Memorandum submitted by Diana Conyers,
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
INTRODUCTION
1. The views expressed in this submission
are based on my knowledge of the development literature (see select
bibliography attached) and, in particular, my personal experience
in development work (mainly in Africa) over the last 40 years.
OVERVIEW
2. I believe that channelling increased
amounts of funding through the World Bank will hamper DFID's efforts
to:
— implement the 2006 White Paper
on Eliminating World Poverty;
— assist in achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs);
— implement the recommendations
of the 2005 Africa Commission; and
— meet its commitment to the 2004
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
3. I suggest that there are four main reasons
why this will be the case:
(a) The Bank is not sufficiently committed
to reducing poverty and inequality;
(b) The Bank's mode of operation discourages
local ownership and good governance;
(c) The Bank's governance structure and influence
on development discourse discourages constructive debate, particularly
by representatives of developing countries; and
(d) The Bank's technocratic approach ignores
the political realities of development.
4. These four points are elaborated below.
THE BANK
IS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMMITTED
TO REDUCING
POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY
5. DFID is committed to reducing poverty
and inequality. This is explicitly stated in its 2006 White Paper
and implicit in its commitment to achieving the MDGs and implementing
the recommendations of the Africa Commission. In recent years
the Bank has also expressed a commitment to reducing poverty and,
since the publication of its 2006 World Development Report,
inequality. However, the extent of this commitment is constrained
by two factors:
— As a bank, its main role is
to lend money and it has to operate on a commercial basis; even
the "soft" loans administered through the International
Development Association (IDA) have to be repaid.
— It remains committed to "neo-liberal"
policies, such as privatisation and free trade, which in many
countries have had a negative impact on poverty and, in particular,
inequality.
THE BANK'S
MODE OF
OPERATION DISCOURAGES
LOCAL OWNERSHIP
AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE
6. DFID is committed to local ownership
of development policies and programmes and the promotion of "good
governance". This is reflected in the White Paper, which
is sub-titled Making Governance Work for the Poor, and
in its commitment to the 2004 Paris Declaration and 2005 Report
of the Africa Commission. However, the Bank's mode of operation
discourages local ownership and good governance. It adopts a "blueprint"
approach to development; it has preconceived views regarding the
types of policies and programmes that are required and its project
planning and management system is inflexible and bureaucratic
and relies heavily on external consultants. This approach discourages
a sense of local ownership and commitment within recipient governments
and does little to develop the capacity to development policies
and programmes, which is an essential component of "good
governance". DFID's experience in Africa has shown that a
more flexible, "learning process" approach is far more
likely to create the local commitment and capacity development
that is essential for sustainable development.
THE BANK'S
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
AND INFLUENCE
ON DEVELOPMENT
DISCOURSE DISCOURAGES
CONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE,
PARTICULARLY BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
7. The failure of conventional neo-liberal
policies to address poverty in many parts of the world (see point
1 above) suggests the need for an open debate about alternative
development strategies, while the importance of local ownership
and capacity development (see point 2 above) suggests that developing
countries must play a major role in any such debate. DFID should
thus be assisting developing countries to formulate their own
development policies, based on an analysis of their own particular
situations. However, it is difficult to do this through the Bank.
The Bank uses its dominant role in the generation, promotion and
dissemination of development thought to promote neo-liberal policies
and its governance structure makes it difficult for developing
countries to put forward alternative perspectives. This was most
obvious in the case of structural adjustment policies, but is
also evident in the Poverty Reduction Support Papers (PRSPs),
which have replaced structural adjustment as the Bank's preferred
basis for channelling multilateral and bilateral aid. PRSPs are
supposed to be formulated by recipient governments in a participatory
manner; but in practice the scope for local inputs has been very
limited, because the Bank has a major influence on both their
content and their format.
THE BANK'S
TECHNOCRATIC APPROACH
IGNORES THE
POLITICAL REALITIES
OF DEVELOPMENT
8. In recent years, DFID has become increasingly
aware that "development" is a complex process that cannot
simply be "designed" and that political interests play
a major role in the formation and implementation of development
policies. This is reflected in the 2006 White Paper and in recent
governance-related strategies, such as the "drivers of change"
approach. However, the Bank tends to underestimate the impact
of politics. This is due partly to the limitations of its mandate,
which prevents it from engaging in politics. However, it also
reflects its approach to development, which is `technocratic'
in nature. Since the widespread failure of structural adjustment
policies, the Bank has recognised that institutions are important;
one has to get the right institutions as well as the right policies.
However, getting the right institutions is regarded as a process
of technical design rather than one of political negotiation.
|
