Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-74)
SIR PHILIP
MAWER
28 FEBRUARY 2008
Q60 David Heyes: That was the purpose
of the question.
Sir Philip Mawer: May I just make
the point that investigations are not the whole story. There is
the advice side, which actually, as I said earlier, I think is
as important if you are to avoid trouble.
Q61 Mr Prentice: You mentioned to
David this new list of ministers' interests. In what way would
this new list of ministers' interests differ from the Register
of Members' Interests that is already publicly available?
Sir Philip Mawer: Ministers are
asked to make a more complete disclosure of their personal interests
and those of close family relatives than Members of Parliament
are, and that is, as I explained earlier, because they carry executive,
that is decision-making, responsibilities. They are deciding,
for example, on the award of contracts, and so on and so forth.
The list is intended, just like the register is, to provide reassurance
to the public that there is no conflict and to do that through
transparency. The kind of areas in which ministers have to make
a wider disclosure, for example—I have mentioned one already—one
concerns close family members, another concerns charities and
so on with which they have links. Therefore, there are interests
which ministers need to make known in their ministerial capacity
which go beyond those in the House's Register.
Q62 Mr Prentice: Is it going to go
into very fine detail: because I can imagine ministers might find
that oppressive if it is very detailed?
Sir Philip Mawer: There is a balance
to be struck between the public interest in transparency on the
one hand and ministers' right to some privacy in their personal
life on the other—and not just ministers' actually. I mentioned
close family relatives. I know that that is a particularly sensitive
and difficult area, obviously. I do not envisage the list of ministers'
interests repeating what is in the parliamentary register. I do
not want there to be any confusion about the nature of the two
lists. What I do envisage is that it will contain a reference
to those, and they will be relatively few, cases in which a minister
continues to have an interest which is in some way relevant to
their ministerial duties. Therefore, the list, you can expect
to be relatively short, because, obviously, one of my tasks in
the advice role is to try to avoid, and in many instances my advice
is you must get rid of that interest; but there will be a few
cases and they may particularly relate, for example, to interests
which are held jointly with another family member or, for example,
the employment of a close family member—a spouse, or partner,
or a child—where you cannot reasonably expect that close
family member to leave their employment but the employment is
in some way relevant to the responsibilities of the minister and,
therefore, particular arrangements have to be made to ensure that
there is no possibility of the minister making decisions in cases
which would butt into or butt across the particular role of the
close family relative.
Mr Prentice: That is helpful.
Q63 Kelvin Hopkins: It is quite obvious,
to me anyway, that you are the man for the job, you measure up
very well to the seven principles of public service in everything
and what you have said is very impressive, but should your post
be dependent upon having someone of your quality in that post
or should the post itself be sufficiently independent and strong
for someone perhaps of lesser qualities to do a good job?
Sir Philip Mawer: I am flattered
that you should think I am the right man for the job. I believe
whether or not that is true will be proved in the doing. In terms
of the strength of the post, as I said to you earlier, I think
it is an evolving scene and I think this Committee can take some
credit for having pointed out the existence of a gap and for the
way in which the Prime Minister has responded to that, perhaps
not to the full extent you might wish—I do not know what
your views will be—but he has certainly responded. Therefore,
I regard my role in this as, if you like, that of initiator and
trail-blazer, and I think as experience of the role goes on, it
will become a more settled part of the arrangements. What that
means in terms of appointment, and so on, remains to be seen.
Q64 Kelvin Hopkins: Could I describe
a scenario to you? Imagine a wilful Prime Minister, with strong
links to the private sector, who has a group of ministers around
him to whom he is very personally loyal—some might describe
them as cronies, perhaps, but that picture—and then someone
in your position, who really thinks there are problems of links
with business, for example, which perhaps cut across the public
interest. The fact that you are serviced by the Cabinet Office,
civil servants who might be intimidated by this wilful Prime Minister
could be a problem. You can imagine a situation where your life
might be very difficult, or somebody in your post might have great
difficulty, which would not occur if they were a parliamentary
officer?
Sir Philip Mawer: I have got more
faith in the Civil Service, I think, than was implied by your
question. Of course civil servants have to work closely with ministers,
but I have been impressed in my experience so far by the seriousness
with which permanent secretaries take these issues of potential
conflict of interest and I think a part of my job is to back them
up if they face difficult relationships with ministers in which
they have got to say, "Look, frankly I do not think that
is on. What you are doing in this area is not appropriate."
Part of my role is to be there as a support, to stiffen the backbone,
if I can put it bluntly, of the permanent officials. Would the
fact that I work closely with the Cabinet Office be a problem
in relation to that? I do not think so, not least because the
Cabinet Secretary, if you like, embodies this dual relationship,
both befriending a minister, of whatever party or political persuasion
they are, befriending in the sense of being there to support,
service, encourage and make sure that policies are delivered,
and, on the other hand, being the guardian of the Civil Service
ethic and approach, which in this country is something we, I believe,
still can be proud of, although I know this Committee has ideas
for how it can be better enshrined in a contemporary context.
Q65 Kelvin Hopkins: Another area
of concern I have is the Ministerial Code and what ministers do
after they leave office and, indeed, after they leave Parliament.
A delay of two years is required before they take up business
appointments, or whatever. I have asked this question of others
we have had before us. This could be simply a two-year holiday
before they take up a multi-million pound position. Indeed, our
former Prime Minister has not even had his two-year holiday; he
has taken up some very lucrative positions with banks, or whatever.
Is that not a great weakness in the Code, that ministers, with
a bit of delay, know that in time they will be of interest to
the private sector and can earn considerable sums of money and,
with a less principled minister, might influence what they do
when in office?
Sir Philip Mawer: Firstly, of
course, if there was any suggestion that a minister had been influenced
in office by the kind of enticements of the private sector that
you were referring to, then that would be a case which I could
investigate. Frankly, it would be very serious if there was such
an allegation against a minister in office, that they were trimming
what they were doing because they were hoping to get a job with
some defence, pharmaceutical or other company of some size. There
are some really quite difficult questions about what ministers
may or may not do when they leave office. I think you need to
be very clear about whether you are going to put a permanent ban
on ministers; indeed, not just ministers; it would potentially
affect others who have not held ministerial office necessarily
but have been prominent in public life in one way or another.
If you were going to put a complete ban on them ever being involved
in the private sector after they have stepped down from a public
role, you would have to be very clear that you were going to be
even-handed in the way you applied that ban; you would have to
be very clear also about what you were going to do in terms of
providing them with the retraining, reskilling, or whatever would
be necessary, to ensure that they were capable of being employed
somewhere after they left this place. I remember there was a report
produced not so long ago by the Association of Former Members
of Parliament—I may have misread or mispronounced their
title—which highlighted the difficulty that Members of Parliament
often have in finding some other job when they lose office. That
is less of a problem for ministers, for the reason that you have
described, but if you were to say, "No, minister, you cannot
be employed in the private sector in some capacity or another"—and
some ministers may have been in eight departments or something,
they may have been in a number of departments—then you have
got to have some sensible arrangements in place which would allow
you to retrain and re-equip these people—"Fresh Start
for Ministers" perhaps!
Q66 Kelvin Hopkins: The problem has
arisen since the drive to privatisation has occurred. There clearly
are closer links now between government and the private sector.
There is an instance I have raised in the Committee more than
once of a senior representative of Amey, a company which has PFI[2]
contracts, and a man who worked for that company at a senior level
on PFI contracts who was taken into the Department of Health as
Commercial Director to drive PFI contracts out from the inside
rather than seducing them from the outside, so to speak. I have
raised this as a concern, and a minister berated me for impugning
the integrity of this wonderful man. Subsequently, he went off
to become, I think, Managing Director of UBS Bank. Is someone
who is that close to money, and big money, going to be so dedicated
to the public service as he should be, and would ministers who
are closely involved with their appointment not stand perhaps
to be rewarded at a later stage? I think these relationships are
uncomfortable—I find them uncomfortable—and it does
not help what we were talking about earlier, the public's trust
in politicians, and that they should not be so close to mammon
as they are?
Sir Philip Mawer: I agree with
you that there are some important issues in this area. I think
all I could say is that they are not issues which, as I understand
it, are immediately going to be within my new role. They are issues,
clearly, for the Advisory Committee, members of which you spoke
to last week, and it may well be that there is a need to strengthen
arrangements in this area. What I do want to get across is that
when you come to strengthen the arrangements you need to be careful
about exactly where you draw the line, because if you go for a
complete ban, then you have got to reckon with the consequences
of that. That is all I was trying to bring out. These issues of
ethics are easy to write about in banner headline terms and sometimes
things happen which clearly are entirely wrong, and I hope my
record as Parliamentary Commissioner demonstrates that I know
when they are entirely wrong and am not afraid to say as much.
But difficult judgments are also required in establishing the
right regulatory framework within which people in public life
can function in a way which is not so intrusive, not so onerous,
and so on, that the object of effective government is defeated.
Getting the balance right in regulation is always a key issue
for the regulators and for those who advise on the framework of
regulation, as this Committee does.
Q67 Kelvin Hopkins: Is there not
a case for you advising ministers not to have close personal relationships
with specific companies and businesses when they are framing policy,
for example? I will give an example. Before the previous Prime
Minister pressed some liberalising gambling legislation through
the House for super casinos he met with leaders of American gambling
corporations in Downing Street and, allegedly, was with them in
wanting to push forward for a large number of super casinos. The
fact that he did not get his way in the end, because of resistance
in Parliament, meant that the corporate gambling people walked
away from Downing Street and were disappointed that the Prime
Minister could not get through this gambling legislation and,
therefore, they lost interest in him. Again, it was reported,
not in the big newspapers, Private Eye I think it was covered
in. Are these not matters of concern, and could you or a successor
not advise ministers not to have those kind of close relationships
when it is so obvious what it is all about?
Sir Philip Mawer: I would want
to assure you that if in my new role I become aware of a relationship
between a government minister and some section of business which
is improper or inappropriate in some way, then clearly I will
advise accordingly. I hope that any permanent secretary worth
his or her salt would be alive to just that kind of relationship
or difficulty, potential problem, potential impropriety. But there
is another important part always of the regulatory arrangement
and that, frankly, is this House and it is the press. At the end
of the day regulators—work as part of a team may be putting
it too highly—but they are among a range of enforcement
agencies of which this House is part, and this House's role in
ensuring that in fact ministers are held to account for the manner
in which they conduct themselves is absolutely critical and, frankly,
it is the key issue, in my experience, in Parliament. How effectively
that is done is the key issue rather than any of the other issues
that so frequently occupy the headlines. It is the effectiveness
of Parliament in holding the Executive to account which is the
key issue for this House and which is the issue which requires
most attention by this House, and I say that perhaps wearing my
former hat more than my current one.
Q68 Kelvin Hopkins: I agree with
you very strongly. A final trivial example. When I was a councillor
some 35 years ago—I was vice-chair of a housing committee
on a local authority—I was approached by a friend from a
major house-building company who wanted to put a suggestion to
me about a scheme he had for our town. I said, "You do not
approach me. You approach the Chief Executive of the Council and
if you have a proposal, it will come forward before us as a committee
and we will look at it, but you do not approach me." This
was to a friend. I made that absolutely clear, and he never wrote
to the council. It is interesting, but I thought that was a wholly
inappropriate approach, and that is the way I responded. Should
not ministers respond in the same way?
Sir Philip Mawer: Any politician,
anybody in public life in a decision-making role, should respond
in that way to an improper approach of that sort. Of course, it
requires a culture in which members know instinctively that that
is the right thing to do. My job in my new role, as it was in
the old role, is to help develop such a culture and ensure that
such a culture is in place in Whitehall as in Westminster, and
that means a combination of clear rules, confidence in where people
can go for advice, effective enforcement and the tone being set
from the top. I think the Prime Minister has indicated, through
the appointment that he has made and the changes he has made in
this area, that he wants his ministers to observe a high standard
and, frankly, that is the basis on which I am proceeding in the
job, with that objective—as I said, subject to the caveat
that I gave earlier that if I am unhappy that that is not being
achieved, that I am not being helped in relation to that, then
I will make my views known.
Q69 Mr Prentice: Thank you. We are
really on the home straight now. I have just a couple of points
to wind up. You mentioned the role of Parliament. Should Parliament
approve the Ministerial Code, because this Committee recommended
that course of action, but it was turned down by the Government.
What is your own view?
Sir Philip Mawer: The Ministerial
Code is essentially the Prime Minister's instructions to his ministers
on how he expects members of his administration to conduct themselves.
Q70 Mr Prentice: He would write it,
but it would come before the House for endorsement, I suppose?
Sir Philip Mawer: I think this
is an issue that would be better put to the Cabinet Secretary,
or someone of that nature, than to me. My belief is that this
Committee has never flinched from an opportunity to make its views
known on matters, whether or not they were formally within its
remit. I leave it to your fertile—
Q71 Mr Prentice: Fair enough. Finally,
the terms of your contract: is it renewable? How long is the contract
for?
Sir Philip Mawer: It is an appointment
by the Prime Minister and by the Prime Minister of the day. It,
therefore, follows that if this Prime Minister loses office, for
whatever reason, stands down, resigns, retires, what have you,
the new Prime Minister would have to make a new appointment.
Q72 Mr Prentice: So it is suttee
then: you go when the Prime Minister goes?
Sir Philip Mawer: I go when the
Prime Minister goes. It is a personal appointment of the Prime
Minister. The fact that that is the case does not mean that I
am on the coat-tails of the Prime Minister, for all the reasons
I gave earlier.
Q73 Mr Prentice: Are there any questions
that you expected us to ask you which we did not?
Sir Philip Mawer: Chairman, no.
Q74 Mr Prentice: We have covered
the ground?
Sir Philip Mawer: You have covered
the ground and you have also put some questions to me which I
was not expecting, and that is always a good thing.
Mr Prentice: Thank you very much. That
was a fascinating hour of evidence.
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