Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-132)

MR EDWARD BELL, MS HELEN COLLINSON AND MS ROMILLY GREENHILL

13 DECEMBER 2007

  Q120  Hugh Bayley: Good point. What are your respective experiences of co-operation between the Bank and DFID in-country? DFID, when we visit developing countries, invariably tells us that their bilateral relations with the World Bank are one of the most important local partnerships. To what extent do you think that partnership exercises some policy influence on the Bank or constraint over the Bank's policies in that particular country?

  Ms Greenhill: From our side, one of the concerns we have is that the whole harmonisation agenda, which is an extremely important agenda—I am not denying that—but what we are seeing a lot is that harmonisation is tending to mean a lot of donors, including DFID coming in behind the World Bank and the World Bank being very dominant in putting together policy matrices, doing a lot of the background analytical work and so on for lending programmes, and DFID then supporting those matrices, rather than directly engaging with the government to get the government to develop their own matrices. We are seeing generally the Bank playing a very dominant role and DFID tending to come in behind that, which is quite a concern, particularly when DFID's conditionality policy, for example, is a good deal more progressive in our view than the World Bank's policy; its policies on gender and other issues also tend to be much stronger than the Bank's. We are seeing them very much as a subordinate rather than an equal or even a dominant partner in countries.

  Mr Bell: In a number of countries where we work that is true, that in some places the Bank develops a development agenda that DFID staff might themselves, if they had more time, think was wholly unrealistic. If you look at what has just been agreed in DRC for that country's development progress, it is completely impossible in that circumstance. There are though examples where the partnership works quite well on project issues on public financial management in Nepal and on ex-combattant issues in the Great Lakes of Africa.

  Q121  Hugh Bayley: Can you give us a couple of examples?

  Mr Bell: Yes, just to take the example of the MDRP, which is quite a unique and innovative way of working for the Bank. They have joint missions with bilateral expert staff, so a Dutch counterpart, a UK DFID counterpart would travel with Bank staff on a supervisory mission to engage the partner country representatives on the various issues, technical and political, that affects the progress of demobilising and reintegrating ex-combattants in these conflict-affected countries. In Nepal, on public financial management, it is joint DFID-World Bank technical expertise provided to the Government of Nepal to improve the tracking of expenditure— the fiscal space in which development spending can be given. Where I would add a note of caution to what Romilly has said is the issue of country ownership. DFID might have a more nuanced, more politically sensitive conception of it, as you can see this over development governance and democratic politics both of DFID's governance departments produced, which is very different to what the World Bank has to do because it has to act as if it is in a financial institution/client/borrower/grantee relationship. That is where there is the possibility for some tension between the World Bank's approach and DFID's.

  Ms Collinson: Can I comment on the Latin American point to reiterate what I said before. It is not just CARE which is emphasising the importance of DFID having a foot on the ground. It was a conclusion of the ODI evaluation where they said "having a `foot on the ground' is crucial to ensure that DFID maintains its leverage on the IFIs".[27] We have found that the ability of the DFID staff in Nicaragua to develop relations with the World Bank and IDB staff on the ground has definitely been limited. There is evidence that DFID has persuaded the World Bank to hold local-level consultations around its country assistance strategy, which was not happening before. You have had not just the IDB and the World Bank staff but also other stakeholders confirming that it was DFID that persuaded the World Bank to include micro and small enterprises in private sector support programmes. You have had DFID funding workshops to improve the World Bank's work on gender and women's economic empowerment, and then, a crucial issue in Nicaragua, persuading both the World Bank and the IDB to engage much more practically on the Caribbean coast, which was more or less excluded from the National Development Plan. It is not just a question of having some kind of presence on the ground because there is some presence in Brazil—there is a small DFID office in Brazil—but compared to Nicaragua there was quite a stark contrast there in Brazil where the IDB and the World Bank had no idea about what DFID was doing and neither DFID nor the IDB and World Bank staff could identify any particular issue where DFID had exerted any influence. In Brazil, the bilateral programme was closed down. There is a very small team there Generally the switch has been to a regional approach in Latin America. It is very difficult to understand what this regional approach means. Possibly, it is not very appropriate for engaging with, particularly, the World Bank. As a result of decentralisation, there is a certain amount that you can do to influence World Bank operations at a national level, but DFID is falling between stools because they have closed their bilateral programmes apart from Nicaragua. They do not have the staff at a national level and are supposedly working at a regional level, but the World Bank does not necessarily work at a regional level, so the possibilities for influencing at that level are limited.


  Q122 John Battle: If I could ask a question here about agriculture. After years of neglect, there is more of an interest in it and it is seen now as making a big impact on tackling poverty, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, of course, and the World Bank is expressing a new interest. What strategy should they be pursuing? Do you see them having expertise in assisting subsistence farmers? Where is their speciality, what should they be focusing on?

  Ms Greenhill: My summary would be that they should not be pursing the strategy that they are pursuing at the moment, particularly the one outlined in the recent World Development Report. I agree with you that agriculture has been neglected and needs much more attention from the World Bank, DFID and from a large number of donors. The strategy that the World Bank seems to be pursing is very much around liberalisation, around involvement of small farmers in global supply chains, much more emphasis on large farms rather than with smallholders. ActionAid's staff on the ground have a lot of concerns about that because we have seen the damaging impact over the last 20 years of a focus on free markets, on liberalisation, which has left many of the small farmers unable to get basic agricultural inputs—seeds and so on—which has led to increases in landlessness and food insecurity and so on. In summary, this is a very important area for donors to focus on but we need a really big shift in the World Bank's strategy.

  Q123  John Battle: What should the World Bank be doing? I am not as aware as you that they have been doing that much except the mega scale, high-tech telecommunications, road building that they abandoned in Africa after failing. I have not noticed them doing too much on the ground in terms of agriculture. What should they be doing though?

  Ms Greenhill: The main thing that they have been doing is around the content of the policy advice they are giving to governments, and this comes back to the question of conditionality. A lot of the advice gets the public sector out of marketing, provision of seeds, rural extension and so on and their World Development Report is suggesting a continuation of that approach, that there should be a very limited role for states, only in providing an enabling environment for the private sector. The World Bank's own evaluation unit has shown that simply providing an enabling environment is not enough. The private sector has not come in, particularly with very small family-run smallholder farms.

  Q124  John Battle: So should the World Bank turn itself into the Grameen Bank?

  Ms Greenhill: The first thing the World Bank should do is stop putting pressure on governments to withdraw their own role. It should encourage governments and work with governments, so that governments have a much stronger role in the public provision of those areas. And it should have much more emphasis on supporting the smallholder farmers as opposed to the big corporations and trying to get farmers involved in the global supply chain.

  Q125  John Battle: I am looking for models to see what it might do, as opposed to just define policy. Should it become a Credit Agricole which set off a roll of credit unions, for example, that flourish in the West Indies—as it used to be known—and certainly in France and Francophone Africa? The Grameen Bank is another example of small credit. Should the Bank split into parcels of money? How would you see the investment model of the World Bank working? That is what I am trying to seek out.

  Ms Greenhill: Well, again, it comes back to this country ownership question because I do not think the World Bank should be going into any country saying, ok, we are going to do x, y and z. What the Bank should be doing is supporting countries to develop their own strategies to support smallholder farmers and particularly women, because obviously farming is a very important issue for a lot of women. It should be providing some of the support that countries need to develop those policies.

  Q126  John Battle: If I were to push you hard, in the 40 to 50 failed states, how many of their country anti-poverty strategies define it in those terms? That is the problem.

  Ms Greenhill: For me, though, if you have got a failed state, the answer is not to come in and start trying to do your own thing as a donor. If you have got a failed state, the first priority—Edward would probably agree with me on this—is to try and see how you can make the state work better and support those public institutions to deliver those services. Only in very extreme circumstances of war or conflict should there be direct intervention.

  Q127  Chairman: Bob Zoellick has said "accelerated growth", as in agriculture, "requires a sharp productivity increase in smallholder farming combined with more effective support to the millions coping as subsistence farmers, many of them in remote areas."[28] That sounds exactly like what you are asking for?

  Ms Greenhill: But if you look at the detail in the World Development Report, it is still very much about this enabling environment point. There is still a very strong emphasis on the private sector and in trying to get smaller farmers engaged in global supply chains. That is the thrust of the World Development Report, and that is something that we are quite seriously concerned about.

  Q128  John Battle: DFID working with the World Bank—this Committee pushed DFID to re-engage with agriculture—in our report five or six years ago—we put it on the agenda and got a good and positive response from DFID and from other organisations. Where would you see DFID's approach on agriculture then through that prism of the World Bank? Perhaps complementing the World Bank, or pushing the World Bank, or telling the World Bank to get out? How would you see DFID?

  Ms Greenhill: Again, the area where DFID has a much stronger set of policies than the World Bank is really about this ownership question. They are generally much better at listening to countries and supporting countries to build up their own strategy. Where both DFID and the World Bank need to do better is in listening to the smallholder farmers themselves, particularly women to whom farming is extremely important and whose voices often get lost in this whole debate. Both DFID and the World Bank need to be going out and engaging, and this relates to the staffing questions that we have already been discussing.

  Q129  John Battle: It also relates to the men who run the countries in which those questions might be asked.

  Ms Greenhill: Sure, but it is actually getting the voices of the people that are poorest and most marginalised who tend to be women.

  Q130  John Battle: You may meet opposition if you go to that capital city where the politicians who are men say, that is not our strategy, we want the big boys in and the big projects and the rest of it, in order to get our votes in.

  Ms Greenhill: There are two things here. Firstly, it is about countries determining their strategies and ultimately governments are responsible for doing that, but you have also got to make sure that people who are affected on the ground have their voices heard at the national level. For me, the role for DFID is both to take what the government is doing seriously and really work with the government, trying to make the government work more effectively, but also make sure that those voices are heard and provide the support that is necessary for those voices to be heard.

  Q131  Chairman: Thank you. Just a small anecdotal example. When we were in northern Afghanistan, we were in a village where they had been discouraged from growing poppy and had switched to growing melons. But they did not know anything about growing melons and they were being affected by fleas—some melon flea or something—and they said "nobody is there to tell us or advise us what to do." Is that not a role—whether it is in the public or private sector, but frankly these people cannot afford to pay for it so it would have to be bought from the private sector by somebody. Is that not a role where both DFID and the World Bank could be providing some practical help? Or when we were in Malawi, there was a real problem because people wanted to grow maize everywhere, regardless of whether it was the best crop, or the most appropriate circumstances, and were not interested in growing alternative crops. That is the real difficulty when the country only wants to grow one crop and it is the wrong crop or not the best crop. There has to be an interaction, does there not, which tries to guide people even if it does not push them or demand them or force them?

  Ms Greenhill: At the local level, both of those examples are symptomatic of the lack of agricultural extension services and again, that comes back to the heavy focus on simply providing an enabling environment for the private sector, and the private sector will fill the gap. As I mentioned, the World Bank's own independent evaluation group has come in saying that, actually, no they have not filled those gaps. There definitely is a need for advice and assistance to small farmers at the local level but it is the governments that need to set those strategies in place to make that happen. To go back to the point I made earlier, we know that if donors come in and push things that do not have ownership at the local level, they do not tend to be effective.

  Mr Bell: I would just like to give an example of some worthwhile projects on coffee reform in Burundi. Here you see again why you need to nuance this issue of ownership and leadership so much. The World Bank engaged with the Burundian Government to try and liberalise the coffee sector because if you control the coffee, you control the power, you control the money. The Government has sold the entire crop to a New York broker, one Burundian that connected to the elite. We have been trying to work with local confederations of coffee growers. They cannot pull up the coffee plants because it is against the law. They cannot engage in other types of production, so the World Bank is on the right track in trying to give people choice and make it more of an open access type of economy, but the way that they have to engage with the Government means that they are up against elite's capture interest. You have to go through the process of engagement participation extremely slowly and make sure that as a staff member of the Bank you are not conditioned by your own timetable in headquarters about what you have to achieve within a year. You have to work through the process slowly to make sure that reform is sensitive to the context. There are all sorts of competing priorities.

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I am sorry it has been rather a disrupted and consequently longer evidence session, but votes do happen although we were not supposed to have them this afternoon. Both of these sessions have given us quite a lot of evidence to evaluate and consider in our report. It is extremely helpful. If you have any thoughts after you leave here that you think you want to reinforce anything you have said or provide some supplementary factual information to reinforce it, that would be fine, please communicate directly with us.

  Q132  John Battle: Sorry to interrupt. Have we got the full reports on Latin America?

  Mr Collinson: Did the Committee members get copies of the synthesis report? There are summary chapters of the research in each country in this synthesis report and I also have the full reports of the country research but they are in Spanish and Portuguese. The Brazilian one is fascinating but unfortunately it is in Portuguese. However, most of the key points are in the Brazil chapter in the synthesis report. I will send in some additional points about this issue of national ownership because it came up quite a lot in our research, but I will do that in writing. 29

  Chairman: Thank you very much, all three of you.

29  Ev 77





27   Overseas Development Institute, Interim Evaluation of DFID's Regional Assistance Programme For Latin America, January 2007, p 7 Back

28   The World Bank, Agriculture for Development, 2007, p xiii Back


 
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