Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 95-99)

MR EDWARD BELL, MS HELEN COLLINSON AND MS ROMILLY GREENHILL

13 DECEMBER 2007

  Q95 Chairman: Thank you for coming in for this second part of the evidence session. We are obviously continuing to look at the World Bank and DFID, but in the context of specific locations: Africa, Latin America and fragile states. I would appreciate it if you would introduce yourselves so that we have that on the record.

  Mr Bell: My name is Edward Bell, I am Senior Programme Adviser at International Alert, which is a London-based, peace-building organisation, working for over 20 years with conflict-affected communities and on policy issues relating to those countries.

  Ms Collinson: My name is Helen Collinson. I am here on behalf of CARE International UK. I should explain that most of the staff in CARE who work on this issue are either unavailable or in the region. I am an independent consultant who has been brought in to share some of the findings of a research project which I co-ordinated for CARE this year, on the implications of changing donor policies in Latin America for the civil society organisations, with particular reference to DFID's regional assistance plan. If there are specific questions which I cannot answer, CARE has an adviser based in Lima, Peru, Mike Clulow, who works specifically on the IFIs[15] in Latin America and CARE's engagement with the IFIs, and I can direct questions to Mike Clulow in Lima.

  Ms Greenhill: I am Romilly Greenhill. I am a Senior Policy Officer with ActionAid. ActionAid is an international NGO, working in between 40 and 50 countries worldwide, including a large number of African countries. I work in the UK policy department with a particular focus on aid, World Bank and debt issues.

  Q96  Chairman: Thank you very much for that. We did have some discussion when we were talking to World Bank officials in Washington about middle-income priorities. As you know, the context for the UK is that we have, by Acts of Parliament, bilateral aid targeted 90% to low-income countries and only 10% to middle-income countries. But, of course, we are also giving money to multilateral institutions. There was some concern expressed that there are a lot of poor people in middle-income countries and that DFID does not have a very strong engagement with them and, to the extent that they do, it is through the Bank. I wonder if you could give a view, first of all, of whether you think that this 90/10 split is right; whether DFID is sufficiently engaged with poverty reduction in middle-income countries; and whether you think the arrangement in terms of its working through the Bank, which the Department would probably argue is the way they reach these people, is the most effective way to do it and if it works?

  Ms Greenhill: From an NGO perspective, most NGOs think that the 90/10 split is appropriate for DFID. There are some very interesting questions about aid allocations and how we make the international system for allocating aid more effective, but DFID has quite a strong comparative advantage in the highly aid-dependent poor countries in terms of their expertise and their policy advice. Middle-income countries generally have more options in terms of alternative mechanisms for raising finance for development through the private sector—domestic taxation and so on. Most NGOs would be loath to see DFID moving away from that 90/10 split.

  Mr Bell: Just to add a generic point on that. There are estimated to be about 40 fragile states, 40-50 fragile conflict-affected states worldwide. A recent World Bank study put the economic cost of each of those states at about $100 billion, that is, about twice the annual aid budget. There are very good reasons in terms of conflict mitigation and conflict prevention that would argue for that to be the right proportion of assistance.

  Q97  Chairman: I am not really challenging the 90/10 split, it is more about how effectively DFID can reach poor people in countries that are not low-income countries and whether the Bank is the best way to do it. I am sorry, the way I asked the question probably led you down that track. The question is, how effectively, given we have that split, can DFID reach those people and is their partnership with the World Bank an effective way of doing it?

  Mr Bell: It depends on how you go about doing it. Certainly, we would argue from our experience that it is an expert, labour-intensive process by which the incentives for staff performance, for institutional performance, have to be adapted to that context and in some cases you see DFID doing this extremely well and in some cases, you see the Bank doing it extremely well. From the research that we have done, it is quite unsystematic. It is very ad hoc, based on the personalities involved. The Bank is capable of operating extremely effectively but we would also suggest that it is not as effective as it could be.

  Ms Collinson: What came clearly out of the research that CARE has done in Latin America is that the decision to channel much of a very reduced budget for Latin America through the World Bank and the IDB[16] was a response to big budget cuts. With the small amount of money that was available to DFID in Latin America, the view was that, well, we are such tiny players now, we therefore need to look at linking up with much bigger partners. The basic concern is that there was not an analysis of what is the best way of spending money in Latin America to reduce poverty and inequality. The starting position was that our budget had been cut to virtually nothing in Latin America, so how can we make the most effective use of these very reduced funds? It is a reaction to a reduction in budget.


  Q98 Chairman: If that budget starts to rise again, which it should do given (a) there is a rising budget, and (b)—well, it is a questionable (b)—but the draw on funds that have gone into Iraq might diminish, therefore more money should be available, do you think they should change the approach?

  Ms Collinson: We feel very strongly that they should change the approach. We feel that there should be a proportionate increase in the budget for Latin America in line with the 11% increase projected in the recent CSR.[17] When I say we, I am talking about CARE in this case. It may well be strategic to link up with the World Band and the IDB in Latin America because DFID will still be a very small player and obviously those institutions are much larger. But the way in which DFID is engaging with those institutions at the moment, we would have serious questions about, and we are not the only ones that have raised some quite serious questions. There was a very weighty, interim evaluation undertaken of DFID's Regional Assistance Plan by the ODI,[18] which came out earlier this year. A major concern at the moment is the very hands-off approach that DFID has in Latin America, which is in very stark contrast to the way that a relatively small DFID team worked in Latin America up until 2004. They had a very high reputation for high-calibre staff that really understood the realities in those countries, right on the ground. There was some very interesting feedback from CSOs[19] in Bolivia about how DFID staff would go out there and cross rivers and really understand what was going on for poor people, facilitate dialogues between the IFIs and the Government and CSOs, etc. That rather abruptly came to an end in 2004 with these big budget cuts and the decision to channel the funding primarily through trust funds in the World Bank and the IDB and decentralised funds in addition to channelling funding through INGOs.[20] But in both cases, whether it is going through the World Bank and the IDB or INGOs, there is this very hands-off approach now. We have had the closure of offices in Lima and in Tegucigalpa The added value that DFID had in terms of understanding the realities in those countries on the ground, and having quite a lot of influence on the World Bank and the IDB on the ground, has largely been lost with the exception, arguably, of Nicaragua, where DFID still has a bilateral programme and our evidence suggests that the influence on the very institutions which the Regional Assistance Plan is saying it wants to influence, i.e., the World Bank and the IDB, has been greatest in Nicaragua where they still have a bilateral programme and they still have people on the ground.







  Chairman: A very clear and interesting piece of evidence. We will have to go and vote again and I will come back to that.

  The Committee suspended from 4.08 p.m. to 4.20 p.m. for a division in the House.

  Q99 Chairman: I am going to take questions slightly out of order in the hope that John Battle's leg gets him back here in time so as not to lose his question. This question is to Mr Bell. The constitution of the Bank says it should issue its financing without regard to political considerations but whenever we take evidence there is clearly a political dimension to it; political perspectives, priorities and so forth. First of all, do you think the Bank is, in the proper sense of the word, a non-political institution? And, when it is working with fragile states, where by definition there is a lot of politics going on, what are the key factors that the Bank should take into account, legitimately, when it is dealing with fragile states if it is trying to do it in a way that, if it is political, it is not politically biased? Do you think the Bank actually does that?

  Mr Bell: It is certainly capable of doing so. One of the questions that was asked in the first evidence session of this Committee was on how you build up active citizenship, how you increase accountability from the bottom up, and I think the work that we have done in International Alert is really showing that any kind of project, whether it is in the health sector, education or infrastructure, can act as a change agent on those states to society relationships. In that sense, you are having an inevitable political impact but it can be done in an extremely positive fashion. The other element that needs to be highlighted is that where something is extremely explicitly and overtly political, then bilateral donors that are partners of the World Bank in country have an enormous role to play in taking that explicit political dialogue forward. It can be seen in a number of countries in Africa, Asia or elsewhere.



15   international financial institutions Back

16   Inter-American Development Bank Back

17   Comprehensive Spending Review Back

18   Overseas Development Institute Back

19   Civil society organisations Back

20   International non-governmental organisation Back


 
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