Further supplementary written evidence
from the Northern Ireland Prison Service
When my colleagues and I gave evidence to the
Select Committee on 24 October, we undertook to let you have two
additional papers—one on security categorisation, the other
on the different forms of support grades and their terms and conditions.
Attached to this letter are the two papers.
The Northern Ireland Prison Service has a headquarters
strength, including activities as diverse as estate management,
procurement, human resources and psychology, of no more than 200.
Within this complement, we endeavour to cover similar strategic
and operational policy functions to HMPS headquarters which is
many times the size.
The Northern Ireland Service has a wider range
of external scrutiny bodies than our sister Services, for example,
the Criminal Justice Inspectorate as well as HMCIP, the Human
Rights Commission and the Northern Ireland Children and Young
Persons Commissioner. We are usually at any given time processing—and
aspiring to implement—between five hundred and a thousand
"live" recommendations. Each such review may be welcome
in its own right, but the cumulative effect is considerable.
Currently moreover, the Billy Wright Inquiry
is requiring input across all in senior management.
These requirements provide at least a partial
explanation for why sometimes, even when we have identified the
clear direction of travel, the Service has to prioritise our implementation
programmes.
NIPS NOTE ON
SECURITY CATEGORISATION
This note is provided for the Northern Ireland
Affairs Committee on foot of the undertaking given by the Director
during evidence on 24 October.
Background
In recent years, the Northern Ireland Prison
Service has based its security categorisation system on the following
five categories:
In practice, since the closure of the Maze in
2000, no prisoner has been categorised as top risk; moreover very
few have been placed in the low risk category, and none in low
X.
Indeed, while some 10% of prisoners have been
categorised overall as high risk, the great majority have been
placed in the medium risk category. This in large part follows
through from their initial assessment on committal ie first arrival
into the prison establishment, when the information available
about the individual is likely to be fairly limited, and it is
usually deemed prudent to make a medium risk assessment. Currently,
too often there is no substantive review of medium risk thereafter,
for example at sentence or on transfer within the estate, which
would reassess and potentially reduce the individuals' risk status.
(Headquarters is responsible for reviewing those categorised as
high risk, with individual establishments reviewing the others.)
Some time ago, as part of the wider strategic
development programme or Blueprint, the NIPS Management Board
decided that it should review its security categorisation policy
and practice. An assessment was carried out of the approach in
the neighbouring jurisdictions. The Scottish Prison Service has
a prisoner supervision system which is based largely on delivering
the appropriate level of supervision within establishments, rather
than external factors. The Irish Prison Service has traditionally
had no formal system of security classification. The English Service
has used for sentenced prisoners, excluding those on remand or
awaiting trial, the A,B,C,D classification system, which is based
upon a detailed algorithm. (Strictly HMPS has three sub-categories
within Category A.)
In the Blueprint context, the Northern Ireland
Service concluded initially that it would be appropriate to devise
a system fitted to the Northern Ireland context, and a good deal
of work was done to devise our own algorithm. The initial work
that was carried out demonstrated clearly that while there was
likely to be a broadly similar proportion of prisoners still assessed
as high risk, many of those currently in the medium risk would
in practice have a lower risk assessment.
It was clearly shown that there is considerable
value in having an up-to-date and effective security categorisation
system, both for internal management and for external risk reasons.
Managers and prison officers require a system
which enables them accurately to understand the security risk
posed by an individual prisoner, once sufficient information is
available. This has implications for issues such as the level
of escorting and supervision required within the prison, the arrangements
to be made should the individual have further court appearances
or need a hospital appointment, and other linkages to the regime
more generally, eg, work allocation.
Very importantly, an effective categorisation
system can valuably inform issues such as future estate design
and development, and planning differential staffing levels associated
with different designs. It has to be recognised, however, that
in a small and complex estate such as Northern Ireland some of
the economies of scale available to the English Service will inevitably
not be available.
The Northern Ireland Service has many demands
and competing priorities. Individual managers sometimes have to
be moved from one piece of work to undertake another which has
become more urgent. Completion of the work on the security categorisation
arrangements was in consequence deferred for some time until it
was required in the context of the options appraisal. The options
appraisal also brought out more clearly than hitherto the linkages
between the planning of the Northern Ireland estate and the Prison
Design Briefing System of HMPS. That documentation provides clear
guidance on every security aspect of prison design and will continue
to be used as an important reference source for the completion
of the options appraisal, (although clearly there may be Northern
Ireland-specific points that would warrant departing from it in
detail).
After much consideration, it has now been concluded
by NIPS senior management that the balance of advantage lay in
aligning the Northern Ireland security categorisation system more
closely with that used by HMPS; this especially takes account
of the linkage with the PDBS. Below are the categories and definitions
accordingly now used in the Northern Ireland system:
Prisoners whose escape would be highly dangerous
to the public or the police or the security of the state, no matter
how unlikely that escape might be, and for whom the aim must be
to make escape impossible.
Prisoners for whom the very highest conditions
of security are not necessary, but for whom escape must be made
very difficult.
Prisoners who cannot be trusted in open conditions,
but who do not have the resources and will to make a determined
escape attempt.
Prisoners who can be reasonably trusted in open
conditions.
In addition, remand prisoners will be treated
as unclassified if they are not Category A. (Adult males categorised
as U will be held in minimum Category B security conditions, while
all other prisoners categorised U will be held in minimum Category
C security conditions.)
NIPS is moving to introduce this new categorisation
scheme, based on a Northern Ireland specific algorithm, in November.
This follows, as set out above, much consideration, and consultation
with staff associations etc.
Until this decision to adopt the HMPS categories
A, B, C and D, it was being suggested that, recognising that traditionally
many prisoners had been incorrectly assessed as medium risk, that
there would be a need to create two separate categories of low
risk. It became apparent that that was something of a misnomer
and could cause more confusion. Adopting the A,B,C and D system
clarifies this point, and provides a benchmark with HMPS.
It is important to note that the work done thus
far demonstrates that both the Northern Ireland and England and
Wales Services have 10% of sentenced prisoners who are correctly
categorised at D. These are individuals who can be safely held
in open conditions; in Northern Ireland this would broadly equate
to the numbers in Foyleview, the Prisoner Assessment Unit and
Martin House. Leaving aside the separated prisoners who are categorised
as A, the proportion of other sentenced prisoners also Category
A is very alike between the two jurisdictions again. Within Categories
B and D, NIPS estimates that rather more of the remaining 80%
would become Category C (perhaps around 50%, with the final third
being Category B.) The attached graphs illustrate the former and
the new approaches.
Conclusion
This work has been in train for some time, and
is being finalised for the purposes of estate planning. Clearly
it is essential for those designing future buildings to understand
the security categorisation of their occupants. All the work thus
far suggests that it will not impact directly on the criteria
identified in relation with Magilligan's suitability as a site
for a continuing prison facility.
Annex
NIPS NOTE ON
SUPPORT GRADES
Background
1. The NIPS has traditionally relied on
Main Grade Officers (MGO) to deliver the main functions within
Prisons. During the worst years of the troubles this maximised
the number of staff who were available to manage terrorist prisoners
and to respond in the event of emergencies within the prison.
An MGO would be expected to undertake the full range of duties
over a 24 hour 7 day week. Therefore, they would be deployed to
day duties, evening duties, night duties and carry out roles outside
the prison.
2. However, as Prison Officer's pay recognised
the most onerous aspects of their work, this approach was also
very expensive and over a period of time different arrangements
were made to undertake certain types of work. Civilian Administrative
Grades were introduced in 1994 to undertake work which had previously
been delivered by Officer Clerks. In 1995 the Auxiliary Grade
was introduced to undertake peripheral work previously done by
Main Grade staff.
3. After the closure of the Maze Prison
and the significant reduction in staff, a decision was taken to
absorb all of the Auxiliary Officers (about 20% of the complement)
into the MGO rank. This approach recognised a blurring in the
roles and the lack of opportunities for progression for staff,
due to the younger age of the workforce following the redundancy
package.
Analysis
4. The Service is continually considering
how best to deploy its staff so that, firstly, it is used most
effectively and, secondly, that each member of staff is appropriately
skilled and rewarded for the work that is undertaken. The rewards
also need to reflect any unsocial hours and other conditions.
5. There were two significant developments
in the way in which MGOs were deployed during the time when all
of the Prison Officers work was undertaken by MGOs. The first
was the development of a dedicated Night Group to undertake all
the work in the prison after lock up. This group was staffed by
volunteers who were selected for their suitability and willingness
to work unsocial hours. A major benefit from this approach was
that day staff were no longer required to absent themselves from
their normal duties in order to undertake a period of night duties.
Given this was often a period of seven nights in a row, it meant
that individuals would be absent from day duties for up to two
weeks. The creation of the Night Group therefore meant that the
continuity of staff dealing with prisoner issues during the day
was very much improved, and to the benefit of regime delivery.
6. Similarly, when the Prison Service took
on responsibility for Court Escorting from the Police, it became
clear that the task could best be delivered by a dedicated group
of staff who worked Monday to Friday. This meant that they built
up the skills required for the work, and they did not detract
from the continuity of regime delivery in the prisons. The role
was quite different from that undertaken in the prison, and officers
needed to become familiar with court procedures and issues such
as the preparation of warrants. This approach has been proven
over a number of years.
7. What also became clear was that the work
of both of these groups of staff was quite specialised, and neither
required the full range of skills and competences of fully trained
Prison Officers. Therefore deploying MGOs to these tasks meant
that they were not being used to their full capacity. At a time
when the NIPS was significantly more expensive than other Services
and under financial constraints, deploying MGOs to these tasks
was not providing value for money.
8. The Service decided to create the grade
of Night Custody Officer who would have the specific skills, competence
and training necessary to undertake this role. They would also
be appropriately remunerated, reflecting their hours of work—all
at night, working every other weekend and Bank Holidays.
9. The creation of the combined Prisoner
Escorting and Court Custody Service in 2006-07 also provided the
opportunity to recruit and train suitably skilled staff. Their
terms and conditions were informed by the Maybin staff who were
brought into NIPS through TUPE. Again the salary level of this
group of staff recognises their skills and competences and the
hours that they work—which is largely Monday to Friday and
that they work outside the Prison.
10. Finally we are now in the process of
introducing the Operational Support Grade. This group of staff
will undertake work which does not involve prisoner engagement
and does not require the full skills and competence of a Main
Grade Officer. They will work mainly inside the prison on security
and control type work and, similar to MGOs, will work during the
unlock periods with some responsibility for inmates. They will
be required to work every other weekend and Bank Holidays. Their
remuneration reflects these conditions.
Overview
| | |
|
| NCO | PCO
| OSG |
| | |
|
| Conditioned Hours | 44 |
40/35/20 | 39 |
| Hourly Rate | £8.60 |
£7.99 | £8.90 |
| Weekends | 1 in 2 | Mon-Fri
| 1 in 2 |
| Bank Holidays | Works | Off
| Works |
| | |
|
| | |
|
11. There is a suggestion that having one grade of support
would improve the flexibility of deployment and would result in
a more efficient use of resources. However, experience in NIPS
has clearly shown that the roles and responsibilities and the
times that these staff are required to work are so different that
it is more appropriate to organise them into discreet groups of
staff. In this way, when working their conditioned hours, the
work can be delivered most effectively and efficiently by dedicated
groups of staff.
12. We do recognise that all three grades are overtime
grades and there may be some loss of flexibility in cross deploying
staff on rest days. This is particularly felt in the Court Escort
Group where their work is mainly Monday to Friday. They can experience
peaks of work, particularly immediately before a court recess.
We are taking steps to address this through offering NCOs the
opportunity to work overtime in the PECCS on their scheduled rest
days. Volunteers would be given appropriate training to allow
them to carry out this role and would be kept on a list to be
called in when required. This would address the particular spikes
and workload in a cost efficient manner.
Conclusion
13. The development of our new grading structure involves
a lot of detailed work and significant expertise. It has led to
significant improvement in how we define roles. The supporting
documentation provides a lot of detailed information which will
help staff better understand their responsibilities. It also provides
us with the assurance that we have made the correct decisions,
supporting our objective of improving efficiency while maintaining
and improving quality.
14. We are engaged in shaping a Prison Service which
will be more fit for purpose, with staff properly qualified to
undertake their role. We have learnt from our experiences in the
past and are structuring the groups to ensure that they are best
placed to deliver against their specific responsibilities in an
efficient and effective manner. We have focused the training and
the development of skills and competences on those required to
deliver the work.
15. For the future we will be developing progression
arrangements for these staff so providing an attractive career
structure.
Robin Masefield
Director
Northern Ireland Prison Service
6 November 2007
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