Supplementary memorandum submitted by
Care International UK
a) Further examples from Peru of DFID having
more influence over the IFIs in Latin America when it had a presence
at a country level prior to 2004 (to complement examples given
yesterday of positive examples of DFID influence from Nicaragua)
In Peru, much of DFID's successful work on building
community capacity and participation of the poor has been cut
back since the closure of the bilateral programme and of the DFID
office in Peru. But since 2004, DFID work with the WB does not
appear to have directed funds or attention to this type of work.
Meanwhile one INGO informant based in Peru (interviewed for CARE
research) talked of the void left by the closure of the DFID office
in Peru in 2005 with regard to advocacy on the IFIs. It is clear
that DFID staff in Peru used to play an important role in engaging
with IFI staff, facilitating dialogue between the IFIs and CSOs,
and nudging IFI approaches in a more inclusive direction. For
example:
PARSALUD example
The PARSALUD rural health reform project funded
by the World Bank is supposed to include support for a system
of local health administration committees (CLAS) whereby local
people at community and district level manage and monitor delivery
of health service. Up until 2004 DFID had an important health
rights project which supported the CLAS and other forms of participation
in PARSALUD. However, the Peruvian Ministry of Health is not keen
on the CLAS committees and they have been allowed to whither on
the vine since DFID staff left the country.
Despite lip service paid to the importance of
the CLAS, the World Bank did nothing to reactivate them. DFID's
health rights project could have been a major source of support
for this component but it was cut under DFID's new strategy in
Peru (though CARE took over part of the work) and no support for
the CLAS was given by DFID Andes post 2004.
The Committees are now back on the agenda (including
through a recently approved law) but only because CSOs—eg
Foro Salud and CARE—are actively lobbying for it. But neither
Peruvian CSOs nor CARE have the clout that DFID used to have to
ensure that the World Bank remains committed to the CLAS and the
government doesn't railroad them once again.
Peru Country Assistance Strategy consultation process
It may well be no coincidence that the level
of World Bank consultation in Peru over its latest Country Assistance
Strategy was perceived by CSOs in Peru as very tokenistic and
poorly prepared compared to the process in 2001 when, with DFID
support, the World Bank undertook a much more innovative and participatory
"Voices of the Poor" approach to the CAS consultation.
These examples support the assertion of both
the ODI and CARE's own research that (to quote the ODI's interim
evaluation of the RAP), "Having a foot on the ground is crucial
to maintaining DFID leverage over the IFIs."
b) IDB
Regarding the question from the committee concerning
the US Treasury's opinion that the IDB is "disfunctional"
and that this is because the borrowers of the IDB have a majority
on the board, CARE does not share this analysis. It is true that
the on-going process of realignment has caused much turmoil in
the IDB but we do not believe that this is related to the make-up
of the board. On the contrary, in our opinion, the share of voting
rights held by the borrowing governments is one of the strengths
of the IDB. It provides a greater measure of democracy to the
IDB's functioning than is the case of the World Bank and also
goes some way towards ensuring country ownership of IDB country
strategies and projects.
The current level of disfunctionality in the
IDB appears to be mostly due to the changes introduced by current
IDB president, Luis Alberto Moreno, and to his own management
style and personal agenda. For instance, early this year the board
rejected a proposed implementation strategy for Moreno's "flagship"
initiative "Opportunities for the Majority" for reasons
which were not made clear. However, some sources inside the IDB
have suggested that the real reason was that Moreno had behaved
as though all that was needed was for the board to rubber stamp
the proposal rather than properly consult with them. This suggestion
is consistent with other complaints about Moreno emanating from
within the bank.
c) Country ownership
Just to add to the points made by Romilly and
Edward on this. Many of the CSOs we interviewed in Latin America
this year emphasised that "country ownership" of the
development process should include "citizen ownership"
and not just "government ownership". This concern is
particularly pertinent in countries where CSOs' relations with
their governments are currently strained (eg Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua).
Most IFI and donor websites and official documents—including
those of the World Bank—now recognise the importance of
promoting "citizen ownership" of, or "citizen participation"
in public policy processes (even if their primary contractual
agreement at a country level is with the government). However
our research indicates that:
— official IFI and donor policies do
not always reflect actual practice at a country level;
— the models of participation promoted
by the IFIs and donors in PRS processes, for example, while not
entirely negative, have often been quite limited and exogenous
to the country's own processes (as documented in Bolivia and Nicaragua);
— donor and IFI increased support for
CSOs' policy monitoring and advocacy work is welcomed but is still
lacking;
— civil society participation frequently
fails to lead to civil society influence over public policies
and/or their implementation.
A key question is what constitutes "the
promotion of citizen ownership" and whether IFIs' and donors'
perceptions of this concept are the same as CSOs' perceptions.
For the World Bank, for example, it is about giving voice to citizens'
concerns and helping to ensure that their views are factored into
policy and programme decisions (See IDEA/World Bank "Experiences
with National Dialogue in Latin America: Main lessons from a roundtable
discussion" San Salvador 2000 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDF/Resources/elsalvaenglish.pdf;
see also World Bank press release for small grant programme in
Albania intended to "support citizens ownership").
Whilst agreeing that these are important elements,
many CSOs would highlight other elements such as the importance
of recognising that government-led plans and priorities are not
the sum total of "country ownership", that CSOs' strategies
and activities outside government-led plans and priorities are
also part of this concept, and that a diverse civil society independent
of government can strengthen democratic pluralism (and by implication
national ownership).
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