Conclusions and recommendations
1. We were impressed by the personal commitment, sensitivity and professionalism of the Chief Constable, the Director of HET and the other staff involved in the HET. The project is unique and challenging, and it is clear to us that there is a real determination to provide information and answers to those who were bereaved during the Troubles. Whilst the memories are painful, families have appreciated the efforts made by the HET team to listen to their questions and to attempt to explain the circumstances of their relatives' deaths.
(Paragraph 25)
2. We were surprised to find that all cases are automatically reviewed by the HET. We accept that there are benefits in building a complete picture of often interconnected events. We also accept that a family which initially chooses not to participate in a case review may later change this view; and that there will be occasions where a family member (such as a grandchild) might only feel able to participate once an older relative has come to terms with the re-examination of painful past events, or has died. In such circumstances, the fact that the HET has carried out a comprehensive review of all cases will enable it to help families at a time that is right for them. Nevertheless, we conclude that in some cases scarce resources are being used to investigate historic cases where there is little likelihood of helping a family and limited opportunity of securing a conviction.
(Paragraph 26)
3. It is clear that
the HET project will need significant additional funding if it
is to continue with its current approach and complete reviews
of all of the deaths within its remit. We are not convinced that
the funding is being targeted as effectively as it might be. We
recommend that alternative ways of prioritising cases are identified
so as to focus resources on those cases where the next of kin
of the deceased specifically request it or where the existence
of forensics or other exhibits provides investigative opportunities
which could contribute to a successful prosecution case. We recommend
that a mid-term project review is conducted, with a view to establishing
the costs and benefits of continuing with the HET in its current
form, and identifying ways in which the scope of the exercise
and the prioritisation of cases could be adjusted so that the
project can be completed within budget and with maximum benefits.
(Paragraph 27)
4. The financial investment
in the HET has been considerable, but little information about
its progress and the benefits it has brought to families has been
made available to the public. We recommend that the results of
the review we call for above are published. (Paragraph 28)
5. We are concerned
that the demands of running the HET project, and the likely overspend,
might compromise the ability of the PSNI to fulfil its primary
role of policing the present. We also recognise that some families
and organisations have questioned whether the PSNI is sufficiently
independent and would prefer the historic investigations to be
managed by an independent agency. We return to this point in paragraph
40. (Paragraph 29)
6. The Patten Report
underlined the importance of an independent, properly resourced
Ombudsman's Office which had community confidence and support.
Our predecessor Committee noted in 2005 that Northern Ireland's
first Police Ombudsman, Mrs Nuala O'Loan, had constructed from
scratch a credible police complaints system in Northern Ireland.
However, the extension of the Ombudsman's remit to include historic
cases is having a damaging effect on the efficiency of the Office.
The number of complaints about the former Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) arising from the years of the Troubles and the inadequate
provision of additional resources have compromised the Ombudsman's
ability to investigate complaints against the PSNI. There is a
risk that this reduced capability will damage public perception
of the Ombudsman's Office and public confidence in policing. (Paragraph
43)
7. We have considered
the case for a transfer of responsibility to carry out historical
work from the Ombudsman to a newly-created independent body. We
have also considered whether the Historical Enquiries Team, part
of which is based in London and is staffed entirely by officers
and former officers from forces outside Northern Ireland, could
take on this function, or whether the resources of the Ombudsman's
office should be increased, to allow him to carry out historical
work without impacting on his core responsibilities. We are, however,
mindful of the Minister's comment that he prefers to await the
conclusions of the Eames/Bradley Group before reaching any decision.
We, too, wish to avoid pre-empting any conclusion that the Group
may come to on this issue. We therefore make no recommendation
in this Report, beyond noting that the question of who has responsibility
for conducting investigations into grave or exceptional cases
involving alleged police misconduct in the period before the establishment
of the PSNI is of the utmost importance, and that it will have
to be resolved sooner rather than later. We intend to return to
this. (Paragraph 44)
8. The
disclosure of intelligence information to inquiries clearly presents
challenges for the police, and for other organisations which are
required to provide sensitive information. The process of agreeing
necessary redactions requires considerable input from key police
staff who understand the implications of disclosing specific items
of intelligence. This necessarily requires them to divert their
attention from more current issues of concern, which include,
most critically, monitoring the threat posed by dissident terrorists.
The provisions in the Inquiries Act 2005 for agreeing and resolving
disputes about redactions have yet to be tested and it is therefore
possible that difficulties may emerge with the way that those
provisions work in practice. It is crucially important that the
workings of the Act are carefully monitored. The Committee may
wish to return to this issue in a subsequent inquiry.
(Paragraph 63)
9. The
need for the PSNI to provide sensitive information to inquiry
panels was an inevitable consequence of the Government's decision
to conduct the inquiries and, as we have previously discussed,
there are legal provisions to prevent the disclosure of sensitive
information beyond an inquiry if necessary. The inquiries must
be able to operate independently of the Government and the agencies
which provide them with information. It would not be appropriate
for any of those agencies to appear to attach any conditions to
its cooperation, nor to dictate an inquiry's internal procedures.
The Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office has underlined
the fact that as public authorities in their own right, inquiries
have the same obligations under ECHR Article 2 as any government
department or the PSNI. Inquiry chairmen must take full responsibility
for the management of information within their safekeeping and
ensure that they meet their obligations under human rights legislation.
It is important for them to recognise that the future safety and
indeed possibly the lives of certain people who have supplied
sensitive information could well depend upon their decisions.
(Paragraph 67)
10. The
loss or inadvertent disclosure of sensitive intelligence information
by an inquiry panel or its staff could have serious consequences,
including the risk to life. The PSNI has expressed specific concerns
about the inquiries' information management procedures. These
concerns must be addressed to ensure that the inquiries meet their
Article 2 obligations and to enable the PSNI to work cooperatively
with the inquiries, and provide them with the information they
require without further delay. If the inquiries are unable to
demonstrate to the Government that their procedures are adequate,
steps must be taken to implement improvements. We recommend that
if the particular issues raised by the PSNI were not included
in the Government's review of inquiry information management procedures,
they should be included in a further review which should be conducted
forthwith, as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph
68)
11. The
very high annual cost of inquiries into past events is financially
unsustainable. We note with concern that the latest estimated
cost of the Saville Inquiry alone is £183 million and that
inquiry is still not completed. The cost to organisations such
as the PSNI that contribute to the statutory inquiries is also
considerable, in terms of money and resources. The PSNI estimates
that its costs for working with the inquiries over the next two
years alone will come to over £6 million. We fully accept
the Chief Constable's concerns that the diversion of experts from
their current duties is bound to impact upon effective policing
in Northern Ireland. The cost of inquiring into the past is an
issue that, at some point, will have to be faced. Such inquiries
cannot become a permanent feature of life in Northern Ireland.
We recommend that the NIO take further steps to control the costs
of Northern Ireland's statutory inquiries and that inquiries other
than those already under way or announced should only be established
if agreed by the Northern Ireland Assembly.
(Paragraph 73)
12. The
statutory inquiries place significant demands on the PSNI at a
time when police officers are still subject to attacks from dissident
terrorists. No other police force in the United Kingdom is required
to operate in such an environment, and at the same time to service
the demands of the extensive range of historic investigations
which are underway in Northern Ireland. The NIO must continue
to ensure that the PSNI has a budget sufficient to fulfil its
operational remit and to meet its legal obligations with regard
to servicing the statutory inquiries. (Paragraph
74)
13. There
are outstanding legal obligations which require the coroner to
investigate a number of deaths which occurred during the Troubles.
The PSNI has a duty to cooperate with the coroner and to provide
him with whatever information he requires to conduct those inquests.
Since some of that information might include intelligence which
could identify an informant, issues similar to those raised by
the PSNI regarding the disclosure of sensitive intelligence information
to the statutory inquiries might apply to the contentious inquests.
The coroner has a duty under Article 2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights to take steps to protect the lives of informants
who could be put at risk through disclosure of information which
might identify them. We recommend that an information management
code of conduct be drawn up by the coroner, after consultation
with the appropriate agencies, to protect sensitive information
provided to him as part of the inquest process, and that any public
disclosure of such information is made in accordance with the
coroner's obligations under ECHR Article 2.
(Paragraph 80)
14. We
note that no specific additional funding has been provided to
the PSNI in recognition of the extra workload arising as a result
of the inquests and that resources have instead been allocated
from the main policing budget. There are already significant and
unique demands on the PSNI and we are concerned that the volume
of work required to cooperate fully with the inquests may compromise
the PSNI's ability to direct adequate resources to other high
priority areas of policing. We recommend that the impact of the
inquests on the PSNI's resources and any consequential effect
on current policing capacity is reviewed during 2009 and the budget
revised accordingly. (Paragraph 81)
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