Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of witnesses (Questions 80-99)

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

4 JUNE 2007

  Q80  Mr Davidson: Would it make sense to have it out of your budget so that it is under the "bribes to the EU" section of national accounting rather than under the "what we are trying to do" section?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: It scores as overseas development assistance and therefore has to be part of our budget.

  Q81  Mr Davidson: But we do not have any real control over that?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Not as much control as I would like, no.

  Q82  Mr Davidson: What does that mean? Do we have any control over it?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Very slight. In the working groups in Brussels we can argue the case about individual projects and so on. In the development council, we argued that money should be directed more towards the poorest countries.

  Q83  Mr Davidson: But it is unfair to judge you in any way whatsoever on the lack of success of EU spending in this field, because you have no control over it? Therefore the figures that I have reeled off in relation to the scandalous allocation are not your fault and I should raise it with the Minister for Europe, as it is his fault.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: We do not have enough leverage to make a difference on that. What the Government have at least managed to do is to lift the proportion that went to the poorest countries from about 38% just a few years ago to 55% now. That is not good enough for us, and we think that it should be much higher, but that is as much as we have been able to do. The European Development Fund, over which the Government and the Department have more say, has improved a lot.

  Q84  Mr Davidson: Poverty in Malawi has been greatly helped by the bumper harvests over the last couple of years and I think that you touched on that at the beginning. That confirms my own view that better agricultural industries in poorer countries would cut into poverty rates enormously. Am I correct in thinking that our complete failure to reform the common agricultural policy has kept many people in poverty? Rather than spending lots of money on aid, reform of the CAP would do more for people in the third world than any other single thing.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Undoubtedly international trade reform would make a major difference to poverty generally.

  Q85  Mr Davidson: Our support of bloated British farmers has effectively kept poor Africans poor.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Successive administrations have been in favour of CAP reform.

  Q86  Mr Davidson: Good. There are some on this Committee and elsewhere who support bloated British farmers. As you may have guessed, I am not one of them.

    May I ask about targeting support to people in the countryside? One of the headings refers to a transfer of budgets away from agriculture and towards education. However, support of education is not necessarily mutually incompatible with supporting agriculture. I am not clear from the information that we have here about the extent to which education spending is focused on those in the greatest need. Does that entirely depend on the will of the Government involved? I am conscious of the Vietnamese example.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Because Governments' budgets are involved, the targeting obviously depends on the extent to which they wish to spend the money in rural and urban areas, but we have shown that we can shift their thinking and move more resources to rural areas. Vietnam is a very good example.

  Q87  Mr Davidson: Perhaps the Government of Vietnam is a bad example, as they wanted to do that anyway. We were keen to support their budget, because they were already on the side of good. For those who are not, to what extent does Government financial support come with ties? Do we say, "We will give you x amount of money in budget support provided that you do x, y and z", rather than just giving them a lump of money to steal?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Our policy is not to impose that old-style conditionality, because it did not work. Governments simply rejected our aid or would not comply. We have tried to persuade them that if they are serious about reducing poverty—only then would we want to help them—they really need to think about their resource allocation and skew it in favour of the rural areas.

  Q88  Mr Davidson: But if they do not accept what you are saying to them, do you just give them the money anyway?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: No. Paragraphs 2.9 and 2.11 clearly state the conditions for budget support. When we give budget support, which is, in essence, what you are getting at, the Governments we give the money to have to show us that they have serious poverty reduction plans and not just say so. Part of the poverty reduction planning process would be the extent to which they are impacting on rural and non-rural poverty.

  Q89  Mr Davidson: So there is conditionality then?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: That is not conditionality. It is a sort of starting point.

  Q90  Mr Davidson: It is conditionality if you say to the Governments that if they do not do things that we agree with, we will not automatically give them money, but if they do things that we agree with, we will give them money. If that is not conditionality, I do not know what is.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: They are the criteria for budget support. In the case of some Governments—for example, I mentioned the DRC, which, frankly, does not have the capacity even to set a proper plan—we would work more directly in the rural areas ourselves.

  Q91  Mr Davidson: Right. What happens in those circumstances? Who measures how successful that has been? Do you? To what extent does your moving in to do the work free the Government from needing to bother about doing such work at all? Do they say, "We will spend our money on a new steel plant, or a new airline, or another palace, because the British will take care of education in the rural areas."?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: That is a fundamental issue when giving money to any Government, whether through budget support or project support. I hope that the issue will come out in the NAO study later this year. Fungibility is there however money is put in. There is an issue about whether support releases money for bad expenditure. Therefore, it is important that big donors such as this country and the World Bank sit at a table with the Governments to examine how they are allocating their expenditure and whether all we are doing is simply releasing money to go elsewhere for bad uses. As the NAO Report rightly says, the good thing about budget support is that it gives us a seat at the table, in a way that project support does not, to argue the toss about such things.

  Q92  Mr Davidson: May I go back to the example of grow bags, and the corruption that it embodies? Presumably you gave support to the Malawi Government not imagining that that would be the result. As I understand it, the Malawi Government have been better recently, but clearly that was a failure. What happens in circumstances where there has been a degree of failure?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: We need to check the facts of the Malawi case to determine whether DFID money was actually misused. I shall come back with a note on that. I will ask Sam to tell you what happens—what steps we go through—if we think that money has been misused.[5]

  Sam Sharpe: First, we have an internal audit department that can investigate carefully. On the very rare occasions when we find that something has gone wrong with a project that we have been supporting, we try to get the money back from the institution that received it. We certainly do not continue to provide funding if things are going wrong. It is important to emphasise one of the key things that we are doing: one of the reasons why we are investing so much in governance these days is because of the critical importance of getting systems in place to prevent corruption in developing countries.

  Q93  Mr Davidson: I understand all that, and I note that you referred to the rare occasions when examples such as this are brought to our attention. However, that cuts both ways, does it not? Had Mr Wyatt not recently been in Malawi, it might not have been brought to your attention.

     I am not sure what mechanism exists for identifying things such as the grow bags situation. There is always potential for the misuse of any system, but I have no idea of the scale of this. I am not convinced that you have mechanisms that would pick that up, and I am not sure how you got into that situation.

  Dave Fish: May I give you an example of a major programme that we have in Ethiopia—the basic services grant, provided through local administrations, for health, education and water? When Hilary Benn and I were in Ethiopia about a year ago, people told us that this programme faced the grave risk of money being diverted to supporters of the Government, so we put in place monitoring mechanisms to ensure that if that should happen, we would spot it straight away. We have links to 258 different local authorities specifically to examine the potential for misuse. In most of these sorts of areas, I hope that our monitoring arrangements would pick up major elements of corruption.

  Q94  Mr Davidson: Perhaps you could tell us whether or not you picked this up. I know that in my area—I am sure that this is the same for my colleagues' areas—people are supportive of aid to the third world, but they often want to be reassured that it is not being wasted or stolen.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: I shall be very happy, in the note to the Committee, again to set out our various mechanisms, from project monitoring to audit and evaluation—the lot. [6]

  Mr Davidson: Fine.

    Chairman: I have to remind everyone that under an agreement with the Treasury notes must be delivered to this Committee within two weeks.

  Q95  Mr Khan: In 2005-06, £4.4 billion was spent by DFID. We know from the National Audit Office Report that 57% was in the form of bilateral aid and 38% went through international bodies. In the past 10 years, since DFID became a mainstream Department rather than a subsection of the Foreign Office, what has the expenditure been?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: It has grown rapidly, as you know. It has been the fastest growing—

  Q96  Mr Khan: What is the figure for the past 10 years? It was £4.4 billion in 2005-06—

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: It is now roughly £6 billion.

  Q97  Mr Khan: If each of the past 10 years is added up—you spent £4.4 billion—

  Sam Sharpe: It started at about £2 billion; I am sorry but I would have to add it up.

  Q98  Mr Khan: What is the ball-park figure?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: We have moved from about £2 billion to £6 billion.

  Q99  Mr Khan: From £2 billion a year to £6 billion a year? So how many years are we talking about?

  Sam Sharpe: Well, you said 10.


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