Recommendations
The importance of being in Afghanistan
1. We
fully support the continuing commitment of the UK Government,
in partnership with the Government and people of Afghanistan,
to help to bring peace and security to Afghanistan and to promote
political reform and reconstruction and development. We accept
that the commitment, in terms of development assistance, is likely
to last at least a generation. As one of the poorest countries
in the world, with continuing humanitarian needs, Afghanistan
should remain a major focus for DFID. (Paragraph 10)
2. It is important
that the job of helping to bring security to Afghanistan, in which
over 7,000 British troops are engaged, is given full support by
the British public. We recognise the strong UK media interest
in this involvement given that British troops are putting their
lives on the line. While acknowledging that continuing insecurity
threatens to set back progress, we are also conscious that the
media focus on this has meant that achievements in political reform,
economic growth and in the provision of basic services are not
getting the attention they deserve. We recommend that DFID's media
strategy for Afghanistan is strengthened to ensure that development
achievements in Afghanistan are given the press coverage in the
UK which they merit. (Paragraph 15)
3. Expectations need
to be managed so that they accord more realistically with the
capacity—both of the Government of Afghanistan and of the
donor community—to deliver. Greater publicity of successes
and of the nature and scope of DFID's work in Afghanistan would
help in this regard. We recommend that DFID develop a new communications
strategy in Afghanistan to ensure accurate information about the
scale of its work is widely circulated. (Paragraph 17)
4. We believe it is
fundamental to the rebuilding of Afghanistan that international
commitments made by the Government of Afghanistan and by donors
on the rights of women are honoured and given greater priority.
(Paragraph 19)
Conditions of service for UK staff in Afghanistan
5. The
work DFID staff undertake in environments such as Afghanistan
is demanding and context-specific. We believe that they should
be given a level of support which is commensurate with the responsibilities
they are asked to bear, including an appropriate level of language,
cultural and security training. (Paragraph 24)
6. We agree that Afghanistan
should be a priority for DFID. We understand that consideration
is being given to how best to encourage staff to work in insecure
environments and to increasing the length of postings. We believe
that this is an important issue if DFID intends to remain in countries
such as Afghanistan since there is a limited pool of staff who
will undertake such postings. Current working conditions are comparable
with those of other donors but consideration should be given to
the impact of six-week periods of work on overall efficiency.
We would urge DFID to encourage those staff who gain experience
of working in Afghanistan to return to similar posts after a sufficient
break so as to build up a cadre of DFID staff with experience
of working in insecure environments. (Paragraph 26)
7. We welcome the
approval of an increased number of helicopters in Afghanistan
for the military effort announced by the Prime Minister on 12
December 2007. We would also welcome an update on the deployment
of those helicopters and confirmation of how much increased effective
capacity will be available. In addition we noted the use we made
of US operated helicopters in Helmand and would like to know if
they will still be available after the increase in the UK contribution.
(Paragraph 28)
8. We also note that
DFID and Embassy employees are hindered in carrying out their
jobs in a timely fashion when they are subject to lengthy waits
for secure transport. Given the priority which the UK Government
has placed on Afghanistan, we consider that appropriate logistical
support for the civilian effort is essential. We recommend the
early provision of a dedicated aeroplane for the use of DFID and
other Embassy staff to carry out their work in Afghanistan. (Paragraph
29)
DFID's programme in Afghanistan
9. We
welcome the allocation of additional funds for development and
stabilisation assistance across Afghanistan. We wish to be given
more details on the allocation of the funding in response to this
report. (Paragraph 31)
10. We agree that
DFID's objectives should be to help build and support a viable
sovereign state in Afghanistan and that the majority of DFID funds
should therefore continue to be directed through the Government
of Afghanistan. The priority for donors should be the "Afghanisation
of development"—building up Afghan capacity at all
levels for successful development and reconstruction. However
DFID must also continue to ensure that funding is available for
NGOs in their key advocacy tasks including helping to establish
a robust civil society capable of holding the government to account.
DFID should also ensure that NGOs promoting women's rights are
adequately funded. (Paragraph 38)
11. We encourage the
Government of Afghanistan to continue to work towards International
Monetary Fund revenue mobilisation targets as a means to ensuring
that its future funding base is secure. We believe that DFID's
assistance in this respect is vital to progress. (Paragraph 40)
12. We do not consider
that the UK Government's development programme is unduly slanted
towards Helmand at present. 80% of DFID's funding is channelled
through the Government of Afghanistan. The UK effort in Afghanistan
is thus a "whole of Afghanistan" one. Misunderstandings
about this need to be countered in Afghanistan, and in the UK,
by improved media strategies. (Paragraph 44)
13. Given the UK leadership
of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand it is important
that sufficient resources are available to ensure that stabilisation
and development follow military action speedily. This need not
be solely the responsibility of the UK since other donors are
present there. DFID should also try to ensure that gains made
in more secure provinces are not lost for lack of funds and should
coordinate with other donors more effectively in this regard.
(Paragraph 45)
Donor coordination
14. We
look forward to receiving confirmation of the start of the maternity
training programme in the unit built with UK funds in Lashkar
Gah. (Paragraph 53)
15. We note that,
according to the Peace Dividend Trust, out of a total of US$1.36
billion spent between March 2005 and March 2006 from major donors
the local impact was around 31% or the equivalent of $424 million.
Data provided by the Peace Dividend Trust for 2005 also suggests
that, although US Official Development Assistance was six times
as large as UK ODA, its local impact was only twice as much. (Paragraph
59)
16. Development agencies
need to come to international agreements among themselves about
what constitutes good practice for post-war reconstruction and
development in fragile states, especially when they are working
in partnership with the military. The development community needs
a body of agreed principles every bit as much as the military.
(Paragraph 60)
17. The international
community committed themselves to the Afghanistan Compact under
which they have agreed to provide an increased proportion of their
assistance through the core government budget. While DFID is exemplary
in this respect, other donors are not. This means that the Government
of Afghanistan does not "own" the development and reconstruction
process and that the local impact of donor assistance is greatly
reduced. DFID's efforts at improving donor coordination in this
regard are commendable but the results are currently unsatisfactory.
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has been shown to be
effective. The use of parallel structures to deliver assistance
by the US does nothing to build up Afghan capacity, and will therefore
lengthen the time-period for which aid is necessary. Such policies
are also contrary to Paris Declaration principles and commitments
made under the Afghanistan Compact. We believe DFID should make
renewed efforts to encourage the US and other donors to channel
a greater proportion of their funding through the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund. (Paragraph 63)
18. We urge the UK
to use its leadership role in the Provincial Reconstruction Team
to encourage donors to provide more resources to Afghan government
health services in Helmand. (Paragraph 64)
A high level UN coordinator
19. We
are disappointed that sufficient international momentum could
not be gained for the appointment of a high level joint UN, NATO,
EU coordinator for Afghanistan. Criticisms by the Afghan Government
of the UK and the international community's efforts seem to be
becoming more frequent. Problems of donor coordination are leading
to a proliferation of disparate projects, low local impact of
funding and creating a poor impression in Afghanistan about donors'
lack of agreement. We believe such outcomes are harmful to the
international effort in Afghanistan and may set back progress
in reconstruction. If the international community will not agree
the appointment of a super-envoy, ways must be found to ensure
that the role of UN Special Representative is properly resourced
and that the incumbent has sufficient weight in dealing with partner
countries. We hope that the Government of Afghanistan can recognise
the long-term benefits for them of the UN appointing a strong
representative to improve coordination. (Paragraph 67)
Security conditions
20. We
note the UK Commander of Taskforce Helmand's explanation that
the key objective of the military was to gain the consent of the
local population and to marginalise the insurgents and starve
them of their support base. We also note that most people in Afghanistan
do not support the insurgency so that influence-winning activities
are more important than overt military force. Cooperation and
understanding between NATO forces and the Afghan Government and
armed forces are crucial to success. (Paragraph 73)
21. We would like
to pay tribute to the commitment and sacrifice being made by UK
forces in this difficult environment. We were disappointed by
the tone and timing of the recent criticisms made by President
Karzai of UK military operations in Helmand, particularly as these
concerns were not raised with us by the Government of Afghanistan
during our visit. We are concerned that such comments risk undermining
the support of the British people for the UK's long-term commitment
to Afghanistan. (Paragraph 74)
22. Increasing insecurity
and the continuing insurgency are threatening the reconstruction
effort in many parts of Afghanistan. The relationship between
security and development is a key determinant of success in post-conflict
environments. While it is important that the NATO forces remain
in Afghanistan to help provide the security which is a necessary
precondition for reconstruction, it is clear to us that without
tangible improvements in people's lives the insurgency will not
be defeated. (Paragraph 77)
23. We believe that
greater international pressure should be placed on Pakistan to
control more effectively the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Unless this happens the Taliban will have a steady supply of recruits
and the international effort to bring stability and security to
Afghanistan will be futile. (Paragraph 80)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the UK troop
contribution
24. We
support the Government's commitment to bringing security and stability
to Afghanistan and commend the work of our armed forces there.
(Paragraph 82)
25. We support the
conclusion of the Defence Committee that the excessive use of
national caveats increases the risk of impairing the effectiveness
of the International Security Assistance Force and will increase
the length of time which NATO troops are required to be in Afghanistan.
The UK Government should continue to press contributing nations
to reduce these to facilitate more effective ISAF operations.
(Paragraph 84)
26. We are concerned
that civilian-military co-operation is weakened because UK military
commanders serve only a six-month tour of duty while the civilians
are in post for longer periods. We ask the Secretary of State
to discuss with the Ministry of Defence the feasibility of extending
UK military commanders' tours of duty in Helmand to, say, one
year. (Paragraph 85)
Security Sector Reform
27. There
has been significant progress in the building up of an effective
Afghan National Army. There is still some way to go before it
is a fully capable force and we commend the role played by the
UK to date in training and mentoring. (Paragraph 87)
28. Progress in creating
an effective and legitimate Afghan National Police force has been
slow. Corruption and bribery are rife and this is hampering acceptance
of the police as a force for good. There are insufficient police
trainers and there is no clear consensus about what type of police
force—paramilitary or civilian—is required. We believe
that the issue of remit must be clarified as quickly as possible.
(Paragraph 91)
29. We believe that
the new EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is a step in
the right direction in that it makes policing a shared EU responsibility.
However we are disappointed that progress has been so slow. This
mission should ensure that the recruitment, training and retention
of female police officers is given appropriate priority within
the overall imperative of building an efficient and effective
police force. (Paragraph 94)
30. We have reservations
about the suggestion of arming local communities to defend themselves.
While we accept that there are many people who already have weapons,
we believe that it is important that donors do not encourage or
exacerbate factionalism and tribalism. (Paragraph 96)
The justice sector
31. Violence
against women is still pervasive and without a functioning formal
justice sector threatens to set back progress made thus far in
the realisation of women's rights. A key part of protecting women's
rights is ensuring they have proper access to justice. Funding
for the justice sector is disproportionately low and we believe
its reform should now be a priority for donors and for the Government
of Afghanistan. We recommend that the UK Government play its part
in this through increased funding for the justice sector from
the Stabilisation Aid Fund. We accept that changing the values
of society is a long-term process; however, we reiterate that
the Government of Afghanistan should seek to honour its commitments
to international human rights law in respect of women. Consideration
should also be given to inviting Islamic countries to advise
the Government of Afghanistan on establishing a justice system
that would meet the needs of women, children and minorities and
protect their fundamental human rights. (Paragraph 100)
Sub-national governance
32. The
Government of Afghanistan has recognised the need to address sub-national
governance and to make the existing system work better. To this
end the Independent Directorate for Local Governance has been
established and has set out for itself an ambitious programme.
We believe that clarification of the role of provincial governors
and the establishment of local tax-raising powers should be a
priority. We welcome the allocation of £1.5 million of DFID
funding to support the work of the IDLG. (Paragraph 112)
33. Community Development
Councils have created elected forums for inclusive community level
decision-making. Communities have been empowered and linkages
established between neighbourhoods. Funding from the National
Solidarity Programme has enabled CDCs to identify needs and acquire
funding for specific community priority projects which deliver
basic services. Such developments are important for creating an
active and engaged civil society. CDCs have also been effective
in encouraging the proper involvement of women in local decision-making.
(Paragraph 119)
34. Concerns have
been raised about the future of Community Development Councils
as the future of their funding mechanism, the National Solidarity
Programme, is itself uncertain. We consider that the tangible
benefits of CDCs are significant. Decisions about future NSP funds
need to be made before current funding expires. Community Development
Councils have enabled valuable community level decision-making
in a context where the rest of government is highly centralized.
Given the limited reach of central government and the need for
rural development as part of the counter-narcotics effort, we
recommend that the UK Government actively encourage the continuation
and formalisation of CDCs in the medium term recognising it will
require a significant share of the limited funds under Government
of Afghanistan control. (Paragraph 120)
Narcotics and counter-narcotics
35. Opium
poppy production is causally linked to insecurity and corruption
in Afghanistan. Suggestions of the involvement in narcotics of
high-ranking officials are worrying. We believe greater effort
on the part of the President and donors is essential to ensure
that involvement in opium poppy production is stamped out at every
level of government. (Paragraph 124)
36. A key part of
any counter-narcotics policy is tackling the traders of opium.
Controlling drug trafficking between Afghanistan and Pakistan
in particular requires, as a necessary condition, greater knowledge
of and control over the borderlands and assistance from the Government
of Pakistan. (Paragraph 131)
37. We agree with
the UK and Afghan Governments that aerial spraying of poppies
is not desirable for health and safety reasons and because it
risks increasing insecurity in already insecure provinces. (Paragraph
132)
38. Wide-scale eradication
has not contributed to a sustainable reduction in poppy cultivation
in many provinces. We believe that while eradication has a legitimate
role, for example in targeting large landowners, an excessive
focus on it and on reducing acreage under poppy cultivation has
been at the expense of the creation of qualitative changes in
rural livelihood opportunities (Paragraph 134)
Alternative livelihoods
39. The
increase in opium poppy cultivation is directly linked to continuing
insecurity in many parts of Afghanistan. Insecurity prevents the
development of alternative and sustainable income sources. Poppy
cultivation can be an attractive choice in a high-risk environment,
especially for poor farmers. We believe that expectations that
poppy cultivation will be reduced over a short period are misplaced.
Given the heavy reliance on poppy cultivation for household income,
any enforced dramatic reduction would have significant negative
social, political and economic consequences. We welcome the shift
in thinking towards a more holistic and integrated approach to
alternatives. We commend the World Bank and DFID for their commitment
to undertake research and reformulate policies based on evidence.
(Paragraph 139)
40. We are disappointed
that the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund has not been more successful
in its efforts thus far. Given research findings on the need to
include a counter-narcotics perspective in all development programmes,
consideration should be given to whether a separate counter-narcotics
fund is the appropriate mechanism for driving this forward. (Paragraph
140)
Rural livelihoods
41. There
has been insufficient attention to and funding for the agricultural
and livestock sectors which could provide a range of alternatives
to poppy cultivation. Improved irrigation would help to increase
yields and thus income from agriculture. We would welcome an update
on the possibilities of restoring and improving irrigation and
drainage systems. The provision of relevant agricultural extension
services to farmers could help to reduce poppy cultivation. The
UK has long experience of working on agriculture. We recommend
that DFID establish a programme to offer technical advice and
training in agricultural extension services. (Paragraph 149)
42. Whilst we support
DFID's work with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development,
ways must be found to support and build capacity in the Ministry
of Agriculture so that appropriate programmes in this sector can
be developed. In addition, programmes must be devised to ensure
that a range of social protection and safety measures are in place.
In order to achieve these two goals, donors will need to allocate
more funds to this sector—most effectively in partnership
with the Ministry of Agriculture. (Paragraph 150)
43. We agree that
counter-narcotics strategies need to reach as many poor people
as possible and offer income and employment opportunities. We
recommend that the UK Government gives greater priority to a multifaceted
rural livelihoods approach. (Paragraph 154)
44. Microfinance initiatives
are an important way of bringing women into the workforce. They
may also act as a vehicle for women's empowerment in Afghanistan.
We support attempts to scale up microfinance initiatives under
the Government of Afghanistan's Microfinance Investment and Support
Facility. We recommend extending the outreach of microfinance
to rural areas to encourage the growth of rural enterprises and
the displacement of the role of poppy traders in providing credit.
(Paragraph 155)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
45. It
is important that aid is evenly distributed in Afghanistan based
on need and that the donor effort should be a 'whole of Afghanistan'
effort. We accept that each Provincial Reconstruction Team has
its own national funding mechanism which means that some PRTs
are better funded than others. This is unavoidable. We do however
believe that there needs to be a robust debate about the continued
role of PRTs in more secure provinces. There is a lack of a clearly
defined exit strategy for PRTs and accordingly uncertainty amongst
communities in Afghanistan as to when and how functions of the
PRTs will be transferred over to domestic provincial and local
government. If the goal of the international effort is to build
up Afghan capacity, PRTs should not perform functions which could
be performed by Government of Afghanistan structures. We are mindful
of the concerns expressed by NGOs about the need to preserve their
humanitarian space and consider this to be an important issue
which the donor community needs to take into account. (Paragraph
162)
The UK effort in Helmand province
46. We
would welcome an update on how the new school being built in Sangin
will be staffed and operated. (Paragraph 171)
47. The Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Helmand is trialling new methods of joint
military-civilian cooperation in difficult circumstances. However
we note that it is extremely difficult for the civilian teams
to move out from the base to meet with local people. This means
that the military are often closely involved with the work of
DFID and the Stabilisation Unit. We accept that in such an unpredictable
security environment this may be necessary but it may mean that
DFID's work is viewed by local people as one and the same as that
of the military. Where there is still an ongoing insurgency this
is potentially dangerous for DFID and its staff. It is important
that the distinction between development and military activities
is maintained. We welcome the increase in staff for the Stabilisation
Unit if such staff are able to travel around more easily without
compromising their security. (Paragraph 173)
48. Quick Impact Projects
are not a substitute for development and reconstruction. We believe
that DFID should continue its work through Government of Afghanistan
programmes in rural development as these present greater opportunities
for long-term development, including building up the capacity
of local governance structures. (Paragraph 174)
49. The co-location
of the civilian and military teams is designed to ensure joined-up
decision-making. We believe this is a good idea. It is of utmost
importance that the military do not seek to extend their operations
at a faster pace than the civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team
capacity and advice. This may mean scaling back political objectives
in Helmand. (Paragraph 175)
50. Differences have
recently emerged between the Government of Afghanistan and the
UK and the international community over the effectiveness of the
military strategy in Helmand, the choice of governor and who should
take the lead in any dealings with the insurgents. Such disagreements
highlight the importance of ensuring that the process of reconstruction
becomes an Afghan-led one. (Paragraph 176)
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