Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Third Report


4  Statutory Inquiries

Background

45.  On 1 April 2004, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland published the reports by Justice Cory into the cases of Robert Hamill, Billy Wright, Rosemary Nelson and Patrick Finucane.[89] At the same time, he announced the establishment of public inquiries into the cases of Robert Hamill, Billy Wright and Rosemary Nelson and undertook to set out the way ahead regarding the case of Patrick Finucane at the conclusion of prosecutions in that case.[90] On 8 July 2004, the Secretary of State published a Statement on Governing Principles in respect of the inquiries into the deaths of Robert Hamill, Billy Wright and Rosemary Nelson.[91] The general principles applying to the establishment and conduct of inquiries include independence, transparency consistent with the interests of justice and national security, fairness and respect for individuals and avoidance of unnecessary expenditure.

46.  The Billy Wright inquiry was established under the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953. The Robert Hamill and Rosemary Nelson inquiries were established under section 44 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998. Both statutes provide inquiries with powers to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of documents. These mirror the powers of the High Court and inquiries established under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 to compel evidence and witnesses. The Inquiries Act 2005 came into force on 7 April 2005. It repealed the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. The Billy Wright and Robert Hamill inquiries have subsequently been converted into inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005.

47.  The demands of the statutory inquiries, and other historic investigations, have been such that the PSNI has established a dedicated team of staff to deal with this work. The PSNI's Crime Support department, headed by Assistant Chief Constable Alistair Finlay, now has lead responsibility for legacy investigations, including overseeing the work of the HET. One branch of the department acts as the Police Service's main interface with the three statutory inquiries in Northern Ireland and the two statutory inquiries in the Republic of Ireland (the Smithwick and McEntree inquiries).[92] Within this branch are three units: one is responsible for meeting the PSNI's legal obligations to search the PSNI's archives and provide information and other material to the inquiries; another provides legal support to serving and former officers involved in the inquiries; and the third is responsible for reviewing and redacting intelligence information.[93] A second branch of the Crime Support department is the Retrospective Murder Review Unit which is responsible for the re-examination of unsolved murders that were committed between 1998 and 2004.[94]

48.  Sir Hugh Orde told us that liaising with statutory inquiries had created a "huge amount of work" for the PSNI.[95] He said that it had been a burden in terms of recovering archive information and providing storage for it in secure accommodation. However, he said that the PSNI had now "physically searched every single building, and every murder file which we think we can find we now have in very secure accommodation …"[96] The PSNI is required to provide to an inquiry panel on request any relevant information which it holds, including intelligence. It has expressed concern about the arrangements for protecting confidential intelligence and other sensitive information contained within the records which it has provided to an inquiry. In particular, the protection of information which might identify a covert source is a critical issue. ACC Finlay explained that:

What is not always understood … is that there is still an appetite in Northern Ireland for people to try and research from the past those within the communities who might have been giving information to the police. Over the period of time we have seen in excess of 30 people killed, believed to be police informants … and that is the real threat and issue that surrounds public inquiries and inquests if we are not absolutely careful … in the redaction and the careful framing of material that should end up in the public domain, because we have an absolute duty of care to these people.[97]

49.  The PSNI expressed concern about the history of compromised sources being murdered; the potential difficulties of recruiting covert sources in the future if it were to become widely believed that information about them could not be kept confidential; and the financial costs to the police of relocating compromised sources. It also commented that wider knowledge of intelligence capacity and surveillance techniques could reduce the ability of the PSNI to prevent and detect crime, and highlighted the risk that international intelligence communities might become more reluctant to share intelligence information if they considered that it might ultimately be published by a public inquiry.[98] We consider the issue of source protection in the following paragraphs.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources

50.  A covert human intelligence source (CHIS) is an individual who provides information to the police, or security services, on criminal activity. The intelligence provided by covert sources was of particular importance during the Troubles as there were often no eyewitnesses willing to come forward, and the paramilitaries became practised in removing evidence from the crime scene.[99] NIRPOA praised the contribution made by covert sources in saving many lives during the Troubles and explained the importance of keeping secret the identity of covert sources and the consequences for those who were identified:

One common feature shared by every CHIS is a desire for their activities and identity to remain secret. … Without such reassurance very few people, if any, would actually agree to provide secret intelligence to the police. Everyone in Northern Ireland knows well and understands the penalties that the terrorist and organised crime groups inflict on those whom they believe to be CHIS. The ultimate sanction of death awaits those who fall under the terrorists' suspicion … Death is often marked with ritual humiliation and the families of informers are obliged to listen to 'confessions' and to distance themselves from their loved ones. Faced with the prospect of such a death if their relationship with the police becomes known no CHIS will operate without the belief that they will be protected by a cloak of anonymity, which they see as vital to their safety.[100]

51.  One way of providing protection to a covert source whose identity has been revealed is for the police to offer a resettlement package. However, NIRPOA pointed out that whilst this might give the individual some protection, the provision of a new identity and relocation to another country had a devastating impact on family and personal life and often left covert sources in a position where they were unable to return home even for a parent's funeral, or for a final visit to an elderly relative before they died.[101] NIRPOA suggested that covert sources were now at greater risk of being identified because of the range of historic investigations underway which required the PSNI to share its information about the identity of sources.[102]

52.  The Police Ombudsman questioned whether continued reliance on covert sources was necessary or desirable. He pointed out that there were "other effective and lawful technologies and methodologies available to the police, which may be used in the fight against terrorism and serious crime and which support the rule of law." He added:

There is, regrettably, a legacy in Northern Ireland of inappropriate and on occasions unlawful practice and policy in the use of sources, and the information received from them, which has on occasion prevented good policing and has undermined the rule of law and confidence in policing.[103]

The Ombudsman pointed out that the PSNI had decommissioned many covert sources, many of them because they were engaging in serious crime, and that inappropriate use of sources had the potential to impact negatively on good policing. He nevertheless recognised the need to consider the effect of disclosure of any source identity.[104]

Legal framework

53.  The PSNI told us that it considered there to be a tension between different aspects of the PSNI's legislative duties in respect of covert sources. The PSNI has responsibilities to protect the identity of sources under European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 2 and under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). However, it also has a duty to provide information to inquiries, including information which might identify a source. We consider the nature of these duties in the following paragraphs.

ECHR ARTICLE 2 AND REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000

54.  ECHR Article 2 states that "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law." In practice, this is interpreted as placing the following obligations on states:

i.  a substantive prohibition on the taking of life;

ii.  a procedural obligation officially to investigate the taking of life in certain situations; and

iii.  a substantive obligation to protect the right to life, i.e. to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction.

The Human Rights Act 1998 provided for Convention rights to be enforced through the United Kingdom's courts. [105]

55.  The PSNI and the inquiry panels are public authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. As such, each must act in a manner that is compatible with European Convention rights. The ECHR Article 2 substantive obligation to protect the right to life applies to both the PSNI and the inquiry panels. That obligation arises where state authorities know (or ought to know) of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an individual (the Osman threshold)[106] and requires them to take preventative, operational measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. Whether the obligation arises in any particular case and whether the state authorities are in breach of that obligation will depend not only upon the nature of the threat and the degree of risk to the individual, of which the authorities knew or ought to have known, but also upon the extent to which there were appropriate measures reasonably available to the authorities to alleviate or obviate that risk. However, where it is the conduct of the state authorities which has itself exposed an individual to the risk to his or her life (including for example where the individual is in a special category of vulnerable persons, or of persons required by the state to perform certain duties on its behalf which may expose them to risk) and who is therefore entitled to expect a reasonable level of protection as a result, the Osman threshold of a real and immediate risk is too high. If there is a risk to the individual on the facts, then there is a real risk and 'immediate' can mean just that the risk is present and continuing at the material time, depending on the circumstances.[107]

56.  Part II of RIPA sets out the legislative framework for the authorisation, conduct and use of covert human intelligence sources. The RIPA Codes of Practice require authorizing authorities such as the police to take account of the safety and welfare of informers while they are actively working for them and to consider their ongoing security and welfare when the informer has completed his or her involvement. Case law has established that the police have a duty to take reasonable care to avoid unnecessary disclosure to the general public of confidential information provided by an informant.[108] However, public policy considerations will be relevant in determining both the scope of the duty on the police and the question of any breach of that duty, and the phrase 'reasonable care' limits the extent of the duty by recognizing that the police have many functions to perform, only one of which is the protection of their sources. If there is a real and immediate risk to life, then the PSNI and the inquiry panels may have a positive obligation to take preventive, operational measures to protect the identified individual whose life is at risk as a result of the criminal acts of a third party. This could include imposing strict procedures and arrangements for the storage, retention and disclosure of sensitive information and intelligence provided (by the PSNI and others) to the inquiry panels and the imposition of restrictions by the inquiry panels on disclosure or publication of any sensitive evidence or documents provided to an inquiry.

INQUIRIES ACT 2005

57.  A Minister may establish an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 where it appears to him or her that (a) particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public concern or (b) there is public concern that particular events may have occurred. The Minister defines the terms of reference of the inquiry and its setting-up date. The Minister also appoints the members of the inquiry panel. The NIO described the three mechanisms by which sensitive information might be protected:

58.  There is a presumption in favour of public access to both inquiry proceedings and information. However, restrictions may be imposed by the inquiry chairman on attendance at an inquiry and/or disclosure or publication of any evidence or documents provided to an inquiry. When considering whether to impose any restrictions, specific regard must be given to any risk or harm that could be avoided or reduced by such a restriction.[110] This means that concerns voiced by the PSNI regarding potential threats to life or risk of harm to informants, witnesses or other individuals[111] must be considered by the inquiry chairman and thought given as to whether to impose restrictions to alleviate or obviate any such threats or risk. BIRW pointed out that it is consistent with the rule of law generally that it is the independent person presiding over proceedings (in this case the inquiry chairman) who determines what is or is not too 'harmful' to disclose.[112] It is also consistent with ECHR Article 2 which requires the state to hold effective, independent investigations into deaths involving force.

Issues raised by the PSNI

PROCESS FOR AGREEING REDACTIONS WITH INQUIRY PANELS

59.  The PSNI told us that, to date, it had been able to reach agreement with inquiry panels with regard to any redactions to information which it wished to be made prior to disclosure by the inquiry.[113] However it expressed doubts about the procedures for resolving disputes between the PSNI and an inquiry about what redactions were necessary. It was not confident that the provisions in the Inquiries Act for resolving disputes would be satisfactory if there were to be a disagreement between an inquiry chairman and the PSNI about publication of a specific piece of information. The PSNI view was that the Inquiries Act does not clearly specify in what order of precedence a decision of the Minister or the chairman can be sought and which is appropriate at different stages of the proceedings.[114] It also suggested that there had been some debate as to the capacity of inquiry chairmen to award PII, and that the view of Lord McLean, Chairman of the Billy Wright inquiry, was that he could not.[115]

60.  BIRW accepted that the PSNI "obviously has a duty of care towards its covert sources" and that "any action on the part of the PSNI that adds to [the risk to life] could potentially infringe the sources' right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR."[116] However, it added that "there are no provisions in the Inquiries Act 2005 which place the police under any special or new difficulties in relation to the protection of covert sources."[117] CAJ commented that:

It is not necessarily the case that in order for the inquiry to do its job the name has to be given of every informer and the level of detailed methodology, but that actually there is a lot of information which could be put into the public domain, more information certainly than is there currently, that would allow us to assess why certain decisions were made and what actually happened.[118]

The Police Ombudsman pointed out that,

Even where it is not readily apparent to an Inquiry, other individuals, better placed to realise the risk, may invoke protection of the information, or, more accurately refuse to provide the information, in accordance with Sections 22(1) and (2) [of the Inquiries Act]. Section 22(1) specifically negates compellability where to require it would be incompatible with a European Convention obligation. … Additionally Section 22(2) preserves a public interest 'exemption', protecting that which would attract a claim of Public Interest Immunity (PII) in any other venue and therefore 'copper fastens' the ability of the PSNI, in such situations, to raise a defence to a production order.[119]

61.  The Joint Committee on Human Rights and others have raised concerns about the independence of inquiries under the Inquiries Act, particularly with the Minister's powers regarding evidence and restriction notices under Section 19 of the Act.[120] For example, BIRW told us that:

The Minister's role is particularly troubling where the actions of that Minister or those of his or her department, or those of the government, are in question. In effect, the state will be investigating itself. … Indeed we doubt that the Inquiries Act can deliver an effective investigation in compliance with Article 2. The Minister's powers to interfere in every important aspect of an inquiry robs it of any independence.[121]

In this context, ACC Finlay suggested that if the Secretary of State were to be required to make PII decisions, it would place him in "the invidious position of seeming to intervene in the inquiry" and that the issue might therefore have to go to judicial review. [122] The Police Ombudsman also referred to the potentially damaging effect on public confidence of issuing PII certificates, pointing out that:

Where the Police Ombudsman or the Chief Constable, under their statutory obligations, seek to protect methodologies or sources from being made public at an inquiry, this may have the effect of undermining confidence in these organisations.[123]

62.  The Minister of State accepted that there would be "real pressures" in the complex process of negotiating which redactions were necessary and confirmed that he would take a very close interest in the process to ensure that progress was maintained.[124] However, his view was that the legislation was adequate and that the provisions for agreeing redactions were clear. He confirmed that the Ministerial powers would be used when necessary:

If the Chief Constable was saying to an inquiry, 'I do not think that information should be shared with other parties or should be in the public domain because there is an Article 2 obligation here that prevents that' and the inquiry did not agree and they could not reach a voluntary agreement, if I or the Secretary of State was persuaded by the Chief Constable indeed that that matter should not be shared because of Article 2 obligations, then the Secretary of State would have the power to make a restriction notice. Of course, it would then be for the inquiry to challenge that in court. If we were persuaded as ministers, we would not hesitate to use those powers because Article 2 obligations are absolute.[125]

63.  The disclosure of intelligence information to inquiries clearly presents challenges for the police, and for other organisations which are required to provide sensitive information. The process of agreeing necessary redactions requires considerable input from key police staff who understand the implications of disclosing specific items of intelligence. This necessarily requires them to divert their attention from more current issues of concern, which include, most critically, monitoring the threat posed by dissident terrorists. The provisions in the Inquiries Act 2005 for agreeing and resolving disputes about redactions have yet to be tested and it is therefore possible that difficulties may emerge with the way that those provisions work in practice. It is crucially important that the workings of the Act are carefully monitored. The Committee may wish to return to this issue in a subsequent inquiry.

Inquiry panel information management procedures

64.  Sir Hugh Orde said that one of his key concerns regarding the statutory inquiries, was that the PSNI was "losing control of more and more secret and extremely sensitive material" which previously would have been retained by the PSNI and kept within its control.[126] ACC Finlay explained that a particular issue was the arrangements made by inquiry chairmen for the safe storage and management of information by the inquiry panels and their staff to prevent the loss or inadvertent disclosure of sensitive intelligence information within their care.[127] The importance and relevance of this issue was highlighted during our own inquiry, by the news that a disk, believed to contain sensitive information, had been lost by the Rosemary Nelson Inquiry. We also discovered that each inquiry might have a staff of around 30, and that turnover of these individuals has been high. The specific concerns expressed by the PSNI are listed below:

i.  It is not clear to the PSNI whether inquiry staff with access to intelligence have been required to sign strict confidentiality agreements or been subject to a high level security vetting process. [128]

ii.  According to the PSNI, the government intelligence handling regime (STRAP) used by the Security Service, MOD and others managing intelligence information does not apply to inquiries, even though they are in possession of a "very significant volume of intelligence".[129]

iii.  The PSNI told us that it was subject to regular audits by the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner to monitor that its information was stored, managed, collected and disseminated in accordance with the required guidelines, but that the management of intelligence information which it had handed over to inquiries was not subject to an equivalent level of scrutiny.[130]

iv.  With regard to the return or safekeeping of documents after the end of an inquiry, the PSNI would also like to see all the un-redacted documents to which PII and Article 2 obligations attach returned once the inquiry is closed and the report is issued, and would be satisfied for documents to which no PII attaches, in other words redacted documents, to be archived as required.[131]

65.  In January 2008, the Billy Wright Inquiry published a paper which suggested that the PSNI had contributed to delays and difficulties in the recovery of documentation required by the Inquiry.[132] The PSNI published its response in May 2008, in which the Chief Constable explicitly stated his commitment to supporting the work of the Inquiry. It also included an acceptance that the PSNI had "at times fallen short of the expectations of the Inquiry" and listed a number of specific areas where it accepted that the criticism had been justified.[133] However, the response also listed examples where the PSNI judged that the Inquiry's management of intelligence information had fallen below the required government standards.[134]

66.  The Minister of State explained that the NIO, as sponsoring department for the inquiries, had reached "robust agreements" with them about the handling of sensitive information, and that the inquiries had provided assurances that all of the agreed systems were in place and were working well.[135] He added that it was "deeply concerning" that information had been lost by the Nelson Inquiry and advised that the Secretary of State had asked a security expert to work with all of the inquiries, to ensure that their systems were as robust as they needed to be.[136]

67.   The need for the PSNI to provide sensitive information to inquiry panels was an inevitable consequence of the Government's decision to conduct the inquiries and, as we have previously discussed, there are legal provisions to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information beyond an inquiry if necessary. The inquiries must be able to operate independently of the Government and the agencies which provide them with information. It would not be appropriate for any of those agencies to appear to attach any conditions to its cooperation, nor to dictate an inquiry's internal procedures. The Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office has underlined the fact that as public authorities in their own right, inquiries have the same obligations under ECHR Article 2 as any government department or the PSNI. Inquiry chairmen must take full responsibility for the management of information within their safekeeping and ensure that they meet their obligations under human rights legislation. It is important for them to recognise that the future safety and indeed possibly the lives of certain people who have supplied sensitive information could well depend upon their decisions.

68.  The loss or inadvertent disclosure of sensitive intelligence information by an inquiry panel or its staff could have serious consequences, including the risk to life. The PSNI has expressed specific concerns about the inquiries' information management procedures. These concerns must be addressed to ensure that the inquiries meet their Article 2 obligations and to enable the PSNI to work cooperatively with the inquiries, and provide them with the information they require without further delay. If the inquiries are unable to demonstrate to the Government that their procedures are adequate, steps must be taken to implement improvements. We recommend that if the particular issues raised by the PSNI were not included in the Government's review of inquiry information management procedures, they should be included in a further review which should be conducted forthwith, as a matter of urgency.

RESOURCES

69.  The Chief Constable has made a clear public commitment to supporting the work of inquiries.[137] The purpose of our work has been not to question that commitment, but to examine whether the PSNI is adequately enabled to fulfil its obligations without compromising its ability to police the present. The PSNI estimated that its costs relating to the inquiries for 2007-08 would be £2.05 million, with a further £2.75 million projected for 2008-09 and £0.5 million for 2009-10.[138] No specific additional funding for this work has been provided by the NIO. Whilst these are significant sums, they represent a relatively small proportion of the entire PSNI budget but the Chief Constable told us that the biggest impact was in the loss of expertise in key areas of policing where intelligence was currently critical. He explained that the PSNI had only a small pool of appropriately skilled officers able to search intelligence information and identify which parts could be used to identify covert sources. He had had to divert key staff from current policing priorities to historical work and as a result there was a risk that the quality of current policing could be compromised. He said that, "… we cannot just recruit anyone to do this; (a) it is deeply sensitive and (b) the corporate memory goes over time and trying to get that back is difficult."[139] He went on to explain the consequences for the PSNI:

… what I am having to do, if I cannot find it externally, is use some of my key players who will be delivering some of my most sensitive operations today to look to service historic inquiries. … all the inquiries and all the inquests, all [are] coming into a fairly small hub of experts.[140]

70.  The Police Federation stated that "We consider that this pressure on police resources should be a matter of concern to be shared at the highest level of Government. Ineffective policing will not help to stabilise the still bedding down political institutions of Northern Ireland."[141] The view of the Policing Board was that:

the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service in preventing and detecting crime should not be compromised by dealing with various commitments to historical inquiries … It is the responsibility of Government to ensure that the police service be provided with adequate funding to deal with 'policing the past'.[142]

71.  The Minister of State acknowledged the pressures on the Chief Constable:

I have a lot of sympathy with the Chief Constable in this. Where he is faced with public inquiries, inquests and so on, it is officer time tied up with going back through files, often very experienced officers going back through files, coming up with the information, sharing it and so on. I acknowledge that is a pressure but it is a pressure that, in his own redoubtable way, the Chief Constable gets on and deals with.

However, he stated out that the PSNI's resource allocation was "substantially more than comparable forces across the rest of the United Kingdom"[143] and that the Chief Constable and the Policing Board had confirmed that they had balanced the budget for the current year.[144] He also accepted that the pressures on the PSNI were "significantly and substantially different from the pressures in other police force areas in the United Kingdom" and explained that was reflected in the PSNI's budget settlement.[145]

72.  The Minister of State told us that he believed it was necessary to fund the statutory inquiries in order to help people achieve resolution and to build public confidence, and also to fund practical projects which helped people to rebuild their lives.[146] He explained:

I genuinely believe that they [inquiries] can help to build up public confidence as well as to deal with individual circumstances. I am not pretending … that they are a perfect and complete answer in themselves. There are many issues and difficulties associated with them and, in and of themselves, they do not produce the final answer which Northern Ireland as a whole will need if it is to move forward.[147]

73.  The very high annual cost of inquiries into past events is financially unsustainable. We note with concern that the latest estimated cost of the Saville Inquiry alone is £183 million and that inquiry is still not completed.[148] The cost to organisations such as the PSNI that contribute to the statutory inquiries is also considerable, in terms of money and resources. The PSNI estimates that its costs for working with the inquiries over the next two years alone will come to over £6 million. We fully accept the Chief Constable's concerns that the diversion of experts from their current duties is bound to impact upon effective policing in Northern Ireland. The cost of inquiring into the past is an issue that, at some point, will have to be faced. Such inquiries cannot become a permanent feature of life in Northern Ireland. We recommend that the NIO take further steps to control the costs of Northern Ireland's statutory inquiries and that inquiries other than those already under way or announced should only be established if agreed by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

74.  The statutory inquiries place significant demands on the PSNI at a time when police officers are still subject to attacks from dissident terrorists. No other police force in the United Kingdom is required to operate in such an environment, and at the same time to service the demands of the extensive range of historic investigations which are underway in Northern Ireland. The NIO must continue to ensure that the PSNI has a budget sufficient to fulfil its operational remit and to meet its legal obligations with regard to servicing the statutory inquiries.


89   "Government publishes Cory reports", www.nio.gov.uk, 1 April 2004 Back

90   Ibid. Back

91   Public inquiries into the deaths of Robert Hamill, Billy Wright, Rosemary Nelson and Patrick Finucane. Statement on Governing Principles, 8 July 2004 (Statement on Governing Principles). Back

92   Police Service of Northern Ireland, Chief Constable's Annual Report 2006-07, p 5 Back

93   Police Service of Northern Ireland, Chief Constable's Annual Report 2006-07, p 5 Back

94   Police Service of Northern Ireland, Chief Constable's Annual Report 2006-07, p 5 Back

95   Q 13 Back

96   Q 13 Back

97   Q 31 Back

98   Ev 124 Back

99   Ev 111 Back

100   Ev 111 Back

101   Ev 112 Back

102   Ev 112 Back

103   Ev 119 Back

104   Ev 118 Back

105   A House of Lords judgment in 2004 established that the Act is not retrospective. It does not, therefore, apply to unlawful killings which took place before the coming into effect of the Act on 2 October 2000. This does not, however, displace the obligations under ECHR Article 2, which continue to bind the UK under international law. Back

106   Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 Back

107   R (A) v Lord Saville of Newdigate [2002] 1 WLR 1249 Back

108   Swinney v The Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [1997] Q.B. 464 and Swinney v The Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (No 2), the Times, May 25th 1999 Back

109   Ev 101 Back

110   Inquiries Act 2005, ss.19(5) Back

111   Ev 128 Back

112   Ev 108 Back

113   Q 72 Back

114   Qq 529-503 Back

115   Q 72 Back

116   Ev 107 Back

117   Ev 107 Back

118   Q 204 Back

119   Ev 118-119 Back

120   Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fourth Report of Session 2004-05, Scrutiny: First Progress Report, HC 224, HL Paper 26, paras 2.12-2.16 Back

121   Ev 107 Back

122   Q 72 Back

123   Ev 120 Back

124   Q 579 Back

125   Q 580 Back

126   Q 526 Back

127   Q 531 Back

128   Ev 127 Back

129   Ev 127 Back

130   Ev 128 Back

131   Ev 131 Back

132   Position Paper on the PSNI's Response to Requests for Information, January 2008, www.billywrightinquiry.org  Back

133   Police Service of Northern Ireland Response to Billy Wright Inquiry Position Paper, May 2008, p 82 Back

134   Police Service of Northern Ireland Response to Billy Wright Inquiry Position Paper, May 2008, p 26 Back

135   Q 582 Back

136   Q 582 Back

137   Q 534 Back

138   Ev 124-125 Back

139   Q 53 Back

140   Q 53 Back

141   Ev 133 Back

142   Ev 110 Back

143   Q 576 Back

144   Q 578 Back

145   Q 577 Back

146   Q 601 Back

147   Q 597 Back

148   HC Deb, 19 June 2008, col 148W. The Government has stated that approximately half of these costs have been incurred in legal fees, HC Deb, 20 February 2008, col 337. Back


 
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