Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-119)

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3 MARCH 2008

  Q100  Mr Dunne: Dr Shafik, you have identified the vast array of choices that you have in your Department of how to spend your limited resource and I would like to get into that a bit further. You have increased steadily the proportion of funding going into budget support and yet your decision making as to how you decide which countries benefit from that does not come out clearly in this Report as being something which is an established procedure. It appears to be somewhat haphazard, if I can put it like that. If you look at table three, if I have read this properly, it seems as though you are giving £16 million to India for budgetary support, a nation which undoubtedly has significant poverty problems but is also producing ten times as many chemistry PhDs as this country and it has an economy growing at three to four times the rate of this country each year. Likewise Pakistan is receiving £52 million; it is not as advanced economically but still in the emerging nations rather than the most poorly developed. Also Vietnam, a country whose economic growth rate is even higher than India's, is receiving £34 million in budget support. Why is it? On what criteria are you selecting those countries as opposed to many others that would be lower down the league table of established government procedures and so on?

  Dr Shafik: Let me give a rationale for each of those countries and then make a more general point. In the case of India what we are doing is supporting selected national programmes which target some of the poorest communities in some of the poorest parts of India which have poverty levels which are African, to be frank. Pakistan is a very deceptive country because its per capita income is actually relatively high but its social indicators are often at levels which would be considered African. Only 52% of children in Pakistan are in primary school and that is a huge issue for us for many reasons, including concerns about terrorism. Vietnam is actually an incredibly poor country. It is growing fast but its poverty levels are very, very high. I think in each case we do have to look at the issue in the round and we also see budget support as one of many instruments that we look at. In a country like Pakistan or Vietnam we may be doing general budget support but we may also want to intervene at a sectoral level where we see that some social indicators are particularly problematic.

  Q101  Mr Dunne: What criteria are you using? As you said earlier, you have 120 countries and only 15 are getting budget support. Where are the criteria? Why do we not have here in any of these appendices a clear set of parameters that you are using to judge whether to supply budget support or not?

  Dr Shafik: The main criterion is whether we think the potential benefits of using this instrument are worth the risks involved. That is the underpinning for all of these choices.

  Q102  Mr Dunne: It is not to do with the power of advocacy of the individual country managers who are arguing their case more forcefully than others.

  Dr Shafik: I do not think so, no.

  Q103  Mr Dunne: So how would you decide, for example, that one country should have a ten year partnership? You have decided Mozambique should not get this for seemingly sensible reasons, but did you consider a 10 year agreement two years ago when the election was further away? How do you assess whether the neighbouring countries should get a long standing agreement or not? Again it appears from the Report that there is quite a lot of inertia. Once you have got a programme up and running then your prospects of getting it renewed are probably rather higher than another country which is not yet on the programme.

  Dr Shafik: I can give you three or four countries where some of our country heads have argued that budget support would be useful as an instrument and we have said no. To give specific examples, Kenya, DRC, Nigeria are all countries where we judged that the risks were not worth the benefits and that we could use other aid instruments and achieve significant development outcomes and not have to take the risks that budget support would entail.

  Q104  Mr Dunne: Do you accept the tenor of this line of questioning, that there is not a clearly articulated set of criteria for budget support and there should be within the Department.

  Mr Sharpe: I would just like to clarify that we do take two decisions separately in sequence. One is allocations to countries where ministers will decide on the basis of an aid allocation model what they think is the right amount of aid to go to that country in terms of its poverty and in terms of its governance record and so on. Then there is a separate set of decisions which ministers take about the choice of instruments within that country. I thought it might be useful to clarify that that those are treated as separate decisions.

  Q105  Mr Dunne: Can I move to one of the issues that Mr Davidson was raising which is to do with improving accountability within countries? If you look at page 17, paragraph 3.5, the NAO say that it is difficult to obtain evidence that the impact of strengthened systems on the quality of public finance outcomes and specifically they say there is no evidence between 2000 and 2005 that among your 25 priority countries those which received DFID's budget support had on average performed at the same levels as those which did not. There is little evidence that your work to improve public institutions and accountability within these countries is actually helping to reduce leakage (if that is the current buzz word for corruption).

  Dr Shafik: This data is very difficult and the trends are very difficult. If, for example, you took a different time period and looked at some of the World Bank governance indicators and corruption indicators and took a slightly longer time period you would find there are more cases that have improved than have not improved. The numbers move around depending on the indicators you use and a lot of these are aggregate indicators based on ten or 15 different indices. I think one could have a dispute about some of the specifics on the indicators. The NAO itself does say that there is independent evaluation evidence and boxes 11, 12 and 13 give examples across a wide range of countries, as does appendix seven which gives trajectories and shows that most of them are improving.

  Q106  Mr Dunne: I think it is a fairly mixed picture coming out of this Report, to be honest.

  Mr Sharpe: I wonder if I could just say that if you look at some of the things that are actually happening as part of public financial management reform—improving tax collection, making much more procurement open to competition, getting proper computerised payroll systems to get rid of ghost workers—it is quite hard to believe that that is not reducing the scope for the space for corruption in countries.

  Dr Shafik: I could ask Rachel to give us some examples from Mozambique of these kinds of things. Corruption is a very big word but when you actually look at it, where does corruption come from? It is usually around procurement and misuse of the payroll. Rachel, maybe you could give some examples of those two places where things have improved in Mozambique.

  Ms Turner: Mozambique is a good example because we have had two of these things that Sam described earlier, these assessments of public expenditure financial management quality which are very detailed scrutinies of the whole process and the whole system using international methodology to rank and score each part of the system, including the raising of tax which of course is important, as is public expenditure. In Mozambique we have just had an assessment which is showing a near 20% improvement over the last one two years ago in terms of the quality of public financial management systems. Mozambique has been through a very intensive process of public financial management reform with a new legal framework and introducing a new electronic management system. Payroll is also interesting. What they have done with the payroll—which is 30% of the budget—is that they have had an independent census of all the public sector. Everyone has been fingerprinted and you now have to prove every year that you are alive if you are a civil servant and that has to be notarised. You have to have notarised proof that you are alive because, as you know, in Africa there is often a problem with ghost workers. Payrolls will be on this electronic management system, they are going to be audited regularly and the system has become extremely tight; the payrolls have been collapsed into only 12 for the whole public sector. That is an example where it takes time to do that kind of work, to do a census, and we have supported that ourselves, we have put a lot of support directly into that process. It takes time to build these things, but you can really start to narrow the space. Similarly in procurement we have had a new procurement law and introduced a new procurement process. Last year 85% of contracts were tendered competitively in the public sector. You can really see that the space begins to narrow.

  Q107  Mr Dunne: The DWP might like to get a note from you on how to introduce such measures to reduce benefit fraud. In the case of Mozambique could you tell me whether you have secured an agreement from the public authorities to go in and inspect the use of funds post the event?

  Ms Turner: We have an agreement that every year there will be a value for money audit in a different sector. The system in Mozambique is not very familiar to our kind of system here in the UK, it is done by something called the Internal Audit Authority that belongs to the Ministry of Finance. They do value for money audits and they do a different sector every year. We see that audit and we talk about the results. At the same time, in some sectors, we have also agreed that the External Audit Authority that is more like the NAO will do what is called audit work and we will agree the terms of reference of that. We have a lot of access to both design and type of audit, to see it early in the process and to talk about it.

  Q108  Mr Dunne: Dr Shafik, one of the things that comes out of the Report at page 31 paragraph 5.14 is that again there is a very "mixed picture"—to use the NAO's words—on how successful you are at securing agreement from donee governments for your Department to go in and check how the money has been spent and it would seem that that, particularly in the area of budget support, should be a principle which applies in every case. Can you explain why it does not apply in every case?

  Dr Shafik: We have issued new guidance to our teams that they need to do a better job at getting value from these audits and be more proactive. I think the new guidance which we issued last month will hopefully respond to the NAO's view that progress has been mixed.

  Q109  Mr Dunne: You have not issued guidance—or perhaps you have done it last month since the Report was published—following the 2006 White Paper recommendations in paragraph 6.18, as to how your country teams should consider introducing budget support and the appraisal process. Is that what you are referring to? Have you now done that?

  Dr Shafik: Yes, we have.

  Q110  Mr Dunne: So the NAO Report was helpful in encouraging you to introduce some new systems.

  Dr Shafik: Yes, very helpful, both on quantifying benefits, on fiduciary risk assessments and more broadly on budget support we have issued new policies on all three of those. The interaction with the NAO has been a tough process but I think it has been a very useful one for us.

  Q111  Nigel Griffiths: What this Report summarises is that the budget support that you have given has enabled partner governments to increase expenditure on priority areas, it has resulted in them providing more services, particularly in education and in health; it has helped increase the capacity which is important to deliver the services; it has helped them strengthen their financial management systems and encouraged other donors to adopt that sort of policy. In summary it says that DFID has done a good job in moving public financial management up the development agenda, it has taken a lead role in developing and using tools to assess the quality of developing country systems and to assess the levels of fiduciary risks. How did we manage before DFID existed?

  Dr Shafik: The truth is that we used to provide something called programme aid before we had budget support. To be honest, there were elements of it which were a legacy of the colonial relationships where we would provide direct support to their budget but we did not hold them to account in terms of outcomes, poverty reduction and benefits. One can think of budget support as an evolution from that origin of providing direct support to government budgets but with much more rigour around holding to account in terms of audit, accounting and so on but also in terms of results that we expect.

  Q112  Nigel Griffiths: Do you get satisfaction out of the fact that DFID's aid is now divorced from arms sale and UK exports? How has that helped us and helped the developing countries?

  Dr Shafik: I think it has been hugely important for the UK as a whole. To be frank, it has meant that the independent reviews of DFID that have been done globally have identified us as the most successful bilateral development agency in the world. I think the fact that it is de-linked from anything but the objective to reduce poverty in the world has been a key factor in our international reputation.

  Q113  Nigel Griffiths: I visited India with your predecessor and saw the wonderful work that was being done in education so I am slightly concerned to read on page 52 that, perhaps understandably, you are going to have to scale back your contributions as the wealth of India grows. How are you managing that process with the Indian Government?

  Dr Shafik: We have had some initial conversations with the Indian Government to look at our programme evolving to focus increasingly on two of the poorest states in India—UP and Bihar—over time and we will focus our efforts there in the medium term. We are also looking to work with the Indians more globally on international issues as they become a major international player, so we would talk with them about climate change, the international trade round, their role as a regional player in South Asia. The nature of the relationship will change but I think the Indians welcome that.

  Q114  Nigel Griffiths: The Report on the same page touches on the problems of DFID not having access to the World Bank's assessments in India and the Report says that you will now strengthen the financial management control by applying full risk assessment procedures et cetera for new programmes. Has that begun and how advanced is it?

  Dr Shafik: That has begun; we have raised that issue with the highest levels of the World Bank. There was a change of personnel in India which has resulted in much higher levels of cooperation and we now have access to all the information we need.

  Q115  Nigel Griffiths: I also visited Vietnam which I see appears in the appendix five examples and saw some of the education and other projects, including the ground breaking malaria one that Dr Jeremy Farrar and his colleagues have in Ho Chi Minh City. In fact I am meeting the Prime Minister of Vietnam on Wednesday. What message should I give him from DFID because that seems to be one of the most successful of our partner countries?

  Dr Shafik: Vietnam has been the country that has been the most successful in the world at reducing poverty in terms of the pace of poverty reduction. They have been even more successful than China in terms of the number of people they are taking out of poverty every year. I think congratulations are in order.

  Q116  Nigel Griffiths: How do you engage with the vile regimes like Mugabe's and Darfur? How do you reach civil society when they have driven out NGOs?

  Dr Shafik: Zimbabwe is a very good example because it is the antithesis of budget support. It is a country where we do not put a penny through the government budget because we have no confidence in their systems nor in their commitment to reducing poverty. We have actually not cut our aid programme to Zimbabwe throughout this period because poverty levels have gone up, but we have put all of our money through either UN agencies or NGOs operating in Zimbabwe. Our judgment is that that is a much safer and better use of DFID funds to achieve poverty reduction because frankly we do not trust the government.

  Q117  Nigel Griffiths: What aspects of this Report were you most concerned about and what are your priorities for addressing those concerns?

  Dr Shafik: I think the main thing I was concerned about was the fact that there were weaknesses. We were often doing the work, doing the analyses and doing the assessments but we did not do them in a systematic way; they were not all in one place; the records were not particularly good. I think there is a consistency and clean up job that we need to do and I think the NAO has been very useful in terms of helping us on that. I am a bit of a numbers junkie and I think more effort on quantification, quantifying benefits, quantifying risks, quantifying costs and that sort of thing; that is something I hope to take forward in the years ahead.

  Q118  Nigel Griffiths: There are 26 recommendations, which are going to be the most challenging ones to address?

  Dr Shafik: We still need to go through these recommendations in detail and we are obviously looking forward to seeing the recommendations from the PAC so I probably will not respond on individual ones. I think broadly speaking DFID is a pretty disciplined organisation; our country offices are far away but they are pretty clear about what we expect from them. I am not so worried about getting our documentation sorted. I think quantification implies some culture change in the organisation, getting people much more used to thinking about quantification and thinking of themselves as investors in poverty reduction. We need to make sure that every pound we spend is getting maximum impact in terms of reducing poverty in the world and thinking about that in the way a banker would in maximumising rates of return, these are just not financial rates of return. I think that will require some culture change in the organisation which will be challenging.

  Q119  Nigel Griffiths: I am very impressed with you and your team and I look forward to great achievements from you.

  Dr Shafik: Thank you very much.



 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 24 June 2008