House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Tearfund

INTRODUCTION

1. Tearfund is a UK-based Christian relief and development organisation working with local partners in over 60 countries spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. Tearfund is a member of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and a member of key coalitions such as Stop Climate Chaos and the Trade Justice Movement. We welcome this opportunity to make a submission to the International Development Select Committee. Whilst the DFID Departmental Report covers a wide range of issues, we and have focused our comments on some of the questions raised by the International Development Select Committee where we have most experience and expertise.

How effectively is DFID responding to the challenge of climate change in its programmes, staffing structures and use of resources?

2. In terms of programming, the Commission for Africa recommended in 2005 that donors should "make climate variability and climate change risk factors an integral part of their project planning and assessment by 2008". We welcome the pilot programmes underway and being led by a number of DFID country programmes to identify climate change risks. However it remains unclear how DFID will scale-up such risk management in all their programmes by 2008, particularly in climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, water, health and energy. In light of the 2008 deadline, it is important that DFID quickly demonstrates how this will be achieved.

3. In terms of resources, clarity is required over the UK Government's plans for resourcing the various international adaptation funds. We are concerned that the UK Government currently has no plans to fund the Nairobi Programme of Work on Adaptation. Greater commitment to this, and other funds, by the UK and other developed countries is vital, in line with the polluter-pays principle. Additional money should be directed to these funds above and beyond existing ODA commitments, and should not be diverted from other activities.

4. We would also like to see DFID taking a greater role in ensuring that adaptation is a fundamental component of a post-2012 framework on climate change. This includes ensuring that adaptation initiatives are readily accessible by least developed countries and small island developing states, reflect their concerns and support long-term mainstreaming of efforts rather than quick-fix add-on programmes.

5. We welcome an increase in dedicated staff within DFID to climate change adaptation. However a lack of co-ordination has been apparent between staff working on adaptation and disaster risk reduction, for example, before and during UN climate change conferences. There are fundamental links and overlaps between the work of these two communities of practitioners, and DFID could play a key role in modelling effective collaboration that makes maximum use of appropriate tools and avoids duplication of activities.

What changes has DFID made in its programmes, funding and staffing to reflect the increased priority given to governance?

6. We welcome the increased emphasis given to improving governance, and feel DFID has much to offer. However, while there has been a broad menu of proposals to help build government capability and responsiveness, the options offered for improving accountability, particularly through building civil society capacity, seem limited. A strong civil society is fundamental to ensuring fair and functioning governments.

7. One example of concern is the DFID Strategic Divisional Framework for South Asia which focuses on state-to-state partnerships without meaningful consideration of the contribution of other key stakeholders, including the media. With the support of NGOs, DFID could encourage bottom-up, demand-driven accountability, linked to national policy-making by, for example, fostering participation in elections, advocacy to improve decentralisation, policy-monitoring, and budget analysis. We would thus urge DFID to think creatively as to how to address this in their governance objectives.

What are the implications of DFID's commitment to provide 90% of aid to low-income countries?

8. We wholly support the principle of prioritising aid assistance for the poorest countries where development needs are undeniably the most urgent. However, as DFID itself acknowledges, a graduated approach to phasing down support in countries "approaching middle-income status" is vital, given the different dynamics of poverty, the high levels of inequality within many middle-income countries and the ongoing economic vulnerability that these countries face. [8]That some 38 countries in the past 20 years have fallen back from middle to low-income status serves to highlight why such graduated approaches are necessary.

9. The decision for a scaled-down DFID presence in Sri Lanka, for example, is a matter of concern to local NGOs. Sri Lanka may be classified as "approaching middle-income status" but we would dispute DFID's claim that there are "relatively low levels of poverty",[9] because it is based on figures which exclude the areas under LTTE control in the north and east. In the light of the increase in conflict over the past 18 months, and the fact that aid flows to the country will decrease significantly once post-tsunami programmes end, we believe that the UK Government needs to maintain close engagement with the country, not simply under the auspices of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and via the multilateral donors. The drastic reduction in UK bilateral assistance to Sri Lanka (from an estimated £8 million in 2003-04, to £0.5 million under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, with 0.25 million allocated to cover staff costs) appears inadequate and will make it difficult for the UK to have a meaningful impact on the situation in these areas.

10. We also recommend that DFID produces a full explanation of the principles and process for withdrawing from countries that are "approaching middle-income status". This is relevant for Sri Lanka, [10]but it will also soon become a concern for a number of other Asian countries including India (based upon current growth trajectories).

How do attempts to "do more with less"" affect the choice of countries in which DFID operates; the programmes it pursues; and the way it channels funding?

11. Our principal concerns relate to how DFID intends to "square the circle" of delivering more aid with a reduced head-count, whilst continuing engagement with civil society. Chapter 9 of DFID's report explicitly acknowledges that "country offices are a major source of assistance for civil society organisations",[11] and yet, many of the grassroots organisations Tearfund works with feel that DFID country offices in South Asia are "remote", "distant" and do not engage effectively with civil society. [12]Whilst we appreciate the capacity conundrum that DFID currently faces, we are concerned that further scaling back at the country level could undermine DFID's relationships, knowledge, understanding, influence, and hence effectiveness on the ground.

12. The trend towards contracting-out core functions of DFID country offices is also worrying. Our partners in Asia suggest that this has the potential to result in significant disconnects between DFID and local communities. Outsourcing agents are often, as is the case with the DFID Programme Management Office in India, [13]a private, profit-making company, and can sometimes be unaccountable, lack the prerequisite knowledge and local expertise, or act as a potential barrier to policy engagement between civil society and DFID. While it is understandable that DFID may be obliged to use this approach on occasion, it is essential that this mechanism be refined and monitored to ensure that genuine open and effective partnerships between DFID and civil society can be retained.

13. As noted, the attempt to "do more with less" also has the potential to weaken DFID's ability to engage with civil society groups in general, due to the higher transaction costs involved. Within this broad grouping, Tearfund would particularly encourage DFID to continue to engage with faith-based organisations (FBOs) as religion is a key element in individuals' lives and social structures worldwide, and religious organisations can play a vital role in addressing poverty at the local level.

14. DFID's strategy on HIV/AIDS, Taking Action, recognises that FBOs have the potential to play an important role in tackling HIV/AIDS, (for example by providing care and support, challenging stigma and encouraging behaviour change). However, a recent study[14] has demonstrated that DFID does not have a systematic approach for dealing with FBOs in this area and that it is very difficult to track commitments made to FBO and civil society programmes as information is only collected at the country, not the head office, level. [15]We also note that the DFID position paper on faith in development, produced in May 2006, was never actually published, and that DFID does not currently have a public position on this topic.

How coherent are the policies of DFID with other departments?

15. During the period covered by DFID's last annual report, the DTI was the UK Government's lead department on trade. We are encouraged that the new Prime Minister has appointed a Minister who spans both the new DBERR and DFID to lead on international trade, and that DFID has increased responsibility in this area, as we believe that development concerns must be given higher priority within trade policy.

16. The negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) remains of utmost concern. While DFID and DTI produced a joint statement on EPAs in March 2005 that was largely consistent with some of the main asks of Tearfund and other members of the Trade Justice Movement, as the negotiations have progressed the UK government's position has not been taken on board by other member states. The European Commission has continued to pursue an aggressive and anti-developmental agenda in the negotiations.

17. The ACP and EC's vision for EPAs are very different and while they are supposed to be "tools for development", the EC's vision of EPAs poses a serious threat to development and poverty reduction in the ACP. This should be of up most concern to DFID. There is a need for DFID to ensure that the UK government deliberations on EPAs fully incorporate a development perspective and are as influential as possible with other Member States and the Commission.

18. At the European level, DG Development appears to have little if any policy input into EPAs. There is serious lack of coordination between DG Trade and DG Development and DFID must do more to ensure DG Development engage more systematically and constructively with DG Trade on EPAs, in order to ensure trade policy coherence with development and poverty reduction.

July 2007