Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-108)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MICHAEL
ANDERSON AND
MR JOHN
JENKINS
20 MAY 2008
Q100 Chairman: When we produced our
previous report the most shocking thing on the West Bank—we
did not go to Gaza—was how obstructive the roadblocks and
various other barriers were. When I was speaking at a Palestinian
reception across the road I simply said it was great that $7.7
billion had been offered in aid and development but it was difficult
to see how that could be spent if people could not move around
and engage in normal activities. I received a pretty rapturous
reception for just saying that. All I did was point out something
which was fairly obvious, but it is a huge problem. It appears
that since we reported the number of obstacles has gone up. According
to OCHA following a detailed field survey completed on 18 March
2008 obstacles to movement in the West Bank increased to 612.
This represents an increase of 236 obstacles over the baseline
figure of August 2005. The Government of Israel claims to have
removed 61 obstacles from the West Bank, which is only a fraction
of the number, but OCHA says that when it checked it found that
of those six had not been removed, 11 did not exist, 17 were insignificant,
nine were of minimal significance and 30 had very recently been
put in place. It does not seem to me that there is a realistic
engagement given that Israel is increasing the number of obstacles
and making the situation worse and then claiming the removal of
obstacles which did not exist or do not really count. Is there
any serious engagement in this very practical issue? When you
visit the West Bank and see it you can understand that no one
can do normal business in that situation.
Mr Alexander: My experience when
I visited in December was very similar to yours. The first visit
I made on my arrival was to OCHA's headquarters where I was given
a presentation. You probably had it. One is taken to where the
physical barriers exist. OCHA remains the most authoritative source
in terms of numbers. The figures we have within the department
show that as recently as 18 March there were 612 physical barriers
including checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds, trenches, fences
and gates. That represents a 61 per cent increase in the situation
at the time of the Agreement on Movement and Access, with a baseline
of 376 in November 2005. As to the prospects for forward movement
on this issue, on 30 March this year Defence Minister Barak indicated
that measures would ease movement and access on the West Bank
and the easing of restrictions on businessmen and suggested a
target of 50 roadblocks which would involve clearance by the Israelis.
My recollection is that since that announcement was made only
five significant obstacles have been removed notwithstanding the
61 that you described. That gives a sense of how slow progress
is on this issue. In addition to the statement made by Mr Barak,
amidst a rather bleak outlook on the whole issue of movement and
access the other small point of light that I identify is the continuing
work of Tony Blair as special envoy of the Quartet to try to identify
the specific roadblocks that have the greatest impact on the Palestinian
economy.
Mr Jenkins: One of OCHA's great
achievements is to have become the respected international interlocutor
of the Israeli Defence Force in talking about these obstacles
and barriers. We did not have one before and it was difficult
for OCHA to get into that position. It was done under David Shearer,
the former head of OCHA, in Jerusalem. As far as I know, that
continues which means that there is at least a basis for having
this conversation with the IDF. The IDF simply will not say, as
it said before characteristically, that these figures are wrong.
I believe that to have a common data set as we have now is good.
It has not impacted on the number of obstacles although that has
fluctuated over the past four or five years, but the sort of approach
that Tony Blair is trying to pioneer in Jenin in expanding space
around an urban commercial centre, dealing with security and economic
and social issues at the same time with Salaam Fayyad and the
Palestinian Authority who are very keen on this, seems to me to
be the right approach. It will be slow.
Q101 Chairman: But do you believe
you are seriously engaging with Israel when it makes claims that
are, to put it mildly, disingenuous? I have just double-checked
what the Secretary of State said. I have added up the ones that
they said did not count. That leaves five out of 61 which presumably
did count. Therefore, if the Government of Israel says that it
has removed 61 and OCHA can quickly say that of those 56 are for
all practical purposes irrelevant or do not exist, what is your
assessment of how successful Tony Blair can be in Jenin given
that the Israeli authorities have the right at any time to move
in and close it down if they feel their security is threatened?
Are they really serious about engagement in this?
Mr Alexander: Frustrating and
disappointing though the pace of progress is on this issue, candidly
in conversation with the Israelis it is almost impossible to talk
about the number of constraints on movement and access without
having a dialogue about the number of suicide attacks because
they see a mechanistic relationship between the strengthening
of the barriers to movement and access within the West Bank and
the very significant decline in terms of the number of suicide
bombing attacks within Israel. In that sense we just need to be
honest with each other as to the rationale behind the approach
that the Israelis have taken to this issue. They feel that they
face an existential threat and there is public support behind
the action that has been taken. That is not to say that we are
in every instance in agreement with them in terms of the specific
measures that have been taken, but at least we need to understand
the rationale they adopt. It is not coincidental that the conversations
I have had on the issue have been with the Defence Minister.
Q102 Chairman: But is it not also
true that quite a lot of these roadblocks and obstructions are
not to protect the state of Israel but to protect illegal settlements
within the West Bank? Therefore, one argument may be valid but
that argument is not.
Mr Alexander: I hold no brief
to speak on behalf of the Israeli state. Our position in terms
of settlements is that they are, as you suggest, illegal. Equally,
it is right to recognise that that is not the position that the
IDF takes when an illegal settlement is established. It takes
the view operationally that its responsibility then is to defend
and protect citizens of Israel. There are immediate consequential
impacts, namely a security cordon is established and buildings
are demolished with all of the damaging consequences with which
this Committee is familiar. In that sense the fact that we continue
to disagree with the Government of Israel in terms of the legality
of these outposts and settlements does not diminish the fact that
the Israelis take a contrary view in terms of both settlements
and outposts. As to engagement by the Quartet's envoy Tony Blair,
I spoke to him ahead of the AHLC meeting and the Quartet meeting
in London a couple of weeks ago about whether at that stage we
were in a position where there would be significant movement from
Israel in terms of the removal of roadblocks. Unsurprisingly,
given that there was not significant movement even before the
conference he was able to say that there had not been the movement
he wanted. On the other hand, it rather echoes the statement I
made in terms of the broader challenge of Annapolis. It is hard
to think of a better alternative than to continue to work through
every channel we have, including the office of the special representative
of the Quartet, to try to make the case to Israel that there needs
to be movement on this; otherwise, notwithstanding the efforts
we as the international community and Salaam Fayyad and Abu Mazen
will make tomorrow we will not see the kind of sustainable economic
growth for all the reasons we discussed in relation to Ann McKechin's
question.
Mr Jenkins: The security angle
to this is absolutely critical. That is why what Salaam Fayyad
wants to do in Jenin and maybe in Nablus as well seems to me to
be the approach we have to adopt. One must try to create a space
in which Palestinians can function and for the economy to start
to grow. There is a disproportionate number of obstacles around
the major towns certainly to the north of the West Bank. Nablus
is a particular example but Jenin is also one. If you can isolate
and remove the obstacles that stop these places functioning economically
and backfill with Palestinian security in such a way that you
provide a platform for the economy to grow without intervention
by the IDF that is the path we have to take. It is a process that
will proceed very much by attrition and it will be slow, but that
is the nature of the beast.
Mr Alexander: For completeness,
I have just been passed the figures for suicide bombings. In 2002
there were 36; in 2003, 20; in 2004, 12; in 2005, seven; in 2006,
three; in 2007, one; and to date in 2008 there has been one. Those
figures are cited not because I disagree with the suggestion that
there are significant discussions to be had with the Israelis
in terms of whether each and every one of the barriers just discussed
is necessary to avoid this, but it is important to recognise how
significantly these figures weigh in the calculations not simply
of politicians but also the public within Israel. Much as I would
like to suggest there is a significant disparity between the position
taken by the public and that taken by the politicians, the politicians
to whom I speak in the state of Israel feel they have the strong
support of the public in ensuring these roadblocks and restraints
remain in place for the improvement they judge in security. The
sustainability of that security—whether or not it offers
a long-term and viable basis on which Israel can exist alongside
its neighbours—is a wholly different discussion, but it
is important to be clear as to what they tell us in bilateral
discussions as to the very strong approach they have taken to
this issue in recent years.
Chairman: I appreciate that is an explanation
of the Israeli perspective, but it is very difficult to understand
the commitment that Israel claims to a two-state solution when
the West Bank does not even have internal movement and Gaza is
effectively blockaded and President Bush says that he wants a
settlement by the end of this year. He was somewhat credulous
about the good intentions of the parties in that situation, security
notwithstanding.
Q103 Richard Burden: Perhaps I may
explore a little further the strategy of Tony Blair in removing
the major impediments to movement and where it might go. I understand
that that approach has quite a lot to commend it, but perhaps
you would say how we can avoid some of the possible dangers in
that approach. When I was last there I was told that a number
of the roads previously reserved for settlers were no longer so
reserved and anybody could travel on them. The reason they are
no longer reserved for settlers is that no Palestinian can in
practice travel on them because the restrictions now are such
that unless Palestinians want to travel from one Israeli settlement
to another they will have no business being on that road anyway:
all the routes to villages, towns and so on leading off those
roads were blocked off at that stage. Is there a danger we could
reach a stage whereby what are seen to be the key elements or
obstacles to economic activity are removed so there is one isolated
Palestinian town joined up with another and movement between those
two but with the villages still being cut off and Palestinians
in practice still not being able to move around the West Bank?
We cease to have a situation where we can look at a Palestinian
state based on territorial contiguity and instead have a strange
patchwork based on transport continuity, with Israel saying that
the Palestinians can get from one place to another, so what is
the problem? Is that a danger and, if so, how do we guard against
it? What mechanisms are in place to work out at each stage whether
what is going on here is helping the Palestinian economy or is
a way of making the occupation just seem a little nicer?
Mr Alexander: I suppose I would
say with humility that life is full of risks. In that sense I
think the greater risk is simply to engage in what could increasingly
become a dialogue of the deaf over aggregate numbers, in the sense
that by any measure we have not seen the progress that all of
us in this room would I am sure have wished to see on movement
and access in recent months and years. Notwithstanding the efforts
made bilaterally and multilaterally I think it is a perfectly
reasonable for Tony Blair as special representative of the Quartet
to adopt the approach of seeing whether or not there is another
route by which we can avoid a situation whereby the constraints
become ever greater, the impoverishment increases and critically
hope diminishes. In that sense I do not believe there is an "either
or" between economic development and progress in the peace
process. Certainly, from the conversations I have had with Abu
Mazen and Salaam Fayyad it is critical for the viability of the
Palestinian Authority and an alternative state to emerge that
a credible peace process is seen to be moving forward. Sustaining
that possibility among the Palestinian people, never mind among
those engaged in negotiations, requires that if progress is not
being made in the dialogue on movement and access we have to search
for other routes that prove more fruitful. I have had conversations
with Ehud Barak in terms of movement and access; I have talked
to him directly on the position of the British Government and
our concerns not simply about where it leaves the state of Israel
in terms of international public opinion but where it leaves Palestinians
in the context of the relative impoverishment or prosperity of
an emerging Palestinian state. But if we have quoted to us the
diminution in the number of suicide bombings and are told that
the first responsibility of the state of Israel is to protect
its own population then to find a way to channel that conversation
to identify where the balance point lies between the need for
a viable economic solution to emerge and the legitimate security
concerns of the people of Israel seems to be exactly the job in
which we need somebody like Tony Blair to engage. That does not
guarantee the outcome or prescribe how many or where those barriers
exist, but it seems to me to be an important conversation in which
to engage; otherwise, the risk is that over a period of time we
will see the haemorrhaging of confidence in the legitimacy of
the process in which we are engaged. That haemorrhaging of confidence
would itself have an impact both on the ongoing negotiations and
in turn the facts on the ground.
Mr Anderson: The danger identified
is absolutely valid and is one on which we shall be working with
Blair's team to try to ensure that does not become a reality.
There is another danger in focusing only on roadblocks and particular
obstacles to movement and access. The regime of regulation which
imposes a challenge for economic growth in Palestinian territories
is also related to other aspects. For example, for each building
permit granted to a Palestinian there are 55 orders for the demolition
of Palestinian buildings. There has been a lot of discussion about
the number of gates within the official separation barrier. We
have had arguments on the number of gates, but we also know that
at the moment only 64 per cent of them operate in accordance with
officially published opening times. That is another example of
where in practice constraints are imposed. Sixty per cent of Palestinian
families in the Seam Zone between the barrier and Green Line do
not have access to their land. Of the Israeli settlements, only
1.3 per cent are owned by settlers and some 40 per cent of settlement
land is owned privately by Palestinians who have not been compensated.
There is a whole series of policy issues, not just access, over
which Israel has direct control all of which we need to take in
the round and address. We hope that one of the things Blair will
be able to do is continue to make progress on all of them. That
said, in addition to the very real security concerns of Israel,
36 suicide bombings a year equate to three per month. If one compares
that with the bombings in London even at the most intense times
of the Northern Ireland conflicts one can imagine the sort of
impact that has on the population. Israel is very clear that it
cannot return to those days. But the other consideration which
clearly is borne in mind is that Israel is managing facts on the
ground with an eye to the bargaining chips it has in the peace
talks. There is no point in pretending that that is not the case.
As long as the peace talks proceed that will continue to create
incentives for Israel to have bargaining chips which is why the
Annapolis process is absolutely vital. To go back to the question
of the extent to which we expect Israel to deliver, it will not
deliver on all of these until such time as we have some movement
on a final settlement which gives Israel what it needs which is
security.
John Battle: The phrase "facts on
the ground" is one that Israel imposed on the international
debate in a sense and it has become the benchmark for defining
the situation. We sometimes say that there are the facts and we
make our commentary on them, but the very phrase "facts on
the ground" tells me that one side is setting the terms of
the debate and we ought to be aware of that all the time.
Q104 Ann McKechin: In the context
of increasing the number of bargaining chips let us turn to the
question of settlements. Perhaps the reason why settlements are
continuing apace is because of the timidity of the international
community's response.
Mr Alexander: I am not sure that
I share your view. In the conversations that I have described
I have set out very clearly the British Government's position
and the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and others have done
the same. The position of the British Government remains unchanged.
In the exchanges that I have had with Israeli ministers "timidity"
has not been the first term they have used to describe our continuing
assertion that settlement on the occupied Palestinian territories
is illegal.
Q105 Ann McKechin: A great number
of statements have been made but there have been no real consequences.
One issue that has been raised consistently is the European Union
trading agreements which allow Israel to have preferential treatment.
If there is no consequence to increasing the number of settlements—there
were 1,000 new units in 2007 alone and £13.5 million for
settlement building already set aside for this year's budget—surely
the inevitable conclusion is that Israel will simply be encouraged
to increase the number of bargaining chips it has by the time
it reaches some form of negotiation?
Mr Alexander: There is a judgment
to be made as to whether the more appropriate response to the
situation in the Middle East is to disengage economically or politically,
to impose sanctions or at some level to walk away. That has never
been and is not the position that the British Government has adopted
in relation to finding a way forward in the Middle East peace
process.
Q106 Chairman: That is a slightly
unfair response to Ms McKechin. She does not suggest that that
is what the policy of the British Government and the international
community is or should be. She is asking what sanctions at all
is one prepared to apply to try to even the balance?
Mr Alexander: As I say, we are
not convinced of the case that sanctions would themselves assist.
I recognise that that is a judgment to be made, but in terms of
our long-standing discussions and engagement with the state of
Israel I am not convinced that the response to that would yield
the results for which we are looking. I recollect a conversation—this
is not part of my brief and my officials will clearly be very
concerned—to which I was party shortly after President Clinton
left the White House. He was talking about the part he had played
in trying to find a way forward in the Middle East. He said that
unless there was a belief in the minds of the Israeli Government
that you would literally be in a trench next to them as the tanks
rolled across the Jordan River they simply would not listen to
you. He was speaking on his own behalf and it does not represent
the position of the British Government, but it is a telling remark
by someone who in a number of ways came closer than many others
to finding a way forward in the Middle East. It is a recognition
that psychology matters in this as well as economics, and in that
sense there is a judgment to be made as to how best we can influence
not simply the Palestinian Authority but also the Government of
Israel. We have not regarded sanctions against the state of Israel
as the way we can maximise the leverage that we need, reflecting
the extent to which the Israeli economy is now integrated not
simply into the European economy but the global economy. Some
years ago I had the opportunity to visit Haifa and see for myself
Intel and Microsoft plants in the same business park. First, I
am not convinced of the idea that there would be a straightforward
or immediate response following the imposition of sanctions. Second,
I think the reason we have resisted that path is not because we
do not have robust exchanges with the Israelis both in private
and if necessary in public but because of a judgment as to how
best we can influence the capacity—I hesitate to say "the
facts on the ground"—of the peace process to find a
way forward.
Mr Jenkins: In the 40 years since
the settlement enterprise started the Israelis have not managed
to persuade anybody that settlements in Jerusalem, East Jerusalem,
the West Bank or Gaza are legal. There is a consistent international
position on this; it is our position. I do not speak on behalf
of the Government of the United States either, but I note that
Condi Rice has been pretty vocal recently about this and has pushed
back particularly on the issue of settlements in East Jerusalem.
I believe that is an international acquis to which it is
worth holding on. In the end the resolution of this will be the
same as the resolution of everything else; it will be a package
deal that concludes the negotiations and constructs a Palestinian
state on the 1967 borders. Ultimately, all these things are interlinked,
but it is important to recognise that on this particular issue
the international community as a whole has been very consistent
over the past 40 years. In the end, if we get to a stage where
there is a conclusion to negotiations and a peace deal with a
Palestinian state this will be one of the matters, which is clearly
associated with the whole issue of borders, that will be resolved.
Q107 Ann McKechin: In relation to
settlements and the E1 plans already there is a definite sign
of development by the Israeli authorities, including the expropriation
of Palestinian land surrounding four West Bank villages and investment
in public infrastructure such as police stations and roads. The
Government has stated previously that if E1 goes ahead it will
threaten the prospects for a sustainable Palestinian state with
access to Jerusalem. What is our Government's strategy now to
try to ensure that that does not proceed?
Mr Jenkins: We have been as robust
as anyone in saying that any construction leading to settlement
activity is illegal and risks cutting off access between the north
and south of the West Bank, which is the critical issue; that
is the bit which goes down the Jordan valley. The rest of the
EU and the United States have been as robust on that. This arises
in the context of the barriers to travel up and down the West
Bank because it is an integral part of that. This is an issue
on which we need to keep pressing the Israeli Government extremely
hard. Ultimately, like all the other settlement issues and those
relating to the barrier around Jerusalem it will be resolved as
a package. The security issue again is integral to the whole issue
of the wall or barrier around Jerusalem of which E1 will form
a part. This is a matter on which we have made our views extremely
clear to the Israeli Government and we shall continue to do so,
but ultimately the answer will lie in some sort of package deal.
Q108 Ann McKechin: Presumably, that
will be before the E1 settlement is built; otherwise, effectively
the chances of a two-state solution will be substantially reduced?
Mr Jenkins: I do not think that
any of the settlements at the moment mean that a two-state solution
is unavailable. It means that when we reach the stage, as I hope
we shall, where a two-state solution is on the table to be negotiated
there will be mechanisms to deal with the existing settlements.
Settlements have been removed before; Gaza is one example and
the Sinai withdrawal is another. It is slightly different on the
West Bank given the level of population but clearly it needs to
be dealt with. That is something we and the rest of the international
community have said consistently, and that remains our position.
Chairman: Secretary of State, we thank
you and your team very much. You will appreciate that this Committee
like your department is interested in the development of the Palestinian
territories. Inevitably, we stray into foreign policy issues which
is why we appreciate the attendance of the Foreign Office representative.
Our fundamental frustration is that one looks at the situation
and thinks that if there was peace there would be no need for
DFID to be there. It would have the capacity to be a viable and
functioning economic area and our money could be spent in other
parts of the world where perhaps there was a greater need for
aid. These exchanges have been extremely useful and have given
an insight into the tensions. The facts on the ground are moving
against us, or in the other direction. We appreciate that your
evidence in this context is slightly out of order. Tony Blair
is still to come and no doubt we shall have an interesting exchange
with him, too. This session has been extremely useful.
| 
