Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of witnesses (Questions 140-159)

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

4 JUNE 2007

  Q140  Mr Bacon: If you could send us a summary and perhaps an internet link as a note, that would be great. [9]

    My second question concerns paragraph 2.21, which relates directly to our discussion of a moment ago. It states that the NAO: "did not see evidence that DFID raised these issues formally with the Government of Mozambique." You have been saying in your answers, which I wrote down, "we have raised these issues". What evidence is there that you have raised those issues with the Government of Mozambique?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: In the number of discussions that we have had with the Government of Mozambique in multi-donor forums, and also directly. I told you about some of the changes that have occurred.

  Q141  Mr Bacon: Are there letters? The sentence is very carefully drafted. It says: "we did not see evidence that DFID raised these issues formally with the Government of Mozambique." Did you raise those issues formally with the Government of Mozambique and are there dated letters to that effect?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: I do not know whether there are dated letters, but certainly we would have raised them in all the donor group discussions with the Government of Mozambique.

  Q142  Mr Bacon: So it was spoken but not written.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: It might have been. We would need to check.

  Dave Fish: If donor discussions tend to be as a group of 18 donors to Mozambique—so there are 18 people round a table with the Government—there will be some kind of written record of those discussions.

  Q143  Mr Bacon: Perhaps you could send us those minutes and also, if there are very specific concerns, it is not uncommon to write a letter saying so. Any evidence that you could send to the Committee would be helpful. [10]

  Dave Fish: The best evidence is the change of behaviour.

  Q144  Mr Bacon: Send us some information on that as well, but not instead of the minutes. That would be very helpful.

    I should like to ask you about the shifting the political economy, Sir Suma. You said that the question is a fundamental issue of political economy and that the most powerful way is to shift the political economy. We are talking about the urban bias and not reaching the rural poor. We are one of the richest countries in the world, yet we still face an issue of fundamental political economy. I represent a very rural constituency in which the largest town is quite small—it has about 10,000 electors and will be smaller still after the next boundary change. In Wales and Scotland, much more is spent per head on health care than in England. That is undoubtedly for good reasons—I do not know whether it is because they are more ill in Scotland or because of the cost of delivering health care in a wide area. There is obviously a reason for it and I am sure that Mr Davidson would go into it if he had the chance, which he does not.

    None the less, those are issues of political economy that we have not solved— they are still there; they are inherent. We have not solved them here, yet you are hoping to solve them several thousand miles away in countries where we spend relatively small sums and have a relatively small impact on the political culture. Is that not a rather ambitious way of trying to do things? Is it not better to try to do it directly? Instinctively, my hackles rise over the whole question of budget support. It makes me wonder whether it is actually about making things easy, rather than effective, and general rather than specific, and about having a seat at the table rather than being in the driving seat as would be the case if one were managing a project directly. Operating directly is more difficult, but is it not more effective?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: We shall deal with the NAO review of budget support later this year, but the multi-donor evaluation discusses the pros and cons and shows how we have shifted what you might call political economy. We are quite a big donor in a substantial number of the relevant countries; particularly in Africa, where in the case of many countries we are the biggest donor. Our seat at the table is therefore rather larger than that of many others, and our views are taken seriously. That is clearly much less true in relation to less aid-dependent countries such as China, however.

  Q145  Mr Bacon: Nevertheless, your view is that you can effect a lasting shift in the attitude of a recipient Government that has demonstrated the right track record by increasing budget support and decreasing project support.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Provided they are meeting the basic criteria.

  Q146  Mr Bacon: It was interesting that you said that the Department is not at all out of the project business—yet. The implication was that there might come a time when the Department would indeed be totally out of that business.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Only if all the countries where we are active followed the criteria in paragraphs 2.9 and 2.11 of the Report, which would constitute a pretty tough test for many of them. Some have not even developed a poverty reduction plan of the sort that Mozambique and Vietnam might have. The criteria have to be met first, and then there has to be work on financial management, fiduciary risk and the like.

  Q147  Mr Bacon: Last autumn I was in Kenya with Mrs Brooke of this Committee, and it was quite obvious that the DFID people out there were much more trusting of the Ministry of Education than of the Ministry of Health, and were much more willing to engage in budget support to the Ministry of Education. Would it characterise your general stance to say that the Department is content to adopt a variegated approach, whereby it might do one thing in one place but not in others.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Having worked there, Dave is the expert on Kenya. I believe that the Ministry of Education has a track record of effectiveness and our projects and programmes with it have been quite successful, whereas that has been much less true of the Ministry of Health. Overall, we are not in the business of budget support to Kenya—for good reason.

  Q148  Mr Bacon: May I ask the NAO about the chart in figure 7 on page 15? The human poverty index referred to there is, I believe, a composite index that measures deprivation in three dimensions—long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. I think it is fairly obvious that the budgeted transfer per capita increases as one goes up the vertical axis of the graph. However, does the horizontal axis indicate increasing poverty from left to right, or vice versa?

    Jim Harvey: It increases from left to right.

  Q149  Mr Bacon: So if my poverty index is 60, I am very poor, and at 70 I am the poorest on the chart. Is that right?

    Jim Harvey: Yes.

  Q150  Mr Bacon: I understand. There is a cluster of transfers to districts around the middle of the chart. It does not appear, however, that the budgeted transfer per capita rises as poverty increases. In fact, the cluster is between 35 and 50 despite one's expectation that there would be a skew, with a line from bottom left to top right, such that poorer people would get more money. Have I interpreted the chart correctly in saying that that is not the case?

    Jim Harvey: Yes.

  Q151  Mr Bacon: Sir Suma, could you account for that?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: I would have to ask that of the Uganda team. My supposition is that when the Ugandan Government started to shift allocations to the poorer districts it did not cut the level of allocations in other places, with the result that the shift has been a very gradual one.

  Q152  Mr Bacon: It would be good if you could double check and send a note to the Committee.[11] You mentioned microfinance earlier. Do you know how much the Department spends in supporting it?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Overall? We would have to add up the various elements.

  Jim Harvey: It is £70 million over the past three years.

  Q153  Mr Bacon: That is out of a total budget of what? You told Mr Khan earlier.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: It is £6 billion.

  Q154  Mr Bacon: £70 million is only just over 1%.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: That is the bilateral spend. Obviously, there are multilateral contributions through the International Finance Corporation and others.

  Q155  Mr Bacon: I visited the Jami Bora Trust in Nairobi. I do not know whether you happen to know whether the Secretary of State has done likewise; I spent a long time encouraging him to do so through his private office because it was one of the most impressive things that I have ever seen. From the available evidence, it seems that microfinance is not only one of the most self-sustaining but effective ways of achieving the kind of change that you want to see. That being the case, why does it not have a higher profile? Why does it not get more of the cake? Is it because most of the cake goes into things such as education?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: It has a pretty high profile. In the past two or three years, we have been doing a lot more.

  Q156  Mr Bacon: It is £70 million out of £6 billion.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: That is out of the bilateral total, which is less than the overall total. I agree that £70 million is not a large share, but if you look at the number of microfinance programmes and projects that we have set up, and at the international initiatives that we have mounted, you will see that we are attracting a lot of co-financing from other donors. We actually have quite a good story to tell on the matter.

  Sam Sharpe: Having worked on microfinance a lot in South Africa, I can say that getting the banking system and commercial suppliers involved in the microfinance industry is a key part of what we are trying to do. There is a limit to how much subsidised finance one would want to put in.

  Q157  Mr Bacon: I understand that, but it also means that a little goes a long way. The Jami Bora Trust started with 50 poor street beggars, some of whom were drug addicts, some of whom were prostitutes, and now there are 130,000 members. It is like a small building society. It has tremendous power to deliver change which, if it does not cost much, you can do again and again.

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: We are trying to get other donors to buy into such projects through co-financing. We have set up the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund, which you know about, and the Financial Deepening Challenge Fund to attract other donors to co-finance with us.

  Q158  Mr Bacon: Is it possible for you to send us a note that tells us the story of microfinance in the past few years, how it has grown, how much money you have put in, what its effects are, and where you see it going?

  Sir Suma Chakrabarti: Yes.[12]

  Chairman: Mr Khan has to leave now. Before he does so, I would like to thank him very much, because he leaving the Committee. He has been a most assiduous Member of the Committee and his questioning has always been very robust. We are sorry to see him go, but he has been promoted to the Government.

  Q159  Mr Dunne: I have a quick follow-up question to what Mr Davidson said about governance. Where there is a clear allegation of wrongdoing in a donee country, what steps do you take to investigate? Would you take a statement from an individual who makes an allegation, in particular if that person is an employee of the Department or one of its agencies?

  Sam Sharpe: I have been DFID's Finance Director for only two months, and I am already aware of several cases that we are investigating, about which we would certainly take evidence from people who wanted to blow whistles.

    Obviously, there may be cases in which we know that there may be some questions to be asked before we can take a statement from an individual because of other things that might be known. Clearly, the first thing to do in any case is investigate thoroughly all of the evidence that is available. That will involve the Department, but we will also work with our partners.


9   Ev 25-26 Back

10   Ev 26-28 Back

11   Note by witness: Figure 7 uses data which cannot capture the progress that has been made over time in using poverty as a factor in district resource allocations. The government, supported by DFID and other donors, has had a policy of increasing the influence of poverty in district transfer allocation formulae since 1999. This policy was strengthened in 2004 following a major review. But a decision was made at the beginning that no district would have its funding reduced as the policy was rolled out. This has meant that the impact of the new formulae has been incremental. Back

12   Ev 28-29 Back


 
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