House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts First Report

3 MONITORING AND EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS

MONITORING THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AID TO RURAL AREAS

24. It is not easy to measure the results of aid. Countries such as India, China and Vietnam have well developed statistical capabilities but other developing country governments generally have weak data systems.[59] DFID is funding statistical development in many African countries as part of the Marrakech Action Plan to improve statistical capability in developing countries. For example it is financing censuses in Ethiopia and Nigeria.[60] DFID reported that it does not tie its aid to improved statistical analysis since host country governments support these improvements. But until that statistical capability is developed it is difficult to monitor whether DFID is effective in getting aid to rural areas or districts. Lack of data means that it is also difficult to monitor unit costs: while many services cost more to deliver in remote rural areas, weak data hinders quantification.[61] That weakness in turn hampers accurate assessment of equity in resource allocation or analysis of service delivery performance.

25. Nearly three quarters of DFID's projects examined were largely or completely meeting their objectives, although only 16% fully achieved them.[62] Close monitoring is important in identifying corruption or wastage. A project in Malawi between 1998 and 2005 which gave starter agricultural packs to individuals was abused because of government bias and corruption.[63] Almost a quarter of packs did not reach the intended beneficiaries between 2001 and 2003 for a variety of reasons including corruption in the distribution system.[64] DFID has a set of safeguards against corruption including project monitoring and internal and external audit.[65] But in this Malawi case the abuse was not picked up quickly enough to stop the corruption after the first year. Where DFID is concerned about corruption it sometimes puts in place additional monitoring mechanisms. For example, in Ethiopia, DFID has links to 258 different local authorities to examine the potential for misuse, although this arrangement is not common in other countries.[66]

26. DFID's project monitoring and evaluation has carried out little analysis of the efficiency of its interventions and in general, it is stronger in planning its assistance than on proving that it has delivered value for money.[67] In two thirds of the DFID projects reviewed by the National Audit Office, DFID did not give an estimate of the number of beneficiaries so it was impossible to calculate indicators such as the cost per beneficiary to see whether the project had been value for money.[68] And although different project proposals often compete for limited funds, few contracts are let through direct competition.

27. DFID considers whether benefits from interventions are likely to be sustained in the longer term during design phase of projects, but not as consistently during or after the project, which reduces DFID's ability to learn lessons on what factors affect the long term success of projects.[69] DFID did not pay sufficient attention to ensuring that projects can continue after funding ends. The £2.6 million Land Husbandry project in Kenya was originally designed to become self-sustaining, but when DFID funding ceased the results could not be maintained without further funding.[70] DFID assessed this project as only partly achieving its objective of increasing farmer incomes.

28. There is relatively little information available on the cost-effectiveness of different types of aid. For example, there is not yet an established way of comparing benefits from projects, such as providing microfinance to rural people, with benefits from broader assistance to host country government budgets. DFID reported that it and its partners carried out a number of surveys and evaluations to evaluate how effective its assistance was at reaching the rural poor, mentioning for example the Joint Evaluation of Budget Support published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2006.[71] But such evaluations have seldom been focused on rural poverty. The Joint Evaluation did not cover the impact of budget support on rural populations in any depth. DFID has not drawn together the evidence which does exist to assess its overall impact on rural poverty or which types of assistance are most effective, though it has set up a new committee to oversee its evaluation programme and practice.[72]

UNDERSTANDING THE NEEDS OF THE RURAL POOR

29. To design and implement effective programmes, DFID staff need an in-depth understanding of the problems the poor face in different areas of the country. DFID's management practices do not give it sufficient insight into the situation on the ground. DFID advisers and programme staff spent little time outside capital cities: the National Audit Office found that on average such DFID staff spent less than five days in rural areas in a year.[73] In Rwanda and Nigeria staff spent less than two days in the field each year. DFID acknowledged that visiting rural areas was important in understanding rural needs and that different country offices had taken varying and inconsistent approaches.[74] In future DFID will require all African offices to follow Tanzania's example of encouraging staff to visit the field more often.[75]

30. To design good programmes for rural areas staff need rural skills and experience, even where DFID is providing funds to developing country governments, as DFID still needs to carry out detailed monitoring of what is being achieved with UK funds. As direct aid for rural livelihoods and rural development has declined, the number of advisers for these areas also decreased.[76] DFID has increased its number of governance advisers, who mainly work at central levels and specialise in improving political systems and promoting good accountability and security from 75 in 2003 to 161 in 2005. But over the same period the number of advisers specifically associated with rural poverty reduction such as livelihoods, infrastructure and environment, has decreased. Despite the predominantly rural focus of its country programmes, DFID has reduced its capacity to understand the specific problems and needs of the rural poor.

59 Q 60 Back

60 Q 60 Back

61 Q 61; C&AG's Report, paras 1.5, 2.19 Back

62 C&AG's Report, Figure 3 Back

63 Q 46 Back

64 Ev 21-22 Back

65 Q 92; Ev 22-23 Back

66 Q 93 Back

67 Q 19 ; C&AG's Report, para 2.8 Back

68 C&AG's Report, para 2.8 Back

69 Q 114 ; C&AG's Report, para 2.7 Back

70 Q 37 Back