Examination of Witnesses (Questions 52-59)
MR DAVID
MANSFIELD
15 NOVEMBER 2007
Q52 Chairman: Mr Mansfield, good morning
and thank you very much for coming to give evidence to our inquiry
on Afghanistan. For the record, I should say that recently the
Committee spent a week in Afghanistan. We were based in and around
Kabul but Members of the Committee split up and some visited Helmand
and some visited Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh in the north. Therefore,
we have some perspective. I do not suggest that a week gives us
total knowledge and understanding of a hugely complicated situation,
but at least we feel we have some exposure to a variety of the
issues. Obviously, you do not spend much time in Afghanistan before
the issue of poppy production and narcotics—opium, heroin
and so forth—comes up. By way of starting the discussion,
perhaps you could comment on the effectiveness of the control
of poppy. What seems to happen is that you hear sweeping statements
that poppy production has been eliminated or cut back here or
there, but when you look across the piece it goes up and clearly
it is concentrated in some parts of the country and diminishes
in others. We heard some explanations for that while we were there.
Perhaps it would be helpful to know how you see the wide variation
in poppy production which increases in some parts of the country
and decreases in others. I half-expect what the answer would be,
but it would be helpful to have your take on why that happens.
Mr Mansfield: Thank you for the
invitation to speak. I do not want to give the usual explanation
of how complex this is in some ways, but regional context is very
important within Afghanistan. In the past 10 years I have spent
a lot of time doing field work in Afghanistan and looking at why
there are changes in poppy cultivation in different areas. In
the past three years I have looked particularly at Nangarhar in
the east, Ghowr province just north of Helmand and I have also
gone into Badakhshan. I have spent a lot of time looking at the
very specific circumstances of those areas. A colleague of mine
for AREU[1]
has also been looking at Balkh. For instance, in an area like
Nangarhar in 2005 there was a very strong effort to reduce poppy
cultivation. They had 28,000 hectares in Nangarhar in 2004; by
2005 it had reduced to 1,200 hectares. There was a big political
push to reduce poppy cultivation but it was on top of economic
changes against poppy. For instance, wheat prices had increased
quite significantly in Nangarhar during the winter of 2004/05.
Regardless of the returns on wheat, it does not have to compete
with poppy. People become concerned about food security and so
they have to balance their livelihood strategies. If there is
concern about accessing wheat because prices are rising or because
there are controls in Pakistan about wheat smuggling into Afghanistan
people will start to think. It is not a question of whether it
is competitive; they need to grow some wheat to feed themselves
and their livestock. Therefore, they expand wheat cultivation
and reduce poppy. That process was already in place. In 2004 because
of disease there was also a poor poppy yield in Nangarhar and
prices fell. Wheat prices rose and there was concern over access.
Poppy prices fell and there were problems over yield. On top of
that there was a big political push to say "You will not
grow poppy". There was a concerted effort to go out into
the districts, learn from the way the Taliban ban was implemented,
press people not to grow poppy and promise development assistance.
I have been looking at the consequence of this over a two or three-year
period. The consequence was to create a quite significant income
deficit not just amongst poppy farmers but others. If you reduce
poppy cultivation by 96%, as happened in Nangarhar that year—it
is happening in Balkh at the moment—you end up impacting
not only on the poppy farmer himself but there is a multiplier
effect across the economy. Businesses systematically reduced their
wholesale and profit, the numbers they employed and the wage labour
rates they paid. There were similar falls in wage labour rates
in the construction industry. That created economic pressure which
subsequently meant a shift in the political dynamic. We predicted
that in Nangarhar in December 2006. It went from 28,000 hectares
to 1,200 hectares and then to 4,800 hectares. It is now back to
18,500 hectares because of the sheer economic pressure on households
which faced an income deficit. In Badakhshan in the north east
we have seen another shift in the dynamics in relation to the
balanced livelihood strategy that people pursue. They balance
their cash needs with food security and issues around their livestock
which needs fodder and wheat straw. We saw the price of poppy
fall again and wage labour rates increased significantly. Poppy
is an incredibly labour-intensive crop. The net returns on poppy
were decidedly unattractive even compared with wheat to some extent
but particularly in relation to things like improved onion or
potato. Again, the Government came in and pushed down on poppy
cultivation. People are already producing less. The authorities
pressed harder, essentially expending a degree of political capital
to make themselves look a bit better; they can attribute the reduction
to government effort rather than shifts in the economy in the
way that livelihoods are working. In Balkh there is a big push
by Governor Atta. I can commend the work of Adam Pain of AREU
who has done a lot of work on this and looked at the deals struck
between Governor Atta and various stakeholders in the drugs and
non-drugs business to press down on poppy cultivation. There is
a big question over whether that reduction will be sustained.
You will have seen and heard a number of times how there appears
to be an increase in cannabis cultivation. That is in the nature
of substitution to reduce the winter opium crop and increasing
the summer cannabis crop. There is a question of how that will
be sustained and how it is perceived by some. If we look at poppies
as a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment, I do not think
we have seen Helmand as being as high risk as it is today. In
the late 1990s I used to wander round Kajaki and Musa Qala in
Helmand province talking to opium traders to understand more about
the farm gate opium trade. Today in Helmand whilst there is enormous
agricultural potential in some areas, particularly the canal-irrigated
lands, you could grow onions and a whole range of different legal
crops that potentially could bring in more money, especially through
inter-cropping, than poppy because they are less labour-intensive
crops. You would not have to hire labour. But insecurity is such
that poppy is essentially your best option. If I grow onions I
have to take them to the market and in doing so I may have to
go through a number of checkpoints. In doing so I will have to
pay a bribe known as a `backsheesh' to the ANP,[2]
militia or whoever it might be. By the time I get to the market
I am uncompetitive at best; at worst I can suffer physical injury.
It is far better to grow a crop where the trade comes to you;
it arrives at your farm gate and buys from you. The traders inherit
the transaction and transportation costs. If there is a degree
of insecurity and you have to leave the house you can take with
you a few kilograms of opium; you cannot carry a bag of onions.
This is a liquid asset. Therefore, in the context of Helmand for
me it is a rational choice in a highly insecure environment. I
do not hold with the idea that farmers in Helmand opt to grow
poppy only because it can provide a high income. There is some
element of that but they have an economic potential in Helmand
but cannot realise it due to the insecurity.
Q53 Chairman: Referring to Balkh, we
had a meeting with Governor Atta who said that he had made the
province poppy-free. The chairman of his district council said
that poppy production had gone up until that council got stuck
in, so there was a little argument about who had made Balkh poppy-free.
You do not sound very optimistic that it will remain poppy-free
even under the auspices of a "strong" governor like
Governor Atta.
Mr Mansfield: We have seen it
before, if I can put it like that. In 1995 we saw Haji Oadeer
reduce poppy cultivation in Nangarhar by 50%; we even saw Sher
Mohammad Akhondzada reduce poppy in Helmand in 2003 by 50%. We
saw Haji Din Mohammad, the governor, do it in Nangarhar in 2005.
Some of us talk of Balkh as being the `new black' or new fashion.
Nangarhar illustrates how the economic consequences shift the
political dynamic. Once you have a critical mass of the population
suffering a degree of economic crisis, which is exactly what we
saw in Nangarhar, the governors become understandably a bit more
reluctant to enforce a ban that makes them unpopular with the
people. The political context shifts. If the price increases we
also see a similar phenomenon. These kinds of sustained reductions
even with `strong' leadership are quite difficult. No matter how
strong the leadership we are talking about armed populations.
There are rivals who are more than happy to marginalise the leadership.
In Nangarhar we saw a reduction, but in some areas around the
provincial centre there was a very interesting process in which
people made the transition from an `illegal' to a legal livelihood.
They expanded their horticultural crops; they sent their sons
to the bazaar or into Pakistan to find work. Those areas did quite
well around the provincial centre of Jalalabad, but beyond that
area, people replaced their poppy crop purely with wheat which
is an `inshallah' crop. You put it in and walk away; it is not
labour-intensive and you hope to get a crop. Essentially, they
relied on off-farm and non-farm income. A lot of Nangarharis went
to Balkh and played a role in the increasing cultivation in Balkh
in 2005 because they were perceived to have particular skills.
They get a premium rate as itinerant harvesters. Therefore, a
process of change took place in those areas which was not sustainable.
Essentially, they could not grow enough wheat as a surplus to
sell; they needed non-farm and off-farm income. They did that
for a while but it had its limits and wage labour rates were going
down. Therefore, where you see poppy replaced by wheat be concerned
that it is not a sustainable shift; where you see poppy replaced
by high value horticultural crops and non-farm income opportunities
you see a genuine process of transition taking place. You have
to look at the qualitative nature of the change, not just the
reduction in cultivation. Too often we focus purely on hectareage
or eradication rather than what is filling the gap.
Q54 Sir Robert Smith: You have dealt
with all the economic factors. I picked up a lot of local addiction
to the poppy, especially among children, in processing it and
handling it. Is any element of the cultivation of poppy dictated
just by the growing problem of addiction amongst the local population?
Mr Mansfield: There seems to be
a growing problem of drug use within Afghanistan. You see many
surveys but how accurate they are I do not know. Certainly, when
you do field work people will discuss the issue of opium use and
pharmaceutical use. There is a whole range of different products.
In many ways we should not only focus on opium when it comes to
demand issues. Some very good work is done in Afghanistan on this.
You can buy a month's worth of Valium for $1 in Kabul. People
use a whole range of different products of which opium might be
one. In some communities particularly in the Wakhan in Badakhshan
there are drug use problems. I am sure that colleagues who know
Badakhshan better than I, in terms of those kinds of areas, can
comment. There is also a definite element of local demand that
fuels this trend, but fundamentally it is about addressing your
economic needs.
Q55 Ann McKechin: What are your views
on the Afghan National Drugs Control Strategy and where you think
it is placed or viewed by the major donors? Why is there currently
such a difference of opinion between, say, the European donors
on the one hand and the US on the other who still seem to be married
to the idea that crop eradication is the first priority? What
is your view on the Strategy? Is the UK Government right in trying
to align its policies with that strategy?
Mr Mansfield: I suppose one of
the questions is whether the National Drug Control Strategy is
a strategy, but it contains a lot of the right policy elements
for me in terms of international experience. I have been involved
in various aspects of it over the past five or six years. It contains
elements to do with eradication only where viable alternatives
exist, no conditionality, ie making development assistance contingent
on reductions in poppy cultivation, which has proven not to work.
As to how eradication might be done, typically it is manual with
no use of spraying et cetera. I think it contains many of the
important ingredients in relation to international experience
on drugs policy in terms of supply reduction. As to whether its
sequences and prioritises the assistance required, clearly that
is not within the programme. There are issues around the mechanisms
by which line ministries will implement it. It is all very vague
on that kind of thing and that is why there has been an attempt
to do CN[3]
implementation plans with which I am a bit unfamiliar these days.
The strategy itself contains the right policy elements. There
is constant discussion about those. The more the figures go up
the more eradication comes to the fore. At a certain level you
can see the arguments on eradication that are presented. You look
at the experience in Colombia. I have had these discussions time
and time again. If people grow more opium poppy you just destroy
more. I do not understand the logic of it. To some degree this
is a faith-based issue. If people grow poppy it is perceived as
illegal. The farmers are perceived to be making more money than
non-poppy farmers. If you look at the latest UNODC[4]
survey and the kind of analysis it presents that is exactly the
argument that is made. Therefore, if they are wealthy and grow
poppy and it is illegal and you destroy it because of their wealth
they should be able to pick up an alternative; they can become
second-hand car dealers or who knows what. Reality is very different
from this. Often the figures that are presented on the drugs issue
are quite problematic. The idea that poppy farmers in Helmand
are rich rather than potentially wealthy fuels this discussion.
The whole understanding of why people grow opium poppy in the
context of Afghanistan today informs your policy response and
view on that strategy. There are differing views about the understanding
of the causal factors and drivers of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
today and those are fuelled by a lot of the numbers and some quite
problematic methodologies that generate them.
Q56 Ann McKechin: I take it from what
you have said that you do not think crop eradication should be
used as a technique unless there are alternative livelihoods,
but there are some suggestions that focusing on alternative livelihoods
only in the area of opium production could act as an incentive
to people who are currently producing legal crops to move into
illegal production so they benefit from alternative livelihood
schemes. Do you think there is there any validity in that criticism?
Mr Mansfield: In many ways I think
they are two separate arguments. In relation to eradication, we
have seen that experience not only in Afghanistan but other countries
where you destroy the crop and there is no alternative, you create
an economic and political crisis. In Thailand in the 1970s there
was heavy emphasis on eradication and it ended up pushing people
into the Thai communist party. We have Colombia, Afghanistan et
cetera. But I do not think that means that you do development
only in poppy-growing areas; not at all. You need the right balance.
You can see some of the arguments. I have heard Afghan ministers
say—I have to agree—there is a danger that if you
do work only in Helmand, Nangarhar et cetera and not in Ghowr
and other marginal players in poppy cultivation you create the
wrong motives. Some of these areas have fewer security problems,
less criminality and few problems of poppy cultivation. Neglect
them at your peril. There is an argument for containment, making
sure these areas do not feel neglected. I confess that I have
not come across many farmers in the field who say they are growing
poppy to attract development assistance because, quite frankly,
they do not believe it will come anyway. Therefore, it is not
realistic that they would waste valuable resources—land,
labour, water et cetera—purely to attract development assistance
in which often they have little confidence. I tend to hear that
argument from the malik or head of a village or a governor with
a bit more political savvy. You go back to the issue of what is
happening in Balkh and Nangarhar. We already see statements from
Governor Atta, as we did from Haji Din Mohammad and Sher Mohammad
Akhondzada, saying that they have "not received a dime".
They have reduced poppy but where is the development assistance?
Potentially, this opens the door to them saying they have done
their bit but we have not done ours. They cannot control it and
people will have to return to poppy. In many ways the governor
does very well because he is seen to be a good citizen for reducing
poppy. Therefore, he gains from the national and international
community for doing that and if development assistance comes he
argues that he provided that assistance; he negotiated with the
international community and the government and he is therefore
seen as a benevolent leader. If development assistance does not
come he can say that people should feel free; if they have to
grow poppy, so be it.
Q57 Chairman: There is a slight problem
in that there is a difference of view as to what development assistance
is. We had exactly that discussion with Governor Atta. I believe
that the week before the head of DFID[5]
who had been reconnoitring our visit got the rough end of Governor
Atta's tongue before he understood that the department was putting
80% of its money into the Government of Afghanistan which was
spending money in Balkh province and therefore aid money was arriving
but it was not perceived as such. He was looking at things that
he controlled as opposed to things that the Government of Afghanistan
controlled.
Mr Mansfield: If you will forgive
me, there is also an issue about the label "alternative livelihoods"
which I find singularly unhelpful.
Chairman: We shall come to that.
Q58 Hugh Bayley: I want to turn to
the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund. Why has it been so slow disbursing
funds? If you were running it what would you do to get some wind
in its sails?
Mr Mansfield: I feel a little
outside my comfort zone on the CNTF;[6]
I have not poured over it in great detail. I have seen a version
of a very interesting review that has been made of it. One of
the fundamental issues has been vision and ownership of it. Some
people, particularly the former minister of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics,
saw it as almost a competitor of ARTF[7]
and that it would have $1 billion in it in due course. I believe
that to some extent UNDP[8]
also viewed it in that sense, whilst others saw it as catalytic
funding. Why would you need to compete with ARTF? This is the
Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund and the "CN" is the value-added
aspect of it. Therefore, what would you be funding from that in
relation to delivering on the vision of drugs as a cost-cutting
issue across the whole of the Afghan national development strategy?
The former minister saw it as a way of having money where he could
almost become a proxy implementer of development programmes. That
was never how others saw it, particularly on the UK side. You
do not want to set up parallel systems where MRRD[9]
and the Ministry of Agriculture are doing livelihoods programmes
in non-poppy-growing areas and MCN[10]
through the trust fund is implementing them in poppy-growing areas.
That was not the idea here. This is about national programming.
I thought that these were meant to be elements that would make,
say, a national priority programme more CN-focused. National priority
programmes can contribute to reductions in poppy cultivation,
but there are things that you might be able to do to increase
the CN outcome in terms of where the assistance is going, how
it is targeted and who gains from that assistance, be it irrigation,
roads or whatever it might be, also bringing together the national
priority programmes so you create development synergies. The CNTF
should have been part of the process of assisting NPPs[11]
to be more CN-focused; maybe it could fill in strategic gaps,
or maybe you had an area where you had irrigation, ag-extension[12]
but no micro-finance. Therefore, plug in sectoral gaps through
NGOs[13]
and others who are flexible and can work in the field. Do that
diagnostic and say, "Look, we are seeing a reduction in poppy
but there is a gap. People are being marginalised and there is
a danger that poppy may increase over time if we do not address
that gap." You could be constantly doing a diagnostic on
the ground as to what is missing in relation to sectors and technical
assistance to make development programmes more CN-focused. I think
that should have been its vision, but it became $80 million, or
whatever it is—I do not even know—to fund greenhouses
in Nangarhar at $2,000 a shot, or mushrooms. All of these have
validity, but where is the CN value-added? If you can justify
that and ground it in terms of how the programme will assist the
transition from poppy cultivation dependency to a reduction in
poppy then it is fine, but I think a lot of that context was lost.
I see the CNTF as having a problem of vision more than anything.
The issues around how it reviewed the projects and subsequent
issues of disbursement and institutional capacity I leave to others.
Q59 James Duddridge: In the paper that
you co-authored with Adam Pain you challenged the use of the term
`alternative livelihood'. What are your reservations about that
terminology with respect to Afghanistan?
Mr Mansfield: The point at which
you have an alternative livelihood as an end state; it is not
a programme or set of specific interventions. The causal factors
that have led me to the point where I have a viable alternative
to poppy cultivation are a process of economic growth, security,
governance and to some degree the threat of eradication. It is
there at the end; it is not a series of discrete interventions
that we can call `alternative livelihoods'. Road building and
irrigation can contribute to a reduction in poppy. There is a
danger that national priority programmes and development are here
and alternative livelihoods are there and so when Governor Atta
says he is not receiving any assistance he is not looking at the
national priority programmes and the role they can play in reducing
poppy cultivation; he is thinking of his "alternative livelihoods
programme". It serves the purpose of compartmentalising the
drugs issue in a way that is counter-intuitive and makes no sense.
To deliver a drugs outcome we need governance, security, development
and economic growth, not a certain set of interventions. They
do not exist outside those elements. I just find it an unhelpful
term and a way of saying that insufficient alternative livelihoods
assistance has been received. There are national priority programmes
and other assistance. It is a way of negotiating for more money.
1 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Back
2
Afghan National Police (ANP) Back
3
Counter-Narcotics (CN) Back
4
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Back
5
Department for International Development (DFID) Back
6
Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) Back
7
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Back
8
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Back
9
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) Back
10
Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) Back
11
National Priority Programs (NPPs) Back
12
agricultural extension (ag-extension) Back
13
Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) Back
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