even in such circumstances.

29. Recent reports, such as the Channel 4 programme "Unreported World—Gaza"[34], indicate that Hamas has been restricting Fatah supporters, and their families, access to medical treatment in Gaza.

30. A recent World Bank report describes how coordination with Israel ensured that the parts needed to improve the sewage handling system in northern Gaza were supplied.[35] This is in spite of pipes being a key component of the homemade rockets that are fired into Israel from Hamas-controlled Gaza.

31. There is evidence that Hamas has exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Gaza in order to create international pressure on Israel. Associated Press reported on 7 February 2008 that the Palestinian Red Crescent had complained when "policemen from Hamas halted 14 trucks filled with food and medicine at a checkpoint after it crossed an Israeli checkpoint into Gaza on Thursday."[36] Subsequent reporting by the Deutsche Presse-Agentur added that this was not the first time that Hamas had confiscated aid.[37] Additionally, an interview with the head of the Gaza power station has revealed that during the Gaza "blackout", the power station had already provided enough power for another three days.

32. There is little reporting of attacks on the terminals themselves. The crossing points between Israel and Gaza have been the target of attacks by Palestinian terrorists. In March 2004, two suicide bombers exited Gaza through the Karni crossing and detonated their explosive belts at the Ashdod port. Ten people were killed and 16 wounded. In August 2006, Israeli authorities discovered plans for a large-scale terror attack on the Karni crossing, which included planting explosives in a tunnel under the crossing. Searches revealed a 13 metre-deep shaft and 150 metre-long tunnel near the crossing. On 3 March 2008, a fuel truck entering Gaza from the Nahal Oz fuel terminal was subject to sniper fire.

33. The irony of Israel's position is illustrated by the fact that innocent Palestinians evacuated to Israeli hospitals for urgent care are themselves coming under rocket fire directed from Gaza at the Israeli hospital treating them.

34. In one incident, a Palestinian mother and her two premature babies, transferred out of Gaza via the Erez crossing and delivered at Ashkelon's Barzilai Hospital, were moved into a bomb-shelter to ensure that they were protected from Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire aimed at the hospital from northern Gaza.[38]

ISRAELI RESPONSE TO VIOLENT ATTACKS FROM GAZA

35. In the last seven years over 6,000 rockets and mortars have been fired at Israel from Gaza. In the face of these attacks Israel has acted with great restraint. However, no country can stand by and let these attacks continue without response.

36. Israel's western Negev communities have endured seven years of relentless rocket and mortar shell fire from Gaza.

37. Since 2001, over 6,000 rockets and mortars have been fired at Israel. These have been directly responsible for the deaths of 21 Israelis and the wounding of 620. However, this statistic does not take into account the massive psychological cost borne by the 190,000 Israelis who live within striking range and have at most 15 seconds of warning of a rocket attack.

38. Not only has the number of these rockets increased (249 rockets in 2001 to 1,645 in 2007), but the range has also increased from 3 km in 2001 to 22 km in 2007, bringing more Israel citizens within their reach.

39. The barrage of homemade rockets from Hamas-controlled Gaza has been augmented by military Katyusha rockets which carry a significantly larger warhead: 18 kg as compared to 4 kg. For comparative purposes, the 7 July 2005 suicide bombers each detonated 5-7 kg suicide bombs, killing 52 civilians and wounding 700.

40. Evidence shows that the situation in the Gaza Strip dramatically worsened as Hamas's influence and control grew stronger and violence escalated in spring 2007. Since the seizure of power in June 2007, Hamas has spawned a police state, severely impinging upon the fundamental civil liberties of Gaza's 1.4 million residents.

tabligh bil-hedour

41. Given Hamas's refusal to meet the Quartet requirements for engagement, it appears that the chance of a diplomatic solution to the situation is bleak.

42. Indeed Hamas does not see negotiations as means to reaching a long-lasting agreement in the region. The organisation's spokespeople state time and again that ceasefire agreements with Israel are only temporary measures and do not compromise Hamas's commitment to the destruction of the State of Israel. Fundamentally, Hamas is willing to engage in negotiations, but is not willing to change its mission or its methods. In fact, Hamas has used previous ceasefires to rearm and enhance its weapon stocks, further reiterating its perception that its engagement in pragmatic talks does not exclude its commitment to violent actions against Israel. As such, there is no point in negotiations simply for the sake of negotiations.

"hudna"

hudna

v. Its efficacy as a tool for the Palestinians, in the eyes of Hamas, was explained by Dr Mahmoud a-Zahar, one of the movement's leaders in Gaza, on 24 June 2005: "Hamas would definitely not be prepared for coexistence with Israel should the IDF retreat to its 1967 borders. It can be a temporary solution, for a maximum of five to 10 years. But in the end Palestine must return to become Muslim, and in the long term Israel will disappear from the face of the earth."[52]

43. Israel has limited options if Hamas will not talk. It is clear from numerous statements from IDF and government officials, such as Defence Minister Ehud Barak, that Israel does not want to go back into Gaza or undertake a large ground offensive. However, it cannot continue to absorb rocket attacks advancing deeper into Israel. Yet the problem that Israel faces is that it can only significantly decrease the rocket fire with ground troops in control of the area. Israel does not want to do this due to the risk of collateral damage to innocent Palestinian civilians in Gaza, as the territory is so densely populated and the nature of terror networks is that bomb factories are often in family houses and living rooms; there is also much evidence that children and innocents have been used as human shields. This is why Israel has been trying other means, such as targeted strikes on terrorist operatives and reducing certain supplies used to build the rockets.

44. Due to not wanting to use overwhelming force, Israel has had to try and find other means to pressure Hamas to cease the rockets; hence the reductions in fuel and electricity are designed to hamper the ability of terrorist groups to build and fire rockets at Israel. These measures also add to the policy of pressuring Hamas to reduce its violent attacks on Israel. They are not aimed at punishing the civilian population, as some have alleged. It should be noted again that Israel continues to ensure that the basic humanitarian needs of the civilian population are met.

45. The policy of distinguishing between the humanitarian needs of the civilian population of Gaza and those of the Hamas government is not restricted to Israel. In August 2007, the European Commission cut the supply of fuel to the Gaza Generating Company's power plant at Nusseirat for five days, citing concerns that the Hamas government planned to levy a tax on electricity bills. "We are ready to resume our support to the Gaza Power Plant within hours once we receive the appropriate assurances that all the funds will be exclusively used for the benefit of the Gaza population. . . . the Commission needs to be reassured that this will reach the real target: the Palestinians in need."[53]

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEGOTIATING WITH HAMAS

The demand for open negotiations with Hamas must take into account the effects this might have on the international effort to support peaceful forces in the region. The view of our own FCO is that such negotiations would undermine the moderate forces within Palestinian society, particularly with the PA led by Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, thus destroying the peace process.

46. In general, there is a broad regional and international consensus that the diplomatic track between Israel and the Palestinians should include all the actors committed to a peaceful future in the region, based on the two-state policy. This stance has been at the foundation of British foreign policy in the Middle East."[54]

47. The demand for open negotiations with Hamas must take into account the effects this would have on the international effort to support peaceful forces in the region and the undermining of moderate forces within Palestinian society.

48. As Israel's willingness to launch negotiations with the PLO leadership since the 1990s proves, talks with Hamas will become possible if the organisation renounces its rejection of negotiations based on a two-state solution, acknowledges Israel's right to exist and halts its explicit support for terrorism against Israel. Opening negotiations with Hamas without meeting these benchmarks will provide extremists with a moral and political victory.

49. Negotiations with Hamas would undoubtedly undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and the leadership of PA President Mahmoud Abbas.

50. Engagement with Hamas under the current circumstances would lead to an eventual replacement of the current moderate leadership by a hard-line Hamas administration—thus rewarding its use of extreme and violent practices.

51. As we have already seen in point 41 Hamas does not see negotiations as means to reaching a long-lasting agreement in the region.

CONTEXTUALISING ISRAEL'S RESPONSE

The term "disproportionate" is used freely to discuss Israel's response to terror attacks from Gaza. Before resorting to the use of this term, it is critical to recognise the extent of the threat Israel is up against, as well as the restraint Israel has exercised in avoiding a large-scale military incursion into Gaza.

52. Since 2001, over 6,000 rockets and mortars have been fired from Gaza into Israel.

53. The average rocket fired from Gaza into Israel contains 7-8 kg of explosives, with some, like the 122 mm Katyusha, able to carry a maximum of 18 kg in explosives.[55] For comparative purposes, the 7 July 2005 London tube suicide bombers each detonated 5-7 kg suicide bombs, killing 52 civilians and wounding 700.

54. February and March 2008 saw a dramatic increase in rocket attacks on Ashkelon. With 120,000 residents, it is Israel's 13th largest city. Ashkelon contains a proportion of Israel's citizens comparable to the number of British citizens resident in the city of Birmingham.

55. The range of Qassam and Katyusha rockets has increased steadily since 2001: in 2001, the range was about 3 km; in 2002, the range increased to 8 km; in 2003, the range increased to 10 km; in 2005, the range increased to 12 km; in 2006, the range increased to 15 km; and in 2007, the range increased to 22 km.[56]

56. Advances in rocket technology mean that Ashdod, Israel's 5th largest city with 204,000 residents, could soon fall within rocket range. Ashdod is about halfway between Gaza and Tel Aviv (32 km from Gaza and 35 km from Tel Aviv). It is one of Israel's major ports.

57. In Sderot, a 15-second warning is sounded when an incoming rocket is detected. This is a very short amount of time for people to stop what they are doing and run to find shelter. Sometimes the shelters are full when they are reached. The 15-second warning is not foolproof and does not always sound when a rocket is inbound.

58. As for Ashkelon, although the decision to activate the `Code Red' early warning system was made on 28 February 2008, residents have complained that they are unable to hear it. The system has also been activated in the nearby communities of Bat Hadar, Beit Shikma, Talmei Yafeh, Gia, Briha, Misha'an and Kfar Silver.[57]

59. While Sderot has been fitted with shelters (though certainly not as fully as necessary and unable to withstand the payloads of increasingly larger rockets), Ashkelon lacks similar availability of infrastructure. Ashkelon Mayor Roni Mehatzri remarked on 28 February that the city is essentially unprepared for this influx of rockets from Gaza.[58]

60. Hamas and other terror groups in Gaza harness the inaccuracy of Qassams as part of their terror strategy. Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar explained to the Sunday Telegraph in August 2007 that Hamas prefers rocket attacks to suicide bombings because rockets "cause mass migration, greatly disrupt daily lives and government administration, and make a much [larger] impact . . . We have no losses, and the impact on the Israeli side is so much."[59]

61. Israel has shown tremendous restraint during the past seven years of rocket attacks from Gaza. The 190,000 Israelis living within the rockets' striking range, particularly in the town of Sderot, have suffered physically, psychologically and economically.[60]

62. 90% of Sderot residents have experienced a Qassam falling on their own street or on an adjacent street. 30% of Sderot residents suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Children in Sderot exhibit higher levels of fear (62%), avoidance behaviour (50%), behavioural problems (22%), problems in school (28%), somatic (stress-related) problems (26%), regression (31%) and difficulty sleeping (47%) than any comparable Israeli city by population size and socio-economic demographics.[61]

63. Many of Sderot's businesses have been forced to close. Business at Sderot's only supermarket has fallen by 50%.[62]

64. During this time Israel has ensured that food and other necessary supplies, such as fuel, are imported to sustain the Gazan population. It has allowed Gazan patients requiring medical treatment to enter Israel for treatment in Israeli hospitals.[63] It has removed its residents and troops from Gaza through disengagement. Yet it is continually asked to pay the price of restraint, through ongoing trauma to its citizens.

65. Qassam rockets are made with basic supplies, but can evade the most advanced anti-rocket technology.

66. The rockets are made of easily obtained metal pipes (such as water pipes and road signs) filled with explosives and propellants, which in most cases are improvised and made of readily-available household supplies such as sugar and agricultural fertiliser.[64]

67. Rockets are made out of household items for two reasons: rocket manufacturers are aware that Israel will not prevent basic supplies such as sugar from reaching the Gaza Strip, and homemade rockets carry no manufacturing signature and therefore cannot be traced.[65]

68. Israel cannot prevent pipes being used for manufacturing rockets.

69. Israel has intercepted fertilizer shipments containing potassium nitrate because their use has been diverted for rocket manufacture.

70. Israel has explored numerous options for developing and activating anti-rocket technology for its residents living near Gaza. Unfortunately, the option that was expected to work, called the Iron Dome, will not be able to intercept Qassams that are airborne for less than 20 seconds.[66] This means that rockets fired from Beit Hanun in Gaza will still be able to hit Sderot. This would leave 4,400 homes outside the perimeter of protection.

71. Therefore, the only positive way forward is for Hamas to take the decision to stop launching rockets into Israel. If they do not do this, Israel has limited options.

72. A ceasefire, or "hudna", as offered by Hamas would not work. As explained, a hudna is neither a truce nor a genuine ceasefire, but is rather a tactical tool to gain a military advantage. Its efficacy as a tool for the Palestinians, in the eyes of Hamas, was explained by Dr Mahmoud a-Zahar, one of the movement's leaders in Gaza, on 24 June 2005 in the following terms: "Hamas would definitely not be prepared for coexistence with Israel should the IDF retreat to its 1967 borders. It can be a temporary solution, for a maximum of five to 10 years. But in the end Palestine must return to become Muslim, and in the long term Israel will disappear from the face of the earth."[67]

73. Israel could undertake a large-scale military operation in Gaza, but would prefer to avoid this option if possible, as confirmed by numerous statements from IDF and government officials, including Defence Minister Ehud Barak. It is likely that many casualties and deaths, numbering in the hundreds, would result among both the Gazan population and Israeli soldiers if a large-scale invasion takes place. Such an invasion could require 30,000 soldiers operating in up to three divisions.[68] Furthermore, an exit strategy is not at all assured: Israel may not be able to exit without an international force in place (similar to under Resolution 1701), as rocket attacks on Israel would simply resume. For perspective, this is more force than was required during the Second Lebanon War.

74. It is incumbent on Israel and the international community to scrutinise the Hamas negotiation option honestly and sensibly. Israel has and will always negotiate with those who are serious about achieving peace, provided its basic needs—having a negotiating partner who can provide genuine acceptance of Israel and deliver on security guarantees—are met. It would be irresponsible not to investigate Hamas's actions and motives.

THE CHECKPOINTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE SECURITY FENCE

Once the Palestinians have proven their ability to effectively contain the terror threat in the West Bank, Israel will be able to alter the security measures taken in the area, which include various means of monitoring Palestinian movement. The PA government can help speed up this process by taking more assertive steps to combat and confront terror infrastructure.

75. The Agreement on Movement and Access introduced the procedures for open movement to and within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli, Palestinian and international parties committed to the Agreement share the belief that the promotion of peaceful economic development and improvement of the humanitarian situation on the ground are vital for successful progress in the diplomatic process. Additionally, the Agreement clearly and repeatedly stipulates that "It is understood that security is a prime and continuing concern for Israel,"[69] and any implementation is dependent upon the fulfilment of these assurances.

76. Since the finalisation of the Agreement in November 2005, important events have altered the political, military and diplomatic reality in the region, which must be taken into account when assessing its implementation. These are:

77. Hamas's victory in the January 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the movement's refusal to back away from its support of violence and terror; and

78. The international community upholding its commitment to isolate Hamas.

79. This new situation significantly reduced Israel's ability to proceed with the implementation of the Agreement, and increased the need for heightened security measures.

80. Following Hamas's violent seizure of control in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the international community has reviewed its policy regarding its relations to the Palestinian leadership. The international community now makes clear distinctions between the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and the West Bank under the leadership of PA Chairman Abbas.[70]

81. In accordance with this new international policy, and as a result of increased security threats from the Gaza Strip, Israel has reinforced security measures in the border crossings into the Strip. This has affected the free flow of produce and trade in and out of the Gaza Strip, yet Israel remains committed to its policy of facilitating the transfer of food, medical supplies, and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in the Strip.

82. This change in policy does not breach Israel's commitments made in the Agreement on Movement and Access. The Agreement stipulates that border crossings will be jointly monitored by Palestinian forces and representatives of the Quartet. All of these monitoring forces have ceased their activity since June 2007, which requires adequate changes to be made on the Israeli side as well.

83. The Agreement on Movement and Access must be reconsidered in light of the complex political situation on the ground and the de facto division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

84. Talks to reach a new agreement on the management and monitoring of crossings into the Gaza Strip have been taking place under Egyptian auspices. This process will have to reinstall security measures and a full Palestinian commitment to take an active part in preventing any misuse of the crossing for hostile activities and for the strengthening of terror infrastructure. A firm mechanism of monitoring must be put in place to provide assurances that all sides are fully implementing their responsibilities.

85. Egypt will continue to play a fundamental role in establishing new procedures of passage and movement to and from the Gaza Strip. Since Hamas forces breached the border barrier between the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian-controlled Sinai Peninsula, Egypt has stepped up its involvement in the negotiations over the Gaza Strip border crossings and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

86. Egypt's involvement has been positively received by Israel's leadership and close contacts between Jerusalem and Cairo will continue until an adequate balance is found to reconcile the need for open movement of goods and people to and from the Gaza Strip with proper security measures.[71]

87. Since 14 June 2007, the Hamas-led administration has been replaced by a government under the premiership of Salam Fayyad. The new government has expressed its obligation to the negotiation process with Israel and has stated its rejection of violence.

88. The introduction of a new Palestinian leadership paved the way for renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. One of the key issues in the negotiations has been the easing of travel restrictions in the West Bank. Section 4 of the Agreement on Movement and Access states: "Consistent with Israel's security needs, to facilitate movement of people and goods within the West Bank and to minimise disruption to Palestinian lives."

89. Israel remains committed to the language of the Agreement: any easing of travel restrictions in the West Bank must be subject to assurances that these will not bring about increased security threats.

90. For this condition to be addressed, Palestinian security forces must be able successfully to confront existing terror infrastructure and prevent its reinforcement in the future.

91. This is not, and cannot be, a short-term process. Since November 2007, Palestinian forces have taken policing responsibilities in the West Bank city of Nablus[72], and recent reports indicate that similar steps will be taken in other West Bank cities.[73] Israel has recurrently stated its commitment to continue to support the gradual deployment of Palestinian forces in the West Bank.

92. Once the Palestinians have proven their ability to effectively contain the terror threat in the West Bank, Israel will be able to alter the security measures taken in the area, which include various means of monitoring Palestinian movement.

93. The PA government can help speed up this process by taking more assertive steps to combat and confront terror infrastructure. Specifically, the Palestinian leadership has to ensure that the legal procedures against those involved in terror are thorough and systematic, including a comprehensive process of prosecution and punishment. Partial execution of firm legal action sends a message of ambivalent consent to acts of violence, and hinders the prospects of further changes on the ground.