The UK effort in Helmand province
163. The UK took over leadership of the PRT in Lashkar
Gah in May 2006. The UK is assisted by Estonia, Denmark and the
US, as well as representatives from Jordan and the Czech Republic.
UK objectives are set out in the Joint UK Plan for Helmand and
the subsequent review of the plan.[198]
164. The PRT in Lashkar Gah is co-located with the
military headquarters of the UK armed forces—Task Force
Helmand. This is intended to ensure that the PRT is an integrated
civil-military operation with joint decision-making structures.
The civilian team is comprised of about 26 staff from DFID, the
Stabilisation Unit, the FCO, the British Embassy Drugs Team and
UK police personnel. They live within the military compound. We
were told that discussions were taking place about the possibility
of increasing the civilian presence in the PRT.
165. Coordination is led by the Helmand Executive
Group which comprises the leaders of the four strands of the Joint
Plan: the Deputy Commander Task Force Helmand for security, the
FCO head of the civilian operations for governance, DFID for development
and the FCO leader of the counter-narcotics and rule of law teams.[199]
166. The Joint Plan was based on the assumption that
a secure zone or 'lozenge' would be established around Lashkar
Gah.[200] In fact the
zone has been extended and now includes the towns of Sangin, Gereshk,
Garmsir and more recently Musa Qala. The Deputy Commander of Task
Force Helmand told us that the Governor had influence over about
50% of Helmand province which was secured by ISAF and Afghan National
Army forces. This area, around the river basin, was also where
about 50% of the population of the province lived. There were
safe havens in the border regions of the province for the insurgents.
These were often also centres of poppy-growing. The ability of
the PRT to carry out stabilisation activities was limited to those
areas which were under the influence of the Governor. We were
also told it would be difficult for the military to seek to extend
their influence further south unless they had access to hospital
facilities for their soldiers.
167. The approach of the military was to "clear,
hold and build". The stabilisation advisor from the Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Unit (now the Stabilisation Unit) played a key
advisory role in the early stages of this process which involved
improving access, looking at population movements, return of Internally
Displaced Persons, and setting up or re-establishing local governance
structures in order to identify priorities which Quick Impact
Projects (QIPs) could address.
168. QIPs are funded through the Global Conflict
Prevention Pool (GCPP) and managed by the FCO.[201]
There was a budget of £9 million for 2007, of which £3
million came from DFID.[202]
We were told that Quick Impact Projects were designed to deliver
a peace dividend in towns and villages. They had both development
and military objectives.[203]
Effective joint military and civilian operations are important
in ensuring that towns such as Musa Qala, which has recently been
recaptured, do not fall into the hands of the insurgents again.
QIPs might include building a school, digging wells or projects
to increase female employment. The PRT was conscious of the need
to build consent among civil society for such projects. DFID reassured
us that, whereas in the past some QIPs might not have involved
local governance structures, this was no longer the case.[204]
169. DFID told us that over 180 such projects were
planned, ongoing or completed. The monitoring of these projects
was difficult because of the security situation which meant that
the military had to monitor progress when the civilian staff were
unable to get out from the base.[205]
In post-conflict situations the UN would normally have an important
and neutral presence. However the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) is not present in Helmand which meant there was more for
the PRT to do. In addition there were few NGOs able to work in
Helmand. The Secretary of State said that new funding for the
Stabilisation Unit would enable an increase in the number of UK
staff and that such staff would be more able to engage in insecure
situations.[206]
170. The development adviser in Helmand told us that
it was important that the military should not seek to move ahead
of the civilian effort. DFID's written evidence confirms this:
"It is important to note the relationship between
the military effort, reconstruction and development work and the
ongoing political transition through national development programmes.
The concept of the 'lozenge' is driven by military action, yet
it can only be stabilised by reconstruction and development, governance
and political engagement. The National Development Programmes
engage in the space created. It is only through sustainable efforts
being encompassed in all the activities that the objectives set
out in the UK Helmand Plan will be realised."[207]
The development adviser also emphasised that the
PRT had to work with the elected and nominated leaders in the
Province—it could not pick and choose. Thus what it could
achieve was limited by the capacity of local governance. It was
sometimes difficult for these groups even to decide what their
priorities were. But we were told that progress had been made:
two years ago the PRT would have been dealing with warlords and
tribal fighting; now there were nascent governance structures
in place, although it would take some time for these to be effective.
171. During our evidence session with the Secretary
of State we discussed progress on the building of a new school
in Sangin in Helmand.[208]
In follow-up written evidence from the Department we were told
that the new school would take approximately six months to complete.[209]
There had been some concern during our visit as to whether this
was the right priority for development and the Minister of Education
had highlighted to us the general point about the need for more
teachers to be trained before more schools were built. We
would welcome an update on how the new school being built in Sangin
will be staffed and operated.
172. Three incidents since our visit have reinforced
the importance of working with Afghan leaders. We discussed with
the Secretary of State the expulsion of two international diplomats,
accused of negotiating with the Taliban, by the Government of
Afghanistan.[210] He
thought there had been a misunderstanding of the respective roles
and responsibilities of the Afghan and UK authorities. Subsequently
President Karzai is reported to have accused the UK of failing
to bring security to Helmand, and for interfering in the choice
of appointments of key provincial posts.[211]
While such accusations do not themselves negate the UK effort
in Helmand they do flag-up the significance of local ownership
of the reconstruction effort. Disagreements about the choice of
UN Special Representative have also been aired publicly (see paragraphs
65-67).
173. The Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Helmand is trialling new methods of joint
military-civilian cooperation in difficult circumstances. However
we note that it is extremely difficult for the civilian teams
to move out from the base to meet with local people. This means
that the military are often closely involved with the work of
DFID and the Stabilisation Unit. We accept that in such an unpredictable
security environment this may be necessary but it may mean that
DFID's work is viewed by local people as one and the same as that
of the military. Where there is still an ongoing insurgency this
is potentially dangerous for DFID and its staff. It is important
that the distinction between development and military activities
is maintained. We welcome the increase in staff for the Stabilisation
Unit if such staff are able to travel around more easily without
compromising their security.
174. Quick Impact
Projects are not a substitute for development and reconstruction.
We believe that DFID should continue its work through Government
of Afghanistan programmes in rural development as these present
greater opportunities for long-term development, including building
up the capacity of local governance structures.
175. The co-location
of the civilian and military teams is designed to ensure joined-up
decision-making. We believe this is a good idea. It is of utmost
importance that the military do not seek to extend their operations
at a faster pace than the civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team
capacity and advice. This may mean scaling back political objectives
in Helmand.
176. Differences
have recently emerged between the Government of Afghanistan and
the UK and the international community over the effectiveness
of the military strategy in Helmand, the choice of governor and
who should take the lead in any dealings with the insurgents.
Such disagreements highlight the importance of ensuring that the
process of reconstruction becomes an Afghan-led one.
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