Memorandum from Community Links
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This paper argues that:
1.1 clearer, more discriminating, thinking
about "commissioning" is required if the role of third
sector organisations in the provision of public services is to
be understood fully;
1.2 in many contexts, a principal objective
of commissioning is to ensure and develop responsiveness to the
needs of service-users;
1.3 the case for involving third sector organisations
in the provision of public services flows similarly (a) from the
need to ensure responsiveness to—often local—need
and (b) from third sector organisations' accessibility as sources
of help that are outwith "the state";
1.4 many—but not all—services
are best defined with a strong local involvement; and
1.5 multi-functional third sector organisations
with strong local roots can be especially useful in informing
commissioners' decisions and ensuring responsiveness to local
need.
2. It provides an analysis of the elements
of "responsive commissioning" and compares it with tendering
(or "pre-determined commissioning") and unconditional
grants.
3. It does not argue that third sector organisations
have a monopoly of understanding of service-users' needs. Rather,
it argues that there are many circumstances—especially locally—in
which third sector organisations are able to make a crucial contribution
to that understanding.
4. The paper concludes by addressing some
of the specific questions that the Select Committee included in
its consultation paper.
INTRODUCTION—"LOOSE
TALK"
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said,
in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it
to mean, neither more nor less".[127]
1. Whilst Humpty Dumpty's self-centred ideal
is unattainable, looseness in the use of terms is likely to cause
confusion and certainly has done so in the cluster of terms that
surrounds the commissioning of public services.
2. Useful distinctions are lost. Thus "grants"
are contrasted commonly with "contracts", obscuring
from view the useful distinction between:
2.1 the majority of "grants" that
are "conditional" (ie the grantee must meet the grantor's
conditions if the grant is to be payable); and
2.2 the diminishing number of "grants"
that are "unconditional".
3. Distinctions without differences are
also made. For example, the "service level agreement"
has emerged as "a thing in itself" and thus purports
to be distinct from a "contract". However, except where
"service level agreement" is used in its original sense
(ie to give precision to obligations within a pre-existing legal
relationship), it is indistinguishable from a "contract"
in which services are exchanged for money or other consideration.
4. Nevertheless, we have purposes in mind
when we use words and these purposes affect our usage. Hence we
might next look briefly at some of the purposes that lie behind
the various uses of the term "commissioning".
WHY "COMMISSION"?
Strategic commissioning
5. Whilst it might seem impressive, to describe
commissioning as "strategic" is neutral—and sometimes
vacuous—in terms of its substantive values. Just as a contract
can be fair or oppressive, so a strategy can be benign or malign.
The value comes from the particular strategic objective—"getting
services on the cheap" might be less laudable than "seeking
to respond to the interests of (actual and potential) service-users".
Outcome-based commissioning
6. The potential of commissioning to move
away from the "provider perspective" is emphasised in
"outcome-based commissioning". In this model, the concern
is not with "inputs" but with the "outcomes".
Where these "outcomes" focus on the actual and potential
users (or beneficiaries) of the service, the approach is to be
welcomed greatly. By contrast, where the outcomes are the achievement
of top-down targets—set without sufficient regard for the
needs and preferences of service-users—"outcome-based
commissioning" can be regressive.
The creation of quasi markets
7. "Commissioning" can also be
used to introduce competition, which can be based on: quality
(best determined at the level of the service user); reliability;
and/or price. The danger is that commissioners' legitimate concerns
with price will distract them too much from their concern to represent
or respond to the interests of service-users and to ensure a quality
of service that meets service-users' needs. This danger is particularly
acute where commissioners are under significant pressure to reduce
or constrain expenditure. It is difficult to ride two horses at
once.
A proxy for service-users
8. A key reason for "commissioning"—from
the value perspective of the third sector, the principal or overriding
one—is to ensure that the services commissioned really do
meet the needs of service-users. The trends towards "personalisation"
and the provision of "choice" make this a challenging
task. There are two models.
8.1 Commissioner as proxy: The commissioner
is in the position of "proxy for the service-users".
In this model, commissioners are to cast off any "provider
perspective" and to concentrate instead on the articulation
of service-users' various needs. Consultation[128]
and research processes are often needed in order to ensure that
the commissioner-proxy can make the necessary empathetic leap.
This model predominates in health and social care.
8.2 Third sector organisation as proxy:
In this model, a third sector organisation is involved in the
identification of need and the development and delivery of the
service because the third sector organisation is closer to the
needs of (actual and potential) service-users than the commissioner
can be. For a range of reasons, the empathetic leap is often much
smaller for the third sector organisation.
8.2.1 The third sector organisation might
draw some of its staff and volunteers from service-users.
8.2.2 It might be seen as part of the "community"
rather than as part of the "state" and thus be more
"accessible".
8.2.3 It might be seen as less bureaucratic
and thus be more likely to be offered information.
These possibilities are likely to be strongest
where the third sector organisation has deep roots in a particular
locality and where it is seen to be multi-functional.
WHY INVOLVE
THE THIRD
SECTOR IN
PUBLIC SERVICES
DELIVERY?
9. In policy terms, the fundamental[129]
purpose of public service delivery through the third sector is
taken in this paper to be to provide services that—as a
consequence of third sector organisations" distinctive values
and structures[130]—are:
9.2 more responsive to local communities;
and
than might be provided by a public sector organisation
directly.
10. Whilst "best value" for public
expenditure is a guiding principle, third sector organisations'
advantages in terms of flexibility, responsiveness and innovation
are themselves a form of "value".
11. Most importantly—and again because
of their distinctive values and structures—third sector
organisations are not "the state" and are not perceived
as such by the people who seek their help. If third sector organisations
came to be regarded as "arms" or "agents"
of the state, their perceived accessibility would suffer greatly
and the reach and responsiveness of their services would be diminished
profoundly.
INAPPROPRIATE REASONS
FOR THIRD
SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
12. There are also some reasons for involving
third sector organisations in public service delivery that, in
the light of the main policy drivers set out above, are wholly
inappropriate.
12.1 That their costs are lower because they
can pay staff markedly less than comparable public sector workers
are paid and can provide fewer benefits for their staff.
12.2 That risk can be exported easily from
the public sector to third sector organisations without ensuring
that the third sector organisation is in a position to bear the
particular risk.
12.3 That independent funders can be expected
to make up shortfalls in the funding of the full costs of the
work, which costs include a due proportion of the organisational
overheads.
12.4 That "outsourcing" is a "good
in itself" rather than the means of securing "best value"
in terms that are not simply financial.
BEST PROXY—HORSES
FOR COURSES
13. The third sector is not a monolith,
neither are all public services so similar that a "one size"
procurement process will fit all.
14. The third sector's heterogeneity[131]
flows from four principal variables.
14.1 Range of functions, from single
purpose, through a cluster of related purposes, to multi-purpose
organisations. The advantages of specialism are in tension with
the advantages of breadth of vision, flexibility and responsiveness.
14.2 Size, from multi-million pound
businesses, with huge assets and employing thousands, to one or
two devoted volunteers, who give or borrow the resources that
are needed to sustain their tiny organisations. Economies of scale
are in tension with immediacy, flexibility and responsiveness.
14.3 Asset rich or asset poor. An
asset base lends stability and confidence and opens up opportunities
for the constructive use of credit. Whilst financial security
can lead to complacency and can mask inefficiency, the programmatic
development of public-third sector partnerships is a hopeless
enterprise without some stability in the third sector.
14.4 Geographical scope. The comprehensiveness
and simplicity of national coverage is in tension with the sense
of identity and involvement of the local organisation.
15. In respect of the public sector, the
key variables would seem to be:
15.1 The nature of the service in question.
There is no reason to assume that, for example, advice on benefit
eligibility and acute health care services are best procured in
the same way.
15.2 The ability of the service-users
to articulate their own needs and preferences. Some actual
and potential service-users are able to represent their own interests,
perhaps through well-established representative organisations.
However, as the Victoria Climbi
case illustrates so powerfully, others are
far more vulnerable. In the former case, the commissioner has
only to listen and question open-mindedly. In the latter case,
the commissioner must either ensure that another body is able
to represent the service-users' interests or itself move to do
so. On this spectrum of ability to make the case, there will of
course be middle cases.
15.3 National or local provision? The
two principal arguments for local provision would seem to be that:
15.3.4 conditions vary significantly with
locality; and
15.3.5 a genuine sense of involvement is
needed and is best secured by local arrangements.
16. Bringing these two sets of variables
together is too complex a task for this brief paper. However,
it does seem reasonable to conclude that, where:
16.1 local responsiveness and inter-connections
are valued highly; and
16.2 the technical issues involved are not
such that central investment in research, development and/or provision
is required for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency,
there is a strong case to look locally for the
best representatives of—and/or proxies for—the interests
of service-users.
17. Whilst local government has a strategic
and leading role in such cases, it is also clear that participation
rates in local authority elections are low presently and that
a single vote cannot give an opinion on the myriad issues that
will arise locally. Hence, to ensure responsiveness to local needs,
there is a clear requirement for a range of appropriate partnerships,
including the well-developed Local Strategic Partnerships that
the recent Local Government White Paper seeks to ensure.[132]
18. In paragraph 5.69, the White Paper identifies—as
a condition for successful commissioning—the requirement
for "a thorough understanding of what local people need and
want ..."[133]
19. The question that arises is, "How
best—on a case by case basis—to ensure `a thorough
understanding of what local people need and want'?" Substantial
multi-functional third sector organisations, with strong local
roots[134],
have an important role to play. If, for example, their advice
workers come from the local communities, they are likely to be
sensitive antennae for local needs—the more so if, as is
often the case, the workers first became involved as service-users.
THE "LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD"
CHIMERA
20. Such local, multi-purpose third sector
organisations make the claim that their wholes are greater than
the sum of their respective parts. For example, if a third sector
organisation's child-care workers spot that parents need advice
that is more user-friendly than that which "state agencies"
provide and make successful referrals to another part of the organisation,
they are adding value in a way that has few comparators with the
specialist services that might be provided by private contractor
providers of child-care.
21. A genuinely "level-playing field"
is only possible where the commissioner does not need the inputs
of the local voluntary sector in order to identify local needs
and to specify the work to be tendered and/or where interconnectedness
and a sense of involvement are not considered to be significant.
The fundamental reasons for involving third sector organisations
at a local level are to ensure local responsiveness and interconnectedness.
22. Third sector organisations are often
challenged to demonstrate that they do in fact add the distinctive
value that they claim to add. Social audit methods are developing
and might become cost effective instruments.[135]
There is however a case for more research on interconnectedness
and on service-user satisfaction.
Table 1
FORMS OF PROCUREMENT
|
| Key Issues and Options | Grants
| Tendering | Commissioning
|
|
Results of the
process | A grant that is not contingent on any specific action by the grantee
| A contract or conditional grant
These are legally and economically indistinguishable. In both cases, the payments are contingent upon the third sector organisation's performance of the terms of the contract or of the conditions of the grant.
|
| | |
|
| Relevant legal considerations | Grants totalling
more than €100,000 over three years might be "state aid"—but
there are some exceptions
| The resulting contracts (or conditional grants) are subject to the Public Contract Regulations 2006 if the sums involved exceed the threshold of (in most relevant cases) €211,000. These Regulations prescribe the form of procedural "fairness" in procurement.
|
Invitations to be considered can be
open or invited
| Open or invited
| Open or invited
Public Contract Regulations require openness above the threshold.
|
| | |
|
Funders'
intentions can be:
— "pre-specified"
by the funder
at time of
invitation
or
— "responsive" to
third sector
organisations'
inputs
| Very likely to be "responsive" but
can be "pre-specified"
| Likely to be "pre-specified" but can be "responsive"
| Likely to be "responsive", but
can be "pre-specified"
|
| | |
|
Nature of selection
criteria | Open-textured,
requiring "apples
and pears"
comparisons
| Relatively
mechanistic: price,
quality and
reliability
"Quality" and
"reliability" are less mechanistic than
"price"
| Open-textured,
requiring "apples
and pears"
comparisons
|
| | |
|
Guarantees of
fairness | Openness and
impartiality
Clear criteria
signalled in
advance
| Openness and
impartiality
Clear criteria
signalled in
advance
| Openness and
impartiality
Funders' objectives
signalled clearly in
advance
|
| | |
|
Final specification
can be determined
by funder/third
sector/jointly
| Third sector | Funder
| Third sector or
jointly
|
| | |
|
Scope to adjust
responsively
during the funded
period
| High
Flows from the
nature of a grant
| Low
Set at tender stage
by the funder
| High or medium
Precise balance will
depend on
negotiation during
commissioning
|
| | |
|
| Length of contract | | A matter of
spreading the fixed
cost of set-up
| Longer contracts
reflect the depth of
the relationship
|
|
COMMISSIONING IN
THE CONTEXT
OF OTHER
FORMS OF
PROCUREMENT AND
FUNDING
23. Table 1 brings together several important practical
and formal dimensions of procurement that have implications for
the implementation of policy.
24. "Grants" have been included in Table 1
as an illuminating comparator—and because they remain an
available and useful option in the implementation of policy in
relation to the third sector.[136]
25. Whilst Table 1 sets out analytical models, some of
the commentary in Table 1 itself and later in this paper indicates
how hybrid variants can—and inevitably will—emerge
in the real world of politics, budgets, opportunities and exigencies.
26. Along with "tendering", "commissioning"
is a particular form of procurement of what are ultimately "contracts".
Both are, in essence, processes—means to more substantive,
policy-driven ends.
"RESPONSIVE COMMISSIONING"
FITS BEST
WITH THE
POLICY DRIVERS
27. Current government policy clearly implies that public
funders should be more responsive and flexible—and less
proactive or prescriptive—when involving the third sector
in the delivery of publicly-funded services. In the context of
public partnerships with the third sector, "responsive commissioning"
is likely to be far more "responsive" to those local
needs that are reflected through third sector organisations. Using
"responsive commissioning", a funder can indicate its
willingness to fund projects of a broad character and then seek
proposals—either from an invited group of organisations
or by open invitation—for projects of that broad character.
28. To maximise the advantages of third sector delivery
(flexibility, responsiveness, innovation and perceived independence
from the state) of publicly-funded services, public funders should:
28.1 make as much use as they can of invitations that
are "responsive" (ie where the detailed outcomes etc
are not pre-specified); and
28.2 be prepared in their contracts to specify the outputs
in terms that allow third sector organisations to be flexible,
responsive and innovative during the course of delivery.
29. Because of their legal status, third sector organisations
that have charitable status cannot be merely the agents of the
public sector funder. Consequently, the publicly-funded services
that charities deliver must further charities' own objectives.
This is better facilitated by genuinely "responsive commissioning"
than by "pre-specified commissioning" or by "tendering".
The heart of the matter
30. In "responsive commissioning", the shared
ground between:
30.1 the public funder's policy objectives—some
of which are locally determined and some of which are passed down
from central government as conditions of grant or performance
standards—and powers; and
30.2 the third sector organisation's powers, duties and
charitable objects and the objectives of the strategic plan that
its governing body has determined as the means of furthering the
charitable objects
becomes the arena for negotiation and innovation, building
partnerships on shared objectives—and not on control.
"RESPONSIVE COMMISSIONING"
IN OPERATION
31. If "responsive commissioning" is to become
the dominant model in placing public funding with third sector
organisations, there are significant implications for:
31.1 the drafting of invitations;
31.2 selection processes; and
31.3 the terms in which contracts are drawn.
Invitations
32. Whilst the distinction between open and restricted
invitations can be taken to be crudely binary, the distinction
between "pre-specified" and "responsive" commissioning
is a question of degree. If the funder indicates a willingness
to fund "work with children", one might regard that
as "responsive". A willingness to fund "an after
school club for primary age children in a specified area"
is clearly "pre-specified". Between these poles there
might be case in which a funder indicates a willingness to fund
"innovative developments in after school work". It is
suggested that invitations that are cast in terms that are broad
enough to result in "apples versus pears" judgements
are those that are essentially "responsive".
33. Unlike commissioning, tendering is inherently "pre-specified".
In the case of tendering, the funder pre-determines the services
or the specific results that it requires and seeks offers from
potential contractors (sometimes invited specifically, sometimes
open to all comers) to provide the services or to produce the
particular results at a price and at a standard of quality and
reliability. It is price, quality and reliability that will drive
the choice of contractor.
34. Commissioning can be similarly "pre-specified".
However, if a very high proportion of the elements are pre-specified
by the funder and there are no significant elements of flexibility,
the use of the term "commissioning" is rhetorical and
confusing and "tendering" would seem to be the more
appropriate approach—and the more accurate description.
Selection
35. The selection of partners and projects in "responsive
commissioning" will be less mechanistic and more judgemental—and
consequently more expensive to administer—than selection
in pre-specified tendering. The required selection processes are
significantly different.
35.1 In "tendering" and "pre-specified
commissioning" there are relatively few "apples versus
pears" choices. Application of the price criterion depends
on arithmetic and reliability is largely a matter of track record.
Quality criteria can be less mechanistic. For, example, a national
specialist might be competing with a locally-based organisation.
The comparison can be accommodated within quality criteria but
the element of evaluative judgement might be substantial as the
funder seeks to determine whether it values the particular quality
of "local responsiveness" more than the quality of "specialist
system". Where a funder has anticipated such issues, the
quality criteria might address them expressly and the judgemental
element in the decision might thereby be reduced.
35.2 By contrast, in "responsive commissioning"
the funder, having indicated its willingness to fund projects
that will produce more "fruit", will very often be choosing
between proposals that will produce "apples" and proposals
that will produce "pears"—or "plums".
Table 2
|
| Pre-specified
| Responsive |
|
| Invited | The funder has invited a restricted group to tender for contracts—or to be considered for commissioning—to produce outputs or results that the funder has pre-specified
Selection can be on price, quality and reliability only
| The funder has invited a restricted group to propose projects but has not determined the specific outputs
Selection cannot be on price, quality and reliability only and involves more judgemental elements
|
| Open | The funder has issued a general and open invitation to tender for contracts—or to be considered for commissioning—to produce outputs or results that the funder has pre-specified
Selection can be on price, quality and reliability only
| The funder has issued a general and open invitation to submit proposals for projects but has not determined the specific outputs
Selection cannot be on price, quality and reliability only and involves more judgemental elements
|
|
Responsiveness during delivery
36. Another key variable—identified in the penultimate
row of Table 1—is the tightness with which outputs etc.
are specified in final contracts. This affects the potential for
responsiveness during the delivery period. Flexibility to make
changes during delivery is more consistent with the overall policy
drivers—especially where projects break new ground.
THE SELECT
COMMITTEE'S
CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
1. What are the benefits of contestabilty to the users
of public services?
(a) Have services which have been transferred to third
sector organisations shown improvements in quality?
In some cases, but there is a dearth of systematic evidence.
(b) Is loss of accountability a threat of commissioning
services? If so, how can this best be managed?
The extent of realistic accountability for the provision
of public services by the public sector is often questionable.
It seems unlikely that third sector organisations are inherently
less attentive and responsive to criticism.
2. Is the third sector more likely to provide better public
services than the state or the private sector?
(a) Is there evidence that where services are provided
by the third sector, that they are popular with those that use
them?
Experience on the ground gives a very strong impression that
many service-users value the friendliness of service and its separation
from "the state". Some third sector providers (eg Barnardo's,
Macmillan Cancer Relief) have enviable reputations.
(b) Is there evidence of demand for more services to be
provided by the third sector? If so, who from?
Please see 2(a). By way of example, Community Links' "Education
Otherwise" provision and its work with children and young
people with special needs is clearly sought after by schools,
and parents.
(c) Do public services provided by the third sector more
accurately reflect the changing needs of those that use them?
The closeness to the service-user has undoubtedly led to
creative development in services.
Through its department, LinksUK, Community Links has trained
and used community researchers and citizens' juries. The methods
used by its "Everyday Innovators' section are open-textured
and have identified many issues that would otherwise have remained
submerged.[137]
(d) Is there evidence that contracting to the third sector
leads to greater scope for innovation in public service delivery?
From Community Links' experience, we would cite again the
work that is captured by LinksUK and the work conducted in the
provision of New Deal into employment services. In the latter,
innovative methods and a community-based staff have consistently
produced higher than average levels of performance.
3. Does commissioning benefit the third sector?
(a) Will contractual relationships with the state improve
stability within the third sector?
All depends on the terms of the contracts. Contracts that
are over-elaborate, too short and make an insufficient contribution
to overheads will not assist stability.
(b) ill close involvement with service provision prevent
third sector organisations retaining the ability to be critical
of government?
There is a risk but it is a manageable one. Third sector
organisations must remain true to their charitable objects and
must emphasise these—and the values that they embody—at
every opportunity. Public sector bureaucrats—and politicians—are
often too remote from such organisations and need constant reminders.
In addition, reliance on a reasonable range of funders enhances
a third sector organisation's ability to take a robust approach.
(c) Is there a risk that the service providers will become
increasingly bureaucratic?
Again, the risk is there to be managed. Appropriate monitoring
requirements and reasonable flexibility in contractual terms would
seem to be the principal means of managing the risk.
(d) Is there a risk that third sector organisations will
lose their independence, their identity or their distinctive ethos?
Please see 3(b) and 3(c).
(e) Might the third sector become polarised between large
service providing organisations and more radical groups? If so,
would this matter?
This is a real risk. To manage it, commissioners need to
become clearer about the different kinds of value that can be
secured. Responsiveness, interconnectedness, accessibility and
local involvement all matter. If the commissioner values these
highly it will ensure that it does not simply transfer services
from a public bureaucracy to a third sector—or private sector—bureaucracy.
The conditions for this kind of risk management are more favourable
locally than on regional and national scales.
4. Does commissioning services from the third sector have
any benefits for the state?
(a) Does the state risk losing control of service delivery
in a way which might be damaging?
It is questionable how effective control of service delivery
is within the public sector. The baseline for comparison with
third sector provision is very patchy. Well-drawn contracts and
well-informed and trained commissioners are the ways to manage
this risk. Commissioners tend to have an administrative mindset
and need much more experience at the sharp end of service delivery
in both the third and public sectors.
(b) What capacity will the state need to ensure that it
can be an intelligent customer of services?
Please see 4(a).
(c) How is duplication of effort in order to monitor and
manage contracts best avoided?
There is a strong case for a study of standard form contracts.
A comparison with the construction industry might be instructive.
That industry has developed a range of standard forms from which
contracting parties can select—and adapt where necessary—the
most appropriate. Again, training and experience for commissioner
will also assist.
(d) How good is the state at managing bidding processes
and defining contractual obligations when commissioning services?
The main thrust of this paper suggests that this particular
question is simply too broad to be addressed. A case by case examination
of the activities of central government departments and agencies
and local government, dealing with a huge range of services, would
be needed.
5. What are the financial implications of providing services
through the third sector compared with directly provided state
services?
(a) Are services cheaper to provide?
They often are cheaper because staff are less well paid and
because charitable funds are often diverted, sometimes wholly
inappropriately, to subsidising the state. Third sector organisation
will tend to have lower overheads—in some cases these are
too low for organisational health.
Whilst the third sector is able to reach high levels of efficiency,
the principal reasons for third sector involvement are not cost-price
related.
(b) Are there "hidden costs" such as contract
oversight?
Yes, including redundancies when contracts are not renewed.
However, public funders vary greatly in their realism about recoverable
overhead levels.
(c) Are the benefits of the third sector participation
in public service provision so great that it is appropriate to
have financial rules which encourage this, or should the aim be
to have "competitive neutrality" between public, private
and voluntary sectors?
"Competitive neutrality" is probably practicably
unattainable currently if the various kinds of value that the
third sector can provide are to be recognised fully in the process.
This paper argues that these different forms of value are well
worth taking in to account in many cases—especially where
provision is determined locally.
6. Are the costs and benefits to the state the same when
commissioned from the third and private sectors?
Clearly not in all circumstances. Large scale national provision
of highly technical services might not vary as greatly between
third sector and private sector providers as would be the case
with local lower tech services.
February 2007
127
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass-and what Alice found
there, Macmillan (1871, post dated 1872). Back
128
Where the commissioner is a local authority, "community
forums" and Local Strategic Partnerships supplement the more
traditional political processes. Back
129
This view differs from that in paragraph G8 of Strong and
prosperous communities-The Local Government White Paper, (2006),
which provides that, "Some parts of the [third] sector will
wish to play a greater role in the delivery of public services.
This should be embraced, not only because it will better meet
the diverse needs of individuals and communities, but because
it also has the potential to deliver value for money and efficiency."
This paper argues that better meeting "the diverse needs
of individuals and communities" must be the priority if efficiency
and effectiveness are to have strategic focus.
See http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1503999
for Volume 2, which includes Section G. Back
130
See Blake, Robinson & Smerdon, Living Values-A report
encouraging boldness in third sector organisations (2006).
http://www.community-links.org/ourwrk/livingvalues_page153.aspx
and Values in Action (September 2006), which is Community
Links' submission to the Treasury Review of the Third Sector. Back
131
Strong and prosperous communities-The Local Government White
Paper, 2006, paragraph G6 provides, "This White Paper
recognises the diverse nature of the third sector and the different
roles that it plays-shaping and designing effective services,
representation and advocacy, lobbying and influencing policy". Back
132
See Strong and prosperous communities-The Local Government
White Paper, 2006, paragraphs 5.16 to 5.30. Paragraph 5.20
provides that Government "will also work with national third
sector umbrella bodies to establish a standard by which local
third sector bodies should organise themselves to be effectively
represented on [Local Strategic Partnerships]".
http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/98/StrongandProsperousCommunitiestheLocalGovernmentWhitePaper
Vol1_id1504098.pdf Volume 1
In Volume 2, in paragraph G9 it is stated unambiguously that,
"A core principle of this White Paper is responsiveness.
In order to identify priorities, meet needs and secure agreement,
local authorities need to listen to citizens, services users,
local businesses and community groups." Community forums
and other such methods also have a role to play. It would be as
unreasonable for third sector organisations to claim exclusivity
as for commissioners to disregard its contribution. Back
133
The paragraph continues, "... as well as a knowledge of
supply markets and the range of providers and potential providers
who might be engaged in delivery, with local authorities playing
a variety of roles-broker, facilitator, procurer, market regulator
and provider". Back
134
Of which Community Links provides a good example: see www.community-links.org. Back
135
See http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/newways_socialaudit.aspx Back
136
For example, the Treasury's document, Improving financial
relationships with the third sector: Guidance to funders and purchasers
was published in May 2006 and includes numerous sections that
discuss grants in some detail. Back
137
See http://www.community-links.org/ourwork/whatif_page20.aspx
and
http://www.community-links.org/ourwork/evidencepapers_page25.aspx Back
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