Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-51)

MR JIM DRUMMOND, MS LINDY CAMERON AND MR PETER HOLLAND

23 OCTOBER 2007

  Q40  Richard Burden: Ms Cameron, you spoke about the US and the ARTF. Did you say that the US put money into that?

  Ms Cameron: It is a contributor. We do not have the number to hand but we can provide it.[16]


  Q41 Chairman: In passing, we note that President Karzai is in town today. I know that he is meeting some parliamentarians, but he is not going to meet any members of the Select Committee. Are these questions that can usefully be explored with him either here or in Afghanistan? We are to meet a number of Afghan Ministers who are directly responsible.

  Mr Drummond: Yes.

  Chairman: It is a slightly tangential point. This Committee is very focused on the development of Afghanistan, as is the President, so perhaps some exchange may be desirable. We have not discussed in detail the longer-term strategy to deal with poppies, livelihood development and so forth which is clearly very important for the longer-term establishment of a functioning economy, particularly in rural areas. I ask Ann McKechin to ask questions.

  Q42  Ann McKechin: Mr Holland, can you indicate how the alternative livelihoods approach which is promoted by DFID seeks to address the structural and institutional causes of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan?

  Mr Holland: Perhaps I may set some of the context and then ask my colleagues to pick up the specific "livelihoods" question. The Afghan Government has a National Drug Control Strategy which is based on that which was successful in Pakistan and Thailand. Essentially, it recognises that there will not be one approach to tackling poppy cultivation. That strategy has eight pillars which I will not discuss but can be given to the Committee.[17] Essentially, they cover the law enforcement and justice side; livelihoods; the institutional development that is needed to build Afghan capacity; and the eradication of poppies targeted on those areas where farmers have the option to have alternative livelihoods. The deliberate aim of the strategy is that it should be a balanced, targeted approach.


  Q43 Ann McKechin: In a recent article on alternative livelihoods David Mansfield criticised the programme as being a mismatch between the geographical focus of the NSP programme and the location of the areas of highest poppy cultivation. He suggested that the programme appeared to be based more on where there was a possibility of greater alternative production rather than on where the greatest problem existed.

  Ms Cameron: The National Solidarity Programme is not only intended to address poppy cultivation; it is a key vehicle for the Afghan Government to extend its reach to the people of Afghanistan and to become visible to them and it is a source of funding for community level development projects not just in poppy growing areas but across Afghanistan as a whole. It has been incredibly successful. More than 17,000 communities have been reached; more than 30,000 projects have been undertaken. It has been the most visible sign of the Afghan Government to most communities in Afghanistan. A number of the rural livelihood programmes that we support are intended not only to tackle poppy production but also to ensure that incomes in rural areas of Afghanistan rise in general, because clearly Afghanistan is an overwhelmingly poor rural society. The approach to legal livelihoods is really about replicating the kind of opportunities that the drug trade offers, that is, improving access to markets, security and credit and ensuring that farmers have better technology, seeds and inputs. Basically, it is a matter of making sure that farmers have all the things they need to do something else and raise their incomes. On average, farmers in Afghanistan do 17 different things in a year as part of their income; it is not a choice between all poppy and all something else.

  Q44  Ann McKechin: There is a mixture of alternatives?

  Ms Cameron: Yes. For example, DFID's Research into Alternative Livelihoods Programme is investigating mint and saffron as high value alternatives to poppy and trying to look at ways that those can become alternatives. The horticulture programme is looking at horticulture more broadly as an option. That requires looking at orchards which are quite long-term investments. We put £20 million into a credit programme because credit is a key constraint. Essentially, what we are looking at are binding constraints that prevent people from having a real choice. Those are quite similar to the kinds of constraints that poor farmers face in Afghanistan generally.

  Q45  Ann McKechin: There are multiple schemes. Is there a uniform system by which they are monitored so we can review the most effective interventions?

  Ms Cameron: That is a really challenging issue and is something that we are trying to work on with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. One of the key challenges that we would like the Government to tackle more effectively is to review the kinds of things that ministries—agriculture, rural development and the other rural departments—across the board are doing to make a better assessment of what can have an impact on poppy cultivation specifically. As David Mansfield highlights in his article, trying to make sure that the rural development programmes are as focused as they possibly can be to make maximum impact on poppy cultivation is a key challenge. We are now at a stage where we have enough results and can begin to do that, but for a while and until some of these programmes had been implemented it was hard to see how the target could be achieved.

  Q46  Ann McKechin: Realistically, they are more likely to work in the north of the country than the more insecure areas in the south such as Helmand?

  Ms Cameron: Given that security is a key constraint for farmers in terms of what, how and when they can get their produce to market, almost any rural development programme is easier and cheaper to implement in more secure areas.

  Q47  Ann McKechin: Is that where the donor priority would be?

  Mr Drummond: Poppy is a high value and low volume crop which tends to be collected from farms rather than farmers having to take the stuff to market. Therefore, in insecure areas it is an easier crop to grow.

  Q48  Ann McKechin: Can we anticipate that poppy cultivation in the south of Afghanistan will continue to be at very high levels for the short term at least?

  Mr Holland: It is very hard to predict what the levels will be because they fluctuate pretty dramatically year on year depending on local economic circumstances as well, but now the trend is that poppy cultivation decreases in those areas that have better security and stability and the converse is true in areas which are more insecure. I believe that that trend will continue. One will see more provinces which have low poppy cultivation or are poppy free, but cultivation will be concentrated in those provinces where it is now high. Whether it will be as high next year is difficult to say. There is some evidence that prices at the farm gate are dropping which may persuade farmers not to cultivate as much next year.

  Q49  Chairman: To raise a broader topic, the Government has announced the scaling down of our troop involvement in Iraq. Leaving aside the question whether we are moving towards exit or minimal retention and increasing the troop levels in Afghanistan to provide for security, from your point of view as a development agency what would be your message to the British people about the need for more troops on the ground to create space for development and to start making a material impact to demonstrate that what is happening in Afghanistan, albeit a long haul, is achievable and measurable in this situation? Is not the danger that people may start to say that we are pulling out of Iraq? You well know that there is a campaign that maybe we should pull out of Afghanistan. The first question is: could you cope with development in Afghanistan with fewer troops? Second, if the argument is about maintaining or increasing troop involvement, can you give people confidence that that will create space for significant development opportunities in Afghanistan?

  Mr Drummond: You are beginning to take me into areas where Ministers would probably want to comment.

  Q50  Chairman: It has just been pointed out to me that Des Browne is giving evidence to the Defence Committee on exactly this issue now. I am asking you as the Department for International Development what can be achieved and what the security situation and troop level must be to create that space. I do not ask for specific numbers but can you respond in general terms?

  Mr Drummond: What we have seen in Afghanistan is in many ways quite remarkable progress on the development numbers in the past five years considering where we started from. Despite our best efforts, I do not think that is tremendously well publicised in the UK because the press tends to concentrate on other things. The Taliban problem in the south is obviously serious. It is localised and it has been contained, and at a tactical level we are making good progress. Clearly, if it spread that would have a major impact on development in Afghanistan overall and so it is extremely important that our forces do what they are doing. They are doing a tremendous job. I do not think I can comment on whether or not it is sensible to have fewer or more forces helping to do this because it is not really my area of expertise, but there is a tremendous opportunity in Afghanistan to make progress on development even though it will be a 20 to 30-year haul. People need to recognise that there are few quick fixes to development in Afghanistan, just as there are few quick fixes to the narcotics problems that we have been talking about.

  Q51  Chairman: How do you respond to the argument that has been put to us by some people that the potential for development is greater in the centre and north of the country and perhaps more resources should be put in there because you get results that (a) may improve the absolute performance of the economy and (b) even encourage those in the south to believe that if they can get the security right there is something for them to share?

  Mr Drummond: Clearly, the problem in the south needs to be addressed through a mixture of security, development and politics, and we know that from the OECD guidelines on working in fragile states. Obviously, that is what people are trying to do. If we neglect the south then it will become a bigger problem for the whole of Afghanistan. I do not believe we can neglect it. As we have been trying to do, we need to find ways to get development assistance in there even though it is more difficult to do it in some areas of the south because of insecurity than in the north.

  Chairman: Thank you for your evidence this morning. We look forward to finding out more for ourselves and hope to make an evaluation of how things are proceeding. In that process we shall be seeing more of you.





16   Ev 60-61 Back

17   Ev 60-61 Back


 
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