Examination of Witnesses (Questions 61-79)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MICHAEL
ANDERSON AND
MR JOHN
JENKINS
20 MAY 2008
Q61 Chairman: Secretary of State and
colleagues, thank you very much for coming to give evidence to
us on our brief update inquiry on the situation in the occupied
territories of Palestine. We produced a report about 18 months
ago and we are now conducting a London-based inquiry to try to
bring ourselves up to speed with how things have developed. A
good number of things have happened since. For the record, perhaps
you would introduce your team.
Mr Alexander: It
is a pleasure to be before the International Development Committee.
To introduce my colleagues, John Jenkins is head of Middle East
and North Africa Directorate in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Given the interrelationship of aid and the peace process it seemed
appropriate to be supported by a colleague from the FCO. Michael
Anderson is head of the Iraq and Middle East Group within the
Department for International Development. With the Committee's
permission, I propose to bring in both of my co-witnesses at the
appropriate stage.
Q62 Chairman: Thank you for putting
that on the record. We had evidence from John Ging[1]
via a video link direct from Gaza. He gave pretty stark and shocking
evidence about the situation on the ground. He said it was a shameful
situation and there was real suffering. He quoted statistics in
relation to the numbers killed. He reported that 334 Palestinians
had been killed and 756 injured in Gaza since the beginning of
2008. These figures included 60 children killed and 175 injured.
He gave a catalogue of disruption and a shortage of food and fuel
supplies. Even those who were dependent on the UN for food distribution
did not get it for a period because it was unable to provide it.
Perhaps I may start by asking you for your department's assessment
of the humanitarian impact of the closure of the crossings and
the effective isolation of the people in Gaza. Obviously, we are
aware of the fact that you, Tony Blair and others have made calls
for the crossings to be opened and relaxed and to allow in supplies,
but what have been the results of that? How bad is the situation
from the department's point of view, and what effect is its engagement
having on improving the situation and creating access to essential
supplies?
Mr Alexander: In preparing for
this meeting of the Committee obviously I familiarised myself
with the evidence of my immediate predecessor Hilary Benn in the
session that gave rise to your previous report on the situation.
If I correctly recollect, he described the situation as pretty
grim. In that sense I am afraid that I come before the Committee
with equally dispiriting news in terms of the humanitarian situation.
To take the relevant parts of your question, first, we are seriously
concerned about the humanitarian situation about which I will
say a word and then move on to the issue of movement and access.
The indicators available to us, the principal sources of which
are both OCHA[2]
and other UN agencies within Gaza, paint a very bleak picture.
Ninety per cent of the water is polluted and over one million
Gazans are dependent on some form of food aid. To take a couple
of other statistics to put into context our discussion, there
is a prevalence of anaemia in children aged nine to 12 months
which has risen from 67.8 per cent in January 2007 to 69 per cent
in August 2007. In the year to 2007 diarrhoea among children has
increased by 20 per cent. Twenty to 30 per cent of wells do not
work properly due to power cuts and fuel shortages, and 60 million
tons of raw and partially treated sewage flows into the Mediterranean
every day. Food prices, which is a source of concern and discussion
far beyond the boundaries of Gaza, have increased by 17 per cent
in the year to March 2008, and 76 per cent of Gazans—over
one million people—are in part dependent on food aid. As
to the related point raised in your first question, we judge the
partial closure of the Gaza closings since Israel declared Gaza
a hostile entity in September 2007 in response to the Qassam rocket
attacks to be the principal cause of the deterioration, although
other factors, including the ongoing violence, have contributed
to the deterioration that I have described. Not only do the shortages
cause difficulties in terms of humanitarian supplies accessing
Gaza and the population therein but they also at a very basic
level increase the costs of the efforts of agencies like the World
Food Programme (WFP) to deliver aid. The WFP has calculated that
additional cost created by Israel's food clearance procedures
will reach $6 million in 2008-09 alone. Health infrastructure
and equipment are deteriorating or breaking down, not least as
a result of frequent power cuts and surges which damage dialysis
equipment. To deal specifically with fuel before I come to the
efforts we have been making, that situation came to a head last
April when a militant attack on the Nahal Oz fuel pipeline closed
fuel supplies. That was temporarily stopped. That was exacerbated
by a prolonged strike by the Association of Gas Distributors in
Gaza. Supplies of ordinary fuel and cooking gas are therefore
severely limited. Reports in mid-April stated that 12 per cent
of Ministry of Health staff were reporting late to work due to
lack of transport and fuel cuts also shut Gaza's main power plant
from 10 to 11 May. The cuts have left humanitarian agencies working
within Gaza with little or no fuel. UNRWA's operations were suspended
for several days at the end of April. Some fuel and gas are now
flowing again but supply does not meet the manifest needs and
could be cut off at any time. In terms of the response of the
British Government I will say a word about the Quartet envoy in
a moment. I can assure the Committee that we continue to raise
directly with the Government of Israel the concerns reflective
of the situation on the ground both in private and public. I and
the Foreign Secretary David Miliband have issued three public
statements on 11 and 21 January and 8 February specifically related
to the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the issue of movement
and access that you describe. I can assure you that in addition
to those public comments these are matters we continue to press
directly with the Israeli authorities. In relation to the actions
of the Quartet, I last spoke directly to Tony Blair when he was
here at the curtain-raising event for the Palestinian Investment
Conference, to which I will travel in a few hours' time. Again,
both in his contribution to the AHLC[3]
meeting that took place in Lancaster House and in private conversation
it was equally clear that he continues to press the Israeli Government
on the issue of movement and access.
Q63 Chairman: Thank you for that update.
John Ging's written evidence provided some of the information
you have just given as well as his own impression of it. The particular
point he made was that this was not a stage-managed crisis. There
have been some suggestions that it has been blown up. He said:
"It is a reality for Gaza's 1.5 million residents."
When you look at proportionality, everybody understands that Israel
is under severe pressure from rocket attacks on civilians and
that causes a great deal of concern, fear and anger within Israel.
Nobody underestimates the fact that whilst these rockets are not
very well directed and do not hit many people they terrify an
awful lot of the population, but the casualties and disruption
in Gaza are extremely severe. The reality is that unless the crossings
are opened and people can get goods and supplies in and out the
situation moves pretty close to crisis. The impression one gets
is that Israel will stop short of starving people out but pretty
well up to that point almost everything else can be restricted.
How could UK pressure turn round that situation? We are not talking
about somewhere that is cut off from the world in the sense it
is remote; it is next to a highly developed economy and there
are supplies people need very close by but they just cannot get
through. What is the effect of pressure by the UK and the international
community to provide a means of delivering that? John Ging also
made the point that the restriction on supplies into Gaza had
severely affected the humanitarian condition but it had not stopped
the rockets; in other words, the two do not seem to be connected.
What can we do to improve that situation?
Mr Alexander: Clearly, we look
to Hamas within Gaza in terms of the rocket attacks that continue
to afflict Sderot in the southern part of Israel to take what
action is within its power to end them. As to what action we can
take, we continue to fund UNRWA and other humanitarian agencies
amidst all the difficulties that your evidence clearly manifests.
We continue to work the political and diplomatic tracks to try
to effect change, but this is part of a broader peace process.
I should also mention that in the recent discussions between Gordon
Brown and Prime Minister Olmert of Israel this was one of the
issues discussed. It was also a key message in what was quite
a strong statement from the Quartet during its meeting that took
place simultaneously with the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee just a
couple of weeks ago in London. We continue to press the case for
a UN access cell which we regard as a practical means by which
we can secure the humanitarian access required by Gaza.
Mr Anderson: The humanitarian
access cell is a very practical measure. We are looking to fund
up to £800,000 to provide seven plus one UN officials to
be on call 24 hours a day, to anticipate when people will need
to use the crossings and to make sure that liaison with Israelis
is effective, proactive and done in advance so that people can
get through. We were particularly concerned about the benefits
this could have for emergency medical cases where in the past
people have been stuck at places like Erez unable to get across
and unable to receive treatment. We are doing two things. On the
one hand, we are pursuing the diplomatic front on a regular basis;
there is routine discussion with the Israeli Defence Force to
ensure they are doing everything they can to open up. On the other
hand, we are taking very practical measures to try to facilitate
movement and ensure that the relief effort is not impeded.[4]
Q64 Chairman: Was that decision taken
at the meeting in London on 2 May?
Mr Alexander: You can appreciate
how frustrating it is given the scale of effort we are making
in terms of both the humanitarian response and the political input.
There is no direct correlation between British effort and results
on the ground. In that sense it is important that we continue
to work with our international partners. Perhaps Mr Jenkins can
say a word about the continuing work with the UN, the Quartet
and others to press the case for change on the ground.
Mr Jenkins: I was Consul General
in Jerusalem for nearly four years. To have a practical impact
on the ground there needs to be a collective international response,
in particular through the UN which with UNRWA has the most significant
international presence in Gaza and the EU which has the most significant
level of donor funding available, together with other willing
donors including regional partners like Egypt which has a major
role to play in the southern Rafah crossing. That aspect is critical.
The access cell is one aspect of the work that the UN has been
trying to do on the crossing points. I think it has been very
creative in thinking about how to link up humanitarian access
issues with security issues which are also critical to Israel.
That is the lever by which you will get these things open in the
end. General Dayton, the US Security Co-ordinator, is involved
in this as well along with General Jones and we are also providing
support to them. We have been working very hard with them for
a long time to come up with practical plans to get these crossings
open. It is all linked together in that way.
Mr Alexander: In no way wishing
to diminish the issue of movement and access and the powerful
evidence you have already received, I should like to make clear
that we are continuing to get aid into Gaza. For the record it
is worth giving a sense of the continuing efforts we are making
despite the very severe restraints under which we are working.
In 2008-09 we have given £17 million to UNRWA which will
help provide health education and other services, given that 70
per cent of Gazans are designated as refugees. We would expect
to provide a further £2 million to UNRWA based on performance.
The UK's contributions to the Commission's PEGASE mechanism also
helped to provide allowances to 77,000 key workers such as doctors,
nurses and also engineers engaged in Gaza power supply. As a department
we have also given £2 million humanitarian support for Gaza
and the West Bank through the ICRC[5]
as recently as March, and as late as last year DFID provided £3
million to help pay debts for the Palestinian Authority with the
private sector which benefited firms within Gaza. We are continuing
to press the case for the provision of humanitarian support, but,
as Mr Jenkins' comments reflected, none of us would deny the inter-relationship
between the political process and the ability to achieve the scale
of change on the ground we would like to see.
Q65 Chairman: All I would say is that
the evidence we have both in writing and verbally from John Ging
reinforced the point he made that vital public services are in
a pathetic state. He gave detailed, horrific descriptions verbally
as well as in writing. There was one comment—which was perfectly
understandable—from an Israeli source saying that Israel
was being attacked with rockets while normal life carried on in
Gaza. What is described by UNRWA is not normal life under any
circumstances that would be tolerable. I take it you accept that.
Mr Alexander: If one looks at
the deterioration in the economy in Gaza—never mind the
public services you describe—the situation is far from normal.
We are seized of both the urgency and importance of trying to
find a way through very challenging political circumstances.
Q66 Richard Burden: Perhaps I may
seek further clarification on what is happening as regards the
crossings, in particular the discussions with the UN which you
say are proceeding in a cautiously optimistic direction. What
confidence can we have that that is likely to be different from
the saga of EU monitors at Rafah? The EU monitors were there to
observe that everything that happened at the Rafah crossing was
above board but half the time they could not get to that crossing
because the Israelis stopped them and, therefore, the crossing
was shut. Why should this system not be equally entirely dependent
on the grace and favour of Israel as the Rafah crossing?
Mr Anderson: There is absolutely
no doubt that the effectiveness of crossings with the UN access
cell or any other initiative will depend on the goodwill of the
Israeli authorities because they regard their vital security interests
as being at stake. That will continue to be the reality, so the
key to success is building the confidence of the Israelis that
their security concerns are being taken into account. There is
an important difference between the UN access cell and the EUBAM[6]
mission in Rafah. The EUBAM mission was there to do some monitoring
of a crossing that was controlled by other people, so it was to
provide overall assurances. A lot of the obstructive actions taken
on EUBAM had to do with the Israeli position in respect of Corporal
Shalit. It was clearly the case that if we had had some kind of
agreement for Corporal Shalit to be released we would have had
much better co-operation from the Israelis on EUBAM. That kind
of political reality will remain the situation in Gaza. If we
are concerned about making a real impact on the dire humanitarian
situation in Gaza we need to accept that reality and work very
closely with the Israelis to ensure that they have the confidence
to open up the crossings. In terms of ultimate confidence in whether
the access cell will possibly be frustrated, of course it will
be frustrated sometimes, but that is the reality in which we are
working. What we can do is make sure that what we do is as professional,
efficient and proactive as possible and so give the Palestinians
the best possible chance of making crossings in these circumstances.
Mr Jenkins: I should like to make
one point about EUBAM and the monitors at Rafah. I was there when
we did the deal. I thought EUBAM worked pretty well. There were
interruptions which as time went on increased; it became patchier,
but it did get that crossing open and effectively kept it open
until June of last year. I believed that it was quite a creative
response and an unusual one in the sense that it was the first
example of which I am aware in the Middle East where there was
acceptance by the Israelis of a third party doing some sort of
monitoring on their behalf at a border which mattered to them.
In a minor way that was something of a breakthrough. What affected
EUBAM were developments on the ground in Gaza in June 2007, but
it could have continued. It was the one bit of the agreement on
movement and access which lasted and worked.
Q67 Richard Burden: Perhaps you could
talk briefly about Karni specifically and what is happening there.
The reports are that it is closed most of the time. One hopes
that the kind of initiatives you have talked about will help.
For the record, in your view what is it that stops Karni being
opened? Is there a security concern around Karni as opposed to
concern in relation to something else, for example Corporal Shalit,
that stops it being opened? If so, what is that security concern?
Mr Jenkins: The Israelis have
had security concerns about Karni for a long time. I think there
were a number of attacks, one actual and one or maybe two abortive
attacks, on Karni back in 2006 when I was there. A large part
of what General Dayton was trying to do at the time was develop
a kind of cordon sanitaire arrangement at Karni which would stop
these attacks. The attacks we saw at Karni then were analogous
to the attack on the Nahal Oz crossing in the sense there were
people within Gaza who wanted to interrupt the operation of those
two interlinked crossings. It goes back to the centrality of security
as an issue in unlocking this conundrum. What do you do about
access and crossings? You need to get that right to make the crossings
function on a sustainable basis. At Rafah security did not work.
You need some sort of regime that makes security work for everybody.
The Israelis would say that they do not have that assurance yet
about Karni. I know it is something that General Dayton has focused
on for something over a year.
Q68 Richard Burden: But Israel and
nobody else controls Karni; it decides whether it is open or closed.
If there is anything to be checked going through Karni they will
do it for their own security reasons. They have in practice created
a cordon sanitaire around Karni anyway. Given all that, what more
could be done to resolve their security concerns; or is it just
a matter of saying that some time in the future somebody somewhere
might attack Karni? That is true, but nobody could ever give such
a guarantee against that.
Mr Anderson: There are four elements.
First, the closure of the crossings regime is partly directed
by security concerns and is partly a political strategy on the
part of Israel to put pressure on Hamas to sign up to the Quartet
principles. Therefore, the decisions that have been taken about
crossings are partly about security but they are also part of
a broader political agenda. Clearly, there is a political element
to this equation. Second, the Israelis have created a cordon sanitaire,
but in the end if the crossings are to work there will have to
be a credible Palestinian side of the crossing. In the nature
of crossings, there are two sides. At the moment we do not have
the kind of conditions in which the PA[7]
can put in credible forces, ideally the Presidential Guard. Third,
the infrastructure and equipment at Karni need to be upgraded.
Wolfensohn dealt with this in part when he was on the case. Lieutenant
General Dayton has continued with plans for how Karni can be upgraded.
Clearly, there are infrastructure improvements at Karni so it
could be made much more secure. Fourth, there is a question as
to the intelligence patch around Karni and the management of information
in and out; it is about who is coming, what their purposes are
and so on. That could be greatly improved. A whole package of
things would be needed in order to make Karni the kind of efficient
crossing envisaged in the agreement on movement and access in
November 2005.
Q69 Richard Burden: To put a question
of fact, the US security co-ordinator was assigned to Karni and
then removed. Is he back? Is he assigned to the Karni project?
Mr Jenkins: Are you talking about
Keith Dayton?
Q70 Richard Burden: Yes.
Mr Jenkins: He still has plans
for Karni. I am not entirely sure of the status of those plans
as we sit here today.
Q71 Richard Burden: But Karni is
still part of the plans?
Mr Jenkins: Yes, indeed.
Q72 Hugh Bayley: Ever since the land
for peace deal fell apart the prospects for peace have moved backwards
despite the best efforts of the Quartet. It is easy to point the
finger at failures of Palestinian or Israeli leadership, but the
fact is that we are now further from a peace settlement than we
were last year, and last year we were further from a settlement
than the year before. It seems to me absolutely essential that
the siege on Gaza is lifted. Economic deprivation is a better
recruiting sergeant for extremism than the use of force. I know
that both our government and the Quartet have issued statements
saying very clearly that humanitarian needs should be addressed
but they seem to have no effect. It seems to me incredible that
world powers cannot use pressure, including economic pressure,
to achieve some change in the circumstances of the Palestinian
people, especially in Gaza. Why is it that more than words are
not apparent from the Quartet?
Mr Alexander: With respect, there
is a lot more than words. The European Union is the largest funder
of humanitarian support and assistance to the Palestinian Authority.
Notwithstanding the very real constraints under which efforts
by the international community operate they continue. It is hard
to overstate, as Mr Anderson's answer anticipated, the inter-relationship
between the views taken by the Government of Israel towards the
security threat it faces and continuing rocket attacks from within
Gaza and the broader political process in the Middle East. In
that sense my answer to your question would be to say that we
need to continue to be unstinting in our efforts both to provide
the long-term support so we can see the emergence of a viable
two-state solution, which means continuing to support the Palestinian
Authority and the longer state-building process in which it is
engaged, as well as provide the immediate humanitarian supplies
that are so desperately needed but, at the same time, seek every
opportunity as an international community constructively to engage
with all sides in that peace process. I do not underestimate the
sense of frustration that clearly you and we feel at the slowness
of the progress made, but when you say we need more than words
I point to the very real decisions reached in Paris in December
where $7.7 billion was committed by the international community
to manifest in a financial sense the potential benefits that could
accrue to the people of the occupied Palestinian territories if
we are able to secure the kind of breakthrough we want. That matters
not simply in relation to the West Bank but also in relation to
Gaza. To be able to persuade the Israeli Government that it does
not face the kind of security threats it has experienced to date
from what it has now designated a hostile entity requires the
success of that broader peace process. I struggle to see how we
could have a breakthrough on Gaza without a broader breakthrough
in the Annapolis process. As to the latter, that would be one
other point on which, with respect, I might take issue with you
in the sense that 2007 was a pretty uniformly bleak year for the
prospects of progress in the Middle East. Notwithstanding that
disappointment, the fact is that real negotiations are now under
way as a result of Annapolis and to an unprecedented extent the
international community has supported it, not simply in terms
of attendance at the original meetings in Maryland but also in
reinforcing it with financial commitments in December. We have
also sought to sustain that progress through meetings of the AHLC
here in London and also at a further Quartet meeting which issued
a stronger statement on issues like settlement and the humanitarian
needs of Gaza than I can recollect. That means the international
community continues to press the case for negotiations. A judgment
has been made on those negotiations by the principal parties—we
may get to those issues in due course—that they do not want
to send out public messages on the progress being made against
what are continuing fundamental disagreements on issues for negotiation.
But the clearest indications we have—Mr Jenkins from the
FCO point of view is better qualified than I to discuss them—are
that there are real and substantive negotiations under way. Substantive
discussions are taking place not simply between Mahmoud Abbas
and Prime Minister Olmert but also between the Foreign Minister
and the Palestinian Authority's chief negotiator twice weekly.
Given how difficult these issues are, we need to be respectful
of the right of negotiators to proceed in a way that they judge
most likely to yield the outcome that we seek.
Mr Jenkins: It is critical that
Gaza remains part of the goal of the Palestinian state for which
we are all aiming. When one talks about Gaza, it remains an integral
part of what we think will be the eventual Palestinian state of
Gaza and the West Bank. That certainly remains the position of
the Palestinian Authority. In terms of the negotiations that have
taken place, we are told by Abu Mazen, Olmert and Livni, Abu Ala
and Saeb Erekat that they are starting to drill down into some
of the key issues particularly borders and water. As I understand
it, there has been some detailed discussion about Jerusalem and
the right of return of refugees. This is the first time since
2000 that this has happened. We are not privy to the details because,
as the Secretary of State says, the parties have said they want
to keep them confidential. I know there is a lot of scepticism
here and possibly more in the Middle East than anywhere else about
these negotiations and where they are going, but given it is the
first time there has been a structured dialogue and discussion
and they are talking about the key final status issues and want
to keep the details confidential, because in the past when they
have been leaked they have undermined the whole process, what
we have to do is try to find ways to support that practically.
That brings me back to the issue of Gaza and what we do about
access and so forth which is an integral part of trying to sustain
a Palestinian Authority and the negotiations on the part of the
PA which can make some sort of progress on these issues. When
one bears in mind that in Gaza we are historically the third biggest
donor to UNRWA and something like 55 per cent of the Palestinian
Authority budget which is sustained by donors goes into Gaza mostly
in the form of salaries, there is a real practical link between
the assistance we provide and sustaining conditions as far as
we can in Gaza and giving Abu Mazen and Salaam Fayyad[8]
a platform on which they can continue negotiations with the Israelis.
The situation is not great but it is better than it was this time
last year because we have a negotiating process which we simply
did not have.
Q73 Hugh Bayley: I hope you are right.
Secretary of State, both you and Mr Jenkins cited UK aid as something
that went beyond words, which I accept is absolutely right, but
since June of last year what proportion of UK aid to the Palestinians
has been routed specifically to Gaza?
Mr Anderson: UNRWA's estimate
is that 46 per cent of the overall aid goes to the Palestinian
territories together. They do not have a breakdown as between
Gaza and the West Bank, but not a bad indicator of this is where
the PA budget goes. The PA estimates that approximately 55 per
cent of its budget goes to Gaza.
Q74 Hugh Bayley: But there are big
worries, are there not? For instance, the salaries of Palestinian
Authority officials in Gaza are of course paid but the officials
are not in a position to do any work because their bosses are
not in Gaza?
Mr Anderson: The bulk of the money
goes into frontline workers and education and health. We have
had problems with strikes and so on.
Q75 Hugh Bayley: Obviously, UNRWA
must have figures to show where the money is spent. Would you
be able to obtain from UNRWA and let us have the breakdown of
expenditure between the West Bank and Gaza because there is a
real concern? Given the enormously greater economic pressure on
Gaza than on even the West Bank and that aid is to provide humanitarian
relief because normal economic circumstances do not exist, we
must make sure that sufficient aid is applied to provide for humanitarian
basic needs which it is intended to supply in Gaza as well as
the West Bank. Your answer does not tell me that that is happening.
Mr Anderson: We are very happy
to go back to UNRWA to ask again to see whether or not they can
give us a breakdown. The difficulty for UNRWA in the past in giving
a breakdown is that a lot of its sourcing is global and it does
not have good data on the distribution of some it. We are very
happy to go back and ask for that again.[9]
Q76 Hugh Bayley: Given the incredible
difficulties in getting material in and out of Gaza, it must be
possible to determine which trucks taking UNRWA goods and service
got through and which did not?
Mr Anderson: The details on exactly
which shipments and in what quantities are going in when are available.
We have data on that if you would find that helpful.
Q77 Hugh Bayley: I think it would
be helpful.
Mr Anderson: We can provide that.
Q78 Hugh Bayley: To try to be optimistic,
until the siege on Gaza is lifted the economic prospects are absolutely
dire and the political consequences which I have already mentioned
are in my view entirely negative to the peace process. To what
extent will the Palestinian Investment Conference look at investment
in Gaza and will creating conditions in which investment in enterprises
that can operate be one of the priorities for the conference?
Mr Alexander: It will be one of
the functions of the conference. I say that on the basis that
I along with the Prime Minister hosted the curtain-raising event
for the event that takes place in Bethlehem tomorrow which I will
attend. There was a prominent focus on Gaza along with the economic
opportunities on the West Bank at the curtain-raiser. One of the
confidence-building measures of the Quartet's special envoy, Tony
Blair, is the extension and development of the sewage treatment
plant in Gaza. That is one of the specific projects that has been
identified. I can give you the assurance that is one of the continuing
focuses of the conference. If it is helpful perhaps I can write
to the Committee having attended the conference and give more
detail about the discussions that take place.[10]
Mr Anderson: There is a specific
session at the Palestinian Investment Conference on Gaza that
will focus on economic issues. There is a lot of opportunity there
for infrastructure investment. Bear in mind that prior to June
2007 Gaza along with Nablus were a very important part of the
overall Palestinian economy. In terms of exports to the EU, many
of which are agricultural, Gaza is a major source. Therefore,
the economic opportunities in Gaza, if we can open up movement
and access, are very substantial. The Palestinian Investment Conference
which starts tomorrow will have on the table $1.8 billion worth
of project proposals. The UK Government has put in a lot of effort.
It has funded Ernst & Young to go in and make sure that these
project proposals provide a credible prospectus with a business
case and good details on the information that investors need to
make investment proposals. We think that a large number of these
will be viable even in the absence of liberalisation of movement
and access. Obviously, economic growth particularly in Gaza will
depend on movement and access liberalisation, but we can make
an important start. Leadership on this has been shown by Salaam
Fayyad who by background is an economist who believes strongly—we
support his assessment—that a lot can be done even in current
circumstances. Therefore, we feel that there is no excuse just
to sit back and wait for movement and access to open up. We can
make real progress, get the investment started and begin to get
the wheels moving on this.
Q79 Sir Robert Smith: Dealing with
the humanitarian situation caused by the siege which you have
all agreed is dire, you have talked about various funding that
DFID is doing in the region. Specifically UNRWA has asked for
$168 million of emergency funds and so far only $90 million has
been pledged. Given the severity of the situation that we have
all agreed upon, does DFID have any plans to put any money into
that emergency appeal?
Mr Anderson: We negotiated what
was then a unique five-year agreement with UNRWA in March 2007.
The deal we put on the table with UNRWA is that we would provide
them with predictable funding over a period of years. It has two
components: a core tranche which is very substantial—it
is £17 million this year—and a performance tranche
of an additional £2 million. One of the objectives was to
provide predictable funding. A second objective was to create
strong incentives for UNRWA to reform and be more effective particularly
in monitoring and evaluating its work. A third message to UNRWA
in general was that we wanted it to begin to operate in a situation
where funding spikes would be a routine part of the work it did
and it should plan for them in advance. We wanted UNRWA to get
away from lurching from crisis to crisis. UNRWA got in the business
of funding some of its core activities through emergency appeals.
We are trying to shift it back to a position where it is funding
its core activities much better. Not only has our aid for UNRWA
increased; we have been urging others to join in this approach
and increase the overall profile for UNRWA funding in the entire
donor community. Part of the consequence of that is that we were
urging donors to increase on a sustained basis the level of support
for UNRWA and we would not necessarily look to UNRWA as the only
vehicle for dealing with crises. In March we made a commitment
of an additional £2 million to the International Committee
of the Red Cross, in part because UNRWA alone is not ideally situated
to deal with surges in need. Therefore, the surge in need which
you have rightly identified is great at the moment and is not
fully subscribed to. We have taken the decision to put a greater
portion of our funding into core budget support for the Palestinian
Authority following consultation with Salaam Fayyad. We put it
on the table and asked whether he wanted more money in the core
budget to make sure that salaries were being paid or emergency
assistance through UNRWA. There are two arguments. One is that
in order to build up the capacity of the Palestinian Authority
you need to continue to work with it rather than through parallel
systems. As good as UNRWA is it is still a parallel system. The
second argument is that this is a more sustainable response than
lurching from crisis to crisis. We hope that other donors will
come to the table. Other donors are less willing than the UK to
provide budget support. Although the $7.7 billion pledged in Paris
is not yet committed we hope that they will help to fund that
gap, but at the moment we think that the UK has a credible set
of reasons why it does not plan to do that.
Mr Alexander: At the same time
that this is identified as a humanitarian need there is also an
identified fiscal crisis facing the PA. In that sense in part
the judgment that has to be reached, given that salaries are paid
both to Gaza as well as West Bank civil servants and public service
workers, is how we balance our innovative and long-term approach,
which is what UNRWA seeks, with sustaining the only entity that
is capable of being a credible negotiating partner for the peace
process which underpins the prospects for resolving both the humanitarian
crisis and the broader political challenge that we face.
1 The Director of Operations (Gaza) for the UN Relief
& Works Agency (UNRWA) Back
2
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Back
3
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Back
4
Ev 54 Back
5
International Committee of the Red Cross Back
6
EU Border Assistance Mission Back
7
Palestinian Authority Back
8
The Prime-Minister of the Palestinian Government Back
9
Ev 51 Back
10
Ev 51 Back
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