Examination of Witness (Questions 109-119)
RT HON
TONY BLAIR
5 JUNE 2008
Q109 Chairman: Can I say to you, Mr Blair,
thank you very much for coming to give evidence. I know there
have been some problems with both our diary and your diary so
we very much appreciate the fact we have managed to find a slot
that is mutually productive. I appreciate the fact you were able
to accommodate this slot as it became available. As you know,
we produced a report in January last year on the situation in
terms of development support in the Occupied Territories and we
decided we should do a follow-up because there have been substantial
changes since then: there was the creation and collapse of the
Government of National Unity, there was the Hamas takeover of
Gaza and the subsequent blockade, there is an increase in the
number of roadblocks on the West Bank; on the positive side there
has been the Annapolis Conference, the Paris Donors Conference
and the Bethlehem Investment Conference. We took the view this
was an appropriate moment to update the situation, and also your
own appointment which is obviously what we are here to discuss
today. Thank you for coming in to answer our questions. I wonder
if we could start with the situation in Gaza. You will be aware
that the Committee did not entirely agree with the Quartet strategy
in our previous report, and in particular we said that we thought
the treatment of Hamas was not entirely appropriate. What we said
was that it was right to place pressure on Hamas to change its
policies but dialogue and engagement were better tools than isolation.
Indeed, we expressed concern that we would be driving them to
a more extreme position which appears to have been borne out:
the economy of Gaza has collapsed and Hamas is excluded from the
Annapolis peace process. You said to the European Parliament Middle
East Working Group that you felt the current approach to dealing
with Gaza is, to use your terms, "not a clever strategy".
Can you explain what you mean by that, assuming you stand by it?
Mr Blair: I do
stand by it. The situation in Gaza is terrible. The humanitarian
situation is dreadful for the people there. The vast majority
of people in Gaza are people who want to live a decent life but
cannot at the moment. What I meant by saying we had to get a different
strategy for Gaza was that we had to alter the current state of
events fundamentally, and this is what the Egyptians are trying
to do in brokering the agreement between Hamas and Israel. I have
been strongly urging that what we need to do is get a period of
calm, get a ceasefire in Gaza and progressively start reopening
the crossings, start to get proper humanitarian help through some
other goods and services and then build our way back out of this
to a situation where the people of Gaza can be helped and, secondly,
and very importantly, the situation in Gaza does not disrupt other
possibilities of progress. As we speak, as you will know, there
is still a very uncertain situation as to whether the Egyptians
can broker that deal or not. I hope they can because the current
situation will not hold and it is not acceptable.
Q110 Chairman: We had very powerful
evidence from John Ging[1]
by video-link direct from Gaza. At that time on 13 April he pointed
out that 344 people had been killed, six of them children, and
756 injured of whom 175 were children. He also, to put the balance,
pointed out that 2,600 rockets had been fired into Israel with
three people being killed and 20 injured. He made the point that
in spite of the restrictions in Gaza the rocket material apparently
was still getting in so the blockade was not stopping the rockets
but it was causing what he called a "shocking and shameful
situation". In that situation, how are you going to move
it on? How do you deal with the fact that the Quartet seems to
have different approaches? At the same meeting of the European
Parliament the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Gahr St're, said "Norway
talked to the National Unity Government including to its prime
minister. The international community could have done more to
give that government a chance". In fact, Oxfam and others
said legally one has to engage to some extent with Hamas because
they are actually responsible for security in Gaza.
Mr Blair: The big question is:
what is the right attitude to have towards Hamas. I abide by the
Quartet principles, and the Quartet principles are very clear
on this point. However, in the particular situation we are dealing
with in Gaza, it is important to realise that the issue is not
that Hamas are not being talked to, because they are being talked
to by the Norwegians, by the Egyptians and by others, the issue
is at the moment how do you get a situation where you have a ceasefire
so that the rocket and terror attacks stop coming out of Gaza
and the retaliation stops coming into Gaza. Without that happening
I think it is very difficult to see how we are going to ease the
humanitarian situation. Here is the essential political problem.
People in Gaza are suffering in the most terrible way, that is
absolutely true, but if you are an Israeli politician sitting
in Israel and there are 2,500 mortars and rockets falling mostly
on one town, Sderot, and where people are in constant danger,
where the people are suffering trauma, where just a few weeks
back, when I was on one of my visits, there was a massive demonstration
outside the Israeli prime minister's office from people from Sderot
saying you have to get tougher on the situation. Even though,
as I will go on to say, there is a lot more Israel could do, and
has to do, not only in respect of Gaza but in respect of the West
Bank, it is important to realise that if these rocket and mortar
attacks stopped life would be easier. When, as I was, a few weeks
back pressing the Israelis to let in more fuel into Gaza and they
then go and kill two innocent Israeli civilians who were trying
to get fuel into Gaza, it does not create a very easy situation.
The politics of this, at the moment, are that until you get a
period of calm in Gaza you will not get the space into which a
more rational and sensible political discourse starts to happen.
Q111 Mr Crabb: Moving on to the peace
process, you described the recent Annapolis Conference as the
best chance that all sides in the Middle East dispute have to
conclude a deal. In fact, you told the working group at the European
Parliament that it is possible to get this conflict resolved I
think you said by the end of the year. How realistic do you think
the peace process envisaged at the Annapolis Conference actually
is given the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Fatah?
Mr Blair: There is a Hamas/Fatah
complication but, in a sense, for the purposes of the negotiation,
it is very clear that President Abbas is charged with the political
negotiation. I think a more complicating factor is what is happening
in Israeli politics at the moment, which is obviously more uncertain
and that can create a difficulty. Here is my take on it, and I
have a different understanding of it than I did when I was Prime
Minister even though I used to spend a lot of time thinking about
this and going out to the region. My view very clearly is that
most people know roughly what a final settlement looks like. That
is not to say there are not very tricky issues to resolve: Jerusalem,
the right of return, land swaps, precisely the elements of the
border. In the end, people are agreed to a two-state solution.
If you put five smart Israelis and five smart Palestinians together
and said go away and produce a piece of paper that says this is
the peace deal, what would be amazing is you would find that there
was not a vast gap on what people thought ultimately should be
the solution. The problem, as I understand it now, is this. What
happens on the ground is a vital determinant of whether the political
negotiation can succeed, and because both sides have to make compromises
they do not feel like making those compromises unless they see
the situation on the ground moving towards a political solution.
If the situation on the ground is really bad, bad for the Israelis
on security, bad for the Palestinians in the weight of occupation,
then the political negotiation becomes tougher and that is why
I am trying to concentrate on building up Palestinian security
capability and trying to lift the weight of the occupation. In
my view, if you started to get real movement on both of those
things you would pass what I call the minimum credibility threshold
for this situation. The Israeli prime minister could say in time
you can see how the Palestinians could be a safe partner and the
Palestinian president would be able to say that in time you can
see the Israelis will get out of our territory and let us run
it. At the moment, whilst the weight of the occupation is really
heavy and people think it is ridiculous to say this is going to
be lifted because we can see all the signs around us that it is
not, and when the Israelis are still subject to these type of
attacks, it is very hard to get the political negotiation working.
My answer to your question would be that it is at any point possible
to do a political negotiation but we need to pass that minimum
credibility threshold of what happens on the ground.
Q112 Mr Crabb: Is it your view that
a sustainable peace deal can be struck which does not include
Hamas as a partner?
Mr Blair: If you have a political
process going that started to result in real progress on the ground
and the shape of the political negotiation being clear, then I
think Hamas would have to face a choice. You can agree or disagree
about the Quartet principles, and I totally understand the point
of view of people who say you just talk to everyone. It is not
the Quartet position but I can understand it. However, let us
be clear that to cut a deal that has Hamas in it cannot be done
unless Hamas accept the existence of Israel. The realistic thing
is to get Hamas into the negotiation. The Quartet principles are
not foolish in that regard: they are that you accept Israel exists
and you have peaceful means of pursuing the negotiation. That
is quite similar to what happened in the Northern Ireland situation.
I would say it depends on how Hamas deal with the situation if
there is real political progress being made. At the moment obviously
people are very far apart.
Q113 Mr Crabb: If I can ask you about
the role that Hamas is playing on the ground, specifically with
regard to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Are they proving
to be a positive agent in terms of helping to facilitate the distribution
of aid or are they hindering that? We get frequent reports of
rocket attacks on check-points when humanitarian aid is trying
to be transferred into Gaza? Are Hamas responsible for that?
Mr Blair: People argue about this
but I would say the one thing you cannot dispute is Hamas have
a military grip on Gaza and, therefore, my view is if they wanted
to stop these attacks they probably could. Maybe they could not
stop all of them all of the time but I do not think there is much
doubt their writ, in a military and an armed sense, runs in Gaza.
That is why I think one does have to put the other point of view
the whole time. The fact of the matter is if Hamas stopped and
said they will be part of this process on the basis of peaceful
co-existence then a whole multiplicity of opportunities would
open up for Gazan people and for people on the West Bank. A strategy
of deliberately targeting the crossings at the same time as saying
to those of us in the international community this is a humanitarian
catastrophe you cannot really justify. Although, as I say, I have
my own very strong views as to how Israel has to go further and
faster particularly on the West Bank, it is important always to
recognise they are subject to these terrorist attacks and they
do have a genuine security threat. One of the most difficult things
about this whole business, which again I have learnt since going
there, is what each side says about the other is essentially true:
the occupation is hellish for the Palestinians but the Israelis
have a genuine security threat from elements on the Palestinian
side.
Richard Burden: Before we leave the Gaza
situation could I ask you about the specific case of a man who
has written to you, and there has been something in the press
this week, Wissam Abuajwa. He is an environmental science student
who lives in Gaza and has been accepted for a course at Nottingham
University but has been prevented from leaving Gaza to take up
that course. The Israelis will not let him out and it is not clear
why. You said that if Hamas stopped its rocket attacks the situation
would transform on the ground but the letter that Mr Abuajwa sent
to you indicates that this is his fifth attempt to get out. His
first attempt was in 2001 long before Hamas took over, his second
was in 2003 again before Hamas took over and also in 2005. Does
it not appear that this is not just to do with what Hamas is doing
but there is somehow a policy of stopping Gazans getting out even
to get education? What, in practical terms, can we do not just
to say this is wrong but to stop it happening?
Q114 Chairman: John Ging told us
that people were actually dying waiting to get out for medical
treatment because they were not getting timely exits.
Mr Blair: This is something that
is important we raise with the Israelis and get changed. It is
tragic when you get students who have scholarships to come out
here and study, and there was some coverage last week of students
who have scholarships to study in America, and people who obviously
require medical treatment. Actually both this case and others
we will raise with the Israelis and try and get the situation
changed. I am not here to defend the blockade. All I am saying
is that the situation which we find ourselves in is one in which,
in a sense, the ordinary Gazan people—and I have not been
down to Gaza myself yet because I need to be sure it does not
cause more harm to go there than if I do not, but I do want to
go when I can. I talked to John Ging; in fact, I met him a couple
of weeks back. People like him are really sensible people. They
are not in any shape or form other than reasonable, decent people
trying to help in this situation. What happens and all I am pointing
out, and I am not saying more than this, is the options on the
table for the Israeli government are also very limited in this
situation because of the pressures they are under as well. However,
having said that, there should be a situation where we are able
to get humanitarian aid in and we are able to allow people who,
after all, only want to come and study. Actually it is to our
advantage, in the end, that they come and study because they are
less likely to have an extreme view of the world if they are allowed
to come and study in Britain and America.
Q115 Jim Sheridan: There are some
serious people who question whether or not you are the right man
for the job. There is nothing new there.
Mr Blair: I am fairly familiar
with those type of questions.
Q116 Jim Sheridan: Given your track
record as Prime Minister of the UK and our involvement in Iraq,
Afghanistan and our lack of involvement in the Lebanon, there
is a serious question mark about your independence, about your
neutrality and whether or not the Arab world have the trust in
you to deliver the political and financial support that is needed
to help the people in Palestine. What tangible evidence do you
have that you are independent, neutral and that the people of
the Middle East can trust you to deliver the financial and political
support they need?
Mr Blair: The Paris Conference
in December was supposed to raise $5.4 billion in pledges and
we actually raised $7.7 billion so I do not think there is a problem
with us raising the money out there. Sometimes when people talk
about whether you are independent or not what they really mean
is you are too close to America or Israel. As I always say to
people out there, the thing about this peace deal between Palestine
and Israel is that it includes Israel. Actually I find ordinary
Palestinians know that whoever helps them has to have some leverage
with Israel and America to be of any use in this situation at
all. Although I get a lot of questions from various parts of the
media about this, the issues to do with Iraq and Afghanistan and
the broader questions out in Palestine all they want is somebody
to go and help them sort their situation out. For example, the
package which I negotiated with the Israelis a couple of weeks
back was the first time the Israelis have sat down and had that
negotiation in quite that way, but you need the relationship with
the Israelis to do that. That is why one of the things I actually
learnt during the course of the whole Northern Ireland peace process
is you can go out and start condemning one side and saying it
is all their fault but that is basically your exit speech. Once
that happens then you cannot work with both sides, and you have
to be able to work with both sides. It is not really something
I have found that is a big problem there.
Q117 Jim Sheridan: In response to
your question to Richard, you said that you have not had an opportunity
to visit Gaza which suggests that the trust element is not there
yet because of the difficulties you may cause if you go.
Mr Blair: It is more to do with
the fact that in a situation that is immensely tense and sensitive,
at the moment where these negotiations are going on, frankly it
is better to wait and see how they go before you create a situation
which may make it more difficult for the people trying to do good
down there rather than harm. I see people out of Gaza, a broad
range of civic society there. I see them a lot of the time and
I talk to the NGOs who are there and it is a question of choosing
a moment that helps rather than harms.
Q118 Sir Robert Smith: On a practical
point about your role, how exactly do you report back to the Quartet
and how do they relate back to you?
Mr Blair: It is not a desperately
formal reporting mechanism I have to say fortunately. I speak
to the UN Secretary General regularly, to the President of the
United States and to Condoleezza Rice obviously, to the Europeans
and to the Russians as well. I met the President of the European
Commission just recently and, to be fair, they have been extremely
supportive collectively. It may sound not like the ideal quartet
of people who ought to have a similar view but basically they
have all been very supportive and very helpful.
Q119 Sir Robert Smith: A lot of what
we have talked about so far has been about the peace process.
I think you would accept that the peace process and trying to
bring prosperity are inextricably and strongly linked, the one
does not come without the other that easily, yet your own remit
that you have been given by the Quartet does not include the peace
process. How do you really get international aid and development
on the ground effectively if you are not integrated into the peace
process?
Mr Blair: I would say it is pretty
integrated. It is true that in my terms of reference I do not
handle the political negotiation. Again, to be blunt, when you
are out there I am talking to everyone all the time about all
the issues. The particular part that I am focused on, and that
is within my remit, is, in my view, central to this for the reasons
I have given. One of the things, for example, that we have agreed
with the Israelis in this package which will be, in my view, of
really quite profound significance in whether we can move this
process forward is for a new way of working around the Jenin area
up in the north of the Palestinian Territory. Without going into
the detail now, the point is that when you then come to look at
a negotiation like that everything comes into it: the politics,
the economics, the security. The central thing is if we cannot
build Palestinian security capability then the reality is we will
not get the Israelis to lift the weight of the occupation. You
have to do both of those things simultaneously. Those are the
things that, if you can get them done, support this political
negotiation.
1 The Director of Operations in Gaza for the UN Relief
& Works Agency (UNRWA) Back
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